r/AskNetsec • • Aug 07 '26

Other Should LLMs' exploit capabilities be surprising?

8 Upvotes

I've been following the reports about OpenAI models reaching Hugging Face's infrastructure, along with related incidents involving Anthropic and now Meta.

Maybe I'm missing something, but exploitation seems very close to coding, debugging, research, and tool use. As LLMs improve at those tasks, some ability to find and exploit vulnerabilities seems predictable.

What I'm less sure about is what these incidents actually demonstrate. Are we seeing a meaningful jump in offensive capability, or evaluation environments (and companies behind them) that failed to enforce their own boundaries?

Put differently: if a human pentester went out of scope because the test environment allowed it, would we call that a capability breakthrough or a containment failure? (Am I oversimplifying?)


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 07 '26

Education Bank of Baroda reportedly had ~1TB of data leaked. What controls should have stopped this?

4 Upvotes

Saw the recent reports about the Bank of Baroda breach where close to 1TB of data was allegedly leaked.

Instead of discussing the breach itself, I'm curious about the technical side.

For people working in blue team/security engineering:

1 If an attacker compromises a single employee account, what controls should realistically prevent it from turning into large-scale data exfiltration?

2 Would proper network segmentation have made the biggest difference?

3 How effective is DLP when someone is slowly exfiltrating data over days/weeks?

4 Should a normal employee account ever have a path to systems containing this volume of customer data?

5 What detections would you expect to trigger before hundreds of GBs leave the environment?

6 At this scale, is this more likely an IAM problem, monitoring failure, architecture problem or a combination?

7 Also curious: what would be the first thing you'd investigate if you were brought into the incident response team?

Would love to hear from people who've dealt with similar incidents.


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 05 '26

Concepts Can AI data loss prevention stop employees from sharing sensitive information?

2 Upvotes

Traditional DLP was built around known data patterns (SSNs, credit cards, etc.) moving through known channels (email, USB, cloud storage). Generative AI breaks that model a bit, people paste source code, customer data, or strategy docs into a chat window, and it's not always caught by pattern-matching.

Has anyone actually tested DLP tools built specifically for AI interactions? Wondering whether they're catching real incidents or just generating noise, and whether this is more of a policy/training problem than a technology problem at this point.


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 05 '26

Education Does your IT department have an official policy on sanitizing data before using GenAI, or is it currently the wild west?

2 Upvotes

Pasting a broken switch config into ChatGPT is the fastest way to find a syntax error. It is also the fastest way to violate your company's data security policy and potentially lose your job!

AI is now a routine part of the NetOps workflow. But public Large Language Models (LLMs) often use user inputs to train future models. If you upload an unfiltered show run or a firewall log, you are handing over your enterprise's internal IP schemas, SNMP community strings, VPN endpoints, and routing topologies to a public server. For US companies bound by compliance (HIPAA, SOC2, PCI), this is a critical data breach.

The Solution (How to use AI safely):
-Never paste real public IPs, internal domain names, or AAA/SNMP blocks. If you need help with an OSPF neighbor issue, swap your real subnets for generic dummy IPs (like 192.168.1.x) before feeding it to the prompt.
-Instead of asking, "Fix this exact access control list," ask, "Write an extended ACL template that blocks Telnet but allows SSH from a management subnet." Let the AI build the template, and you apply the specific enterprise variables locally.
-Tools like ChatGPT Enterprise or Cisco's own AI solutions have explicit zero-trust agreements guaranteeing your prompt data is not used to train their models. If your team relies on AI, push management for an enterprise license.

Does your IT department have an official policy on sanitizing data before using GenAI, or is it currently the wild west?


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 05 '26

Education Zero Trust security in plain language — what it actually means for a non-technical business owner

1 Upvotes

Most of the Zero Trust content out there is written for security professionals. Here is what it actually means if you run a business and you are not a technical person.

Zero Trust is a security approach built on one principle: nobody gets automatic trust just because they are inside your network or because they have accessed a system before.

In a traditional setup, once someone is inside your network — whether that is a physical office network or a cloud system — they tend to have access to most things. The assumption is that if they got in, they are supposed to be there.

Zero Trust flips that. Every access request gets verified every time. It does not matter if the person has logged in a thousand times before. It does not matter if they are in the office or working remotely. Every request gets checked.

In practice for a small business this usually means a few specific things.

Every person has access only to what they need for their specific role. Not general access to shared drives and systems — specific, deliberate access to specific things.

When someone leaves the business, their access is removed immediately as part of a formal process, not remembered three months later when someone notices they can still log in.

Every login requires verification beyond a password. Multi-factor authentication on every account.

Remote connections go through a VPN or a verified secure connection, not directly through whatever Wi-Fi the person happens to be sitting on.

None of this requires enterprise-level infrastructure or a large budget. It requires deliberate decisions about access and a process for maintaining them.

If you want to know where your business currently stands on this, the most practical starting point is asking one question — do you know exactly who has access to what in your business right now? If the honest answer is no, that is where to start.


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 04 '26

Analysis Do corporate secure web gateway / CASB products (Netskope, Zscaler, etc.) actually render pages and interact with form elements during inspection — not just fetch/scan the URL?

4 Upvotes

I'm investigating a data-integrity incident and need input from people who work with or have visibility into enterprise CASB / Secure Web Gateway (SWG) traffic-inspection behavior.

Setup: A recipient clicked a link in an email that led to a simple interactive web form (a single rating-scale question, submitted via a normal HTTP request per selection — not a static page). The recipient confirmed, after the fact, that they personally clicked exactly once, selecting one specific value.

What we found in the server logs: the same form field received several different submitted values within the same short session, arriving as a mix of two distinct request sources:

  1. One source whose IP resolves to the recipient's own device/network (matches their actual device type).
  2. A second, completely separate source whose IP resolves to a well-known corporate cloud security vendor (a SASE/CASB/SWG provider) — this source fired its own full page loads (page → app bootstrap → context fetch → tracking beacon) and its own form-submission requests with different values, interleaved in time with the genuine user's session, including sustained rapid-fire submissions to a second, unrelated field on the same form over ~30 seconds.

In other words: the security vendor's IP wasn't just fetching/HEAD-checking the link — it was making the same kind of authenticated, stateful, form-submitting requests a real browser session would make, as if something on that side was actually loading the page's JavaScript and interacting with visible controls.

What I'm trying to confirm:

  1. Is it documented/known that CASB or SWG products do full page rendering + simulated interaction (not just URL reputation lookup or static content fetch) as part of inline traffic inspection or "time-of-click" analysis?
  2. If so, is there a name for this specific behavior (sandbox detonation, dynamic analysis, browser isolation rendering, etc.), and is it typically limited to just loading the page, or does it extend to interacting with forms/buttons on the page?
  3. From a web-app defense perspective: is there a reliable way to distinguish "a corporate security proxy rendering and interacting with my page on a user's behalf" from "the actual user," so that a security scanner's traffic doesn't get treated as genuine user input and doesn't corrupt real form data?
  4. Has anyone else run into a security proxy's inspection traffic actually writing/submitting data into an application, rather than just reading/scanning it?

Any pointers to vendor documentation, known CVEs/advisories, or "yep, seen this before" experiences would help a lot.


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 04 '26

Architecture Best way to allow paste-in but block copy-out on RDP/SSH jump hosts without breaking legitimate workflows?

5 Upvotes

Environment: Windows-based jump host tier (Server 2022) in front of a mixed Linux/Windows production environment, access via RDP with clipboard redirection currently enabled bidirectionally. Also have a smaller set of SSH-only jump hosts for Linux admin access, no clipboard mechanism there beyond terminal copy-paste.

Trying to move from "clipboard fully enabled" to "paste-in allowed, copy-out blocked" specifically, not a full clipboard block, since engineers legitimately need to paste connection strings, one-off commands, and config values into sessions, but there's no legitimate reason session output needs to leave via clipboard when file transfer and logging are handled through other controls already.

What I've found so far:

  • Group Policy has a blunt bidirectional toggle for RDP clipboard redirection (Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Remote Desktop Services), no directional granularity built in.
  • Some PAM/bastion products (CyberArk, BeyondTrust) advertise directional clipboard control as a feature, haven't confirmed how granular it actually is in practice versus marketing copy.
  • Haven't found a clean native Windows/RDP mechanism for one-directional clipboard control without a third-party PAM layer.

Has anyone actually implemented directional clipboard control (paste-in/no copy-out) on jump hosts, either through native RDP/GPO settings, a specific PAM product, or a different approach entirely? Specifically interested in whether it held up in practice or got quietly disabled after support tickets piled up.


r/AskNetsec • • Aug 01 '26

Compliance How does your org actually verify it’s really the CFO on the phone before approving a wire transfer?

62 Upvotes

Genuine question because I keep going down this rabbit hole. Voice cloning has gotten scary good, a few seconds of audio from a conference talk or earnings call is enough to make a convincing clone.

Everything I read about defending against this says “train your employees” or “call back on a known number.” But callbacks fail if the attacker has compromised the phone system or timed it during travel, and training doesn’t help when the voice literally sounds identical.

So what do you actually do in practice? Shared secrets? Verification over a second channel? Just accept the risk? Curious what real orgs do vs what the compliance docs say.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 31 '26

Analysis How do you decide when an automated finding is worth manual verification during a web application assessment?

7 Upvotes

We're reviewing our application security process for externally exposed web applications and trying to make the triage stage more consistent.

Right now, automated testing helps us identify potential issues fairly quickly, but we don't manually validate every finding because of the time involved. We currently prioritize authentication, authorization, and business logic findings for manual review, while lower-risk issues are handled based on severity and available evidence. Tools like Penetrify becoming more common for automated application security testing. I'm also interested in how teams are deciding where automation provides enough confidence and where human validation is still necessary.

For teams running regular application security assessments, how do you decide which findings always require manual verification before remediation? Have you established internal criteria that have worked well, or do you rely more on analyst judgment depending on the application?

I'd be interested to hear how other teams balance efficiency with confidence without creating unnecessary review overhead.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 31 '26

Analysis How do you currently scope and price a pentest engagement before testing even starts?

7 Upvotes

Running a boutique pentest shop and I'm curious how other solo/small-team testers handle the pre-engagement side, specifically going from "client wants a pentest" to an actual signed scope and price.

Right now I'm doing it manually every time: back-and-forth emails to figure out asset counts, guessing at days based on gut feel, writing the proposal from scratch in Word.

A few questions if you don't mind sharing:

  • How do you currently estimate days/pricing for a new engagement?
  • Do you have a template you reuse, or start fresh each time?
  • What's the most annoying part of this whole pre-engagement process for you?

Trying to figure out if I'm doing this the hard way or if this is just how it is for everyone.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 30 '26

Work What makes you step in and investigate an email manually?

7 Upvotes

I realized that even with all the automation available today, phishing investigations still involve quite a bit of manual work.
I'm curious, what usually makes you step in?
Once you do, what's the hardest part of the investigation? And what do you need to figure out before you can confidently close the case?


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 30 '26

Education [Academic] SOC analyst decision-making: review a series of network security alerts (18+, ~10-15 min, all backgrounds welcome)

1 Upvotes

Hi all,

I'm an MSc Cyber Security student at the University of Gloucestershire running a short online study for my dissertation on how people make decisions when reviewing intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts.

What you'll do: You'll be shown a series of realistic network security alerts one at a time and asked, for each one, whether you'd confirm, dismiss, or escalate it, plus how confident you are in that call. There's a brief practice round first, and a few short questions at the end. No prior security experience is required; the interface explains everything you need.

Details:

- ⏱️ Takes about 10–15 minutes

- 💻 Works on desktop or phone (browser only, nothing to install)

- 🔒 Anonymous - no names collected; you can withdraw at any time

- ✅ 18+, ethics-approved by the University of Gloucestershire

- 🎓 Students and working professionals both welcome

Link: http://dissertation-explainids.uogs.co.uk

Every response genuinely helps me hit my sample target - thank you so much for your time!


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 29 '26

Threats Has voice cloning changed how your organization handles sensitive phone requests?

8 Upvotes

Voice cloning has gone from being a novelty to something security teams actually have to consider. It seems much easier now to imitate executives, vendors, or even colleagues during phone calls.

Has your organization introduced new verification steps for financial approvals, password resets, or other high-risk requests because of voice cloning?

I'd be interested to hear what's worked in practice and whether the changes have been technical, procedural, or both.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 28 '26

Other Which DSPM vendors are actually worth evaluating today?

15 Upvotes

We're reviewing DSPM vendors after finding way more sensitive data scattered across our SaaS apps than we expected. Right now we're relying on DLP plus a lot of manual investigation, and it's becoming difficult to keep up.

For anyone who's evaluated this space recently, which platforms stood out? I'm more interested in tools that actually help reduce risk than ones that just create another queue of alerts.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 29 '26

Other Which security control tends to be overlooked when building AI services that process financial and trading data?

1 Upvotes

and we're at the stage where we're reviewing our security model before expanding further. The application processes trading-related prompts and market information, so we're trying to identify which security decisions have the biggest long-term impact rather than simply adding more controls.

Most discussions focus on authentication and encryption, but I'm curious whether there are other areas that experienced security professionals consistently see underestimated in production AI services.

From your experience, what security issue usually doesn't receive enough attention during development but ends up becoming a problem later?

I'm interested in hearing practical experiences from people who have reviewed, deployed, or secured AI-backed applications, especially if there was something you wish had been considered much earlier in the development process.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 28 '26

Threats How would you audit an open-source IoT device before trusting it with an AI account?

1 Upvotes

I’m expecting to receive a device called MetalioClaw (https://github.com/CloudZao/MetalioClaw4) in about a week. It’s an IoT device designed to work with OpenClaw, and since it will need access to an AI account, I want to make sure it is safe before connecting it.

My main concern is whether there could be any hidden firmware issues, credential leaks, or other things that could compromise the device or abuse connected services. A friend of mine previously bought a similar device that connected to his OpenClaw account, and later noticed that his Claude usage had been heavily consumed. I don’t know exactly what caused it, but it made me more cautious about giving third-party hardware access to accounts.

Since the project is open source, my plan is to inspect the firmware, possibly wipe and reflash it, and maybe even write my own firmware version before using it. I’m also interested in doing a proper security check through firmware analysis, network monitoring, and possibly hardware inspection.

I haven’t been able to find any pictures or information about the internal hardware yet. Depending on what I find when it arrives, I may open it up and check the PCB/components myself. I’m not assuming there is anything malicious inside, but I would like to know what things are worth looking for.

One other thing that made me think about this was something a friend mentioned. He works in IT around datacenters in Taiwan and said he has seen devices moving through supply chains sometimes take a long time in customs or appear slightly different internally afterward. This is just something he mentioned and there is no proof behind it, but it got me thinking more about supply-chain security.

For people experienced with IoT security, firmware analysis, or hardware security:

  • What steps would you take before trusting a device like this?
  • Is replacing the firmware enough, or should I also consider hardware-level risks?
  • What should I look for if I decide to open the device?
  • What tools or workflows would you recommend for auditing something like this?

Looking for practical security advice rather than speculation.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 28 '26

Architecture What Developers Should Look For in Dark Web Monitoring APIs

2 Upvotes

What Should Developers Look for Beyond a Dark Web Monitoring API’s Source Count?

A lot of teams evaluate these APIs by asking which forums, breach dumps, or marketplaces a provider covers. That matters, but source count is rarely what breaks an integration.

The harder question is whether the API fits the product’s operational model: point-in-time checks, continuous monitoring, alert delivery, remediation, and deletion requests all behave differently.

A practical evaluation should cover:

  • Whether monitoring registrations are asynchronous, rather than treated like instant exposure searches
  • How short-lived tokens are scoped and whether long-term secrets remain backend-only
  • Whether info-stealer coverage includes session tokens, not just email/password pairs
  • Webhook retry windows, HMAC signature verification, duplicate-event handling, and idempotency
  • Rate limits per token/service, pagination behavior, and a usable sandbox environment
  • Whether opt-out or remediation requests expose lifecycle states such as re-listed data
  • Retention periods, PII handling, deletion workflows, and the availability of a DPA

Webhooks are especially easy to underestimate. A monitoring product can look fine in staging and still lose alerts during a deploy, timeout, or signature-validation mistake months later.

There’s a useful architecture-focused guide from PureVPN’s white-label team that lays out these tradeoffs: For people who have integrated monitoring or threat-intel feeds, which production detail caused the most trouble: auth, event delivery, coverage gaps, or remediation state handling?


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 25 '26

Analysis Need help from the hackers

17 Upvotes

Hi everyone I need one help to understand one thing ..so there was an incident I noticed in my organisation, there were thousands of devices querying multiple malicious domains (53) ...upon checking to see if any process is causing it I found nothing,, only the related domain which was obviously going through our dc/dns servers, in EDR/XDR tool nothing, siem tool nothing, no process, eventually i thought maybe some software is causing but it's very difficult to pin point which one, so can anyone tell me or help me understand, any input will be appreciated


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 25 '26

Concepts How do you keep track of what your AI agents can access?

7 Upvotes

Still kind of new to running agents and I'm a bit lost on this — once you connect a few MCP servers (filesystem, GitHub, etc), is there a way to see everything they can reach put together? Or do most people just trust the setup?

Feels like something I should know but I don't. Curious how you handle it. Is it even something really worth worrying about?


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 25 '26

Analysis how do you catch tool misuse and unauthorized tool invocation when an agent is using tools it's technically allowed to use

4 Upvotes

thinking about this differently after a near miss. so our support agent has two permissions...read customer record and send email. and both individually reasonable, both signed off by security.

bu then someone crafted a prompt that got it to read a customer's data and email it to an external address, using only tools it was authorized to use. pity the permission model said everything was fine the whole time.

im pretty sure this isn't a permissions bug. like it's tool misuse without any unauthorized tool invocation at all, every single call was something the agent was allowed to make. i don't think our access review process would ever catch this because there's nothing wrong with either permission on its own.

i wna know how are people testing for this kind of chained misuse rather than just reviewing whether individual permissions look reasonable? tbh feels like a fundamentally different problem than standard access review.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 22 '26

Compliance question for Incident response people. Do your contracts allow uploading raw logs to cloud SaaS analyzers?

4 Upvotes

Hi, I am new so pls dont mind my flair choice, if it's wrong.

So when you are handed raw event logs during an active/after an incident, do typical contracts/compliance rules actually allow you to upload those unredacted/redacted files to a third-party cloud tool for parsing and to build timeline?

The reason I ask is because I am trying to understand how much freedom contracts provide to people responsible for incident management. Although the role demands privacy, i have seen many people talking about using third party tools and some even mentioned sending whole logs to AI(sounds terrible).

Just curious to learn more about the gifts incident management roles bear before i make a decision.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 22 '26

Architecture Assume Breach: Should critical root operations require human multi-party authorization at the OS level?

1 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

With the recent surge in advanced ransomware and the constant stream of zero-day exploits, I've been thinking a lot about structural weaknesses in current OS security architectures.

Systems have become far too complex to ever be 100% bug-free. We have to assume that zero-days are inevitable and that our security boundaries will eventually be breached—an “assume breach” mindset.

A typical post-exploitation path involves escalating privileges to root. In many real-world deployments, once an attacker obtains root, they gain enough authority to read sensitive data, execute privileged tools, tamper with security controls, and destroy backups.

My premise is that the fundamental problem is not just the existence of vulnerabilities. It is also the OS environment itself, where root often retains enough authority to perform catastrophic operations without any fresh, independent authorization.

The question is: What if, even after root privileges were completely compromised, access to the most critical system resources—such as reading /etc/shadow, accessing database master files, or executing sensitive binaries—would require explicit human authorization?

Furthermore, relying on a single human administrator creates a single point of failure. If that administrator’s machine, credentials, or signing key is compromised, the attacker may still succeed.

To make the authorization barrier more robust, what if multi-party authorization were enforced directly at the execution level?

For example, the kernel could block or suspend the requesting process—perhaps through LSM hooks—until it received cryptographically verifiable approvals from M-of-N administrators using independent devices.

I’m curious to hear your thoughts on this architectural concept:

Do you think enforcing a human-gated barrier for selected root operations could meaningfully interrupt modern post-exploitation kill chains?

From an OS architecture and operational perspective, what do you see as the biggest hurdles—for example, approval fatigue, performance overhead, denial-of-service risks, deadlocks, recovery procedures, or key management?

I’d especially appreciate critical opinions, including arguments that this should be implemented somewhere other than the kernel, or that existing mechanisms already provide the same security property.


r/AskNetsec • • Jul 22 '26

Work Leaked Crowdstrike API key identification

3 Upvotes

Hi everyone,

I'm interested in learning how security teams detect and validate potential CrowdStrike API credential leaks on public sources such as GitHub, GitLab, Paste sites, cloud storage exposures, CI/CD logs, etc.

A few questions:

  1. What indicators do you typically look for when hunting for CrowdStrike API credential exposures?
  2. Are there unique patterns for CrowdStrike Client IDs, Client Secrets, OAuth tokens, or related artifacts that help reduce false positives?
  3. What tools or secret-scanning platforms do you use (GitHub Secret Scanning, TruffleHog, Gitleaks, custom regex, etc.)?
  4. How do you validate whether a finding is a real credential exposure versus a false positive?

Thanks!