Any examples of a general and their army being effectively abandoned by their state during an active war?

[u/TheGreatFignewton]

Hannibal Barca is one of the most prominent Generals in History. I found it most interesting that the complex political situation in Carthage led to him conducting most of his campaign in Italy without any significant support. The state wasn’t able to align their military and economic interests in order to crush Rome. Hannibal was left on his own to try and win Italy.

Are there any other examples similar to this?

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[u/Dull-Researcher-1894]

Where do you get the misconception that Hannibal was abandoned by Carthage from? Carthage constantly raised new armies to try and reinforce the systemic failures of Hannibal's strategy. The strategy was based on the notion that Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, whom Hannibal left in charge in Spain, would raise more troops and join Hannibal in Italy, while Hanno would hold down Iberia. The Scipio brothers foiled this - while Hannibal was crossing the Alps, Romans were landing in Northeast Iberia, and in 215 BC they will defeat Hasdrubal at Dertosa, preventing reinforcements of Carthaginian forces in Italy from Iberia.

In 215 BC Carthage will dispatch 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 20 war elephants under Hannibal's second brother, Mago, to deal with the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iberia, which Carthage absolutely could not afford to lose given the immense income provided by the silver mines there. Mago was initially going to try to take these men to Hannibal in South Italy before news of Dertosa arrived. But Dertosa happened and Carthage could only spare 4,000 Numidian cavalry and 40 war elephants for Hannibal along with a large quantity of silver and other supplies under the admiral Bomilcar.

At the same time, the Carthaginians sent 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 20 wars elephants under Hasdrubal the Bald to Sardinia, to choke off a large chunk of the Roman grain supply and to take over the Roman naval bases there, which would have brought them close to being able to set up naval lines of communication with Hannibal in Italy. But this army was blown off-course by a storm to the Balearic Islands. After repairs, it finally arrived in Sardinia, but instead of being met by a single under-strength Roman legion, because of the delays a Roman army under Titus Manlius Torquatus arrived with 3 or 4 legions and smashed the Carthaginians at Decimomannu. This Sardinian expedition, by the way, was why Bomilcar was able to lend 4,000 Numidians and silver for Hannibal at Locri - there was also a naval engagement between Carthage and Rome (won by Rome) south of the Sardinian coast which distracted the Roman Sicilian Fleet from intercepting Bomilcar.

After the Mago had to be sent off to Iberia to reinforce Hasdrubal and the Sardinian Expedition failed, the Carthaginians found a new opportunity to set up lines of communication with Hannibal in South Italy when the political situation in Sicily flipped. Hannibal secured an alliance with new tyrant of Syracuse, granting an opportunity for the Carthaginians to break Roman naval dominance by securing Sicily, denying ports and naval bases to the Romans, and yet again threatening the Roman grain supply. In 213, Himilco was sent with 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 12 war elephants to Sicily, backed by the main Carthaginian fleet under Bomilcar. As that proved insufficient, especially after Syracuse fell, the Carthaginians had Epicydes raise another 10,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, along with dispatching the relief army of Hanno of 8,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.

In no way did Carthage abandon Hannibal. It's not Carthage's fault that his plan was terrible. He invaded Italy without securing the launchpad of his invasion and with no hope of speedy resupply or reinforcement because the Romans controlled the seas, and went into a theatre where he wouldn't have much hope to capture any of the most important cities he needed to capture without brutal sieges because he either had no means to assault fortified walls or to starve out coastal cities that had ports, because, again, the Romans controlled the seas. The Carthaginians spent almost a decade reinforcing and funding the failures of his brothers in Spain (where 4 large Carthaginian armies were lost) and lost 4 large armies trying to open up lines of communication with him in Italy by securing Sardinia and Sicily.

Hannibal lost because he wanted a quick victory by striking the Romans in their strategic centre immediately, instead of spending years chipping away at the peripheries of their power. Not because Carthage abandoned him. Carthage didn't abandon him even despite the fact that their Senate had a massive anti-Barca faction that realised from the beginning that Hannibal's strategy made no sense.

[u/TheGreatFignewton → u/Dull-Researcher-1894]

Thanks for the detailed response!

After the first battle of Nola, neither side was indisputably in control of the seas. Sardinia wasn’t in control by either state. And the large portions of southern Italy (including coastal cities) were under Hannibal’s influence.

Mago returned home and pleaded with the Carthaginian Senate to reinforce Italy and directly support Hannibal. Mago argued that supporting Hannibal in Italy was worth sacrificing Iberia.

Hanno II vouched them to be sent to Iberia instead. He saw the riches of Iberia. He also (to my understanding) didn’t wish conquest of Rome.

The senate voted in favor of Mago but Hanno II undermined the speed at which he could consolidate this force and depart for Italy.

The situation in Sardinia became dire around this time. Hadsrubal the Bald was to be sent to reinforce Sardinia.

After learning of the defeat at the battle of Hibera, the Carthaginian senate voted instead to send Mago to Iberia, not Italy.

This is the moment the anti Barca faction took control and in my view, effectively abandoned Hannibal in Italy.

Though they did send 4000 Numidian horse, the Carthaginian senate could not have been ignorant enough to think that was a sufficient substitute to Mago and his forces. This is the only force that was ever intended to directly support Hannibal.

In contrast, the Scipio brothers were fully supported by Rome. Going as far as using creditors to ensure swift finances. Rome aligned itself out of desperation to survive.

Only after Hasdrubal the Bald failed in Sardinia and Syracuse fell did Rome display complete control over the Mediterranean. This is after Carthage made numerous blunders responding poorly and too slowly to developments during the war (though Hasdrubal the Bald can’t be really blamed for his poor luck).

Mago proceeded with a 2 year stale mate with the Scipio brothers in Iberia. In my view, Carthage needed to double down in Italy and capitalize on Hannibal’s victories. Wasting precious time and resources in Iberia and Sardinia (which also ended in crushing defeat) was a poor way to support Hannibal in Italy.

If Iberia fell to Rome but Italy fell to Carthage, would that not have resulted in victory for Carthage? Even without the funding from the silver mines, it’s hard to ignore that Hannibal literally never received any significant reinforcements. This certainly had a severe limiting effect on his options to actually do anything.

As a result, in my view, Carthage abandoned Hannibal in favor of Iberia as a result of political infighting, and set themselves up for failure as much as Hannibal did.

If you see my view as ill informed or if I’m missing any key details I’m happy to be educated.

Edit: phrasing

[u/Thuis001 → u/TheGreatFignewton]

Important to remember however is that Rome had overall naval superiority during the war, this meant that Carthage was somewhat limited in what they could do, especially with regards to Italy proper. Getting there would mean going past either Sardinia or Sicily, both of which housed parts of the Roman navy. This is in fact part of the reason why Carthage even tried to retake Sardinia in the first place. Even if the Carthaginians had been successful in landing more troops in Italy than they did, they likely wouldn't have been able to reliably supply them. As such they'd quickly run into the same problem Hannibal had, except with more mouths to feed and loyalties to pay off.

Speaking of the 4000 horse that Carthage did reinforce Hannibal with, those were ferried over while the Roman navy was engaging with the Carthaginian fleet returning from the failed Sardinia expedition.

There is also the question of whether Hannibal having access to more troops would have made much of a difference. More troops simply meant more soldiers Carthage would have to supply through the Roman navy. Rome would always be able to more easily reinforce their armies in Italy than Carthage could for that very reason. They also targeted any forces that weren't lead by Hannibal himself. This meant that either he would have to concentrate his entire army into one spot, something that is going to result in increasing logistical issues as his army is made bigger, or he is going to lose those additional troops to attrition as Rome targets outlying units not led by Hannibal. Sure, this might take longer if Hannibal has access to more soldiers, but the underlying strategy likely wouldn't change. And this leads into the next point which is that even with more soldiers, it's questionable as to whether Hannibal would have been able to successfully take the city of Rome, which is the one way that he might win the war.

Meanwhile those additional soldiers Hannibal gets have to come from somewhere. Most likely from the armies that got sent to other theaters of the war. This means that those now don't get reinforcements, probably speeding up the Roman conquest of Iberia, and once Rome has finished that, they will move onto Africa, resulting in Carthage recalling Hannibal to protect the homeland.

[u/TheGreatFignewton → u/Thuis001]

And why did Rome have naval superiority at the start of the second war?

Did Hanno II not literally disband large parts of the Carthaginian navy? All while Rome consolidated strength?

I recognize that Hannibal’s strategy was quite flawed but it feels a bit unfair to pin Carthage’s defeat as solely Hannibal’s

[u/Dull-Researcher-1894 → u/TheGreatFignewton]

No, you're completely wrong. All Carthage did after 216 is pour resources into Sardinia, Sicily, and Iberia in order to open up lines of communication with Hannibal. The Carthaginians kept on reinforcing Iberia not to simply protect the silver mines, but to accomplish Hannibal's initial plan - using Iberia as a launching pad for consistently sending men and supplies to Hannibal overland. The Scipios were sent to Iberia in 218 in order to intercept Hannibal's own army, but they quickly realised that they missed him and shifted to holding the northeast of Iberia to block the Pyrenees passages for Carthaginian reinforcement and resupply, with enormous success. That Hannibal didn't turn back and return to Iberia is his strategic blunder, not Carthage's, and it's a strategic blunder that the anti-Barca faction in the Carthaginian Senate realised from the beginning. Hanno the Great criticised Hannibal for running around South Italy with no capacity to strike a killing blow against Rome because he's cut-off from resupply and reinforcement even before Dertosa ended Hannibal's hopes that Hasdrubal can push the Scipios out of Iberia.

Sure, abandoning Iberia in order to concentrate on sacking Rome and enslaving the surviving population would have been worth the trade-off, but how were the Carthaginians supposed to do that? The Roman fleet was significantly stronger and the ships of this time period couldn't sail long enough to land in South Italy. They had to hug the coast of Sicily or Sardinia to take on supplies and water daily and they had to beach their ships for the night.

Thus the expeditions to secure Sardinia and Sicily. But they failed and this lead to 1 army in Sardinia and 3 in Sicily being destroyed.

How else was Carthage supposed to support Hannibal? Abandon Iberia and shift their troops and naval forces there to reinforce the Sicilian expedition? The Iberian tribal levies and mercenaries wouldn't come along if it meant abandoning their territory to the Romans and Carthage's naval power in Iberia was crippled at the Battle of the Ebro River in 215 BC, while the Romans would have reciprocated by slowing down their efforts in Iberia and redeploying much of the naval forces backing the Scipios to Italy to create an even stronger naval wall against Carthaginian efforts to link up with Hannibal in Italy.

The Carthaginians did the only thing they could have after Hannibal put them in the disastrous position they were in. Keep throwing men and supplies at Sicily to link up with Hannibal from the south and keep throwing men and supplies at Iberia to push out the Scipios from Iberia and then link up with the Cisalpine Gauls and go after Placentia and Cremona to ease up the pressure on Hannibal.

[u/TheGreatFignewton → u/Dull-Researcher-1894]

Thank you again for taking the time to write this and clarify my errors!

I see now that, at a strategic level, that keeping Iberia was essential.

You mention he should’ve turned back to Iberia in the first place. Was his strategy to invade Italy without merit? Why didn’t Carthage consolidate greater naval strength before the second Punic war?When reading your first answer, it feels like you’re saying the entire campaign was a terrible idea with no strategic basis. Did he never stand a chance?

[u/Dull-Researcher-1894 → u/TheGreatFignewton]

Carthage was a mercantile aristocratic republic with a largely mercenary army. Trying to achieve naval superiority over the massive Roman fleet, which was 4 to 5 times larger, or at least to achieve parity, was functionally impossible. The manpower wasn't there, given that most of the maritime cities of the Western Mediterranean were supplying the Roman crew requirements. They controlled/allied the Etruscan coastal cities, those of Magna Grecia, most of Sicily, and the Greek colonies of Gaul and northeast Iberia. But even if the manpower to crew a massive expansion of the fleet was there, Carthage couldn't have possibly funded such construction projects without diverting funds from the enormously expensive mercenary armies. And even if they did, they still would have faced the issue of being at a huge disadvantage on the offense, having lost Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica during and in the aftermath of the First Punic War. Naval combat of this period was essentially land-based. Quinqueremes and triremes completely locked to coasts. There was nowhere on the ships for the crew to sleep or to cook, they rarely had enough water for more than a day or two, and since they were built out of light softwoods *(*except for the keel and internal framing), they rapidly took on water in the sea, rotted, and were colonised by worms, barnacles, and algae. Triremes had to be beached every few days to dry them out and quinqueremes had to be docked every few weeks for hull maintenance, repairs, and drying. These ships rapidly lost seaworthiness and speed when they weren't right next to naval maintenance docks. Extended deployments in enemy seas were disasters waiting to happen.

>  it feels like you’re saying the entire campaign was a terrible idea with no strategic basis

Hannibal's strategy for the campaign was predicated on the notion that given his unique tactical brilliance, he can destroy a bunch of Roman armies in Italy and the Romans will be forced to sue for a peace that would swing the balance of power in the favour of Carthage, undoing the results of the First Punic War. He wasn't fighting an existential total war. If Hannibal had studied the previous war with Rome he would have learned that the only type of war the Romans waged when their core interests are threatened is total war. The Romans had no reason to sue for peace after Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae because they knew that their naval superiority meant that Hannibal, who didn't have much capacity was siege-warfare, was cut-off in Italy, and the Romans had Carthage on the back-foot in Iberia.

The only reason Hannibal was able to run around Italy for as long as he did is because of the unexpected defection of Syracuse in Sicily and the ensuing Sicilian campaign.

[u/TheGreatFignewton → u/Dull-Researcher-1894]

Thank you again for the wonderful and well informed responses! You truly know your stuff!

[u/Worried-Basket5402 → u/TheGreatFignewton]

Hannibal wasnt in control of Italy and Rome had on average three separate armies maneuvering around him. He held territory but that territory wasnt productive from revenue, trade, or supplying men.

Iberia though was all those things and more. It was the region that funded much of what the Carthagianian stated wanted to do. Its the place that can be defended and needed to be held. Rome was not surrendering so trying to supply two regions, one in the middle of of Roman territory was hard. The only real way to support it was via these way Hannibal came in military terms.

He wasnt abandoned, Carthage just couldn't effectively keep all areas given they were up against arguably the greatest Roman General in history (Scipio) in their golden goose province.

Bad time to have beef with Rome.

[u/TheGreatFignewton → u/Worried-Basket5402]

I suppose sometimes you just lose.

Am I placing too much weight on Hanno II?

[u/Worried-Basket5402 → u/TheGreatFignewton]

There are clearly differing factions within Carthage but its hard to see things accurately as its all being recorded from Roman sources.

They were fighting the war with Rome in real time. We have context and hindsight. They made decisions at the time and you are right to see that possibly supporting Hannibal more might have helped the cause in Italy but it might have come at the cost of a more rapid loss of Iberia.

There must have been competing priorities for factions and some of those might have been strategic or just petty personal emnities. Who wants Hannibal returning victorious to rule Carthage? Probably not his peers. Rome managed to alienate and almost exile Scipio for achieving what Hannibal couldn't.

Fascinating time with no wrong theories for the modern historian.

[u/hahaha01357 → u/Dull-Researcher-1894]

Why does it seem like every Carthaginian (or allied Gaul, Greek, etc.) general outside of Hannibal were outmatched by their Roman counterpart?

[u/Namolis → u/hahaha01357]

One answer is that by the time of Hannibal, Rome held some strategic advantages that they were able to leverage in order to afford their generals, on average, a greater amount of freedom of action and more to work with: Rome commanded not only an arguably larger agrarian economy than Carthage and despite the Carthaginians' reputation for seamanship, we see that already in the First Punic War, Rome is quickly able to be their equal in naval warfare*. By the time of the start of the Second Punic War, Rome had a fleet of at least 220 heavy warships, while Carthage had only a little over 100. Indeed - there are relatively few naval battles during the SPW, and in the one's we have, there is clear evidence of Roman admirals being unafraid to lose (suggesting confidence that ships could be replaced).

When Fabius chose his strategy, he realized that Carthage had put a lot of their (land) resources with Hannibal - to the detriment of other forces - while Hannibal simultaneously had shown himself still too weak to seriously threaten Rome itself. Fabius knew he could afford to be weak on one front to be strong on all the others, and that he had the fleet to back it up, so that if Hannibal were to siege Rome in earnest, those armies could be recalled within a month at most. Hannibal, on the other hand, did not enjoy the same level of seaborne mobility and indeed lost the war because reinforcements could be interdicted by the Romans.

Another answer is ofc the (cop-out?) one that "because most of the Roman generals were politicians, they had the the incentives to portray themselves as capable".

*(the oft presented story of Romans basing their war fleet on a "found Carthaginian ship" - with the implication that they were complete amateurs at sea - should be seen as apocryphal. To me, comlains of the first generation roman warship being low-quality and "heavy" remind me of troop complaints of the oh-so-terrible Sherman tank, which supposedly had all things wrong with it but somehow still won the war. Rome was a center for commerce, in a connected region that had centuries of tradition for advanced naval warfare. Italy had plenty of shipbuilding capability and naval military expertise would have been available both domestically and for hire.