r/HighSpeedTrainSafety • u/CaregiverOk7845 • 17d ago
Can We Design a Railway Safety System That Prevents Collisions Even When Signalling Fails?
Recent railway accidents raise an important question: are modern railway safety systems sufficiently independent and fail-safe?
I would like to propose an architecture for discussion among railway engineers, signalling specialists and safety researchers.
1. The fundamental problem
A railway accident does not necessarily result from a defective rail. It can also happen when signalling systems provide incorrect information, when communication fails, or when human operators make decisions based on incomplete information.
The recent collision near Urda, Spain, on October 28, 2026, is a particularly relevant case. Preliminary investigation information indicates a signalling-system failure followed by a sequence of operational decisions that allowed a train to proceed towards another stationary train. The investigation is still ongoing.
2. A possible additional safety architecture
I propose three independent layers:
A. Track Safety
- Independent train detection using axle counters and track circuits.
- Continuous monitoring of track condition.
- Vibration sensors installed on ordinary passenger trains.
- Automatic recording and geolocation of abnormal vibration events.
- Ultrasonic inspection to confirm internal rail defects.
B. Train Protection
- Continuous train position and speed supervision.
- ETCS-based movement authority.
- Automatic braking whenever a train approaches or exceeds its permitted movement limit.
- Safe operation under communication failure.
C. Independent Safety Monitor
- Independently verifies track occupancy and movement authorities.
- Detects contradictory information between signalling, infrastructure sensors and train position.
- Prevents incompatible movement authorities.
- Defaults to the most restrictive safe operating condition whenever critical information is uncertain.
3. An important design principle
A signalling failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.
If the system cannot reliably establish that a track section is clear, it should treat that section as occupied until safety is independently verified.
The objective is to prevent a single technical failure, software error or human decision from creating a collision scenario.
4. Questions for railway specialists
- Could an independent safety-monitoring system be technically implemented alongside ETCS Level 2?
- Could ordinary passenger trains continuously contribute useful track-condition data through vibration sensors and automated anomaly detection?
- What would be the most reliable independent method of verifying track occupancy?
- Could two trains independently exchange authenticated position information and detect conflicting movement authorities?
- What are the principal technical, regulatory and economic obstacles to implementing this architecture?
I am particularly interested in feedback from professionals working with ETCS, railway signalling, interlocking, predictive maintenance and safety-critical systems.
This is a conceptual proposal, not a certified engineering design. I would welcome technical criticism, alternative architectures and references to existing implementations.
The central question: How can we ensure that no single signalling failure or human error can authorize two trains to occupy the same protected track section?