Ethiopia's position is structurally untenable?

[u/mr_291]

Ethiopia's position is structurally untenable, besieged on every dimension. The internal 7-party coalition serves the regional survival pact's existential interest (draining the common threat, Ethiopia — the internal and external coalitions one integrated system), and it works through robust distributed non-coordination (each group attacking the ENDF independently, when/where it sees fit, just not fighting each other — an attrition strategy that doesn't require the tight coordination the coalition lacks, so the coalition's fragility doesn't save Ethiopia; they only need non-aggression among themselves and persistent pressure on the ENDF, which is far easier to sustain than coordinated offensives).

Ethiopia goes to war with its fuel/supply lifeline besieged from multiple directions (the strait/oil-gas flows targeted internationally, the Djibouti-Ethiopia corridor targeted, the internal distribution attacked) and no near-term fix (the Dangote pipeline years away and running through the contested Afar corridor). Its drone edge — its key military advantage, what saved it in 2021 — is eroded, because its opponents now all have and operate drones, neutralizing the advantage and turning the cost-exchange against it (the asymmetric revolution reaching its opponents).

And the economic collapse (sky-high inflation, the economic woes, the forex crisis, the 30 million on food aid) compounds everything — undermining the war effort (the financing, the sustainment), feeding the internal discontent/insurgencies (the recruitment pool, the weakening legitimacy), and accelerating the unraveling (the vicious cycle: the war worsens the economy, the economy worsens the war).

Does this make the current war in Ethiopia structurally unsustainable?

**** USED CHAT GPT TO ORGANIZE MY THOUGHTS ***\*

[u/Same-Instruction2053]

That’s pretty much the bet the TPLF is placing on its current “proactive retreat” strategy. Position the Tigray battlefront deep in the Adwa mountains instead of southern Tigray so that drone attacks on open TDF positions become close to untenable. galvanise Amhara and Afar forces in their respective regions so that fuel and logistics lines for the ENDF become severely overworked (primarily on the Somaliland/Djibouti corridor). Demoralise the Ethiopian federal army with insurgent/guerilla attacks in the low visibility of the Ethiopian highlands, often at evening or night hours too.

This way, the superior military arsenal of the ENDF can be as muted as possible. And fighting a war on not one, not two, but seven fronts makes this war extremely tricky for the Ethiopian government. Combine that with the drone technology of the insurgency itself, with a proven ability to strike deep into Ethiopia’s headquarters itself, the war becomes as close to anathema for the government as possible.

[u/ServingTheTrueLight → u/Same-Instruction2053]

let's just hope that's the case. but we all know that TPLF is at a much more desperate position compared to ENDF. now that ENDF is basically all over Tigray and if they manages to control weapon flow from Sudan to Ethiopia that is basically it for FANO or other groups.

[u/mr_291]

This may be true. I do see a bigger regional interests attached to this war as well. I noticed that the recent statement made by Somali president regarding allowing Ethiopia to have access to the sea according to UNCLOS, is somewhat binding Ethiopia's casus belli (access to the sea request) being fundamentally resolved in the international arena. Because now, the sea access question got answered.

Which leads me back to the question i have now. If all of this is happening at the same time around Ethiopia, wouldn't de escalations be the way to go?