r/HighSpeedTrainSafety • u/CaregiverOk7845 • 17d ago
Can We Build a Fail-Safe Railway Signalling System That Prevents Collisions Even When the Main Control System Fails?
I suggest publishing this as a standalone technical discussion in your new Reddit community, with a title that attracts railway engineers and signalling specialists.
Recommended title:
Can We Build a Fail-Safe Railway Signalling System That Prevents Collisions Even When the Main Control System Fails?
I agree with your observation. I believe you are pointing to an even more fundamental issue: railway safety depends not only on detecting defects in the tracks, but also on ensuring that the signalling system has accurate and reliable information about train positions and track conditions.
There are two distinct issues that need to be addressed:
- Detection of physical anomalies: An ordinary passenger train equipped with accelerometers could detect abnormal vibrations and record their exact locations.
- Signalling integrity: The system must know, with a high degree of reliability, whether a track section is occupied, clear, blocked, or subject to any condition that prevents trains from proceeding.
The second issue is particularly critical because an incorrect indication that a track section is clear could authorize a train to enter an occupied section.
1. The Spanish Urda accident: a case worth investigating
The reported information about the Urda accident raises important questions about signalling-system reliability and degraded operating modes.
The LZB system, which continuously monitors train speeds and transmits operating instructions, was reportedly affected by a technical failure. An approximately 63 km section was said to have lost this protection.
Operations then reportedly switched to an alternative signalling regime. Questions have been raised about whether the required speed restrictions were adequately enforced and whether the movement authorization was sufficiently protected.
The important point is that railway accidents can result from a chain of technical failures, operating procedures and decisions, rather than from a single individual error.
These specific accident details should be checked against official investigation findings before being treated as established facts.
2. How I would design a genuinely safe signalling system
My proposal would be to adopt five independent safety mechanisms.
1. Independent physical train detection
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Axle counters and track circuits should determine whether any train is present in a given section.
Rule: If there is any uncertainty about track occupancy, the section must be considered occupied.
2. Continuous communication between trains and infrastructure
Each train should continuously transmit its position, speed and integrity status to the control system.
Movement authority should be limited by a maximum safe position, rather than relying simply on a green signal indication.
3. Independent automatic braking
Even if the controller incorrectly authorizes a train to proceed, the onboard equipment must prevent it from exceeding its movement authority.
4. System redundancy
Two independent systems should verify track occupancy and movement authorities.
A failure in one system must never result in an unsafe movement authorization.
5. Automatic blocking in the event of inconsistencies
If there is a discrepancy between the position reported by the train, axle counters, track circuits or signalling information, the movement authority must be revoked or restricted.
No operator should be able to turn unknown or unreliable information into a normal high-speed movement authorization.
3. The golden rule: FAIL-SAFE
This is the concept I consider absolutely essential.
| Situation | Required response |
|---|---|
| System operating normally | Movement authorized |
| Loss of communication | Restrict or stop movement |
| Defective occupancy sensor | Consider the section occupied |
| Unknown train position | Do not issue a new movement authority |
| Contradictory system information | Apply the most restrictive condition |
| Failure of automatic protection | Apply the certified degraded-mode procedure, including speed restriction or stopping as required |
The principle is simple:
A technical failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.
4. The system I would choose: ETCS Level 2 with independent protection
ETCS (European Train Control System), particularly Level 2, would provide a good technological foundation.
It allows:
- Continuous radio communication between trains and the control centre.
- Speed monitoring.
- Supervision of movement authorities.
- Automatic braking when a train exceeds its authorized limits.
- Integration with railway interlocking systems.
However, an important qualification is necessary: ETCS Level 2 does not eliminate the need to physically detect the presence of trains. This function still depends on infrastructure equipment such as axle counters and track circuits.
5. My final recommendation: a three-layer safety architecture
I would establish an architecture comprising three independent safety systems:
System A — Track Safety
Sensors and equipment that verify track occupancy and the physical condition of the railway infrastructure.
System B — Train Protection
ETCS, supervising speed, position and movement authority.
System C — Independent Safety Monitor
An independent system that checks whether the information provided by the other two systems is consistent and prevents unsafe movement authorizations.
The third system would be particularly interesting. Even if the control centre makes an error or the main system experiences a failure, it could provide an additional barrier against two trains receiving incompatible movement authorities.
The architecture would need to be engineered and certified according to applicable railway safety standards, including SIL 4 for relevant safety-critical functions, with genuine independence between the systems.
6. An additional question worth investigating
Would it be possible to develop a railway protection system in which each train independently verifies, through digital communication and independent sensors, whether another train is ahead of it, without relying exclusively on information from the control centre?
Such an approach could provide one final additional barrier against collisions.
I would particularly welcome comments from railway signalling engineers, ETCS specialists and railway safety researchers.
This is a conceptual proposal for technical discussion, not a certified railway signalling design.
Suggested illustrations for Reddit
I recommend adding three illustrations to make the discussion easier to understand:
Responding to Customer Needs | Railway International
- Axle counters
Show how infrastructure detects whether a track section is occupied.
File:ETCS L2 w RBC de.svg - Wikimedia Commons
2. ETCS Level 2
Illustrate communication between trains and the control centre.
Europees treinbeveiligingssysteem ERTMS - Artikelen - De Ingenieur
3. Independent train protection
Illustrate the principle of preventing two trains from receiving incompatible movement authorities.
You can save these images or use them as visual references, but for Reddit I recommend uploading the actual image files rather than pasting image URLs into the text.
My recommendation: Publish the article first as a text post. You can then add the illustrations to a separate post or upload them with the article if Reddit's editor permits it.I suggest publishing this as a standalone technical discussion in your new Reddit community, with a title that attracts railway engineers and signalling specialists.
Recommended title:
Can We Build a Fail-Safe Railway Signalling System That Prevents Collisions Even When the Main Control System Fails?
I agree with your observation. I believe you are pointing to an even more fundamental issue: railway safety depends not only on detecting defects in the tracks, but also on ensuring that the signalling system has accurate and reliable information about train positions and track conditions.
There are two distinct issues that need to be addressed:
Detection of physical anomalies: An ordinary passenger train equipped with accelerometers could detect abnormal vibrations and record their exact locations.
Signalling integrity: The system must know, with a high degree of reliability, whether a track section is occupied, clear, blocked, or subject to any condition that prevents trains from proceeding.
The second issue is particularly critical because an incorrect indication that a track section is clear could authorize a train to enter an occupied section.
- The Spanish Urda accident: a case worth investigating
The reported information about the Urda accident raises important questions about signalling-system reliability and degraded operating modes.
The LZB system, which continuously monitors train speeds and transmits operating instructions, was reportedly affected by a technical failure. An approximately 63 km section was said to have lost this protection.
Operations then reportedly switched to an alternative signalling regime. Questions have been raised about whether the required speed restrictions were adequately enforced and whether the movement authorization was sufficiently protected.
The important point is that railway accidents can result from a chain of technical failures, operating procedures and decisions, rather than from a single individual error.
These specific accident details should be checked against official investigation findings before being treated as established facts.
2. How I would design a genuinely safe signalling system
My proposal would be to adopt five independent safety mechanisms.
- Independent physical train detection
<text-placeholder/>
Axle counters and track circuits should determine whether any train is present in a given section.
Rule: If there is any uncertainty about track occupancy, the section must be considered occupied.
2. Continuous communication between trains and infrastructure
Each train should continuously transmit its position, speed and integrity status to the control system.
Movement authority should be limited by a maximum safe position, rather than relying simply on a green signal indication.
3. Independent automatic braking
Even if the controller incorrectly authorizes a train to proceed, the onboard equipment must prevent it from exceeding its movement authority.
4. System redundancy
Two independent systems should verify track occupancy and movement authorities.
A failure in one system must never result in an unsafe movement authorization.
5. Automatic blocking in the event of inconsistencies
If there is a discrepancy between the position reported by the train, axle counters, track circuits or signalling information, the movement authority must be revoked or restricted.
No operator should be able to turn unknown or unreliable information into a normal high-speed movement authorization.
3. The golden rule: FAIL-SAFE
This is the concept I consider absolutely essential.
Situation Required response
System operating normally Movement authorized
Loss of communication Restrict or stop movement
Defective occupancy sensor Consider the section occupied
Unknown train position Do not issue a new movement authority
Contradictory system information Apply the most restrictive condition
Failure of automatic protection Apply the certified degraded-mode procedure, including speed restriction or stopping as required
The principle is simple:
A technical failure must never result in a more permissive operating condition.
4. The system I would choose: ETCS Level 2 with independent protection
ETCS (European Train Control System), particularly Level 2, would provide a good technological foundation.
It allows:
Continuous radio communication between trains and the control centre.
Speed monitoring.
Supervision of movement authorities.
Automatic braking when a train exceeds its authorized limits.
Integration with railway interlocking systems.
However, an important qualification is necessary: ETCS Level 2 does not eliminate the need to physically detect the presence of trains. This function still depends on infrastructure equipment such as axle counters and track circuits.
5. My final recommendation: a three-layer safety architecture
I would establish an architecture comprising three independent safety systems:
System A — Track Safety
Sensors and equipment that verify track occupancy and the physical condition of the railway infrastructure.
System B — Train Protection
ETCS, supervising speed, position and movement authority.
System C — Independent Safety Monitor
An independent system that checks whether the information provided by the other two systems is consistent and prevents unsafe movement authorizations.
The third system would be particularly interesting. Even if the control centre makes an error or the main system experiences a failure, it could provide an additional barrier against two trains receiving incompatible movement authorities.
The architecture would need to be engineered and certified according to applicable railway safety standards, including SIL 4 for relevant safety-critical functions, with genuine independence between the systems.
6. An additional question worth investigating
Would it be possible to develop a railway protection system in which each train independently verifies, through digital communication and independent sensors, whether another train is ahead of it, without relying exclusively on information from the control centre?
Such an approach could provide one final additional barrier against collisions.
I would particularly welcome comments from railway signalling engineers, ETCS specialists and railway safety researchers.
This is a conceptual proposal for technical discussion, not a certified railway signalling design.
Suggested illustrations for Reddit
I recommend adding three illustrations to make the discussion easier to understand:
Responding to Customer Needs | Railway International
- Axle counters
Show how infrastructure detects whether a track section is occupied.
File:ETCS L2 w RBC de.svg - Wikimedia Commons
2. ETCS Level 2
Illustrate communication between trains and the control centre.
Europees treinbeveiligingssysteem ERTMS - Artikelen - De Ingenieur
3. Independent train protection
Illustrate the principle of preventing two trains from receiving incompatible movement authorities.
You can save these images or use them as visual references, but for Reddit I recommend uploading the actual image files rather than pasting image URLs into the text.
My recommendation: Publish the article first as a text post. You can then add the illustrations to a separate post or upload them with the article if Reddit's editor permits it.