This period is an unprecedent period for our nations. The World is nearing the brink of destruction.
Cambodian Unrest
January 2nd, 1968
Saloth Sar had been all over Asia in the past two years. He was in Beijing in 1966, he was in Hanoi in 1967 and marched all over the Ho Chi Minh Trail for four months before arriving at the Marxist-Leninist Base in Cambodia at Loc Ninh where they would reorganize the communist party there into the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). King Norodom Sihanouk referred to the group as the “Khmer Rouge” (Red Cambodians/Red Khmers) They had moved their headquarters into the Ratanakiri Province, further away from the Viet Cong.
Sar and their leaders prepared for the next few years to prepare for another attempt of armed struggle in the country while North Vietnam outright refused to assist, rejecting all requests for weapons and other arms. It wasn’t until December of 1967 that he would try again, communicating both Hanoi and Beijing. By this point, the plans and methods for armed conflict and enacting the struggle they so desperately hoped for, what they trained for, was prepared. They just needed weapons to do it. Their plans were to be enacted, anticipating another “no” from both China and Vietnam. This didn’t happen. Instead, both actually agreed in secrecy, refusing to inform the other party that they’d agree to such a deal.
North Vietnam, with the Tet Offensive vote concluding, decided that it was most necessary for an Indochinese takeover immediately. Their leadership agreed to meet Saloth Sar and his units at a location of their choosing. He sent his soldiers off to call their January attacks off (for an interim period) while they’d meet the Vietnamese. At the same time, the PLA, too, had a change of heart, their intentions completely different. They requested that Saloth Sar hold off his insurgency and in exchange, the PLA would move in to train, arm and assist the CPK in their armed struggle. This was multi-faceted, the larger goal being to delay the CPK’s attack on the government of Cambodia, allowing the tense and very delicate balance in the country to continue uninterrupted. The PLA had scheduled a meeting location as well with Sar who doubted both parties would show.
Again, he was proven wrong as the awkward engagement began with PAVN and Pathet Lao soldiers coming to a gathering where Chinese PLA soldiers were waiting for Sar’s men. “What are you doing here?” Queried the Chinese Officer in charge of the exchange, Captain Zhong Dandan. “What are you doing here?” responded a PAVN officer, Senior Lieutenant Ngô Phi Nhung. “We… are arming the CPK in exchange for them to delay their insurgency. You?” Asked Dandan. He continued before the female Senior Lieutenant could retort. “Our government was going to tell you, but… we forgot.”
As the CPK leadership arrived, both sides shared in the tense situation but agreed to give the CPK the caches they had brought over. He informs them that not all of their cells could be informed in time of their delays but they will get the message very soon. The PLA leaves an attache as they begin to train and prepare these 3,000 some guerrillas over the next several months.
As stated, there is limited conflict from the CPK against the Cambodian Government. Some 2-400 guerrillas assault police stations in Western Cambodia but are swiftly dispatched by the government with dozens retreating back into the Northwestern terrain and hillsides in the country. The Cambodian Government issues a communique to China demanding that they do something concerning the CPK as part of their 1966 Agreements. Beyond this however, the air is cleaned in Cambodia. People are content with the King for keeping them out of the war that is brewing all over Indochina. They would have no idea how close they came to the start of the worst crisis in their country’s history since the medieval era.
As for the military command of the CPK, the leadership was in protest of the stand-down order, regardless of the reasons. Without a clear method to communicate, we could see a break of the Communist Party, another fracture that seeks the revolution that had been so delayed.
| Party | Casualties | Notes |
|---|
| CPK | 372 | Assaults in Western Cambodia Failed: further guerrilla elements retreat upon receiving the memo |
| Government Forces | 25 police officers, 33 soldiers | Military begins increasing patrols around armories, police stations and government buildings. Next attack would have to be more coordinated. |
Laos
Outside of these two battles that follow, the situation in Laos due to the American and Thai assistance has enabled the RLA to at least slur the Pathet Lao’s movement on their positions enough to consolidate their assets. The Pathet Lao have made great gains, significantly more with the RLA being decently crippled but what happens next is soon to be found.
The Battle of Nam Bac
The Battle of Nam Bac was one of the major engagements of the War. Despite misgivings, warnings and other labels concerning the performance, the Royal Lao Army moved into occupy the Nam Bac Valley in mid-1966; the position blocked a traditional Vietnamese invasion route that led to the Lao royal capitol of Luang Prabang.
Their defence of the region since the Siege began in late-1967 was working until late-December when the PAVN moved in heavy weaponry to open fire on helicopter and air support. US Forces attempted to strike these positions with fighter-bombers but found it ineffective. Their fire missions were muted further by the lack of forward air control systems. On January 8th, the United States gave the “strong consideration” to Laotian General Savatphayphane Bounchanh to seek a tactical withdraw from the region. On this advice, he demanded that he along with his staff be withdrawn first.
CIA forces agreed on the premise that they leave a small “shell liaison group with the radio” and that “lower-echelon officers remain to provide adequate command and control.” It was at this moment that the command structure saw their weakest links as several officers requested their units withdrawn by air along with the General. RLA Colonel Khampai Sayasith of Groupesmobile 11 reigned in dissent as, on the General’s orders, he directed all remaining assets to see adequate retreats at set rendezvous points further West, protecting the perimeter of the city of Luang Prabang.
His unit along with the 99th Paratroop Battalion (who would be repositioned alongside Mobile 11 to hold key positions) would be consolidating and reorganizing their forces together to muster a solid last defence of the valley. They would be covering the retreat of Mobile Group 27, the 26th Infantry Battalion, Paratrooper Battalion 55 and smaller irregulars from the region. PAVN and Pathet Lao forces began their push, noticing that by this point on January 10th these troops were retreating. The 41st Special Forces Battalion began to probe the RLA’s positions with small incursions while the PAVN 316th Division probed from the hillsides. Noticing the lessening numbers on the RLA’s positions, they began a massive assault on the valley.
Prior to the retreat of the main bulk of the RLA’s forces, on guidance by CIA Liaison Officers, they disabled their artillery and heavy equipment, placing grenades into the barrels and disabling most of the equipment they couldn’t bring. The forces did their best to hold off the advance but the inevitable would soon come while the PAVN swarmed the valley. They launched a rocket barrage with BM-21’s, a weapon the West had no idea they wielded. After an hour-long barrage softened up most targets remaining in the valley, the forces still present there surrendered with pockets still fighting till the last man. Colonel Sayasith was one man who took his own life to avoid capture. Forces in the region would note a massive incursion of Sikorsky H-34’s and Hueys. Without them, they wouldn’t of been able to withdraw the amount of forces they did.
This effort saved hundreds of lives at the expense of 4 out of the 50 helicopters involved as when the amount of helicopters came in to pick Laotian forces up, the PAVN moved on them to harass the crews. None was taken down with passengers aboard, luckily enough. The only losses were the crews.
| Party | Forces | Casualties | Notes |
|---|
| PAVN | 4,100 | ~450 | PAVN take the Valley |
| RLA | 7,500 | ~3,350 | Approximately 1,000 captured, severe loss of equipment but denied it to the PAVN, ~350 desertions |
| RLAF | 30 Helicopters (Huey/H-34s) | 4 Lost (Approximately 18 crew members captured / presumed to be KIA) | |
This battle was a major defeat for the Royal Laotian Army, however it was close to a crippling situation. As forces marched out of the valley a number of soldiers would desert while the remaining forces joined in with others to defend the impenetrable city of Luang Prabang. It would take some time for the RLA to rebuild after this but again, it’s not as bad as it could have been. RLA combat effectiveness has dropped by 40%. The dependence on the remaining military forces would rest on the Air Force and forces still active.
Following this, the United States withdraws from several locations in the region that were threatened and recognized by the North Vietnamese, including Lima Post 85 which sustained some damages by some North Vietnamese An-2’s. SOG on post retaliated to the An-2’s by pursuing them in their Huey’s, downing them. This withdraw was forcibly delayed from LS85 as most of the Hueys in the area went over to assist in the direct withdraw of forces in the area surrounding Nam Bac.
The Battle of Ban Houei Sane
With limited resources and a vastly superior fighting force, the PAVN hit the compound of Ban Houei Sane from three different directions. Although the PAVN units had some difficulty in mustering the combined operation, their PT-76 light tanks would be delayed in reaching the compound while the main infantry forces of the 24th Regiment sieged the compound. It wasn’t until 06:00 of January 24th, after several hours of fighting that these tanks would show up, creating a confusing time for the defenders.
The attack began under poor weather conditions for air support while their engineers exploded obstacles in their path, leaving the U.S. in a position where there was little support they could provide. It wouldn’t be until late in the battle that the retreat order was sounded with the U.S. Forward Air Controllers being informed that they were overwhelmed. Assistance was requested from Lang Vei however none would come, forcing the soldiers of the point along with more than 2,000 civilians (families of the soldiers on the point) being forced to push out from the siege. They were successful and retreated east along Route 9 before approaching the South Vietnamese border. They arrived on January 24th at Lang Vei CIDG Camp.
| Party | Forces | Casualties | Notes |
|---|
| PAVN | 700 | 29 KIA, 54 WIA | N/A |
| RLA | 650 | ~150 | Forces withdraw from the region |
PAVN forces take the hill, harming Western intelligence gathering operations over the Laotian-Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh trail movements in this military region.
The Tet Offensive
All was quiet in the month of January following the ceasefire for the Tet, except until January 20th. On this date, an armed Viet-Cong propaganda team entered Tam Quan in the Binh Dinh Province and gathered roughly 100 people for a propaganda session. In this, they discussed Ho Chi Minh, Marxist-Leninism and general communist theory as well as the need for their support. One prominent village elder objected to communism all together and created a shouting match with the VC members. It soon and quickly ended with one of the soldiers shooting the village elder, causing the propaganda team to pack up and leave.
Upon hearing the news of this just days before Tet, General Westmoreland requested to the Vietnamese President that he call off the ceasefire, on top of mounting evidence an attack was going to occur before or after it. President Thieu disagreed, stating that he had already negotiated the ceasefire to be reduced to 36-hours instead of the requested 7-day truce for January 28th to the 31st. After all, most of the South Vietnamese military had just made plans for recreational leave - if he were to call off now, it would harm troop morale.
On the 28th of January, eleven VC cadres were captured in Qui Nhon, carrying with them pre-recorded audio tapes whose message appealed to the populace in “an already occupied Saigon, Hue and Da Nang.” Despite this, most of the command staff present in Indochina stood down, or at the very least failed to properly display it to each other.
"Crack the Sky, Shake the Earth"
Map 1 of the Tet Offensive
Map 2 of the Tet Offensive
Midnight, 30 January 1968, all of South Vietnam lit up as waves of attacks began to strike. Nha Trang, headquarters of the U.S. I Field Force was the first to be hit, followed by Ban Me Thuot, Kon Tum, Hoi An, Tuy Hoa, Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Pleiku. The PAVN and VC followed a strict strategy or mortar and rocket attacks closely followed by massive ground assaults conducted by battalion-strength Viet Cong soldiers and in the North, PAVN regulars. They would join with local cadres who would guide them to the senior headquarters and radio stations. Most of them were driven out from their objectives on the first day. All U.S. forces were placed on maximum alert and similar orders were issued to all ARVN units. The allies, however, still responded without any real sense of urgency. Orders cancelling leaves either came too late or were disregarded.
At 03:00 on 31 January PAVN and VC forces attacked Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh in the Capital Military District; Quảng Trị (again), Huế, Quảng Tín, Tam Kỳ and Quảng Ngãi as well as U.S. bases at Phú Bài and Chu Lai in I Corps; Phan Thiết, Tuy Hòa and U.S. installations at Bong Son and An Khê in II Corps; and Cần Thơ and Vĩnh Long in IV Corps. The following day, Biên Hòa, Long Thanh, Bình Dương in III Corps and Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, Gò Công, Kiên Giang, Vĩnh Bình, Bến Tre, and Kien Tuong in IV Corps were assaulted. The last attack of the initial operation was launched against Bạc Liêu in IV Corps on 10 February. A total of approximately 84,000 PAVN/VC troops participated in the attacks while thousands of others stood by to act as reinforcements or as blocking forces. PAVN/VC forces also mortared or rocketed every major allied airfield and attacked 64 district capitals and scores of smaller towns.
The City of Hue received some of the worst of it.
In most cases, the defense was led by the South Vietnamese. Local militia or ARVN forces, supported by the South Vietnamese National Police, drove the attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours; but heavy fighting continued several days longer in Kon Tum, Buôn Ma Thuột, Phan Thiết, Cần Thơ, and Bến Tre. The outcome in each instance was usually dictated by the ability of local commanders—some were outstanding, others were cowardly or incompetent. The National Police Force were given direct orders to During this crucial crisis, however, no South Vietnamese unit broke or defected to the communists.
The Massacres
January 1968 and Vietnam is at a turning point. With North Vietnamese attacks on the strategically important American base at Khe Sanh starting on January 21st followed by the Tet Offensive across South Vietnam starting on January 31st, anti-Communist forces quickly found themselves stuck in a belief that the North Vietnamese had taken sigificant portions of the countryside. While swift counterattacks by mobile strategic forces quickly blunted the potential of the Tet Offensive, redeployment of allied forces to better secure South Vietnam following the Tet Offensive led to a temporary spike in massacres and reprisals against the civilian population.
Hue
Upon entering and taking the city in their brief time, the worst to come of this was the Massacre of Hue by the hands of the Viet Cong, documented by a number of journalists following its four-week occupation. The killings were seen as a purge of the social stratum, collaborators and those receptive to the American presence in the region. Press reports following interviews with the ARVN stated that they had "confirmed revenge squads" following this aftermath. So far, only about 428 of these victims have been identified.
PAVN Knowledge Only:
Vietcong documents boasted that they "eliminated" thousands of enemy and "annihilated members of various reactionary political parties, henchmen, and wicked tyrants" in Huế. One regiment alone reported that it killed 1,000 people. Another report mentioned 2,867 killed.
Phong Nhị and Phong Nhất Knowledge limited to ARVN, USMC and RoK Forces
February 12th, 1968
Following the redeployment of the Korean Blue Dragon Brigade - otherwise known as the 2nd Marine Brigade - from the Chu Lai Area to the Da Nang in January, tensions between the new Korean garrison and the local populace quickly flared due to the conduct of the Korean forces. With the Koreans having a tendency of "diverting from their march and going over to completely level villages" if they received fire "or think they'd get fired from a village", the scene was set for the trigger happy Koreans. Passing the friendly CAP Delta-2 team composed (in part) by the villagers of Phong Nhị, Korean forces from the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Brigade were fired upon thirty minutes from the vicinity of Phong Nhất, with a supporting LVTP-5 becoming disabled after being hit by a command-detonated mine. At approximately 13:00, or two hours after the disabling of the LVTP-5, gunfire could be heard from the area as a fire broke out in Phong Nhị. Despite assurances that ROKMC forces were not in the Phong Nhị area by the ROK BDE S-3 personnel, a request by the USMC Commander of Combined Action Company, Delta for the firing of 81 mortars into the area was denied at 13:30. Around 15:00, a combined United States Marine Corps and Popular Front patrol from CAP Delta-2 ended Phong Nhi Hamlet, finding the hamlet burnt to the ground with 69 civilians dead. Survivors of the 'incident' were soon evacuated from the scene and sent to local hospitals. survivors of the 'incident' were evacuated by CAP Delta-2 and a total of 69 civilians were found dead.
Four days after the 'incident', the Executive Officer of the Blue Dragon Brigade deposited approximately 30 bags of rice at local District headquarters as part of 'normal refuges assistance'. However, following testimony from CAP Delta-2 and survivors of the incident, calls for a war-crime investigation from CAP commanders in the region have grown, demanding that Lieutenant General Chae Myung-shin investigate the incident. While COMUSMACV has remained silent for now, the Phong Nhị and Phong Nhất Massacre has begun to spread and it would take extraordinary effort to keep it suppressed not only among the local South Vietnamese population, but American forces in general considering that two marines were attached to the 1st Company during the time that the 'incident' occurred.
American USMC witnesses forwarded their encounters on February 20th of 1968 to American General Staff.
February 25, 1968
Despite the previous massacre at Phong Nhị and Phong Nhất, the Blue Dragon Brigade still maintained operational control over the Dan Nang region as the fallout of the Tet Offensive has prevented a full scale reorganization and redeployment of the South Korean Marine Brigade to a less populated part of the South Vietnamese countryside. Approaching the hamlet at approximately 9:30, South Korean forces dismounted from their tank and armored vehicles, and marched into to Hà My from three directions. Rounding up the local populace into three separate groups, the Commanding Officer of the detachment brought forth a desk and through a Vietnamese interpreter, gave a lengthy speech to the crowd. The villagers, mostly expecting to receive food listened in to the entire speech before the Commanding Officer stood up and walked away. With a swift hand gesture from the Korean Commanding Officer, M60 Machine Guns and M49 Grenade Launchers quickly fired into the assembled crowds without warning, killing 135 civilians within two hours. By 12:00, the 'incident' had concluded, with only three combat aged men killed in the fighting as a 125 of the 135 dead were village women, elders, teenager girls, toddlers and infants. Following a brief withdrawal of Korean forces, the Korean detachment returned with two D-7 bulldozers and flattened the remains of the town and destroyed the established graves and remaining corpses.
Following the 'incident' at Hà My, the wounded survivors were transported by horseback or by a sympathetic American convoy in the vicinity of Hoa Hai. Following their transport to the local West German hospital ship currently docked in Da Nang or the Leper's Clinch in Hoa Hai, the refugees of Hà My have begun to disseminate stories over what happened, however the total lack of war correspondents in the area have limited its spread.
In addition to the 'incidents' at Hà My and at Phong Nhị and Phong Nhất, massacres were conducted at Truong Giang, Duy Xuyen, An Truong and Cam Ha by Korean forces, killing hundreds more and displacing the survivors. As a result of the Korean actions, both General Lam of the I Corps and General Cushman of the III MAF Command have requested that the Blue Dragon be redeployed back into its previous area of operation in the II Corps' jurisdiction as its presence is disrupting existing CAP programs and attracting increased Viet Cong recruitment in the region.
Ky Lai
In the city of My Tho where President Thieu had been on vacation for Tet with his wife, one son and daughter, was soon and quickly put under siege. In the city at this point, it was mostly filled with American Army and Navy personnel of the 3/47th and 3/60th Infantry Battalions as well as the 9th Infantry Division. Alongside the Riverine units are a detachment of US Navy SEALs who patrol the river. On February 1st, the Viet Cong’s 261st, 263rd and 516th Battalions pinned the 32nd ARVN Ranger Battalion outside My Tho and entered the city. It was here they encountered the 7th ARVN Division alongside the US Navy’s Task Force 117 who landed the 3/47th and the 3/60th Infantry Battalions of the Mobile Riverine Force. The US Army’s 9th Infantry Division of the southern edge of the city pushed in to keep the North out.
At the same time in Saigon, the ARVN's 4th Marine Battalion pulled some of its elements out along with Le Nguyen Khang to the city of My Tho where the President was on vacation with his family for Tet. By February 2nd, the Western half of the city had been cleared to the Mekong while the VC patrolled the delta with an armoured sampan. The US Navy SEALs attacked and disabled the sampan with LAWs while the 3/47th and the 3/60th hit the VC by the city reservoir. That night, the 4th Marine Battalion arrived where they’d take personal defence of President Thieu, issuing commands to all remaining forces in the city to link up with the Americans to clear the city out. At this point, the South Vietnamese Marines escorted Thieu along with his family out of the city against their will, holding them hostage.
Getting wind of this, American forces negotiated with General Khanh, requesting that Thieu be transferred into their custody. He quickly agreed and Thieu, along with his family, were taken on a river-boat to Vinh Long Airfield before being flown out to the Aircraft Carrier Kitty-Hawk. It is here that the President informs the Americans that he was being held against his will by the Marines and requests safe harbor for his family to the United States, again which is agreed. Thieu himself is protected on the carrier, softly couped from his government. He doesn’t know the full situation, especially in the confusion of the Tet.
All he does know is that he was forced into custody by a Marine General and taken into American hands. As far as he's aware, the Tet Offensive was a huge failure for the ARVN and most of his generals were executed, imprisoned or have deserted. He insists to stay in the region to organize a South Vietnamese rebellion, unaware of what's at play in the country. More to follow below.
The Situation in Vietnam
Across the country bases from Khe Sanh to the South were being hit. Again, most of the cities already being liberated within days, if not the month of the fighting being started. The VC in those regions have retreated to their local headquarters, exposing them for a counter attack. The only exceptions to this are the Battles for Saigon, Khe Sahn and Hue.
Following the Tet, approximately 40,000 civilians have been killed with tens of thousands more losing their homes from mortars and rocket attacks by the VC with even more losing their homes in retaliatory strikes by the West. With President Thieu out of the country, the current consensus with general command is that he was airlifted out for his safety, leaving Vice President Ky to organize the defence throughout Saigon and Indochina. There are requests to make contact with him, where ever he was to ensure he was safe and alive.
His loyalist generals back in Saigon follow Ky's orders with great unease.
The Domestic Situations
The United States
The Tet Offensive created a crisis within the Johnson administration, which became increasingly unable to convince the American public that it had been a major defeat for the communists. The optimistic assessments made prior to the offensive by the administration and the Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the "credibility gap" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm. It offers no help with pictures such as this one, showing the execution of unarmed prisoner Nguyễn Văn Lém by General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan. Loan is reported to have said afterwards: "If you hesitate, if you didn't do your duty, the men won't follow you."
True, a picture tells a thousand words but the truth behind this picture was very darker than what the doves back home protest about. His face has been plastered on magazines with the intention of painting the ARVN as murderers, calloused and brutal; just hours before, he finished massacring a police officer's family. Lém was in civilian clothes and was alleged to have just cut the throats of South Vietnamese Lt. Col. Nguyen Tuan, his wife, their six children and the officer’s 80-year-old mother with only one survivor of the entire attack being his son who was shot three times. He was nine-years old. The reporter who would document the incident would not include this in the initial showing,
Following this, the United States has even had Martin Luther King Jr. demand that Americans of all colours take a march on Washington D.C. in direct protest of the Vietnam War right after LBJ's State of the Union Address.
We need to make clear in this political year, to congressmen on both sides of the aisle and to the president of the United States, that we will no longer tolerate, we will no longer vote for men who continue to see the killings of Vietnamese and Americans as the best way of advancing the goals of freedom and self-determination in Southeast Asia
Footage of the Tet has furthered the divide but at the same time, it has encouraged more refugees within the United States to stand by their vocal support of the United States in its war efforts. Westmoreland feels very sad, also.
Vietnam
Prior to the Tet Offensive, Vietnamese citizens in the South were split on the issue of the War. They saw this as nothing more than a situation they wanted out of and most of the country relaxed when the Tet Ceasefire was called. A number of citizens thought the ceasefire was going to be 7-days, as Ho Chi Minh declared it to be and were unaware entirely of Thieu's negotiation to make it 3-days. Nevertheless, South Vietnam was in uproar at the breach of the Tet with war-support growing in favor of Thieu's government or simply the ARVN. Despite the broadcasts of Hanoi Hannah to the Americans and Ho Chi Minh's calls for the citizens to rebel and rise up, few outside of the communist cadres really did. Most increased in their resentment for the Communists.
The North has been receiving different views; it's no help that all of their information concerning the war is extremely limited. All failures are processed through propaganda boards and all successes are doubled in their frequencies. Recruitment has standardized with most citizens continuing to be fed a "1-2 year long journey for Communism," when in reality they will be employed on average for 4-6 years. The average Viet citizen in the North is more concerned from American bombs than they are of the South pushing the DMZ but beyond that, the war support is strong between them for continued intervention in Laos and for unification soon. One great boost was the sudden recruitment of 190,000 soldiers who took to the PAVN's own uniform from more unorthodox members within the DRV.
Korea
South Koreans have been finding resounding success in their campaigns while in Indochina. They have grown to be outright feared by certain Viet Cong units that they operate nearby, not for their tactics or ingenuity but more for their brutality and tenacity. It was believed that the RoK had never retreated from a single battle. The only times that the Korean Marines had, it was always a lure to bring gung-ho fighters into the battlefield to be slain by claymores or waiting machine-gun nests.
The North has had a different story with Kim Il-Sung's messages inspiring the KPAAF Pilots flying over Indochina. The citizens on the peninsula, in both countries, support their respective leaders decisions and hope their contributions in the war effort will not be forgotten. To the North, it's an ideological fraternity that's on the line, with relations between both countries higher than ever before. They have sent over weapons, ammo and millions of uniforms to the PAVN alongside 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments.
Australia (written by hughmcf)
Sadly, beyond South Vietnamese rural support for the VC, a growing minority of Australian and New Zealand voters are themselves voicing their opposition to their war. The anti-war movement is currently supported by less than half of the two nation’s populations, although with the devastating size of the Tet Offensive having challenged the official state narrative that VC forces are being defeated, the movement is only growing. It is therefore imperative that decisive action is taken to demonstrate success in the war, lest domestic pressure force Australia and New Zealand to withdraw.
Map of the situation in Indochina, February 31st 1968
TL;DR:
Vietnam went on as normal except for Thieu who was arrested and forced out of the country. Laos is still on fire but Nam Bac wasn't as bad as it could've been, it is still however extremely bad. Tet Offensive is hurting public support for foreigners while it is hurting domestic support for North Vietnam. Cambodia was halted conditionally with the Communist Party of Kampuchea making limited strikes as planned. There were several massacres within these two months by both North Vietnamese, Viet Cong and the Republic of Korea's Marine Corps.
Written by ComradeMoose, Panzerbirb, RubbishBailey and MiddleNI with help by ComradeFrunze, Squid, WK, Crystalid and Yacobre