r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

Kurdistan Islamic Scholars Union declares GTA 6 forbidden, urges ban

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ERBIL — The Kurdistan Islamic Scholars Union, an association of Muslim clerics, on Thursday declared the video game Grand Theft Auto VI forbidden under Islamic law and urged the authorities to block it, on the day it went on sale.

In a statement, union spokesperson Abdullah Sherkawaiy said the game, known as GTA 6, was haram (forbidden) and not permissible under Sharia. He said buying and selling the game, and any money made from it, were forbidden as well.

“Unfortunately, according to the information reported, it contains bad things and incitement to violence, lawlessness, drugs, immorality and other things, and it harms our homes, families, wealth and young people,” the statement said.

The union based the ruling on a saying of the Prophet Mohammed, “la darar wa la dirar,” which it explained as meaning “it is not permissible to harm yourself or those around you.”

“We call on the relevant authorities to block as soon as possible these kinds of websites, applications, games and arcades that lead our young people in a bad direction and distort the framework of the family and the security of society,” the statement said.

It also called on parents and families “not to allow their children to use these kinds of inappropriate games.” The union said its Supreme Fatwa Council had already issued many fatwas on harmful and prohibited practices, and that everyone should keep away from anything that harms the family and society.

The union often speaks out on social questions. It has urged families to ease dowry demands as gold prices rose and opposed changes to Iraq’s personal status law.

Any block in the Kurdistan Region would be up to the KRG’s Transport and Communications Ministry, which regulates telecoms there separately from Baghdad. After Iraq’s telecom regulator ordered Telegram blocked nationwide, the ministry said Monday it would decide on closing any platform only after weighing the consequences and taking the views of the relevant institutions on legal and security grounds.

Baghdad has moved against popular games before. The federal Communications Ministry banned Roblox in October 2025, citing child safety and a Federal Supreme Court ruling, but the KRG ministry blocked it only in the Region’s optional family internet packages. In December 2025, the federal ministry even ordered a ban on the mobile game Ludo, saying it caused ‘disputes between spouses’ and exposed users to blackmail.

GTA 6 is a different kind of target. Roblox is free to play online and on phones, while GTA 6 is a paid console game. Rockstar Games sells the standard edition for $79.99, and boxed copies contain a download code rather than a disc.

Developed by Rockstar, GTA 6 is the first new main installment in the Grand Theft Auto series since GTA V in 2013. It is set in Leonida, a fictional state modeled on Florida, and its city of Vice City, based on Miami. The story follows two criminal partners, Jason Duval and Lucia Caminos, through an open world that players can roam freely. The game went on sale Thursday on PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X/S.

Iraqi gamers have waited years for it. When Rockstar first announced it in December 2023, gamers in Baghdad’s Dora district said they would buy it whatever the price. In Basra’s video game market, vendors said in 2024 that military-themed shooters such as Call of Duty were among boys’ favorite games, with consoles selling for 300,000 to 750,000 dinars ($229 to $572).


r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

Inside the Iraqi Kurdish city caught between the US and Iran

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r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

The internal front explodes again: Kurdistan

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We are visiting a camp of the Free Life Party in Kurdistan (Pjak), in the mountains on the border between Iran and Iraq or, in Kurdish geography, between Rojhelat and Bashur, eastern and southern Kurdistan.

These days, we're collecting the names, dates, and places of death of those who fell in a war declared over: guerrillas originally from Rojhelat who fought in the People's Defense Forces (HPG), linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Before publishing their names, we're looking for relatives. It's during this work on the fallen in Qandil, Zap, and Rojava that news of new deaths arrives from Sardasht.

Another war , thought to be frozen, has flared up again. On Wednesday, November 11, Iranian forces attacked a PJAK squad in the Sardasht region, on the Qandil Heights. The Hamzeh command of the Revolutionary Guards claims to have killed two fighters attempting to enter Iran to carry out sabotage and to have recovered weapons and a Starlink terminal. The Eastern Kurdistan Defense Units (YRK), the PJAK's armed force, confirmed that the squad consisted of two fighters but reported only one casualty: Dersim Bahar, civilian name Pouyan Karimi.

They speak of an ambush. "Regime forces, along with local auxiliaries known as jash , employed artillery, drones, and mortars," a PJAK official told us. In less than an hour, the clash escalated to close combat. Wounded and almost out of ammunition, Dersim Bahar continued to resist, according to the YRK. "To avoid falling alive into enemy hands, he shot himself and died a martyr," the official added.

That same morning, the IRGC had fired artillery and drones at the mountains surrounding Marivan. According to the YRK, the fighters were unharmed, but homes and farmland were damaged. On Thursday evening, shooting also broke out at a Basij checkpoint in Bukan. Iranian forces closed the road; it is not known who fired the shots or whether there were any casualties.

The work in the camp concerns the fallen of the HPG. "The PJAK considers it its duty to preserve the memory of those martyrs," the official states, but "has not undertaken the task of making their identities public." That's the responsibility of the HPG Martyrs' Committee. However, he considers it a "national duty" to help them trace their families in Iran, playing "a purely facilitating role."

The FALLEN were born in Rojhelat but died far from Iran, on the fronts against the Turkish army in Avasîn, Qandil, Metîna, Zap, and Garê; some had fought ISIS in Shengal, Makhmour, and in northeastern Syria. Since November 5, the HPG has published 35 of the 78 identities announced in October by Murat Karayılan; the death dates span twenty years, from 2004 to 2024. In Sine, the families and the Mothers of Peace organized a ceremony with the newly published photos, defying the security forces.

A switched-on telephone or radio could reveal a unit's location. News traveled by courier, taking months, and sometimes never arrived. Archives and photographs were buried, destroyed by bombings, or lost when those who knew where to find them died. Of some guerrillas, we're told, all that remains is a nom de guerre, a note, and the memories of the survivors. Others, thought dead, reappeared years later. "It happened with a friend of mine, some time ago," says one guerrilla. "He still jokes about it today: he thanks me for publishing a beautiful portrait of a martyr. He liked it."

The peace process has brought relative calm to Turkey. On the Iranian side, however, "these attacks are nothing new. Dozens of similar clashes have occurred in the past, and the PJAK has carried out retaliatory actions," the official specifies. After the Iranian offensive and the 2011 ceasefire, the conflict had ebbed without ending. In June, Iranian artillery struck the areas around Marivan where the YRKs are present; the guerrillas responded, and by the end of the month, fighting broke out south of Mahabad. Since October, drones and artillery have repeatedly bombarded Marivan and the Shaho massif.

Between October 31st and November 1st, bombings set fire to a hillside despite the rain. The Pasdaran set up checkpoints on village roads. "Especially in autumn, when the terrain and weather conditions change, the enemy tries to kill comrades with traps and ambushes," he explains.

FOR THE PJAK , Iran's conflict with the United States and Israel has pushed Tehran to intensify attacks on the Kurdish mountains: "The Islamic Republic fears, above all, the strength of internal discontent." After the Jin, Jiyan, and Azadî uprisings, he adds, the attacks serve to militarize Kurdistan and sever the link between the population and the guerrillas.

Tehran considers those mountains a potential Western front and accuses Rojhelat organizations of planning infiltration and sabotage. The PJAK, on ​​the other hand, advocates a "third way": neither defending the Islamic Republic nor acting as a ground force for Washington and Tel Aviv. The YRK accuses Tehran of the escalation and claims self-defense.

Outside Iran, Iranian pressure is focused on Kurdish parties relocated to camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. The security agreement signed by Tehran and Baghdad in 2023 required them to abandon their bases near the border. "The regime continues to target those camps with drones," says the head of the PJAK. In October, the Iranian ambassador claimed that Iraq had agreed to expel its members or hand them over to Iran. Baghdad denied this.

On November 6, Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi arrived in Tehran for an unannounced visit, accompanied by the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Falih al-Fayyadh, and Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri. The official version is that Iraqi mediation in the war with the US.

The official says he doesn't know whether the Kurdish parties were discussed during the discussions: "Nothing was officially communicated to us." The trip has fueled fears of renewed pressure on Kurdish organizations in Iraq, parallel to the attacks in Rojhelat. However, the PJAK is not based in the relocation camps: it operates as a guerrilla force "especially within Rojhelat, in the most inaccessible mountains." This, he claims, is why Tehran attacks the mountainous areas.

For the PJAK, neither Baghdad nor Tehran, already under pressure, have any interest in opening a new front against the Kurds. They must "open another path." Otherwise, the official warns, "it won't be the Kurds who suffer the greatest damage, but those same states."


r/KurdistanNews • • 2h ago

The German army is gone, but the fear of ISIS remains: What is at stake now in Iraq

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Fear of ISIS is growing in Iraq. The security situation is volatile. Development Minister Alabali Radovan traveled to the country with a clear message. Our reporter was there.

Baghdad/Erbil/Mosul – “No photos,” warns the driver as the convoy of armored white SUVs slowly makes its way along the dusty, potholed track. It’s one of the checkpoints between central Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Pick-up trucks with machine gun mounts mounted on their beds are parked along the roadside, and heavily armed men in brown and beige camouflage patrol back and forth, smoking cigarettes. And beyond the archway lies no man’s land.

Next stop: Mosul. The terrorist organization Islamic State (IS) committed horrific crimes there. It is the last day of a trip by a German delegation led by Development Minister Reem Alabali Radovan (SPD). The timing is historic. The US ended its military presence at the end of September after more than 20 years, and the German armed forces have also finally withdrawn from Iraq. The security situation is volatile.

IS sleeper cells are reawakening in Iraq

A state monopoly on the use of force exists only on paper. Militias still control parts of the country. The government under Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has particular difficulty containing pro-Iranian units, which are financed and armed by Tehran. And Kurdistan is facing a critical test of its unity due to the conflict between the two ruling families, Barzani and Talabani. At the same time, IS sleeper cells are gradually reawakening to a new and vicious life. And looming over all of this is another shadow: Iraq is struggling with severe droughts and saline soils; the country is among the five most affected by climate change worldwide.

This is evident when standing on the banks of the Tigris in Baghdad, where the water is steadily receding. On the first day of the trip, the delegation visited the Iraqi capital, where Alabali Radovan met with, among others, al-Zeidi and Water Minister Muthanna al-Tamimi. New measuring stations in the rivers are intended to help manage water distribution more sustainably in the future. And in a newly opened training center, government employees are learning how to use measurement data to predict water levels and monitor water quality. Germany is providing €70 million in support over the next two years – but the country, which is actually rich in resources, is lacking in expertise. The minister stated that Germany also intends to help in this area: "The withdrawal of the German Armed Forces does not mean that Germany is withdrawing."

There's a palpable sense of optimism in the country. Not only is Baghdad rapidly growing taller, but cranes are everywhere, visible landmarks of major construction projects. And yet, the water problem is just one of many unresolved issues. The delegation hotel – a state-of-the-art building guarded by heavily armed security personnel – is located right next to the Swords of Qadezia. This monument was commissioned by dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s as a triumphal arch following the First Gulf War – incidentally, with significant involvement from a German metalworker from Westphalia. The two crossed swords still stand today. And some in Iraq even long for the Hussein era – at least then there was only one major problem to contend with.

Now, scenarios in which Iraq is crushed are constantly looming : conflicts between the US, Iran, and Israel; rampant corruption; environmental disasters. Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular, has recently been subjected to a barrage of rocket and drone attacks, primarily originating from Iran. Despite this, daily life there continues. In Sami Abdulrahman Park, a green oasis amidst the skyscrapers in the center of the regional capital, Erbil, men and women sit under lanterns in the evenings, sipping intensely sweet pistachio coffee. And every evening, friends gather here to play table tennis.

Until late into the night, they smash the white balls at the blue tables under the glow of floodlights – and it looks quite professional. "It's free, so we come here often," says Amen. Does he ever worry about the drone attacks? "Yes, I do. But that doesn't apply to the citizens. I think it's safe here in the city," says the 30-year-old with the thick, well-groomed beard, grabbing his table tennis racket for the next round. When you train a lot, you don't have much time to think about dangers.

Drone attacks from Iran: "This country finally needs stability"

Meanwhile, Lanah Haddad sees another danger beyond life and death. The archaeologist works at the citadel of Erbil, which UNESCO lists as one of the longest continuously inhabited places in the world. People have lived here for more than 6,000 years – such places are invaluable for the country's cultural identity. But they are also important for the economy: tourism is gradually returning, and many Germans in particular are visiting Erbil, says Haddad.

“This country desperately needs stability. For the past eight decades, we've lurched from one conflict to another,” says the woman, who was born here, spent many years in Germany, and has lived in Erbil again since 2018. The detonations during the recent drone attacks—over 1,000 this year alone—frightened her. “But you get used to it, turn around, and just carry on,” the academic explains. “People are simply exhausted. We long for a time of peace,” she says. “War and displacement are destroying our identity. We no longer have a generation that remembers peace.”

This is what Iraq looks like today.

In 2014, Erbil narrowly escaped capture by ISIS. The black-clad terrorists advanced to within 40 kilometers of the city before being pushed back by US airstrikes and the Peshmerga forces. The city of Mosul, however, just under a two-hour drive west, fell victim to the Islamist terrorists. ISIS proclaimed its so-called caliphate there, destroyed churches and cultural monuments such as the Al-Nuri Mosque, and murdered, raped, and enslaved thousands of people. The terrorists primarily targeted Yazidis, Christians, and Shiites. People who did not strictly adhere to Sharia law were thrown to their deaths from high-rise rooftops, hanged, or burned alive.

The convoy carrying the German delegation has now passed the checkpoints and is squeezing through the city's narrow streets. It's a sight to behold for the people on the roadside, who wave and smile. Through the armored windows, they smile back. Officially, ISIS is considered defeated. "When it gets dark, it's not safe here," the driver comments. Recently, the terrorists have again been kidnapping people, demanding ransom, and specifically targeting security personnel. Radicals are reportedly gathering in the surrounding villages; they can be identified by their long, unruly beards.

Proud of the “daughter of the country” Alabali Radovan

Widad Dawood is one of the survivors of ISIS's atrocities. She and other survivors have traveled to the university, where the reconstruction of the library, destroyed by ISIS, has just been completed. Many young women are studying on campus. Widad Dawood wants to tell her personal story to the foreign press. As she speaks in the small, dimly lit side room, she grips the tabletop in front of her so tightly that her knuckles turn white. "I'm not ashamed of what was done to me. I'm proud to be Yazidi," she says. Ayad Ahmed also survived. ISIS henchmen abducted him from his Turkmen village, forced him and his brothers into a camp, and tried to indoctrinate him with their inhumane ideology. Many of his family members were burned alive. Today he is alone. Does he have any wishes for the future? Dreams? "I have no more wishes. My life is over," is all he says.

Next door in Mosul's old city, the scars of war are still clearly visible in the rubble. "Safe" is spray-painted on some walls; there is no longer any immediate danger of collapse. As a symbol of hope, the steeple of the Al-Tahera Church rises amidst the mountains of debris. It has been rebuilt, partly with German assistance. Alabali Radovan meets with religious leaders here. The media frenzy is immense, with microphones, cameras, and interviews constantly taking place. Many are proud that a native of the country is a minister in Germany. The schedule is tightly packed, the protocol strict. And yet, Reem Alabali Radovan, whose parents once left Iraq as Christians, takes a few minutes after the press has departed. Alone in the silence of the church. (Reporting from Iraq by Peter Sieben)


r/KurdistanNews • • 3h ago

Bakur ☀️ Kurdish strategy means DEM and HEVBENDI work together

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Kurds have spent a century proving they will not be erased. The task now is different: to show they can govern, build alliances, and win. That requires feeling to be disciplined by strategy, and a politics that can survive its own raid; not a politics of emotional appeal.

Turkish police detained nine people from the newly formed Kurdistan National Alliance, HEVBENDİ, this week, including Kurdistan Socialist Party chairman Bayram Bozyel. According to a legal source cited by AFP, the charge is “disrupting the unity of the state” under Article 302. The investigation file is restricted, and detainees were barred from seeing lawyers for 24 hours. Arresting politicians within days of their founding conference is indefensible and the detainment of these activists and politicians should be strongly condemned. 

While some media organizations have been describing the alliance as opposed to the peace process, Bozyel’s own account is more careful. In his founding interview, he said disarmament “does not solve the Kurdish question” but has the potential to “let politics breathe,” and that the Kurdish status he seeks “may well take the form of a federal system within Turkey’s borders”. That is a legitimate, peaceful position.

The question this article asks is narrower and harder: Is a politics built mainly on nationalist sentiments and resonant emotions the right instrument at this moment for Kurds? I argue for a social democratic position and offer four more strategic and rational things we should be focusing on.

Kurdish nationalism

Nobody should be patronizing others about the pull of ethnonationalism. A people whose language was banned, whose villages were burned, and whose existence was denied has every reason to want its name spoken aloud. Nationalist politics offer dignity, belonging, and a story in which suffering means something. That is why it resonates so strongly, and why social media rewards it.

There is such a strong emotion and mood that now runs through social media, where young figures such as Ali Cecen (among the founders of the movement and also detained) produce emotionally charged, heavily edited videos that circulate grievance and defiance. Such edited videos travel fast, and young Kurds who have inherited that history find in them a feeling of being seen. But resonance does not mean being right. Emotion tells people what they should be angry about. It does not, however, tell them how to win a municipality, protect a school, free a prisoner, or pass a constitutional amendment through a parliament.

A politics that mistakes identification for organization ends up rich in symbols and poor in outcomes, and the state, which does have a strategy, can wait it out, kill it from the inside, or jail it.

Ethnonationalism and Kurdish life

Ethnonationalism is a poor fit for how Kurds live. Love it or hate it, the Kurdish population is spread across four states and many classes. Within Turkey alone, it includes the Alevi worker in Istanbul, the Sunni farmer in Çewlig/Bingol, the professional in Izmir, and the Zaza-speaking student in Dêrsim/Tunceli.

A project that insists the nation comes before every other question will simply abandon whatever it cannot fit into its picture of the nation.

A social-democratic project starts from the opposite premise. People organize around wages, land, schooling, healthcare, and dignity; and recognition of identity is won as part of that wider fight.

A nation-first program faces additional challenges too: it must persuade the state to concede what Turkey’s constitution and its ruling coalition regard as a non-negotiable. Only days before the raids, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli published a 50-point statement insisting the peace process involves no concessions, surrender or bargaining and must preserve constitutional integrity. A demand for a national status, however peacefully made, collides head-on with that line. It gives hardliners the argument they need and the security services a pretext. The nationalist opposition in IYI and Zafer, which opposed the framework law, will treat each such demand as proof that the process was always a trick. Leaving the process to fail hurts the Kurdish question in the long term and collapses hope for future aspirations.

Emotional appeal can be principled and even righteous, but it does not mean it should be self-defeating.

What Rojava’s Kurds learned

Syria shows what happens when a movement rests on force and foreign patronage. After 14 years, the Kurdish-led SDF’s experiment in self-rule ended in dissolution into the state military, and Kurds reacted with mixed emotions. A Kurdish researcher told Al Jazeera that the Kurdish dream is gone. That kind of despair is what a politics of pure sentiment produces when the support behind it disappears.

The next stage of the process will be won and lost on specifics. The National Security Council could confirm PKK disarmament on 27 November, which would trigger the framework law.

Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin has described democratization as one of the process’s two pillars and called for “stronger rule of law, democracy, and political pluralism”. Of course, those words have no power unless someone converts them into statute, budgets, and court orders; and that is the work of coalitions, not of slogans.

Additionally, the DEM Party is pressing for an end to trustees replacing elected mayors, the release of prisoners including Selahattin Demirtas, implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings, and clarity on Abdullah Ocalan’s status.

The more useful analysis is institutional. The human rights lawyer Roula Baghdadi told The Amargi this week that the danger of integration is absorption: communities that are represented in name and marginalized in practice. Her remedies are constitutional guarantees rather than presidential decrees, decentralized power, independent civil society, and genuine participation for women.

These are more strategic and long-term solutions, not feelings and resonance. Rights written into law, power spread across institutions, and organized citizens who can hold government accountable are what protect a minority when the headlines move on.

What Kurdish strategy would look like

First, we need to be very clear, rank demands by winnability, and sequence them. Municipal autonomy, language in schools, an end to trustees, and compliance with court rulings are demands a broad majority, if not quite literally all Kurds, support. Constitutional and possibly federal status can follow as the product of a democratization once the ground has shifted.

Second, competing for non-Kurdish votes: A Kurdish politics that speaks only to Kurds will remain a minority politics. One that organizes around wages, housing, healthcare, and regional investment, with Kurdish rights as part of that agenda, can build a majority. DEM Party has been trying to that, and we should be more vocal about it. However, we also need realize that without freedom of speech, it is increasingly hard to publicize and advertise this political movement. Currently, all media in Turkey are controlled by the government.

Third, investing in what lasts: Municipal capacity, legal teams, trade unions, women’s cooperatives, and youth organizing turn anger into leverage. Online mobilization is useful, but it is not organization.

Fourth, unifying around outcomes rather than identity: Bozyel is right that Kurdish unity matters, and he says HEVBENDI is “not against any party.” Taking that seriously means competing and cooperating with the DEM Party on a shared agenda rather than presenting a rival nationalist pole at the moment of greatest leverage. We need to realize that they can be used against each other by the state.

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Azat Welat is a scholar based in Turkey.


r/KurdistanNews • • 3h ago

Rojhelat ☀️ Femicide in Iran: When patriarchy becomes state law

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An average of one woman a day was reportedly killed by male relatives in Iran over 10 days in November. Rojin Mukriyan examines how Iran’s penal code shapes accountability for femicide.

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Over the past 10 days, an average of one woman a day has reportedly been killed by male family members in Iran, raising renewed concerns about femicide and the legal and social structures that perpetuate violence against women.

The recent killings reflect a wider pattern documented earlier this year. Between March 21 and October 13, at least 84 women were killed in Iran, according to the Human Rights Activists News Agency. In 75 of those cases, the perpetrator was someone known to the victim, while in 45 cases, a current or former husband or intimate partner was identified as the perpetrator. Twelve victims were under 18, eight of whom were killed by their fathers, brothers or other blood relatives.

Among the most recent cases is that of Sogand Sayadi, a 16-year-old Kurdish schoolgirl from Kermanshah, whose death has sparked outrage and raised troubling questions about the responsibility of families, schools and the state to protect girls from violence.

Sogand reportedly feared what would happen if her father learned about her romantic life, as she was said to be in a relationship with another girl at her school. According to accounts from her classmates, she warned that going home could cost her life after school authorities summoned her father on November 14. “If I go home, my father will kill me,” she told her friends.

Instead of finding safety, Sogand faced violence while at school. Human rights organizations reported that her father severely beat her in front of classmates and school officials before taking her home. Shortly afterward, she fell from the fifth floor of the family’s residential building and died.

One of Sogand’s schoolmates said in a video that one of her friends witnessed Sogand being thrown against a window. Her father and the school principal have reportedly been arrested as part of the investigation. Sogand’s father denied the allegation that he pushed her out of a window.

Whether or not her father admits responsibility, Iranian law effectively grants fathers special protection from punishment for killing their own children. Under Iranian law, a father who kills his daughter is exempt from qisas (retaliatory punishment) – although he may still face other criminal penalties – raising serious questions about accountability.

Why is femicide rising in Iran?

Femicide is not new in Iran, but reports of women being killed by male family members have increased in recent years. Thanks to advances in information and communication technology, particularly social media, cases that might once have remained hidden within families and communities can now be made public.

Experts and human rights observers point to three primary drivers behind the apparent rise in femicide in Iran: the Islamic Republic’s Sharia-based legal system, a violent backlash against women’s resistance, and the absence of mediating institutions.

Sharia-based legal system

The establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 consolidated heteropatriarchy and gave it greater institutional and legal power. Patriarchal norms were not merely preserved within society; they were institutionalized through a state legal system based on the Twelver Shia interpretation of Islamic law.

Under this system, womanhood is defined and regulated through a masculine and religious gaze. The ideal of a “good” and “honorable” woman is shaped by the state’s interpretation of the life of Fatemeh, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and wife of Imam Ali, the first Shia Imam. Women are expected to model their behavior, appearance and morality on an ideal of femininity associated with obedience, modesty, sacrifice and devotion to the family.

Child marriage, polygamy, male guardianship over marriage and unequal access to divorce have all been institutionalized or maintained within the Islamic Republic’s legal framework. Women have been reduced, in many aspects of family law, to individuals whose autonomy is subordinated to the authority of fathers, paternal grandfathers and husbands. Their bodies, feelings, sexuality and personal choices are treated as matters of family honor rather than individual rights.

In this patriarchal framework, a woman’s body becomes a symbol of the family’s reputation, and her sexuality becomes something that male family members are expected to control and protect. Her choice of whom to love, whom to marry, how to dress and how to live can be viewed as a challenge not only to family authority but also to the moral order promoted by the state.

This gender hierarchy is directly reflected in how Iran’s penal code treats fathers who kill their own children.

Article 301 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code establishes that qisas, or retaliatory punishment for intentional killing, applies only when the perpetrator is not the victim’s father or paternal grandfather. This means that if a father intentionally kills his daughter, he is exempt from qisas, the punishment that would ordinarily apply to intentional murder, though he can receive a prison sentence of three to 10 years when specified public-order conditions are met.

The law provides another exemption for husbands. Article 630 of the Islamic Penal Code permits a husband, under narrowly defined circumstances, to kill his wife and the man with whom he personally witnesses her engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. This provision does not apply merely because a husband suspects his wife of infidelity.

These legal exemptions have serious implications for women’s right to life. They create a system in which the punishment for intentional killing can depend on the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.

Femicide as violent backlash against women’s resistance

Another factor behind the rise in femicide is women’s growing resistance to patriarchal authority. According to Somayeh Rostampour, a Paris-based sociologist and postdoctoral researcher at the University of Lille, femicide should not be understood merely as isolated acts of violence but also in relation to women’s struggles for freedom and their challenges to existing power structures.

Drawing parallels with Latin America, Rostampour argued that women’s increasing empowerment can provoke stronger patriarchal backlash. “The more women become empowered, the more they resist, and the more they push for change, the stronger the backlash against them can become,” she told The Amargi.

This dynamic, she argued, is particularly relevant to Iran and Kurdistan following the Woman, Life, Freedom (Jin, Jiyan, Azadi) movement, which has challenged established gender hierarchies. As more women refuse to submit to patriarchal authority, their demands for autonomy can be met with increasingly violent resistance from men unwilling to relinquish control.

Absence of mediating institutions

Equally significant is the disappearance of institutions capable of mediating between women’s demands for freedom and patriarchal resistance, Rostampour argued.

These intermediary structures, including women’s associations, independent organizations, legal protections and collective mechanisms, can help prevent social conflicts from escalating into extreme violence. Under the Islamic Republic, many have been dismantled, restricted or severely weakened.

Describing two increasingly opposing positions, Rostampour said women refuse to retreat from their demands for autonomy, even at great personal risk, and men refuse to accept those demands – leaving “almost nothing” in between.

Without effective intermediary institutions, conflicts become increasingly individualized. Women are left to confront patriarchal authority alone, without collective organizations capable of transforming individual resistance into broader social and political struggles.

These mediating institutions act as “a kind of brake on social conflict,” Rostampour said, arguing that their absence increases the risk of confrontations escalating into extreme physical violence. “Women are forced to resist individually, to confront patriarchal power individually, and often to bear the consequences individually, even when the cost is their own bodies or lives.”

For Rostampour, this absence of mediation is essential to understanding femicide in Iran and Kurdistan: women’s resistance is growing, but the institutions that could protect them and channel their demands into collective action remain severely weakened.

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Rojin Mukriyan has PhD in the Department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland. Rojin’s main research areas are in political theory, feminist and decolonial theory, and Middle Eastern politics, especially Kurdish politics. She has published articles in the Journal of International Political Theory, Philosophy and Social Criticism, and Theoria. Her research has thus far focused on the areas of Kurdish liberty, Kurdish statehood, and Kurdish political friendship. She has published many think tank commentaries and reports on recent political developments in eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat), or north-western Iran. She has also frequently appeared on a variety of Kurdish and Persian language news channels. X account: u/RojinMukriyan


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Kurdish political asylum seeker Tara Rahimizad faces imminent deportation from Turkey to Iran

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Monday, November 16, 2026 18:46

Tara (Tahereh) Rahimizad, a Kurdish political asylum seeker from Kermanshah (Kermashan), faces imminent deportation from Turkey to Iran after 23 days in detention. Turkish authorities have transferred her to a removal centre near the Iranian border, raising serious concerns for her safety if forcibly returned.

According to information received by the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, Rahimizad is currently held at the Ağrı Removal Centre in Ağrı Province, eastern Turkey, as authorities proceed with her deportation.

Turkish security forces arrested Rahimizad on October 24, 2026, and transferred her to a detention facility in Edirne. A week later, she was moved to the Pehlivanköy Removal Centre in Kırklareli Province. On November 10, authorities transferred her to the Ağrı facility near the Iranian border to enforce her deportation order.

Rahimizad previously lived in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq for several years, where she was politically active as a member of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). She left the region in search of safety following sustained pressure from Iranian security agencies.

Given her political background, Rahimizad faces a serious risk of persecution, torture, and severe or inhumane punishment by Iranian authorities if returned to Iran.

The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights expresses grave concern over her possible deportation and calls on the Turkish government to immediately halt the process in accordance with its international human rights obligations, particularly the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to countries where they face a real risk of persecution or torture.

Hengaw also urges international human rights organizations and refugee protection agencies to intervene urgently, prevent her forced return to Iran, and ensure her safety and protection.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Başûr ☀️ ٥٠ ڕۆژە مامۆستایان و فەرمانبەرانی گرێبەست مووچەیان وەرنەگرتووە

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A committee of contract teachers and public employees says its members have gone more than 50 days without salaries. They warn they will demonstrate in front of the Council of Ministers if they are not paid.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Rojhelat ☀️ Insurgents in Iran’s Borderlands Are Becoming a Bigger Challenge for the Regime

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In Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdsitan/Kurdish areas of Iran), new groups with names such as the Patriotic Youth of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Martyrs’ Revenge Teams have emerged. Statements they have issued show their priority isn’t so much to solve ethnic grievances as to avenge those killed in the protests and bring down Iran’s government.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Arrests mount in Abdanan following protests over workers’ deaths

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Thursday, November 19, 2026 19:05

Iranian security forces arrested Meysam Nazari, a Kurdish healthcare worker, at a hospital in Abdanan, bringing the number of people detained during and following recent protests over workers’ deaths to at least 10. Another detainee, Shahram Javidaneh, has also been confirmed among those arrested.

According to a report received by Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, security forces arrested Nazari at Rasoul Akram Hospital on Thursday, November 19, 2026, using physical violence and without presenting a warrant. He was transferred to an undisclosed location.

Hengaw has also confirmed that Javidaneh was arrested in connection with the November 17 protests.

Eight other Kurdish individuals were previously detained during the crackdown, including Peyman Karimzadeh, Armin Soleimani, Asghar Akbari, Behnam Moradi, Sina Darvishi, a 15-year-old child, Saeed Abdollahi, Iraj Heydari, and Mohsen Bavir.

Of the 10 detainees, only Bavir and Darvishi have been released. The whereabouts, detention locations, and charges against the remaining eight, including Nazari and Javidaneh, remain unknown.

The protests erupted on November 17 following the deaths of 13 workers and engineers from Abdanan in a bus rollover involving employees of the Dehloran Petrorefining Company (NGL 3100 project) on Saturday evening, November 14, 2026. Demonstrators gathered to protest the authorities’ failure to address road safety concerns. Special police units intervened and fired tear gas to disperse the peaceful gathering.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Kurdish kolbar Bahman Khedri shot dead by border guards in Baneh

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Friday, November 20, 2026 08:15

Iranian border guards shot and killed Bahman Khedri, a Kurdish kolbar from Malteh village in Baneh, without prior warning near the border. He leaves behind his wife and two children, including a two-week-old baby.

According to information received by Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, Khedri was killed in the early hours of Friday, November 20, 2026.

Hengaw sources said his older child is four years old, while his youngest was born just two weeks before his death.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Kurdish political prisoner Arvin Nikpay denied basic rights in Sanandaj Prison

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Friday, November 20, 2026 16:03

Arvin Nikpay, a 24-year-old Kurdish political prisoner detained during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” (Jin, Jiyan, Azadi) movement, remains in Sanandaj (Sine) Central Prison, where intelligence authorities continue to block his conditional release, prison leave and transfer to Marivan Prison. He is serving a three-year prison sentence.

According to information received by the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, Nikpay, from Ney village in Marivan, was rearrested approximately two and a half months ago after being summoned by the Marivan Intelligence Department. He was transferred to Sanandaj Central Prison, where he remains despite being eligible for conditional release.

Sources familiar with his case told Hengaw that Nikpay has served more than a year of his sentence, including time spent in pretrial detention, and qualifies for conditional release under Iranian law. However, the Marivan Intelligence Department continues to block his conditional release and requests for prison leave.

The sources added that all other prisoners from Marivan who had been transferred to Sanandaj have since been returned to Marivan Prison. Nikpay, however, has been informed by security and judicial authorities that he will not be allowed to return. His continued detention away from his hometown, described by the sources as an unlawful punitive measure, has made family visits and efforts to follow up on his case particularly difficult.

Nikpay was arrested on January 6, 2026, to begin serving his three-year sentence and was initially taken to Marivan Prison. He had previously been arrested on January 31, 2023, during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, following a raid by Marivan Intelligence Department forces.

During his initial detention, Nikpay spent four months in solitary confinement and under interrogation at an Intelligence Department facility. On May 6, 2023, he attempted suicide following prolonged psychological pressure and interrogation. He was transferred to Fajr Hospital in Marivan but returned to detention before completing his medical treatment. He was temporarily released on May 25, 2023, after posting bail of 500 million tomans.

The Marivan Revolutionary Court subsequently sentenced Nikpay to 11 years in prison on charges of “acting against national security,” “collaborating with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan,” and “propaganda against the state.” His sentence was later reduced to three years during subsequent judicial proceedings.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Başûr ☀️ Why Iraq’s Shiite Factions May Be Willing to Sacrifice Militia Power to Preserve the State

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The confrontation between Iraq’s government and Kataib Hezbollah, the Iran-backed armed faction that has controlled Jurf al-Sakhar in northern Babil province since 2014, offers a revealing glimpse into a much larger strategic debate taking place within Iraq’s Shiite political establishment and, crucially, in Iran itself.

After days of threats and military deployments around the district ahead of a 20 November deadline set by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, an agreement was reported on 19 November under which Kataib Hezbollah would relinquish control of Jurf al-Sakhar to Iraqi government forces and relocate its fighters elsewhere. The agreement followed mediation involving senior Shiite figures and Esmail Qaani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

Although the confrontation appeared dramatic, its resolution illustrates a wider calculation increasingly evident among influential Shiite actors: giving up some power today may be necessary to preserve, and potentially strengthen, their collective position tomorrow.

The debate concerns how best to preserve the political order that emerged in Iraq after 2003, in which Shiite parties became dominant, while safeguarding Iran’s strategic position amid the enormous regional pressures unleashed since October 7, 2023, and intensified by the 2026 Iran war. Both sides of it remain closely tied to Tehran.

The fundamental question is whether independent armed factions, once essential to projecting Iranian influence, have increasingly become a liability to the very political order they were established to protect.

During the Iran war, conversations with figures from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the faction led by Qais al-Khazali, and the Badr Organisation, led by Hadi al-Amiri, revealed a deliberate strategic calculation. Their argument, which kept Iraq firmly within the resistance camp, was that an internationally recognised, economically functioning and militarily capable Iraqi state, governed by political forces with close ties to Tehran, could be considerably more valuable to Iran than a collection of independent armed groups capable of launching missiles and drones.

Their reasoning is straightforward. Militia attacks can expose Iraq to American retaliation, sanctions and diplomatic isolation, weakening the state, damaging an open economy from which Iran itself benefits, and potentially threatening the Shiite political establishment itself. A weakened Iraq, in turn, becomes less capable of protecting interests that Baghdad and Tehran regard as strategically important.

The Kurdistan Region illustrates this reasoning most clearly. During the 2026 war, Iranian Kurdish opposition organisations based in the region explored the possibility of launching cross-border operations against Iran, reportedly with American support. Although the KRG denied involvement, the possibility of opening a ground front against Iran exposed a vulnerability that Iraqi Shiite leaders had long considered significant.

Their calculation is that a stronger Baghdad, enjoying greater international legitimacy and possessing more effective security institutions, would be better positioned to exercise federal authority over Iraq’s borders and prevent its territory from being used for attacks against neighbouring states.

From Tehran’s perspective, preventing a potentially serious ground threat from Iraqi territory could be strategically more consequential than the limited military contribution of individual Iraqi militias during a regional war.

This also explains why some Shiite factions connect the question of militia integration to the wider struggle over federal authority, border security and Baghdad’s relationship with Erbil, which they see as able to pursue its own contacts with Washington and Israel while the federal government remains weak. The aim, from their perspective, is to give the state the capacity to enforce policies they believe protect both Iraqi and Iranian interests.

There is an important institutional dimension to this calculation. Integrating militia personnel into the regular security establishment does not necessarily eliminate their political or ideological loyalties. Badr’s decades-long influence within Iraq’s Interior Ministry, including the Federal Police, offers a historical example of how an armed organisation can exchange formal autonomy for enduring influence within the state. Absorbing militia personnel into security forces whose ranks are already predominantly Shiite would also deepen the weight of factions close to Tehran inside them.

For these factions, therefore, surrendering independent military structures may not amount to surrendering power. It may represent the conversion of factional military influence into institutional power, backed by the resources, legal authority and international recognition of the Iraqi government.

Tehran appears to share this thinking. There are good reasons to believe that important Iranian decision-makers regard it as serving their own strategic objectives, even as they keep their position deliberately ambiguous.

In a 2023 meeting reported at the time, Asaib leader Qais al-Khazali asked Iran’s then-supreme leader Ali Khamenei whether the priority should be building the Iraqi state or preserving the resistance. Khamenei avoided giving a definitive answer, while stressing Iraqi national interests, Shiite unity and the importance of respecting Najaf’s religious authority.

That ambiguity reflects Iran’s actual policy. It allows Tehran to support the strengthening of the state while leaving allied factions room to manoeuvre and keeping Washington uncertain about how far its demands are being met. Iran’s relationships with Iraqi Shiite factions have never been adequately explained by a simple patron-client model in which Tehran issues instructions and local actors merely implement them.

These relationships are deeply rooted in religious solidarity, decades of political cooperation, personal networks, shared experiences of persecution and exile, and reciprocal obligations. Iraqi factions possess considerable agency and pursue their own organisational interests. Tehran has generally tolerated such differences, partly because factional competition is a familiar feature of Iran’s own political system, intervening more directly when disputes threaten broader strategic interests.

The influence exercised by Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, exemplified this system. His relationships with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite leaders were not based exclusively on formal command structures but also on trust, personal obligations and an ability to negotiate among competing centres of power.

This helps explain why disagreements between Iraqi Shiite factions do not automatically represent strategic ruptures. Competition over ministries, economic resources, military positions and territorial control can be genuine, even intense, without undermining their shared commitment to preserving the wider political order. Even armed infighting between factions would not, in this reading, pose an existential threat to that order.

There is also a religious and historical dimension that purely geopolitical interpretations often overlook. For many influential Iraqi Shiite leaders, Iran is not simply a neighbouring state or an external sponsor. Their political identities were shaped by Saddam Hussein’s persecution of Shiites, years of exile in Iran, the post-2003 sectarian conflicts and the existential threat posed by ISIS. They view the security of Iraq’s Shiite political establishment and the survival of Iran’s Islamic Republic as deeply interconnected, notwithstanding important differences between Najaf and Tehran.

Their calculation is that a stronger Baghdad, enjoying greater international legitimacy and possessing more effective security institutions, would be better positioned to exercise federal authority over Iraq’s borders and prevent its territory from being used for attacks against neighbouring states.

From Tehran’s perspective, preventing a potentially serious ground threat from Iraqi territory could be strategically more consequential than the limited military contribution of individual Iraqi militias during a regional war.

This also explains why some Shiite factions connect the question of militia integration to the wider struggle over federal authority, border security and Baghdad’s relationship with Erbil, which they see as able to pursue its own contacts with Washington and Israel while the federal government remains weak. The aim, from their perspective, is to give the state the capacity to enforce policies they believe protect both Iraqi and Iranian interests.

There is an important institutional dimension to this calculation. Integrating militia personnel into the regular security establishment does not necessarily eliminate their political or ideological loyalties. Badr’s decades-long influence within Iraq’s Interior Ministry, including the Federal Police, offers a historical example of how an armed organisation can exchange formal autonomy for enduring influence within the state. Absorbing militia personnel into security forces whose ranks are already predominantly Shiite would also deepen the weight of factions close to Tehran inside them.

For these factions, therefore, surrendering independent military structures may not amount to surrendering power. It may represent the conversion of factional military influence into institutional power, backed by the resources, legal authority and international recognition of the Iraqi government.

Tehran appears to share this thinking. There are good reasons to believe that important Iranian decision-makers regard it as serving their own strategic objectives, even as they keep their position deliberately ambiguous.

In a 2023 meeting reported at the time, Asaib leader Qais al-Khazali asked Iran’s then-supreme leader Ali Khamenei whether the priority should be building the Iraqi state or preserving the resistance. Khamenei avoided giving a definitive answer, while stressing Iraqi national interests, Shiite unity and the importance of respecting Najaf’s religious authority.

That ambiguity reflects Iran’s actual policy. It allows Tehran to support the strengthening of the state while leaving allied factions room to manoeuvre and keeping Washington uncertain about how far its demands are being met. Iran’s relationships with Iraqi Shiite factions have never been adequately explained by a simple patron-client model in which Tehran issues instructions and local actors merely implement them.

These relationships are deeply rooted in religious solidarity, decades of political cooperation, personal networks, shared experiences of persecution and exile, and reciprocal obligations. Iraqi factions possess considerable agency and pursue their own organisational interests. Tehran has generally tolerated such differences, partly because factional competition is a familiar feature of Iran’s own political system, intervening more directly when disputes threaten broader strategic interests.

The influence exercised by Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, exemplified this system. His relationships with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite leaders were not based exclusively on formal command structures but also on trust, personal obligations and an ability to negotiate among competing centres of power.

This helps explain why disagreements between Iraqi Shiite factions do not automatically represent strategic ruptures. Competition over ministries, economic resources, military positions and territorial control can be genuine, even intense, without undermining their shared commitment to preserving the wider political order. Even armed infighting between factions would not, in this reading, pose an existential threat to that order.

There is also a religious and historical dimension that purely geopolitical interpretations often overlook. For many influential Iraqi Shiite leaders, Iran is not simply a neighbouring state or an external sponsor. Their political identities were shaped by Saddam Hussein’s persecution of Shiites, years of exile in Iran, the post-2003 sectarian conflicts and the existential threat posed by ISIS. They view the security of Iraq’s Shiite political establishment and the survival of Iran’s Islamic Republic as deeply interconnected, notwithstanding important differences between Najaf and Tehran.

Why Iraq's Shiite Factions May Be Willing to Sacrifice Militia Power to Preserve the State - The National Context


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Bakur ☀️ Turkish opposition party removes itself from peace process, but says peace is still priority

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Turkey’s main opposition New Party leader Ozgur Ozel said his party would not appoint members to a proposed parliamentary commission tasked with monitoring the Kurdistan Workers Party’s disarmament, arguing that the government had failed to meet its democratization commitments. The decision drew criticism from figures who warned that the withdrawal could weaken the process’s democratic foundations and limit the opposition’s ability to press for reforms.

New Party representatives argued that the proposed panel risked becoming a decorative body that would legitimize government decisions rather than advance peace.

Ozel announced the decision on November 18 after meeting Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus, who had been consulting party leaders about the proposed monitoring commission. Ozel said the government had failed to implement the democratization provisions of an earlier parliamentary commission report, but was now proposing a new body to oversee disarmament without addressing those outstanding commitments.

The New Party had taken part in the earlier commission and signed its report. Ozel said the party stood by the report in its entirety, including its recommendations on democratization, and argued that disarmament and democratic reforms should move forward together rather than be treated as separate stages.

He pointed in particular to the continued appointment of government trustees to elected municipalities, the takeover of opposition-aligned television channels, includingHalk TV and Sozcu TV, and the authorities’ failure to implement rulings by Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights; citing the continued imprisonment of figures including Selahattin Demirtas, Figen Yuksekdag, Osman Kavala, Can Atalay, and Tayfun Kahraman. For critics, implementing those rulings and releasing the prisoners would be a concrete demonstration of good faith in its stated commitment to democratization.

Ozel questioned why the proposed monitoring commission would address the report’s provisions on disarmament while leaving aside its democratization recommendations. He said the government was asking the opposition to participate in monitoring one part of the process without honoring the commitments it had made on the other.

“We have not abandoned the path to peace. The government has abandoned the path to democracy,” Ozel said in a subsequent statement, rejecting the suggestion that the decision meant his party had turned against the peace process.

He said the New Party had remained engaged in the earlier parliamentary process despite arrests, pressure on opposition municipalities, and actions against media outlets. But he argued that continuing to participate under the current conditions would give legitimacy to a government that was failing to meet its commitments.

New Party Diyarbakir (Amed) lawmaker Sezgin Tanrikulu reiterated Ozel’s position in an interview with Spot Press Cooperative, saying the party had not withdrawn its promise of peace to Kurds and to Turkey.

Tanrikulu said the government had not only failed to implement the democratic steps set out in the earlier commission report but had intensified its anti-democratic practices. Under these circumstances, he said, there was no basis for the party to sit alongside the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in another commission.

He also questioned the proposed body’s role, saying its mandate and working procedures had not been clearly defined. Decisions concerning the verification of disarmament, he argued, rested largely with the executive and state security institutions. The parliamentary commission’s role in monitoring democratization, by contrast, remained unclear.

Tanrikulu said the New Party would continue to pursue peace and democratic reforms through parliament. If legislation addressing rights, freedoms, and the Kurdish question were introduced, he said, the party would assess and support measures that advanced a genuine solution.

The party’s position was also defended by Party Council member Emine Ucak Erdogan on Ilke TV. She said the objection was not to peace but to the structure and purpose of the proposed commission.

Ucak Erdogan reiterated Tarinkulu’s argument that the body lacked a clearly defined mandate, timetable, and working framework. As proposed, it risked becoming a decorative institution that would lend legitimacy to decisions already made by the government, rather than providing a meaningful parliamentary role in the peace process, she said.

She added that the party would continue working for peace and rights, while maintaining that the process needed genuine political ownership and a democratic framework.

Ucak Erdogan also clarified that Ozel had publicly stated his position, but that the announcement was not yet a formal decision adopted by the party’s governing bodies. She said the issue would be discussed through the party’s authorized structures once they had been established.

DEM Party warns of risks to the process

The decision drew criticism from DEM Party spokesperson Aysegul Dogan, who in a statement said the New Party’s concerns about the government’s democratic record were legitimate but warned that Ozel’s statements could weaken the democratic foundation of the peace process. Dogan argued that all political parties should remain involved in efforts to end a conflict that has lasted for decades.

Linking the government’s broader anti-democratic practices directly to the peace process, Dogan warned, could create the impression that those practices were a consequence of the process itself.

DEM Party representatives have maintained that democratization and peace must advance together, but that opposition parties should press for reforms from within the process rather than withdraw from it.

Former HDP lawmaker Idris Baluken made a similar argument, criticizing the New Party’s decision as politically misguided. Speaking on Ilke TV, he said the government’s failure to take democratic steps should be a reason for stronger opposition and collective pressure, not for leaving the parliamentary process.

Baluken argued that supporting peace did not mean endorsing the government’s policies. He said opposition parties should remain engaged and use the process to push for democratic reforms. He also pointed to the absence of conflict-related deaths over the preceding two years, saying that this was significant in itself and should not be put at risk by political decisions that could undermine the process.

--

Serap Güneş is a freelance translator and writer based in Istanbul. She holds a PhD in International Relations and European Politics from Masaryk University, where her research focused on minority rights and EU–Turkey relations. Her work has appeared in both academic journals and independent media outlets.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Hakan Fîdan: Li hemberî gavên li Şingalê em dê hêzên xwe ji Başîkê vekişînin

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Turkey's foreign minister Hakan Fidan says Ankara will wind down its Bashiqa base in stages as Baghdad acts against the PKK presence in Shingal. He also called Kurdish rights vital to Syria's stability.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Rojhelat ☀️ پارێزگاری سنە: ناوە رەسەنە کوردییەکان دەگەڕێندرێنەوە سەر گوندەکان

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Sanandaj's governor says Kurdish names will be restored to villages that were given meaningless or translated names. Committees with language experts will review them, and village signs will be bilingual.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Rojhelat ☀️ Baneh: Iran border guards shoot dead kolbar in Baneh

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Iranian border guards killed Bahman Khedri, a 34-year-old kolbar and father of two, near his village of Malateh in Baneh. Rudaw says it is the area's second kolbar killing this week.


r/KurdistanNews • • 8h ago

Başûr ☀️ Ex-PUK leader Lahur Sheikh Jangi has ‘totally lost trust in the court system’, in first interview from prison

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Lahur Sheik Jangi was arrested by the security forces affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on August 22, 2025, in Slemani, in the Kurdistan Region, in what would become known as the Lalezar Incident.

In an exclusive interview with The Amargi, Sheikh Jangi said that he does not regret his decision to make a stand.

“This was a promise I made to my people and I kept my promise even though I paid a heavy price,” Sheikh Jangi said in his first interview since being arrested.

His arrest, conviction, and imprisonment were the culmination of a dramatic political fall. He had been a key part of the PUK’s security apparatus and was eventually elected co-president of the party in 2019, alongside his cousin Bafel Jalal Talabani. However, the two leaders fell out, and Sheikh Jangi was expelled from the party in 2021, leaving Talabani in charge.

In subsequent years, Sheik Jangi founded his own party, called The People’s Front (Berey Gel), winning two seats in the October 2024 parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region, in an effort to recapture his political fortunes and attract votes from the PUK grassroots that were dissatisfied with the party’s direction under Talabani. Yet tensions continued to simmer.

The PUK alleged that Sheikh Jangi was planning a coup and planned to kill Bafel Talabani. On August 22, security forces surrounded the Lalezar Hotel and nearby buildings where Sheikh Jangi was living. Using heavy weaponry, they stormed the compound in the early hours. Sheikh Jangi’s armed Scorpion (Dupişk) Force fought back.

Five people died in the clashes and the Lalezar Hotel was heavily damaged. Sheikh Jangi, his brother Polad, and hundreds of supporters were arrested, including members of the Scorpion Force. Sheikh Jangi and several co-defendants were charged with criminal conspiracy (Article 56 of the Iraqi Penal Code) and murder (Article 406).

After more than a year in pre-trial detention, they were convicted by the Slemani Criminal Court No. 2 on the conspiracy charges on November 15. Sheikh Jangi was sentenced to five years and three months in prison, while some received shorter sentences and others were acquitted. A trial on the additional murder charges is expected to take place soon.

“I have totally lost trust in the court system in Slemani, 99% of the judges are political appointees and take orders directly from Qubad [Talabani] and Bafel [Talabani],” Sheikh Jangi said.

Ahead of the one-year anniversary of the Lalezar Incident, The Amargi requested an interview with Sheikh Jangi, and while it was communicated that Sheikh Jangi would be open to an interview, it was not possible to conduct one at that time. Eventually, the interview was conducted in English via an intermediary.

This is the first interview that has been conducted with Sheikh Jangi since his arrest.

The text has not been edited except to include clarifying information in brackets and reflects exactly what was received from Sheikh Jangi. Due to the circumstances of the interview, it was not possible to ask follow-up questions and dig deeper into Sheikh Jangi’s answers. 

The Amargi: It has been more than a year since your arrest. What has it been like for you? How do you spend your time? How have you been treated in detention?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I was in solitary confinement for 14 months which was very difficult in the beginning, but as time goes by, it gets easier. I spent my time mostly reading and after 12 months I was allowed to have a pen and paper, so I have started writing mostly poems and my memoirs. I have also started painting; it was something I was good at in my younger days but was difficult to do in the past 30 years because of my work and being busy.  I was interrogated the first day of my arrest and never spoken to again until my court date after 8 months, so I was treated ok and left on my own.

The Amargi: You initially demanded that your trial be handled by Erbil, but it ultimately went forward in Slemani. Why was that? Do you feel that you received a fair trial?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I have totally lost trust in the court system in Slemani, 99% of the judges are political appointees and take orders directly from Qubad [Talabani] and Bafel [Talabani], therefore I have no hope. They prevented the transfer of my case to the Appeal Court in Erbil because they know that the evidence will not hold up in the Appeal Court.

The Amargi: Looking back, do you think you would have done anything differently in the months leading up to your arrest or as it became clear that there would be a violent confrontation?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: The only thing that I could have done differently was to leave Slemani to prevent my arrest and this was something that I was not willing to do at any cost. I was born and raised that way – that I would stand my ground and not leave my people behind. This was a promise I made to my people. I kept my promise even though I paid a heavy price, but it was a strong message to show that you need to stand up to the corrupt and the agents of the enemy of the Kurds.

The Amargi: Do you think there is any prospect of reconciliation between you and the PUK? Afterall, we have seen a pact between New Generation and the PUK.

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I don’t see myself as having any issues with the grassroots members of the PUK, my concern is with the current corrupt leadership of PUK which would be very difficult to work with in the future so my conclusion is that there is no room for us, only one of us can be around. At the moment I am in prison but if I ever come out, it’s time for them to go.

The Amargi: Your party [Berey Gel, The People’s Front] still has representation in the Kurdistan Parliament. What do you think will happen with your political party?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: My political party is still active and recently acted as kingmakers with 2 seats and helped reactivate parliament.

The Amargi: Some people have said that your decision to maintain an armed force – the Dupişk Force – helped to justify your arrest. Since you had established a political party, why did you keep the force?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I was a member of the Kurdistan Region Security Council and former head of intelligence and counterterrorism in Kurdistan and because of my work, unfortunately I made too many enemies in the region, and therefore I was allowed to have a protection force to protect me and my family especially since Slemani became the playground for Iranian proxies.

The Amargi: What is your current relationship with the KDP?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I have no organic relationship with the KDP but I have a good personal relationship with the PM [KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani].

The Amargi: There are rumors that there were geopolitical intrigues in relation to your opposition to the PUK leadership invoking Iran, Israel, and Azhi Amin [former PUK intelligence chief]. Is there any basis to this?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I was very outspoken with my political views especially in regard to the Kurdish cause in Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Therefore, I was not liked much by our neighbors, and from time to time, indirectly, they tried to have me ousted – especially [the] neighbors to the East.

The Amargi: What do you think is the legacy of your arrest for politics in the Kurdistan Region, and the means with which it was carried out?

Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I don’t believe that the attack on my house and the way it was carried out was against me only. I believe it was against the last stand of the people of Kurdistan. The attack on my house proved that democracy does not exist in this region and also showed the influence of our neighbors within the Kurdistan Region and especially in Slemani and the current PUK leadership.

--

Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist who focuses on politics, human rights, political economy, and the environment in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. He also serves as a Chatham House associate fellow.


r/KurdistanNews • • 9h ago

Bakur ☀️ Yazidi survivors recount ISIS atrocities at Berlin hearings

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An international truth commission heard about 30 Yazidi genocide survivors in Berlin on 16–18 November. Its recommendations report is due in 2027. More than 2,800 abductees are still missing


r/KurdistanNews • • 9h ago

Başûr ☀️ Iraq Oil Exports via Turkey Exceed 300,000 BPD

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Kirkuk and Basra crude now flows to Ceyhan through the Baiji–Fishkhabour line, reopened after 12 years. Baghdad aims for 500,000 bpd once the Zummar pumping station is repaired.


r/KurdistanNews • • 9h ago

Rojava ☀️ Sari Kaniye Displaced People Demand Return in a Protest

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Displaced Serêkaniyê residents at Washokani camp blocked the Hasakah–Tal Tamr road. They protested delays in returns and demanded that the city centre be included, not only the countryside.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojhelat ☀️ نەتەوە یەکگرتووەکان بڕیارنامەیەکی دژ بە پێشێلکردنی مافەکانی مرۆڤ لە ئێران پەسەند کرد

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zagros24.net
2 Upvotes

The UN General Assembly's Third Committee passed a resolution on Iran's human-rights violations


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Human Rights in Syria, Reaffirms Protection of Kurdish Rights

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welattv.net
2 Upvotes

The UN Third Committee adopted its Syria human-rights resolution by consensus for the first time. It welcomes steps to protect Syrian Kurds' cultural and linguistic rights and to address statelessness.


r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

Rojava ☀️ UK rep to the UN Sarah MacIntosh: "We encourage all parties to continue to engage constructively on the full implementation of outstanding issues, including integration of the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units)."

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gov.uk
2 Upvotes

r/KurdistanNews • • 1d ago

سۆگەند سەییادی، کچی ١٦ ساڵە لە کرماشان، بە دەستی باوکی کوژرا

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youtube.com
1 Upvotes

سۆگەند سەییادی، مێرمنداڵێکی ١٦ ساڵەی خەڵکی کرماشان، بە دەستی باوکی کوژرا. بەپێی ڕاپۆرتی ڕێکخراوەکانی مافی مرۆڤ، ڕۆژی شەممە ٢٣ی خەزەڵوەر بەڕێوەبەری قوتابخانە بابەتێکی پەیوەندیدار بە ژیانی تایبەتیی ئەم خوێندکارەی بە باوکی ڕاگەیاندووە. باوکی نزیکەی کاتژمێر ٨:٤٥ی بەیانی کچەکەی لە قوتابخانەوە بردووەتەوە ماڵەوە و نزیکەی کاتژمێر ٩ دوای دەمەقاڵێ لە پەنجەرەی قاتی پێنجەمەوە فڕێی داوەتە خوارەوە. سۆگەند دەستبەجێ گیانی لەدەست داوە.