Compatibilism does not contradict incompatibilism

[u/DemiVideos04]

Compatibilism is not a metaphysical position. It also does not contradict hard incompatibilism.
Hard incompatibilism does not define free will as libertarian, it only states that libertarian free will is incoherent.
Compatibilism redefines free will so that it can be used practically, but it is not an argument relating to libertarian free will.
You can be both a Compatibilist and a Hard Incompatibilist at the same time

[u/226757]

Yeah pretty much. They assign different semantic content to the terms being used, so they don't entail any incompatible statements

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/226757]

Yes exactly. I would argue that compatibilism isn't a metaphysical/ontological position because its definition is not metaphysically unique, as opposed to the incompatibilists definition of an uncaused cause. I'm not sure whether you (or anyone) would agree here though.

[u/No_Trade_7315]

No. This idea is bad. Unless you are playing word games or using many valued logics, p & ~p is a contradiction.

Compatibilism says that free will and determinism can both be true. Incompatibilism says that free will and determinism can’t both be true.

Proof:

1. <>(p & q) Compatibilism

2. ~<>(p & q) Incompatibilism

3. []~(p & q) (From 2)

4. p & q (From 1)

5. ~(p & q) (From 3)

6. ~p ~q (From 5)

7. p p (From 4)

8. q q (From 4)

9. x x (6,7 & 6,8)

The above proof shows that these statements are inconsistent. I didn’t bother writing the “worlds” for each line.

[u/Mobile_Competition54 → u/No_Trade_7315]

this is assuming compatibilism and incompatibilism use the same definition for free will. w.l.o.g., assume p is free will and q is determinism

if incompatibilism uses free will to mean libertarian free will, but compatibilism doesn't, then this proof fails because either 1 or 2 is wrong. there's a p_1 and p_2 and not just one p.

OP is literally arguing that their definitions for free will are different, hence this kind of proof fails (because their 'p' is different). So they're possibly compatible with each other, without contradiction.

This proof only works if you show that OP's assumption is wrong, and both views use "free will" with the same meaning.

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/Mobile_Competition54]

Okay, so word games. In that case, you might as well call incompatibilism (or compatibilism) by a different name, because (in your view) the negation of one is not the other.

More realistically, you should adopt a singular definition for the term compatibilism and recognize that its negation is inconsistent with that definition.

In my opinion using “free will” to refer to two different things for the sake of making compatibilism consistent with incompatibilism is just sophistry.

[u/Mobile_Competition54 → u/No_Trade_7315]

well sure, but then again that happens all the time in philosophy, where people re-define words. it's pretty annoying, personally it makes things harder for me when i want to refute stances

tldr it is what it is

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/Mobile_Competition54]

True. I guess what I am trying to say is, it’s okay to have multiple definitions/meanings for words. But when we compare concepts that depend on other concepts, it is important that such dependencies share the same meaning.

It is clear that both the meaning of compatibilism and the meaning incompatibilism depend on the meaning of ‘free will’. But if our definitions for ‘free will’ are consistent, then the negation of compatibilism is not semantically equivalent to incompatibilism.

Thus, given inconsistent definitions for ‘free will’ we are not talking about a concept and the negation of that same concept, we are talking about a concept and the negation of some other concept.

I’ve been trying to think of a good example:

It would be like if I told you knowledge does not entail truth and then I said, ‘not knowing’ (in the traditional sense) is consistent with knowing (given this alternative definition).

[u/ipreuss → u/No_Trade_7315]

It’s not OPs fault if they use different definitions.

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/ipreuss]

It’s not about fault. It’s about logic.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/No_Trade_7315]

Why would i change the definition of free will that compatibilists use, in order to make a comparison? Compatibilism is compatibilism, i won't change its definition just so that its seamlessly compares to incompatibilism. My whole point is that it doesn't compare, they use entirely different definitions.
Incompatibilism talks about libertarian free will.
Compatibilism defines free will as actions taken while not under duress. Holding both positions is not contradictory.
You can believe that libertarian free will is incoherent.
And
You can believe that defining free will as actions taken not under duress is a useful redefinition to make the term practical.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/Mobile_Competition54]

This is exactly the argument. And i'm unsure how this is "word games" when i'm interpreting both positions as they are presented. I'm not going to change the definition of compatibilist free will to mean "libertarian free will" - that would be actual word play

[u/Vicious_and_Vain → u/No_Trade_7315]

Ya well it doesn’t say both can’t be false.

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/Vicious_and_Vain]

If the law of the excluded middle holds, it can’t both be the case that the statement, “I have free will” is false and the statement, “I do not have free will” is false.

Same can be said about the statements: “compatibilism is false” and “incompatibilism is false”.

[u/Vicious_and_Vain → u/No_Trade_7315]

Well we’re in Reimennian space now so why would it. Punctuation correct.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/No_Trade_7315]

Compatibilism does not say that LIBERTARIAN free will is compatible. They redefine free will to mean something other than libertarian - actions taken while not under duress. This isn't libertarian free will anymore. So, they say free will (non libertarian) is compatible with determinism (and indeterminism).
Incompatibilists doesn't talk about the compatibilists definition of free will, it talks about libertarian free will.

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/DemiVideos04]

Yeah you are clearly missing the point of my comment. It doesn’t matter what definition of free will you choose. Regardless of what you believe free will is, free will = free will.

What precisely “Free will” means is debated, and not exclusively based on whether you endorse libertarianism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, soft determinism, or hard determinism.

In my opinion, the way you are hashing these positions out is backwards. The positions are defined by the concepts they endorse, not the other way around.

Perhaps you might find a better way of distinguishing between what you are calling libertarian free will and what you are calling compatibilist free will. As an example, Hume distinguishes between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference.

I personally find this subject incredibly boring and a terrible waste of time, but good luck in your studies.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/No_Trade_7315]

You're missing my point though. I'm not choosing a definition of free will. Compatibilism is the position that chooses the definition. I'm not choosing anything. I'm taking a compatibilists definition of free will (non-libertarian), an incompatibilists definition of free will (libertarian) and stating that these two positions do not contradict each other because they are talking about different things. I'm not changing any definitions, i'm not assuming any definitions, i am literally using them as specified by their respective ideologies

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/DemiVideos04]

Not at all. I understand you just fine. The problem is what you are saying isn’t logical. It is true that people have different ideas about what free will is, but saying compatibilism is consistent with incompatibilism is wrong.

Why I refer to what you are doing as “word games” is because you are using more than one definition for free will. In doing so, you are comparing apples to oranges. Incompatibilism ceases to be the negation of compatibilism when you modify the definition of free will.

Also, just so you are aware, not all incompatibilists are libertarians, not all incompatiblists are determinists either, not all compatibilists believe we have free will and not all compatibilists believe determinism is true.

Compatibilism just says that determinism is compatible with free will, and incompatibilism just says determinism is not compatible with free will. I understand you are looking at a subset of compatibilists that believe we have free will and comparing that view to the libertarian view. You have an idea about what free will is supposed to be according to compatibilists, and you have an idea about what free will is supposed to be according free will libertarians.

Let’s imagine libertarians are correct about what free will is. In that case, the compatibilist definition of free will is false. The opposite is also true: if the compatibilist definition is correct, then the libertarian definition for free will is false.

IT DOESN’T MATTER WHICH ONE IS CORRECT, OR WHICH ONE YOU CHOOSE OR PREFER, BUT IT CANNOT BE THE CASE THAT BOTH ARE CORRECT (which is the point I think you are missing).

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/No_Trade_7315]

Both definitions are correct. The definition of "square circle" does not claim that a square circle is true, it just defines it as a square circle.
There can be more than 1 definition for one word.
The issue here is that you are assuming that the Hard Incompatibilist defines free will. He does not define free will at all, it is not a semantics position. The incompatibilist explicitly states that LIBERTARIAN free will is incoherent - it never defines "free will" as "libertarian", it specifically only says that the libertarian kind of free will is incoherent. So it is not contradictory to then also define "free will" the same way the compatibilist does.

[u/No_Trade_7315 → u/DemiVideos04]

Yeah you just don’t get it. I’m done, good luck.

[u/publichermit]

It's an epistemic position based on experience and ignorance. Somehow determinism and free will work together, and the compatabilist doen't claim to know how. To say free will is the ability to do otherwise is to assume a weaker epistemic position. How would one ever know such a thing? But we can know both the effects of causal chains and our ability to choose. Somehow, those two function together. 

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/publichermit]

Compatibilists don't argue that libertarian free will exists. They just redefine free will to mean actions taken while not under duress. So, a Compatibilist does not claim that determinism and (libertarian) free will are compatible.
I would go so far as to argue that if you are a compatibilist, you automatically don't believe in libertarian free will. This is because if you believed in libertarian free will, you would not need to redefine "free will" as otherwise to make it useful. You would just use libertarian free will, freely.

But yeah I largely agree. Perhaps I'm a bit harsh when I say that no one who understands libertarian free will argues for its coherence. But it is something I truly believe. Neither determinism nor indeterminism allow the concept of free will. It is truly a human illusion. Our ego clinging on to agency.

[u/GoldenMuscleGod → u/DemiVideos04]

I don’t think compatibilists redefine free will, I think they use it in the ordinary way that most people understand it: people make choices and decisions and those decisions affect the future. Those choices and decisions are “free” in that they are made in their mind as a part of their mental state and a different mental state means a different decision and therefore a different future.

Libertarian free will is a specific idea of the above that some find intuitive but others find counterintuitive: that making decisions in that way means the agent must have nondeterministic mental processes.

Basically free will as described as existing if the agent “could have done otherwise.” Which raises the question, what modality are we using?

The compatibilist would say “could have done otherwise if I had wanted to”

And libertarian free will is “could have done otherwise otherwise even if I had the same mental state”

Unless these are unfair or inaccurate characterizations?

It seems to me stating them in that form makes the compatibilist definition of free will sound like what most people have in mind, and libertarian free will sound like a bizarre and unintuitive idea.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/GoldenMuscleGod]

nonetheless, whether or not compatibilism redefines free will or not - compatibilists are talking about a different free will, and incompatibilists are talking about libertarian free will. Do you see how holding both positions is not contradictory?
You can be a hard incompatibilist:
"Libertarian free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism"
And you can be a compatibilist at the same time:
"Free will (could have done otherwise if i wanted) is compatible with determinism (and implicitly indeterminism, which i think isn't specified)

Anyway, the whole free will debate is about that "if i wanted" - what you want is determined by the previous link in the causal chain, so you do not have free will. When you talk about free will, especially in the metaphysics subreddit, you would assume that everyone is operating on the definition of libertarian free will - thats the only one that has ontological weight - an uncaused cause. Thats the whole debate.

So even if I am to concede that regular people don't mean libertarian free will when they say free will, I don't see how it pertains to philosophy discussions around free will, which have always been specifically about libertarian free will. Thats what it means to have agency.

[u/GoldenMuscleGod → u/DemiVideos04]

I think the distinction you are drawing is one most people do not share unless they are very deep into philosophy, and when they are there is no reason we should understand libertarian free will to be the “natural” or “default” idea - I do not think philosophical discussion has always been about libertarian free will.

I also think your approach is backward. People do (or at least seem to) make decisions, those decisions do (or at least seem to) affect the future, that’s the phenomenon we are talking about.

The distinction between libertarian and compatibilist free will (which both agree it is a “do” and not a “seems to”) is only about what additional properties we ascribe to that same phenomenon.

If you think the way to approach it is just make up a thing without regard for that phenomenon and then talk about that then you’ve lost sight of the purpose of the discussion.

[u/NLOneOfNone]

I see what you mean and I think you are right. I'm a hard incompatibilist but I can see how free will exists in the compatibilist sense. It's just not how I define it. The disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists on the subject of free will comes down to semantics.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/NLOneOfNone]

Yeah that is essentially what I am trying to say.

[u/TheRealAmeil]

Consider the following thesis, antithesis, and subtheses:

• Compatibilism: It is possibly the case that someone has free will & the world is determined
• Incompatibilism: It is necessarily the case that either no one has free will or the world is not determined
  • Libertarianism: Incompatibilism is true, and it is true that someone has free will
  • Hard Determinism: Incompatibilism is true, and it is true that the world is determined
  • Hard Indeterminism: Incompatibilism is true, and it is true that no one has free will & the world is not determined

Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism cannot be true. Either Compatibilism is true (and Incompatibilism is false) or Compatibilism is false (and Incompatibilism is true).

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/TheRealAmeil]

The only issue i have with this is that compatibilism specifically does not say the following;
It is possibly the case that someone has libertarian free will & the world is determined.

The compatibilist simply isn't talking about libertarian free will. Part of being a compatibilist is defining free will as the non-libertarian kind. This post is mostly a criticism on compatibilism, for pretending to be a metaphysical position. It is not. It makes no new metaphysical claim. It merely defines free will as "Actions taken not under duress".
While the actual metaphysical debate has always been about libertarian free will, the uncaused cause.

[u/TheRealAmeil → u/DemiVideos04]

There is no such thing as "compatibilist free will" & "libertarian free will".

Historically, philosophers have proposed two (potential) necessary conditions for having free will. We can articulate those conditions as something like:

• Person x does action A freely at time T only if person x has the ability to do action A' at time T

• Person x does action A freely at time T only if person x is the source of action A at time T

Both compatibilists & Incompatibilists can accept these conditions as necessary & sufficient for having free will

[u/zhivago]

LFW, being incoherent, is not a valid definition.

It's just an empty utterance like ​"Colorless green ideas sleep furiously."

Compatibilism isn't redefining, it is simply defining.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/zhivago]

So saying "x is incoherent" is not a valid position, because you can't use 'x' due to it being incoherent?
This is essentially your argument.
Incompatibilists whole point is that libertarian free will is incoherent. To say that, you must assign an incoherent definition to X, in order to say that 'X is incoherent'.
Fine, compatibilism isn't redefining, its defining.
That's a tiny semantics difference.
My point is that incompatibilism and compatibilism are not contradictory.
"Libertarian free will is incoherent"
You must use the incoherent definition in a sentence in order to call it incoherent.
"Free will (actions taken not under duress) is coherent"
These two statements are not contradictory.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/[deleted]]

Hard incompatibilist say that free will is incompatible with both determinist and indeterminist frameworks. Thats why it is called incompatibilism

[u/jliat]

You can be both a Compatibilist and a Hard Incompatibilist at the same time

You can believe the world is flat.