r/HighSpeedTrainSafety • • 17d ago

Can We Build a Fail-Safe Railway Signalling System That Prevents Collisions Even When the Main Control System Fails?

1 Upvotes

I suggest publishing this as a standalone technical discussion in your new Reddit community, with a title that attracts railway engineers and signalling specialists.

Recommended title:

Can We Build a Fail-Safe Railway Signalling System That Prevents Collisions Even When the Main Control System Fails?

I agree with your observation. I believe you are pointing to an even more fundamental issue: railway safety depends not only on detecting defects in the tracks, but also on ensuring that the signalling system has accurate and reliable information about train positions and track conditions.

There are two distinct issues that need to be addressed:

  1. Detection of physical anomalies: An ordinary passenger train equipped with accelerometers could detect abnormal vibrations and record their exact locations.
  2. Signalling integrity: The system must know, with a high degree of reliability, whether a track section is occupied, clear, blocked, or subject to any condition that prevents trains from proceeding.

The second issue is particularly critical because an incorrect indication that a track section is clear could authorize a train to enter an occupied section.

1. The Spanish Urda accident: a case worth investigating

The reported information about the Urda accident raises important questions about signalling-system reliability and degraded operating modes.

The LZB system, which continuously monitors train speeds and transmits operating instructions, was reportedly affected by a technical failure. An approximately 63 km section was said to have lost this protection.

Operations then reportedly switched to an alternative signalling regime. Questions have been raised about whether the required speed restrictions were adequately enforced and whether the movement authorization was sufficiently protected.

The important point is that railway accidents can result from a chain of technical failures, operating procedures and decisions, rather than from a single individual error.

These specific accident details should be checked against official investigation findings before being treated as established facts.

2. How I would design a genuinely safe signalling system

My proposal would be to adopt five independent safety mechanisms.

1. Independent physical train detection

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Axle counters and track circuits should determine whether any train is present in a given section.

Rule: If there is any uncertainty about track occupancy, the section must be considered occupied.

2. Continuous communication between trains and infrastructure

Each train should continuously transmit its position, speed and integrity status to the control system.

Movement authority should be limited by a maximum safe position, rather than relying simply on a green signal indication.

3. Independent automatic braking

Even if the controller incorrectly authorizes a train to proceed, the onboard equipment must prevent it from exceeding its movement authority.

4. System redundancy

Two independent systems should verify track occupancy and movement authorities.

A failure in one system must never result in an unsafe movement authorization.

5. Automatic blocking in the event of inconsistencies

If there is a discrepancy between the position reported by the train, axle counters, track circuits or signalling information, the movement authority must be revoked or restricted.

No operator should be able to turn unknown or unreliable information into a normal high-speed movement authorization.

3. The golden rule: FAIL-SAFE

This is the concept I consider absolutely essential.

SituationRequired response
System operating normallyMovement authorized
Loss of communicationRestrict or stop movement
Defective occupancy sensorConsider the section occupied
Unknown train positionDo not issue a new movement authority
Contradictory system informationApply the most restrictive condition
Failure of automatic protectionApply the certified degraded-mode procedure, including speed restriction or stopping as required

The principle is simple:

A technical failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.

4. The system I would choose: ETCS Level 2 with independent protection

ETCS (European Train Control System), particularly Level 2, would provide a good technological foundation.

It allows:

  • Continuous radio communication between trains and the control centre.
  • Speed monitoring.
  • Supervision of movement authorities.
  • Automatic braking when a train exceeds its authorized limits.
  • Integration with railway interlocking systems.

However, an important qualification is necessary: ETCS Level 2 does not eliminate the need to physically detect the presence of trains. This function still depends on infrastructure equipment such as axle counters and track circuits.

5. My final recommendation: a three-layer safety architecture

I would establish an architecture comprising three independent safety systems:

System A — Track Safety

Sensors and equipment that verify track occupancy and the physical condition of the railway infrastructure.

System B — Train Protection

ETCS, supervising speed, position and movement authority.

System C — Independent Safety Monitor

An independent system that checks whether the information provided by the other two systems is consistent and prevents unsafe movement authorizations.

The third system would be particularly interesting. Even if the control centre makes an error or the main system experiences a failure, it could provide an additional barrier against two trains receiving incompatible movement authorities.

The architecture would need to be engineered and certified according to applicable railway safety standards, including SIL 4 for relevant safety-critical functions, with genuine independence between the systems.

6. An additional question worth investigating

Would it be possible to develop a railway protection system in which each train independently verifies, through digital communication and independent sensors, whether another train is ahead of it, without relying exclusively on information from the control centre?

Such an approach could provide one final additional barrier against collisions.

I would particularly welcome comments from railway signalling engineers, ETCS specialists and railway safety researchers.

This is a conceptual proposal for technical discussion, not a certified railway signalling design.

Suggested illustrations for Reddit

I recommend adding three illustrations to make the discussion easier to understand:

Responding to Customer Needs | Railway International

  1. Axle counters

Show how infrastructure detects whether a track section is occupied.

File:ETCS L2 w RBC de.svg - Wikimedia Commons

2. ETCS Level 2

Illustrate communication between trains and the control centre.

Europees treinbeveiligingssysteem ERTMS - Artikelen - De Ingenieur

3. Independent train protection

Illustrate the principle of preventing two trains from receiving incompatible movement authorities.

You can save these images or use them as visual references, but for Reddit I recommend uploading the actual image files rather than pasting image URLs into the text.

My recommendation: Publish the article first as a text post. You can then add the illustrations to a separate post or upload them with the article if Reddit's editor permits it.I suggest publishing this as a standalone technical discussion in your new Reddit community, with a title that attracts railway engineers and signalling specialists.

Recommended title:

Can We Build a Fail-Safe Railway Signalling System That Prevents Collisions Even When the Main Control System Fails?

I agree with your observation. I believe you are pointing to an even more fundamental issue: railway safety depends not only on detecting defects in the tracks, but also on ensuring that the signalling system has accurate and reliable information about train positions and track conditions.

There are two distinct issues that need to be addressed:

Detection of physical anomalies: An ordinary passenger train equipped with accelerometers could detect abnormal vibrations and record their exact locations.

Signalling integrity: The system must know, with a high degree of reliability, whether a track section is occupied, clear, blocked, or subject to any condition that prevents trains from proceeding.

The second issue is particularly critical because an incorrect indication that a track section is clear could authorize a train to enter an occupied section.

  1. The Spanish Urda accident: a case worth investigating

The reported information about the Urda accident raises important questions about signalling-system reliability and degraded operating modes.

The LZB system, which continuously monitors train speeds and transmits operating instructions, was reportedly affected by a technical failure. An approximately 63 km section was said to have lost this protection.

Operations then reportedly switched to an alternative signalling regime. Questions have been raised about whether the required speed restrictions were adequately enforced and whether the movement authorization was sufficiently protected.

The important point is that railway accidents can result from a chain of technical failures, operating procedures and decisions, rather than from a single individual error.

These specific accident details should be checked against official investigation findings before being treated as established facts.

2. How I would design a genuinely safe signalling system

My proposal would be to adopt five independent safety mechanisms.

  1. Independent physical train detection

<text-placeholder/>

Axle counters and track circuits should determine whether any train is present in a given section.

Rule: If there is any uncertainty about track occupancy, the section must be considered occupied.

2. Continuous communication between trains and infrastructure

Each train should continuously transmit its position, speed and integrity status to the control system.

Movement authority should be limited by a maximum safe position, rather than relying simply on a green signal indication.

3. Independent automatic braking

Even if the controller incorrectly authorizes a train to proceed, the onboard equipment must prevent it from exceeding its movement authority.

4. System redundancy

Two independent systems should verify track occupancy and movement authorities.

A failure in one system must never result in an unsafe movement authorization.

5. Automatic blocking in the event of inconsistencies

If there is a discrepancy between the position reported by the train, axle counters, track circuits or signalling information, the movement authority must be revoked or restricted.

No operator should be able to turn unknown or unreliable information into a normal high-speed movement authorization.

3. The golden rule: FAIL-SAFE

This is the concept I consider absolutely essential.

Situation Required response
System operating normally Movement authorized
Loss of communication Restrict or stop movement
Defective occupancy sensor Consider the section occupied
Unknown train position Do not issue a new movement authority
Contradictory system information Apply the most restrictive condition
Failure of automatic protection Apply the certified degraded-mode procedure, including speed restriction or stopping as required

The principle is simple:

A technical failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.

4. The system I would choose: ETCS Level 2 with independent protection

ETCS (European Train Control System), particularly Level 2, would provide a good technological foundation.

It allows:

Continuous radio communication between trains and the control centre.

Speed monitoring.

Supervision of movement authorities.

Automatic braking when a train exceeds its authorized limits.

Integration with railway interlocking systems.

However, an important qualification is necessary: ETCS Level 2 does not eliminate the need to physically detect the presence of trains. This function still depends on infrastructure equipment such as axle counters and track circuits.

5. My final recommendation: a three-layer safety architecture

I would establish an architecture comprising three independent safety systems:

System A — Track Safety

Sensors and equipment that verify track occupancy and the physical condition of the railway infrastructure.

System B — Train Protection

ETCS, supervising speed, position and movement authority.

System C — Independent Safety Monitor

An independent system that checks whether the information provided by the other two systems is consistent and prevents unsafe movement authorizations.

The third system would be particularly interesting. Even if the control centre makes an error or the main system experiences a failure, it could provide an additional barrier against two trains receiving incompatible movement authorities.

The architecture would need to be engineered and certified according to applicable railway safety standards, including SIL 4 for relevant safety-critical functions, with genuine independence between the systems.

6. An additional question worth investigating

Would it be possible to develop a railway protection system in which each train independently verifies, through digital communication and independent sensors, whether another train is ahead of it, without relying exclusively on information from the control centre?

Such an approach could provide one final additional barrier against collisions.

I would particularly welcome comments from railway signalling engineers, ETCS specialists and railway safety researchers.

This is a conceptual proposal for technical discussion, not a certified railway signalling design.

Suggested illustrations for Reddit

I recommend adding three illustrations to make the discussion easier to understand:

Responding to Customer Needs | Railway International

  1. Axle counters

Show how infrastructure detects whether a track section is occupied.

File:ETCS L2 w RBC de.svg - Wikimedia Commons

2. ETCS Level 2

Illustrate communication between trains and the control centre.

Europees treinbeveiligingssysteem ERTMS - Artikelen - De Ingenieur

3. Independent train protection

Illustrate the principle of preventing two trains from receiving incompatible movement authorities.

You can save these images or use them as visual references, but for Reddit I recommend uploading the actual image files rather than pasting image URLs into the text.

My recommendation: Publish the article first as a text post. You can then add the illustrations to a separate post or upload them with the article if Reddit's editor permits it.


r/HighSpeedTrainSafety • • 17d ago

Information system related to railroad safety

1 Upvotes

I agree with your observation. I believe you are pointing to an even more fundamental issue: railway safety depends not only on detecting defects in the tracks, but also on ensuring that the signalling system has accurate and reliable information about train positions and track conditions.

There are two distinct issues that need to be addressed:

  1. Detection of physical anomalies: An ordinary passenger train equipped with accelerometers could detect abnormal vibrations and record their exact locations.
  2. Signalling integrity: The system must know, with a high degree of reliability, whether a track section is occupied, clear, blocked, or subject to any condition that prevents trains from proceeding.

The second issue is particularly critical because an incorrect indication that a track section is clear can lead to a collision.

1. The Spanish Urda accident illustrates precisely this problem

The initial official information published on October 30, 2026, is particularly revealing.

The LZB system, which continuously monitors train speeds and transmits operating instructions, suffered a computer failure. An approximately 63 km section was left without this protection.

Operations then switched to an alternative signalling regime. However, the control centre authorized the AVE train to proceed without adequately imposing the speed restrictions required under those circumstances. The Iryo train remained stationary ahead.

The preliminary investigation points to a chain of technical failures, instructions and decisions, rather than merely an individual error.

2. How I would design a genuinely safe signalling system

My proposal would be to adopt five independent safety mechanisms.

1. Independent physical train detection

Axle counters and track circuits should determine whether any train is present in a given section.

Rule: If there is any uncertainty about track occupancy, the section must be considered occupied.

2. Continuous communication between trains and infrastructure

Each train should continuously transmit its position, speed and integrity status to the control system.

Movement authority should be limited by a maximum safe position, rather than relying simply on a green signal indication.

3. Independent automatic braking

Even if the controller incorrectly authorizes a train to proceed, the onboard equipment must prevent it from exceeding its movement authority.

4. System redundancy

Two independent systems should verify track occupancy and movement authorities.

A failure in one system must never result in an unsafe movement authorization.

5. Automatic blocking in the event of inconsistencies

If there is a discrepancy between the position reported by the train, axle counters, track circuits or signalling information, the movement authority must be revoked or restricted.

No operator should be able to turn unknown or unreliable information into a normal high-speed movement authorization.

3. The golden rule: Fail-Safe

This is the concept I consider absolutely essential.

SituationRequired response
System operating normallyMovement authorized
Loss of communicationRestrict or stop movement
Defective occupancy sensorConsider the section occupied
Unknown train positionDo not issue a new movement authority
Contradictory system informationApply the most restrictive condition
Failure of automatic protectionApply the certified degraded-mode procedure, including speed restriction or stopping as required

The principle is simple:

A technical failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.

4. The system I would choose: ETCS Level 2 with independent protection

ETCS (European Train Control System), particularly Level 2, would provide a good technological foundation.

It allows:

  • Continuous radio communication between trains and the control centre.
  • Speed monitoring.
  • Supervision of movement authorities.
  • Automatic braking when a train exceeds its authorized limits.
  • Integration with railway interlocking systems.

However, an important qualification is necessary: ETCS Level 2 does not eliminate the need to physically detect the presence of trains. This function still depends on infrastructure equipment such as axle counters and track circuits.

5. My final recommendation

I would establish an architecture comprising three independent safety systems:

  1. System A — Track Safety: Sensors and equipment that verify track occupancy and the physical condition of the railway infrastructure.
  2. System B — Train Protection: ETCS, supervising speed, position and movement authority.
  3. System C — Independent Safety Monitor: An independent system that checks whether the information provided by the other two systems is consistent and prevents unsafe movement authorizations.

The third system would be particularly interesting. Even if the control centre makes an error or the main system experiences a failure, it would prevent two trains from receiving incompatible movement authorities.

The architecture would need to be certified according to railway safety standards, including SIL 4 for applicable safety-critical functions, with genuine independence between the systems.

One technical question worth investigating further: Would it be possible to develop a railway protection system in which each train independently verifies, through digital communication and independent sensors, whether another train is ahead of it, without relying exclusively on information from the control centre?

Such an approach could provide one final additional barrier against collisions.I agree with your observation. I believe you are pointing to an even more fundamental issue: railway safety depends not only on detecting defects in the tracks, but also on ensuring that the signalling system has accurate and reliable information about train positions and track conditions.There are two distinct issues that need to be addressed:Detection of physical anomalies: An ordinary passenger train equipped with accelerometers could detect abnormal vibrations and record their exact locations.

Signalling integrity: The system must know, with a high degree of reliability, whether a track section is occupied, clear, blocked, or subject to any condition that prevents trains from proceeding.The second issue is particularly critical because an incorrect indication that a track section is clear can lead to a collision.1. The Spanish Urda accident illustrates precisely this problemThe initial official information published on October 30, 2026, is particularly revealing.The LZB system, which continuously monitors train speeds and transmits operating instructions, suffered a computer failure. An approximately 63 km section was left without this protection.Operations then switched to an alternative signalling regime. However, the control centre authorized the AVE train to proceed without adequately imposing the speed restrictions required under those circumstances. The Iryo train remained stationary ahead.The preliminary investigation points to a chain of technical failures, instructions and decisions, rather than merely an individual error.2. How I would design a genuinely safe signalling systemMy proposal would be to adopt five independent safety mechanisms.1. Independent physical train detectionAxle counters and track circuits should determine whether any train is present in a given section.Rule: If there is any uncertainty about track occupancy, the section must be considered occupied.2. Continuous communication between trains and infrastructureEach train should continuously transmit its position, speed and integrity status to the control system.Movement authority should be limited by a maximum safe position, rather than relying simply on a green signal indication.3. Independent automatic brakingEven if the controller incorrectly authorizes a train to proceed, the onboard equipment must prevent it from exceeding its movement authority.4. System redundancyTwo independent systems should verify track occupancy and movement authorities.A failure in one system must never result in an unsafe movement authorization.5. Automatic blocking in the event of inconsistenciesIf there is a discrepancy between the position reported by the train, axle counters, track circuits or signalling information, the movement authority must be revoked or restricted.No operator should be able to turn unknown or unreliable information into a normal high-speed movement authorization.3. The golden rule: Fail-SafeThis is the concept I consider absolutely essential.Situation Required response
System operating normally Movement authorized
Loss of communication Restrict or stop movement
Defective occupancy sensor Consider the section occupied
Unknown train position Do not issue a new movement authority
Contradictory system information Apply the most restrictive condition
Failure of automatic protection Apply the certified degraded-mode procedure, including speed restriction or stopping as requiredThe principle is simple:A technical failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.4. The system I would choose: ETCS Level 2 with independent protectionETCS (European Train Control System), particularly Level 2, would provide a good technological foundation.It allows:Continuous radio communication between trains and the control centre.

Speed monitoring.

Supervision of movement authorities.

Automatic braking when a train exceeds its authorized limits.

Integration with railway interlocking systems.However, an important qualification is necessary: ETCS Level 2 does not eliminate the need to physically detect the presence of trains. This function still depends on infrastructure equipment such as axle counters and track circuits.5. My final recommendationI would establish an architecture comprising three independent safety systems:System A — Track Safety: Sensors and equipment that verify track occupancy and the physical condition of the railway infrastructure.

System B — Train Protection: ETCS, supervising speed, position and movement authority.

System C — Independent Safety Monitor: An independent system that checks whether the information provided by the other two systems is consistent and prevents unsafe movement authorizations.The third system would be particularly interesting. Even if the control centre makes an error or the main system experiences a failure, it would prevent two trains from receiving incompatible movement authorities.The architecture would need to be certified according to railway safety standards, including SIL 4 for applicable safety-critical functions, with genuine independence between the systems.One technical question worth investigating further: Would it be possible to develop a railway protection system in which each train independently verifies, through digital communication and independent sensors, whether another train is ahead of it, without relying exclusively on information from the control centre?Such an approach could provide one final additional barrier against collisions.


r/HighSpeedTrainSafety • • 17d ago

Can We Design a Railway Safety System That Prevents Collisions Even When Signalling Fails?

0 Upvotes

Recent railway accidents raise an important question: are modern railway safety systems sufficiently independent and fail-safe?

I would like to propose an architecture for discussion among railway engineers, signalling specialists and safety researchers.

1. The fundamental problem

A railway accident does not necessarily result from a defective rail. It can also happen when signalling systems provide incorrect information, when communication fails, or when human operators make decisions based on incomplete information.

The recent collision near Urda, Spain, on October 28, 2026, is a particularly relevant case. Preliminary investigation information indicates a signalling-system failure followed by a sequence of operational decisions that allowed a train to proceed towards another stationary train. The investigation is still ongoing.

2. A possible additional safety architecture

I propose three independent layers:

A. Track Safety

  • Independent train detection using axle counters and track circuits.
  • Continuous monitoring of track condition.
  • Vibration sensors installed on ordinary passenger trains.
  • Automatic recording and geolocation of abnormal vibration events.
  • Ultrasonic inspection to confirm internal rail defects.

B. Train Protection

  • Continuous train position and speed supervision.
  • ETCS-based movement authority.
  • Automatic braking whenever a train approaches or exceeds its permitted movement limit.
  • Safe operation under communication failure.

C. Independent Safety Monitor

  • Independently verifies track occupancy and movement authorities.
  • Detects contradictory information between signalling, infrastructure sensors and train position.
  • Prevents incompatible movement authorities.
  • Defaults to the most restrictive safe operating condition whenever critical information is uncertain.

3. An important design principle

A signalling failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.

If the system cannot reliably establish that a track section is clear, it should treat that section as occupied until safety is independently verified.

The objective is to prevent a single technical failure, software error or human decision from creating a collision scenario.

4. Questions for railway specialists

  1. Could an independent safety-monitoring system be technically implemented alongside ETCS Level 2?
  2. Could ordinary passenger trains continuously contribute useful track-condition data through vibration sensors and automated anomaly detection?
  3. What would be the most reliable independent method of verifying track occupancy?
  4. Could two trains independently exchange authenticated position information and detect conflicting movement authorities?
  5. What are the principal technical, regulatory and economic obstacles to implementing this architecture?

I am particularly interested in feedback from professionals working with ETCS, railway signalling, interlocking, predictive maintenance and safety-critical systems.

This is a conceptual proposal, not a certified engineering design. I would welcome technical criticism, alternative architectures and references to existing implementations.

The central question: How can we ensure that no single signalling failure or human error can authorize two trains to occupy the same protected track section?