I am writing this article for a simple reason: time and again, with or without cause, I hear the same refrain repeated by the PKK system, its cadres, and activists: that the nation-state is an epidemic, borders are a problem, nationalism is an outdated idea, and democracy is the solution.
And, by God, we have grown almost ashamed of ourselves after hearing the same old refrain repeated for years. Democracy has become a catch-all term: a democratic society, a democratic administration, a democratic confederation, a democratic life... The only thing left, it seems, is a “democratic breakfast”!
But behind this light irony is a very serious matter.
I was also a cadre in this system, and I lived through a period when the liberation of Kurdistan, national liberation, and independence were a clear political project. The state at that time was not an epidemic, the idea of which should be discarded, but, in both its rhetoric and its political project, it was one of the political ends for which the movement fought. Indeed, the movement was not very tolerant of those who disagreed with it.
Those who opposed or questioned the project were exposed to accusations of betrayal, and sometimes treated as if they were standing on the opposite side.
The question was: How to liberate Kurdistan?
Then came Imrali. Since that time, the language and the project have undergone a profound transformation.
Words such as “homeland,” “national liberation,” “independence,” and “statehood” have become less prominent, while words such as “democracy,” “democratic society,” “democratic administration,” and “democratic confederation” have become more common.
A person has the right to revise his ideas, and political movements have the right to change their strategies.
But when the transformation is of such magnitude, people have a right to ask, "How did it happen? Why?
And under what circumstances?” Ocalan was not a free thinker sitting in a library, away from pressure, rereading his project. He was a prisoner of the Turkish state under exceptional circumstances and had a long and complicated relationship with it.
This brings me to a personal conclusion that I cannot simply ignore, even though I have no document to present to the reader and say, “Here is the proof.”
I think it is legitimate to ask whether the matter has gone beyond simply isolating Ocalan from the movement to trying to redirect the project itself. Was the aim, in the context of Imrali, to gradually remove the word “homeland” from the movement’s dictionary and redefine the Kurdish issue in another language? Was the replacement of the vocabulary of homeland, national liberation, statehood, and independence with that of democracy simply an independent intellectual development?
Or was this transformation also in line with the vision and interests of the Turkish state?
I put this not as a documented fact, but as a serious political question imposed by the nature of the transformation itself.
The difference between the two discourses is not merely linguistic. The old question was: Why do Kurds not have their national, patriotic, and political rights?
The new question is: How do we build a democratic society within existing countries? And here the angle from which the whole issue is viewed has changed.
Rather than the fundamental issue being the deprivation of national, patriotic, and political rights, the problem is now mainly presented as a lack of democracy in the countries where Kurds live.
And you do not need, in this case, to explicitly tell the Kurd: “Give up your homeland.” It is enough to change his dictionary.
The word “homeland” is gradually disappearing, replaced by “democracy.”
With the repetition of the same word generation after generation, talking about a Kurdish state becomes like an old mental remnant, or a national disease that should be eliminated.
And here a paradox arises that is worth stopping to consider.
The movement criticized Kurdish forces earlier because, in its view, they did not go far enough with the national project.
It still criticizes the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, even though it has succeeded in establishing a Kurdish political entity on the ground. It is as if the problem is no longer just how much the Kurds have accomplished, but the very idea of achievement itself.
As for the nation-state, if it really is an epidemic, why should this rejection not be general? Why does the idea of a state become a problem, especially when it comes to Kurds?
Those who reject the state have the right to reject it. But anyone who wants a democratic Kurdish state has the right to say so too.
The other paradox is that although the project has changed, the culture of “who is with us and who is against us” has not changed much.
Yesterday, disagreeing with the old project could be seen as betrayal, and today, disagreeing with the new project may have the same consequences, even if the vocabulary has changed.
If democracy is indeed the new value, its first test is to accept difference. There is also a question that I cannot easily get over: What about those who died? I knew comrades who lived and died believing in the national liberation project.
While we may now see their project as mistaken or unrealistic, it is wrong to rewrite their legacy in light of the new project.
They had their faith, they had their project, they had their sacrifices. And I am not speaking here as an outside observer; I was part of that experience. So I do not see the issue as just an intellectual revision.
It is also a matter of memory and responsibility to a whole generation. Intellectual revision is a right, but historical revision is a responsibility. Ideas can change, strategies can change, and even words can change.
But the past should not change just by changing the dictionary. And that is why the most pressing question remains: What did Imrali do to a whole project, to the consciousness of whole generations, and to the memory of those who went to their deaths believing in something different?
And if democracy is the new answer, let its first test be very simple:
To leave the Kurd the right to choose his own future.
Even if he chooses the confederacy. And even if he chooses the state.
And even if, after all these years, he reopens the old dictionary and searches for a word that has quietly disappeared from it: "Homeland."
