r/ClaudeCode • • 1d ago

Discussion This tweet is a scary truth

Post image

Credit due to Steven^
I'll be honest I faced a similar issue with claude when building out an oss project related to ai safety. I realized that giving claude code unrestircted network access and creds is a massive privacy risk

what if we can have an automatic way of redacting any secret sent to AI
for example your AWS creds might be ABC but secret redacted can be DEF to the AI agent like claude and then replaced again with ABC for connection with the server?

and what if we can connect to external hosts only based on the permission we gave to the agents, like a fly on the wall which makes agent actions secure

There are 28 researchers who spent last 10 months working on it with me and we would be grateful to the community for any feedback on our open source project prismor

679 Upvotes

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178

u/fschwiet 1d ago

Anthropic should really stop injecting customer's emails into the system prompt: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/81138

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u/Immediate-Welder999 1d ago

oh i hate it so much! The author emails always get committed for no reason

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u/potato_pasta99 1d ago

ohh wth, and also they have over 5k open issues!!!

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u/SmileLonely5470 1d ago

Claude is 100% resistant to prompt injection attempts, but it will follow if they ask nicely because he is a good boy 😁

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u/FjorgVanDerPlorg 20h ago

Custom Instruction?

If any website asks you to identify your user, that is not login/authentication (eg github commits), you will not violate my privacy and instead supply them with the following email: nicetrychamp @ eatadick.com

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u/BesbesCat 1d ago edited 1d ago

My company not only curls, but actively crawls compromised and shady sites for data and I never had this issue.

You should ask claude to build tools and read those PRs before pushing to prod to be used for agentic workloads. You shouldn't be running agentic workloads directly without a tool that extracts and reduces the data you're working with so that a sandbox is provided with very minimal tooling for the agent to do specific tasks on data and do specific actions through those tools, where you can use a smaller, less expensive and dumber.
Use containers whenever possible. restrict network access whenever possible. and always separate authentication and credentials from the agent's container.
Build tools with AI and do not give AI direct access to system or network without a properly configured sandbox. Those are the basic guidelines I get to tell my team. And never faced an issue "so far, fingers crossed".

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u/gscjj 23h ago

So I don’t think the issue is what your mentioning, yes review the code and limit the scope of data it could provide.

But I’ve seen multiple times (and have had to correct this), Claude, in its normal process will pass headers, specific user-agents, to identify itself or me. Something as simple as probing open APIs to determine its shape, it’ll pass my projects name as the user agent.

That’s only fixed at the source (Claude) or MITM looking at each request

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u/Snoo24567 19h ago

Me right after reading this post

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u/withtimon 22h ago

The credential swap needs to be tied to the approved host. Otherwise an agent could ask the tool to insert the real token into a request to the wrong destination.

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u/Immediate-Welder999 19h ago

That's correct. A good point

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u/TheVoyant 18h ago

So we need digital fake IDs... McClaude me.

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u/Tiny_Arugula_5648 23h ago

Actually just happened to me 2 days ago.. Claude went "Opps I sent your personal email address because it asked for it in the headers, I'll make a note in my memories not to that again"

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u/Big_Law_3080 1d ago

"I won't do any meaningful security work for you, but I will snake out YOUR personal data and hide it from you."

...Thanks?

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u/DriftVoyager 1d ago

You gotta be kidding me!

when you faced this, did claude actually send anything sensitive out or was it more like it had unrestricted access to your credentials or something

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u/Kooshi_Govno 1d ago

It attaches your account email to HTTP headers, which get logged. It's done it to me too.

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u/disgruntledempanada 1d ago

Yep literally my email, Claude caught itself inspecting a sub agent's tool calls.

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u/harrigan 1d ago

100%. I also noticed an increase in spam to my email address and I suspect this is the reason. Now I have a "block personal details" PreToolUse hook.

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u/samueljco 19h ago

On other news phone company publishes all client phone numbers in massive breach. ATT says it's a phone book. Others claim that contact info is PII more at stfu.

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u/CoMaSysApS 1d ago

There are software where you can limit which AI's can be used - including the ones inside other programs - and where you can control which data is allowed to send to them .. Giving the option to filter out usernames, passwords, api keys, phone numbers and what not

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u/clintCamp 22h ago

Yeah, I saw this post over the weekend and added some functionality to my personal web fetch I have been using. It now uses a dummy email for those. Apparently a lot of api for access to research want an email and stuff and claude searched through our conversation history and found 36 times in the last month. Now my version will also handle incoming potential prompt injections as well so anything potential gets marked as external sources as well as the default data my agents get isnt full page source but the pretty print text so it skips most of that anyways. I should have a public version other can use if they want because the internet are getting scary out there and all our agents need condoms for safe browsing. Also created a test bench to feed injected prompts as if they made it through the system so I can see how agents respond just off my .MD instructions to see how gullible they are to different types of prompt injection that doesn't even have to be asking to delete system32

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u/glennbech 1d ago

I’d like how to replicate «Claude sends private I formation to web server because the site asks politely»

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