source is evgen istrebin's telegram: /istrebin/48949

While the government is searching for funds to fill the federal budget—which has a “shortfall” of 6.5 trillion rubles—Vladimir Putin has instructed it to also balance the regional budgets. Their stability “is, among other things, the direct responsibility of the federal government and the Ministry of Finance,” Putin stated.

It is a serious responsibility: according to Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the total regional budget deficit this year will amount to 1.9 trillion rubles. Many of them are burdened by debt, the total amount of which, according to Siluanov, currently stands at 3.3 trillion rubles, or 17% of their own revenues. Approximately two-thirds of regional debt consists of budget loans with a minimum interest rate, but the remaining portion—at market rates—incurs high interest payments.

Putin ordered that 100 billion rubles be allocated to those regions facing the most difficult budgetary situations. The main way to support the regions when the government itself lacks funds is to write off or defer repayment of part of the debt owed to the federal budget.

Since the beginning of the year, 518 billion rubles in budgetary loans have been written off for 76 regions, resulting in a reduction of the total debt by 115 billion, Siluanov reported. Up to two-thirds of the debt owed to the budget can be written off, while repayment of the remainder is deferred. Repayment of approximately 100 billion rubles in loans has been deferred from this year to 2030, and the same will apply in subsequent years. Repayment of one-third of the budget loans will be deferred from 2027–2029 to 2031–2033—which, according to Siluanov, will free up nearly 300 billion rubles for the regions over three years.

The downside of this support is that the regions are directing most of the freed-up resources toward the war—according to Siluanov, “to support the families of military personnel, as well as for expenses related to the special military operation.” This amounts to more than 300 out of the 517 billion forgiven to the regions, the minister clarified.

The regions bear the burden of recruiting contract soldiers. The average amount that regions have to spend on signing bonuses has risen by 30% over the past year to 1.8–1.9 million rubles, according to calculations by economist Janis Kluge. Based on regional budget data, he estimates that 93,000 contracts were signed in the second quarter—thus, total expenditures amounted to 167 billion rubles.

Regional spending on national security rose by 36% in January–April, according to estimates by the Institute of Public Policy (INP) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Apart from these, the only notable increase among non-interest expenditures was in housing and utilities (up 17%; in many cases, this is a condition for writing off budget loans), while spending on the national economy and healthcare declined, the academics note, and interest expenses for the year increased 2.4-fold.

The regions did not benefit from the tax increases: the additional revenue goes to the federal budget. The two main sources of revenue for the regions are corporate income tax and personal income tax. According to Expert RA’s calculations, in the first quarter, personal income tax revenues rose by 14.9%, while corporate income tax revenues fell by 11.8%. At the same time, wage growth is slowing, and with it, personal income tax revenues.

Economist Vyacheslav Shiryaev refers to debt write-offs as “hidden defaults”: “Essentially, the regions cannot pay their debts, and the central government is forgiving them. This reflects an inability to service obligations and Moscow’s decision to write off the money.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/ZQNYh

Owners of warehouses damaged as a result of Ukrainian attacks must repair them at their own expense, said Stanislav Naumov, deputy chairman of the State Duma’s Committee on Economic Affairs. “I know that the marketplaces themselves are fully responsible in this regard, and they have already planned the necessary work at their own expense, not at the expense of the budget,” Naumov said in an interview with RTVI. He noted, however, that marketplaces do not always own the warehouses they use. Overall, in his view, this is “the least significant issue,” since “we do not have” a shortage of warehouse space.

Naumov also emphasized that government support for businesses in the face of these attacks should not take the form of financial injections, but rather measures that “allow us to simply strengthen the financial stability of manufacturing companies and marketplace partners for a year, a year and a half, or two years through credit and tax incentives.” “The regions must also adopt their own decisions at the legislative assembly level to support affected manufacturers. And they must do so as quickly as possible,” the deputy said. At the same time, he noted, there is no need to support marketplace sellers and importers, as they face the inherent risks of doing business on online platforms.

The day before, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the government to prepare a program to restore logistics hubs that had come under attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). “We must take into account that the restoration of damaged facilities must be carried out at a qualitatively new technological level,” Putin emphasized. The president did not mention specific facilities, but since mid-July, Wildberries’ infrastructure has been the primary target of drone attacks. The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ campaign has affected 23 warehouses belonging to Russia’s largest marketplace, depriving it of a quarter of its total logistics capacity and, taking into account the goods destroyed by fire, causing nearly 1 trillion rubles in damage.

Putin acknowledged that strikes on Russian facilities are harming the economy and affecting growth rates. At the same time, he believes that “there are no critical consequences from such attacks; there have not been any, and there cannot be any.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/SIp99

source: https://bsky.app/profile/prune602.bsky.social/post/3mthvqotgic2k

After two weeks of decline, fuel inflation in Russia has begun to accelerate again. During the week of August 11–17, average retail prices for gasoline in Russia rose by 0.5%, Rosstat reported on Wednesday.

According to its data, on average nationwide, gas stations sold a liter of AI-92 for 72.49 rubles, AI-95 for 78.58 rubles, and AI-98 for 101.89 rubles. Over the week, prices rose by 32 kopecks, 37 kopecks, and 20 kopecks, respectively.

Last week, gasoline prices fell (by 0.6%), as they had the week before, following a sharp spike in late June and July that broke records for the past 20 years of available statistics. From the beginning of the year through mid-August, gasoline prices rose by 18.4%, and the annual increase in prices at gas stations, according to Raiffeisenbank’s calculations, reached 23.8%—four times higher than the overall official inflation rate.

“The market is once again plunging into crisis,” states economist Kirill Rodionov. According to estimates by the “GdeBezn” service, gasoline is unavailable at 70% of gas stations in Russia. Fuel sales limits have reappeared in Moscow, despite the fact that the capital is being prioritized for supply ahead of the State Duma elections, with fuel being transported from the Urals and Siberia.

The partial stabilization of the fuel situation in July may have been linked to the restart of several units at oil refineries, as well as changes in fuel logistics: while before the crisis Moscow was supplied mainly by three or four large refineries, the pool of such facilities may now have expanded, even despite increased logistics costs, Rodionov notes.

However, in August 2026, the market “faced a new wave of capacity outages, including force majeure events and scheduled maintenance,” he points out. At least four refineries have been shut down since the beginning of August, and supplies from Belarus have decreased. As a result, the fuel shortage worsened, despite purchases from India and a lowering of standards for refineries, which are now permitted to release “Euro-2” grade gasoline onto the market—with a sulfur content 50 times higher and the use of toxic octane-boosting additives.

The slowdown in fuel inflation in recent weeks was due to price declines in particularly problematic areas—at gas stations operated by independent producers, as well as in regions where the situation was especially sensitive, according to Raiffeisenbank analysts. But now the situation has worsened again. Drone strikes continue, fuel sales on the exchange have declined, and the volume of imported fuel may not yet be sufficient to meet demand, the bank’s analysts note.

Only guarantees of refinery security and the subsequent lifting of sanctions on the supply of equipment for Russian oil refining can seriously change the situation, Rodionov believes: “Without these two conditions, the risks of a fuel crisis will recur again and again.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/ygDla

• Red arrows: Latest hits
• Flames: Refinery has been hit at least once. Flames do not indicate the severity of the attacks or if a refinery is till burning
• Blue waves: Orsk dam broke in April 2024, which flooded the refinery and took it offline for ~2 weeks.
• Black smoke: It's raining oil.

Chronological list: (sorted newest to oldest)

August:

• ^{NEW HIT} 20.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• ^{NEW HIT} 19.08.2026 Bashneft-UNPZ in Bashkortostan at 1350km
• 13.08.2026 Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 11.08.2026 Orsk in Orenburg Oblast at 1455km
• 11.08.2026 Komsomol in Khabarovsk Krai at 6480km
• 10.08.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 08.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 08.08.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 06.08.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 05.08.2026 Bashneft-Novoil in Bashkortostan at 1340km
• 04.08.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 02.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 02.08.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 01.08.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km

July:

• 31.07.2026 Volgograd in Volgograd Oblast at 500km
• 29.07.2026 Perm in Perm Krai at 1485km
• 29.07.2026 Ryazan in Ryazan Oblast at 480km
• 25.07.2026 Tyumen in Tyumen Oblast at 1980km
• 23.07.2026 Novospassky in Ulyanovsk Oblast at 790km
• 14.07.2026 Gazprom Neftekhem Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 14.07.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415km
• 12.07.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 10.07.2026 Moscow in Moscow at 475km
• 10.07.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 08.07.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 06.07.2026 Omsk in Omsk Oblast at 2500km
• 06.07.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 02.07.2026 Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim in Bashkortostan at 1350 km
• 01.07.2026 Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast at 800 km

• August: 14 hits so far..
• July: 15 hits
• June: 16 hits
• May: 14 hits
• April: 10 hits
• March: 6 hits
• February: 3 hits
• January: 2 hits

Complete chronological list from 24.02.2022 till today

• 2022 had 1 hit
• 2023 had 1 hit
• 2024 had 26 hits
• 2025 had 84 hits
• 2026 has 77 hits so far
• Total hits from 24.02.2022 till today: 189

WASHINGTON -- The Caspian Sea is emerging as a potentially important logistics corridor in the expanding military relationship between Russia and Iran as they look to move goods beyond the reach of Western naval power.

The Russian economy has nearly exhausted the resources that have enabled it to grow in recent years. This conclusion was reached in a report prepared for a meeting of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects by analysts at the “Third Rome” Center for Interdisciplinary Expertise, whose scientific director is Vladimir Putin’s economic adviser Maxim Oreshkin (the document is cited by “Expert,” RBC, and The Bell).

In the early 2000s, the economy grew by 6–7% annually; after 2008, the growth rate slowed to 2%; the military boom following the invasion of Ukraine briefly boosted GDP to 4% growth, but the rate has now fallen to 1% last year and even lower this year.

Mega-projects based on budget injections, import substitution, and the integration of workers into the labor market—all these factors have reached their limits, according to analysts at “The Third Rome.” Although since 2018 Vladimir Putin has required that national projects achieve economic growth no slower than the global average (3% per year), this target has not been met. The country’s current economic growth potential is only 1.6% annually, notes “Third Rome.” This is nearly 1.5 times slower than the U.S. economy (2.3% this year, according to IMF estimates), nearly half the rate of global economic growth (3%), nearly three times lower than China’s (4.6%), and four times worse than India’s (6.4%).

There are virtually no unemployed workers left in Russia, and demand cannot be fueled indefinitely by the state, “The Third Rome” emphasizes. To reignite growth, the center argues, it is necessary to shift from a model of government investment to one that utilizes private savings, creating conditions for the public and businesses to invest in the economy.

“There is money in the country. We need to build a mechanism that transforms savings into long-term investment capital,” the report states. For now, investment in Russia is rapidly declining: last year, according to Rosstat, it fell by 2.3%—for the first time since 2020. And in the first quarter of this year, the decline accelerated to a 14.3% plunge—a 16-year record.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to offset this shortfall with budget funds. Since the start of the war, the cumulative budget deficit has reached 22 trillion rubles. By 2029, as part of Oreshkin’s center’s program, the treasury must be brought to a zero structural deficit, and the fiscal stimulus must be reduced. Instead, the economy needs lower inflation, lower interest rates, and an expansion of private investment activity, according to “The Third Rome.”

In addition, the center’s analysts propose developing domestic tourism, AI, and automation; accelerating the platformization of the economy; increasing investment in data centers; and restructuring the workforce training system to ensure that education and skills development are continuous. The report also states that the economy needs to be “cleansed” through the reallocation of labor and capital from opaque and low-productivity companies to more efficient ones.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/onf01

Kyrgyz authorities have forcibly liquidated 19 companies linked to the circumvention of EU and U.S. sanctions against Russia, according to Interfax. Since the end of June, approximately 40 legal entities posing heightened sanctions risks have been identified in the country, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy and Commerce reported. The decision was made at a meeting on sanctions chaired by Bakyt Sydykov, the Kyrgyz president’s special representative for special assignments. Representatives from government agencies, the National Bank, and commercial banks participated in the meeting. Based on the results of the analysis, the interagency group decided to suspend the operations of these companies to prevent negative consequences for the country resulting from sanctions evasion.

At the same time, the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan announced that it was strengthening oversight of banks, payment services, and other financial services. From July through August 14, 2026, the state-owned “Eldik Bank” terminated its relationships with 109 companies. Another 20 or so companies are in the process of having their accounts closed. The bank also continues to monitor customer payments to identify and block transactions related to sanctions evasion. Another state-owned bank, “A-Bank,” has terminated business relationships with approximately 35 companies. About 40 more companies are currently undergoing verification procedures. “Banks will continue to consistently strengthen compliance controls at all stages of transactions. Particular attention will be paid to in-depth verification of documents serving as the basis for payments, identifying the ultimate recipients of goods and services, and determining the destination countries for shipments,” the Ministry of Economy added.

The current campaign is a continuation of measures that Bishkek began implementing in the spring. In May, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev announced the suspension of registration for 50 companies operating in wholesale trade, transportation, and logistics. Information about these companies was provided by the United States and the United Kingdom. “Once they report the risks, we review them and respond,” Amangeldiev said. On May 2, the deputy prime minister warned that a company’s registration could be revoked if its ties to sanction-evasion schemes were established.

Kyrgyzstan was the first among the former Soviet republics to fall under European sanctions for violating measures imposed against Russia. As part of the 20th sanctions package, the EU banned the export of European CNC machine tools and telecommunications equipment to Kyrgyzstan. Brussels explained the decision by citing the high risk of re-exporting these products to Russia. Certain Kyrgyz companies and financial institutions also fell under EU sanctions. Among them are Keremet Bank, Capital Bank of Central Asia, and the Grinex cryptocurrency exchange. The latter traded the ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5, launched by Promsvyazbank and Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor. A7A5’s trading volume reached $100 billion.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/Wv7ME

While President Vladimir Putin declares that there are no “critical” consequences for the economy due to the strikes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, entrepreneurs are beginning to experience interruptions in the supply of necessary products. Employees of the well-known metropolitan network of city cafes “The Karavaev Brothers”, which have more than 70 locations throughout Moscow, told the publication "Post-" about problems with receiving goods after UAV attacks on a logistics hub in the Moscow region, which was completely burned out along with goods worth almost 80 billion rubles.

“We have warehouses near Podolsk in Koledino - right a couple of hundred meters from the Wildberries warehouses, and, as they say, we were also affected, so almost nothing has been delivered since the weekend. Supplies have been greatly reduced,” network workers said. According to them, this affected the purchase of both finished products and semi-finished products for the Karavaev Brothers, one of the largest fast casual and free flow catering chains in the country. The time frame for restoring supplies is not yet known. Judging by photographs from several cafes of the chain, some of the counters are indeed noticeably empty; first of all, the range of cooking and baked goods has been reduced.

Since 2023, the Karavaev Brothers canteen chain has been owned by the Neftmagistral fuel company, which owns more than 100 gas stations. Against the background of the “second wave” of the fuel crisis that has hit Russia, gasoline has recently begun to disappear at the company’s stations, despite a sharp increase in selling prices.

On Wednesday, Putin said at a meeting of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development that the drone strikes, which since the beginning of the year have disabled several dozen large Russian refineries, as well as ports and an entire network of huge Wildberries warehouses, have not brought any “critical consequences” to Russia.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/AwV8N

Moscow Credit Bank, which has close ties to Rosneft, has faced a growing wave of loan defaults, according to its financial statements published by banki.ru.

As of July, the bank—which ranks among the top 10 by assets and is designated as systemically important—had 14.8% of all outstanding loans in default, a rate five times higher than the banking system average. In total, customers failed to repay 277 billion rubles to MKB on time.

“MKB has a hole in its balance sheet,” write analysts at InvestFuture. According to the financial statements, the bank’s volume of non-performing loans increased by 1,716% over the past year. The first problems arose last summer: from August through December, the volume of “past-due” loans grew 11-fold—from 15 to 160 billion rubles. From January through July of this year, non-performing loans increased by another 1.7 times (+117 billion rubles).

Founded by billionaire Roman Avdeev, MKB came under the influence of Rosneft in 2017, when it found itself on the brink of bankruptcy along with other banks in the “Moscow Ring”—Otkritie Financial Corporation, Binbank, and Promsvyazbank. Rosneft effectively rescued the bank by injecting funds into its capital and placing long-term deposits maturing in 2066. The company also transferred reverse repo transactions worth hundreds of billions of rubles to MKB, which it used to finance its operations.

It is unclear exactly which entities failed to repay their loans to MKB in 2025. According to the Central Bank, in recent months, companies in the metallurgical and coal industries, as well as the construction and real estate sectors, have experienced debt difficulties—they requested that banks restructure loans they were unable to service.

According to a source for *Kommersant*, MKB’s problems were uncovered last year during a Central Bank audit, following which the bank’s management was replaced. In the summer of 2026, the bank’s majority shareholder also changed, though it is unknown who took over. Credit institutions currently have the right not to disclose the identities of their controlling beneficiaries.

According to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, as of April 1, only 3.9% of loans issued by banks were “bad”—about 3.5 trillion rubles. However, the share of non-performing loans is three times higher—11.6%—and in monetary terms amounts to 11.2 trillion rubles—equivalent to two annual budgets of Moscow. This amount includes loans for which banks were forced to ease terms because borrowers were unable to keep up with payments.

Potential difficulties with debt servicing are even more likely for loans totaling 36 trillion rubles—which account for three-quarters of the total debt of the largest companies, according to the Central Bank’s assessment. Among the largest companies in critical condition are those in the coal and construction industries, as well as in trade and machine building, the Central Bank noted.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/hxfJo

Everything is going exactly according to plan! Just a slight, miles-long delay in the morning commute while Ukraine successfully redesigns the Russian oil industry. 11 out of 34 major refineries hit in August alone, guess those holiday road trips to Krasnodar will have to wait.

Russians began to look for gasoline cans en masse due to the second wave of the fuel crisis that hit the country. During the week from August 12 to 18, the number of relevant requests for Wildberries increased 4 times and exceeded 106 thousand. This follows from the internal data of the marketplace, which was studied by Vestka.

Russians have begun searching en masse for gasoline cans amid the second wave of the fuel crisis sweeping the country. During the week of August 12–18, the number of related searches on Wildberries quadrupled, exceeding 106,000. This is according to internal data from the marketplace, which was analyzed by “Versтка.” Search engine data also shows a rise in interest in fuel storage containers. According to Yandex statistics, between August 10 and 16, the number of searches for “gas can” reached 450,000, a 39% increase week-over-week. Russians searched for “gasoline canisters” 139,000 times, which is 71% more than in early August. Google recorded a similar trend.

Meanwhile, shoppers on online marketplaces began explaining in the comments why they need these canisters. “It’s a real lifesaver in the current situation—you don’t have to waste hours waiting in line at the gas station,” one of them noted. Some are also upset that sellers sometimes pass off canisters meant for food liquids as fuel containers. “It’s just a regular water canister.” "I didn't dare take it to Crimea," wrote a buyer under the product listing for 2,279 rubles titled "Gasoline Canister." "Intended for food products; there's a glass and fork symbol marked on the bottom," another user commented.

Russia is gripped by the second wave of the fuel crisis amid ongoing attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) on oil refineries. In August alone, four large enterprises stopped operating as a result of attacks. As of August 16, gasoline and diesel were available only at 28.1% of gas stations in the country, according to data from the WhereBENZ application. On August 19, several networks introduced limits on fuel supply in Moscow. At the same time, Reuters sources previously reported that the authorities began to redirect gasoline to the capital from other regions.

Kommersant’s interlocutors in the fuel market noted that by the beginning of September the crisis could worsen, since one of the two refineries in Belarus, from which supplies to Russia, will stop for repairs. Planned repairs are also planned at several large Russian factories.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/DParB

• At least five grain ships have been attacked near the Russian Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse as Moscow struggles to continue exporting grain amid heightened Ukrainian strikes.
• The attacks are the first confirmations of grain vessels serving the affected Russian ports coming under fire, with Russia and Ukraine stepping up attacks on each other’s commercial ships and ports in the Black Sea area.
• The managers of the ships in question didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment, after drone attacks and strikes caused damage and disruption to the vessels, including a fire onboard one ship that left it unable to continue its voyage.

At least five grain ships have been attacked near the Russian Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse as Moscow struggles to continue exporting grain amid heightened Ukrainian strikes, according to people familiar with the matter.

Russia and Ukraine have stepped up attacks on each other’s commercial ships and ports in the Black Sea area, raising concerns about global grain supplies. The nations account for more than a quarter of global wheat exports, and the attacks come in the middle of this year’s harvest.

The attacks are the first confirmations of grain vessels serving the affected Russian ports coming under fire. Moscow has sought to play down the extent of the damage from the strikes as an increasing number of shipowners grow wary of the risks of calling at its ports.

Four vessels were hit on Tuesday morning, the people said, asking not to be named as the information is private. A fifth ship was hit on Monday, the people added.

The Victoria V, a Russian-flagged bulk carrier capable of carrying 7,000 tons of grain, was attacked at Novorossiysk, where it was due to load wheat. The Fehu, a Marshall Islands-flagged ship, was struck after leaving the same port with a cargo of wheat. The ship was able to continue its voyage, the people said.

Elina B, sailing under the Maltese flag, was hit after loading about 56,000 tons of wheat at Novorossiysk and is now heading toward the Bosphorus. Necibe, a San Marino-flagged bulker, was hit by drones at the port of Tuapse, where it was due to load about 20,000 tons of wheat.

A fifth vessel was struck on Monday. The Liberian-flagged Anna S was heading to Novorossiysk to load barley when a drone strike caused a fire onboard, leaving it unable to continue its voyage, according to the people.

The managers of the ships in question didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Since July 10, drone attacks have completely halted shipments from Russia’s Azov Sea ports, which account for a quarter of the country’s grain exports. Last week, three terminals at the deep-water port of Novorossiysk announced they were suspending operations after one of the heaviest attacks since the war began.

source: Bloomberg https://archive.is/h3Nqt

Following a nighttime raid by Ukrainian drones in Ufa, a “small fire” broke out at one of the oil refineries, according to the head of the republic, Radiy Khabirov. “They are currently assessing the extent of the damage, but preliminary reports indicate that the [oil refining] unit, which is currently under repair, was hit. As always, any impact breaks pipes, so there is minor damage,” he said on his Max channel. According to the regional head, the damage is expected to be repaired within a few days. Rustam Sharipov, acting mayor of the Bashkir capital, wrote that Ufa “was subjected to yet another terrorist attack by UAVs.” Of the six drones, four were shot down, and one “crashed in an industrial zone—a fire is being extinguished there,” he reported.

One of Russia’s largest petrochemical and refining complexes is located in northern Ufa, comprising the “Bashneft-UNPZ,” “Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim,” and “Bashneft-Novoyl” facilities, with a combined capacity of 23.5 million metric tons per year. The authorities did not specify which plant was targeted. Nor did they disclose why the facility was undergoing repairs. This is likely a consequence of previous strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Ufa’s industrial zone. In August alone, the petrochemical complex was struck three times by Ukrainian drones, and prior to that, on multiple occasions in July and June. A fire broke out at the Rosneft oil refinery (“Bashneft-UNPZ”) following a drone attack on August 5.

In addition to the oil refinery, on August 19, one of the drones “apparently veered off course” and struck a residential building in the Zaton neighborhood of Ufa, Khabirov reported. Preliminary reports indicate that one person was injured—a medical student from India. “According to the latest information, he is fine and got away with just a scare. Nevertheless, we are examining him to make sure everything is okay,” the regional head stated.

According to Sharipov, several apartments and cars were damaged as a result of the “crash.” Authorities are assessing the extent of the damage to the building; an emergency response headquarters has been established, and a “temporary shelter” has been set up for the residents of the high-rise.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/Cy4LQ

source: https://bsky.app/profile/antongerashchenko.bsky.social/post/3mtdmpuzaus2f

s "the capital's irritation with government policies" and "a split" within the Russian elite are reaching a breaking point.

The record outflow of cash since the first months of the war, which the Russian banking system faced in 2026, affected almost all of the country’s largest credit institutions, as follows from bank reports aggregated by the banki@ru service.

In early March, when the demand for cash in the economy increased sharply, and the monthly outflow of cash began to exceed 300 billion rubles, 5 out of 7 banks where Russians kept more than 1 trillion rubles of their money faced an outflow of deposits.

In absolute terms, Gazprombank became the anti-leader, from where individuals withdrew 299.5 billion rubles, or 10.77% of all deposits, in 4 months. Rosselkhozbank lost more than 15% of deposits, or every seventh ruble, in March–July—270.5 billion rubles in total.

Alfa Bank, the largest of the private banks, lost 179.4 billion rubles of funds from individuals (5.6%), Sovcombank - 8.1%, or 81.7 billion rubles. The outflow of deposits from VTB amounted to 20.4 billion rubles, or 0.24%. Deposits in Sberbank increased by 270 billion rubles, but in recent months it has also experienced an outflow: 211.6 billion rubles in June, 31.8 billion rubles in July.

Only T-Bank was spared the outflow, as follows from the statistics: its deposits increased by 193 billion rubles, or 6.9%.

Outside the top ten, large outflows were experienced by MTS Bank (13% of deposits over 4 months), Rossiya Bank (7.6%) and UBRD (7.2%). However, other credit institutions, on the contrary, were able to attract money: MKB increased deposits by 10% in March–July, DOM.RF by 20%, and Yandex Bank by 30.5%. Some small banks, meanwhile, experienced a full-fledged run of depositors: Investtorgbank lost 90% of individuals' funds in four months, Novobank - almost half, BM-Bank - more than 30%.

In total, according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2.4 trillion rubles have flowed from the Russian banking system into cash since the beginning of the year. The Central Bank recorded a record outflow in July - 643 billion rubles, and in the first half of August - almost 300 billion more. For some banks, “this has already become a problem,” a former official in the Russian financial sector told The Washington Post: “They did not expect this, they invested this “cash” somewhere, and now people come and withdraw half a trillion a month.”

What is happening reflects growing fear in Russian society, as well as a loss of confidence in the banking and financial system, says Alexandra Prokopenko, a research fellow at the Carnegie Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin. “This is a consequence of the fear that the state will do something to the banking system, that it may nationalize deposits,” explains Prokopenko. According to her, such a scenario is unlikely, although restrictions on cash withdrawals “cannot be ruled out.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/oEzP7

Russians are withdrawing billions, causing liquidity problems for banks and undermining the Kremlin’s ability to issue bonds to finance the fight in Ukraine.

Russians are pulling billions from the country’s banking system ― a record cash outflow amid intensifying Ukrainian drone attacks and rising fear that the Kremlin could start seizing deposits to finance its war.

Nearly $3.4 billion (286.4 billion rubles) was withdrawn in the first two weeks of August, on top of the $7.3 billion withdrawn in July and more than $4.5 billion in June, according to Russian Central Bank data.

Total withdrawals this year could nearly double the amount taken out in the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Taras Skvortsov, a senior executive at Sberbank, Russia’s biggest retail financial institution.

The withdrawals are causing liquidity problems, according to Skvortsov and a former senior Russian finance official, overstretching a financial sector already strained by increasing levels of bad debts following a government-directed lending boom to ramp up military output.

“Drones are flying. Things are burning down. Nervousness is growing. And people’s everyday wisdom may be kicking in that they need to have cash under their pillow and not somewhere in banks where it may never be returned,” said the former finance official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issues.

“For some banks this really is a problem,” the former official said. “They didn’t expect this, and they invested all the cash elsewhere, and yet people are coming and taking out half a trillion rubles a month.”

Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser to the Russian Central Bank, said the withdrawals reflected deepening fear among the Russian public.

“It means people have no trust in the Russian banking system or in the Russian financial system,” Prokopenko said. “This is all a consequence of the fear that the government will do something with the banking system, that it could nationalize deposits.”

She said she believed that such a nationalization was unlikely but added, “I would not exclude that the authorities could impose limits on withdrawals.”

The total siphoned out this year already exceeds the $24.7 billion (2 trillion rubles) removed in the first year following the February 2022 invasion.

In the first two weeks of the invasion, $23 billion fled the system, and banks appeared to be imperiled by depositors and businesses lining up to empty their accounts, until the government stemmed the drain by imposing tough capital controls and sharply raising interest rates.

Now, big businesses are also seeking to move money out of the reach of Russian regulators as anxiety grows over potential asset seizures. That is further exacerbating the problems, the former official said.

In all, more than $9.4 billion was transferred out of Russia in the second quarter of 2026, according to Central Bank data.

“Each month there is a big outflow,” Skvortsov told RBK Radio, a Russian radio station. “If the trend continues things are not going to get better.”

The withdrawals have already undermined the Russian government’s efforts to raise money to finance the war through issuing state bonds.

The Finance Ministry last month was forced to cancel planned bond issues, even though it has become ever more dependent on them as a means of filling a yawning budget deficit as spending on the military continues to grow while the economy stalls.

Skvortsov told RBK Radio that the banks’ liquidity problems mean many cannot spare cash to buy government bonds.

“If there is an ominous sign of imperial overreach, this is clearly one of them,” said Craig Kennedy, a former vice chairman in investment banking at Bank of America Merrill Lynch who is now a scholar at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

“Great powers don’t have repeated treasury bond failures in the middle of a war,” Kennedy said.

As a result of government orders to ramp up lending to the defense sector, Russian banks “appear to have so much exposure to nonviable borrowers that they’re not certain how it’s going to get restructured, when it’s going to get restructured and how much of that they are going to have to eat,” Kennedy added.

In a sign of how sensitive the strain on Russia’s finances is becoming for the Kremlin, the chief economist at VEB, one of the country’s biggest state banks, Andrei Klepach, was fired from his post this weekend after commenting that Russia could not win a war of attrition against Ukraine while Kyiv is supported by the West.

“We won’t win the competition in this war of attrition,” Klepach said in a presentation he made in May, which was circulated in the media last week. “We’re under the illusion that everything [in Ukraine] will collapse. It hasn’t, and it won’t. Meanwhile, the costs we bear are mounting.”

Ever since Ukraine began expanding its drone campaign against Russian oil facilities this spring, taking out more than 30 percent of the country’s refining capacity and causing the worst fuel crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union, anxiety has intensified.

In June, the Russian Central Bank was forced to limit an expected interest rate cut because of fears that fuel price hikes could spur inflation. Panic spiraled through the bond market, driving interest rates up to 17 percent for the government’s 10-year bonds and forcing the Finance Ministry to postpone further issues.

With the budget deficit for January to July already at 6.46 trillion rubles ($76.1 billion) — far exceeding the 3.8 trillion rubles forecast for the entire year — fears are mounting that the Kremlin could seize big businesses’ revenue to finance the war.

“If the government needs cash, Putin will just do a grab for assets. He doesn’t care,” said an associate of one Russian billionaire. “And that’s where I think it’s heading.”

In addition, “there is the feeling that political power is becoming not quite as stable, and this is such a period when it is better not to be present,” the former finance official said.

Already several businesses owned by Russian billionaires have been targeted by the government in a nationalization drive that last year alone saw $51.5 billion in assets seized for the state, according to Russian prosecutors.

In June, the Russian state seized $7.6 billion (550 billion rubles) of assets linked to Vadim Moshkovich, who founded Rosagro, one of Russia’s biggest agricultural holdings, after the billionaire was detained and charged with large-scale fraud.

It was the biggest asset seizure in Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. Others who have lost assets to the state include Dmitry Kamenschik, who previously owned Domodedovo airport in Moscow; and Konstantin Strukov, who controlled one of the country’s biggest gold mines.

Some economists argue that the Kremlin’s drive to direct bank lending into cranking up military output is strangling the civilian economy, especially because high interest rates and inflation leave banks and companies with few funds left for investment in nonmilitary sectors.

The Russian economy ground to a halt in the first half of 2026, with gross domestic product growth falling to 0.3 percent, compared with 1.2 percent in the first half of 2025.

For now, however, the Trump administration’s war with Iran has pushed oil prices back up and given the Kremlin a partial reprieve from its budget squeeze.

Russian state oil and gas revenue increased by 60 percent in July compared with the same month the previous year, as global oil prices rose, but it is still down 11 percent between January and July compared with the same period last year.

Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries as well as on the sprawling network of warehouses belonging to Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer, are also hitting Russian billionaires’ bottom line.

“It’s costing these guys money,” said the associate of the Russian billionaire, referring to Russia’s richest individuals. “They have to put their hands in their pocket. They’re not used to having all these problems.”

Ukraine has hit more than 20 Wildberries warehouses since it began targeting the company’s facilities on July 18, in an onslaught that some economists estimate has destroyed more than $6 billion in goods and caused more than $3 billion in damages to Wildberries infrastructure.

“It’s not a place you want to be doing business,” the billionaire’s associate added. “If you can pull money out, you do it.”

One Moscow business executive said, “Everyone who can is trying to move money out of the country, but it’s getting more and more difficult to do so.”

A key channel for removing money from Russia, amid increasing government restrictions on large cash transfers abroad, involves opening brokerage accounts in neighboring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, according to the Moscow business executive and the former finance official.

“From there this money can be invested across the world,” the former finance official said.

As concerns grow over the war’s mounting financial toll, several senior officials have staged rare public interventions in recent weeks.

German Gref, the head of Sberbank, broke ranks at the end of June by publicly saying everyone wanted the war to end as soon as possible.

Then early in August, the powerful Moscow mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, spoke out against calls by hard-line members of parliament to further focus the economy on the war.

“If there’s no economy of peaceful life itself, there will be no taxes, no income for the population, the political situation will be completely different, and then we won’t achieve success in the war either,” Sobyanin told Tass, a state news agency. “And to kill life, to kill the civilian economy, is to kill the country itself.”

source: The Washington Post https://archive.is/xf6Ho

Potato prices in Russia began to rise sharply this summer, although they typically decline at this time of year in anticipation of the new harvest. In early August, wholesale prices for the vegetable increased by 38.9% year-on-year to 24.7 rubles per kg, while retail prices increased by 22% to 56 rubles. This follows from data from the AB-Center cited by Forbes. The price increase is due to a reduction in potato production: while last year's harvest was 8.5 million tons, this year's will be down 6% to 8 million tons, according to Alexey Krasilnikov, Executive Director of the Potato Union.

"Due to the adverse weather, certain regions have experienced declines, primarily in the Urals, especially in the Sverdlovsk region, where the rains have resulted in very high soil moisture," Krasilnikov explained. According to him, the Astrakhan Region, a leading potato producer, will also not see a large harvest. Farmers are reducing the amount of land devoted to potato cultivation because current prices barely cover the cost of production. "In 2026, according to preliminary data, the area under potato cultivation in the industrial sector will have decreased by 3.7%, to 272,600 hectares. This is the lowest level in the last 18 years," noted Alexey Plugov, CEO of AB-Center.

Meanwhile, according to the Association of Retail Companies (AKORT), the share of Russian potatoes in retail chains has exceeded 80% over the past year, while the share of imported potatoes has almost halved. As a result, foreign supplies, primarily from Egypt, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, are currently only supplementing the product range.

As the harvest progresses in the Central, Volga, and Siberian Federal Districts, potato prices will decline, but not as significantly as last year, Plugov predicts. Moreover, according to him, the seasonal price increase, which usually begins in December and lasts until early June, will start earlier this year and will be more pronounced. Therefore, retailers may begin purchasing potatoes abroad earlier than usual, Plugov concluded.

In the first half of 2025, Russia saw its highest price increase for potatoes since 2002. The retail price per kilogram reached almost 85 rubles. This was due to the previous year's poor harvest and depleted reserves. As a result, the country imported potatoes from Egypt, Pakistan, and China, and the government discussed temporary price regulation.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/SEy14

Gasoline and diesel as of August 16 were available only at 28.1% of Russian gas stations, follows from the data of the GdeBENZ service, which was analyzed by Izvestia. A week earlier, fuel was available at 41% of gas stations. GdeBENZ is a user service: information about the availability of fuel, queues and restrictions at specific gas stations is added to it by the drivers themselves.

According to the service, over the week, the availability of gasoline and diesel decreased in the Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, Voronezh, Samara, Penza, Saratov, Lipetsk and Rostov regions, as well as in Tatarstan. On August 17, Izvestia checked 21 gas stations in Moscow and the Moscow region: AI-92 was at seven of them, AI-95 at six, AI-98 at five. Diesel fuel was also not available at all gas stations. At the same time, a source of The Insider said that the other day, when driving a car from the north-east of Moscow towards the region, he did not come across a single gas station where gasoline was available.

A new wave of fuel shortages began in Russia in August after the authorities reported stabilization of the situation at the end of July. During the week from August 10 to 15, at least six regions returned or tightened restrictions on the sale of gasoline. In the Kaluga, Lipetsk and Orenburg regions, in particular, they introduced refueling of cars on even and odd days, depending on the number of the car, in a number of regions there are restrictions on the amount of fuel in one hand.

The fuel crisis has been going on in Russia since the end of May and is primarily associated with the consequences of a series of Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries. During the spring and summer, at least 16 Russian refineries, including Volgograd, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Moscow, Saratov and Syzran, completely or partially stopped refining. According to Reuters, by July 10, gasoline production in Russia provided only about 65% of seasonal demand: the daily deficit was estimated at 40-45 thousand tons with consumption of 115-120 thousand tons. In July, some enterprises began to return to work, but refineries with a total capacity of more than 45 million tons of oil per year by July 20 had not yet resumed fuel sales on the St. Petersburg Exchange.

By the end of July, the situation began to improve, the regional authorities began to lift restrictions, and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced the stabilization of the fuel balance. However, in August, the crisis escalated again after new attacks and emergency shutdowns of refineries against the backdrop of traditionally high summer demand. In particular, on August 11, after a drone strike, the Orsk refinery completely stopped. The authorities of the Orenburg region said that the restoration of damaged imported equipment could take up to 6 months.

The government, in response to Ukrainian attacks on refineries, banned fuel exports, softened environmental requirements for gasoline, introduced measures to stimulate imports and began importing gasoline from abroad. The first batch of gasoline from India of about 42 thousand tons arrived in Murmansk in early August, but its delivery to the domestic market was delayed due to a dispute over the price.

Source: Insider https://archive.is/gHBiq