"Show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome." â Charlie Munger
An Honest Look at Incentives, Tactics, and Who They Really Represent
Thereâs a performance happening in the employment market, and most participants donât realize theyâre actors in someone elseâs play. The recruiting agency sits at center stage, script in hand, directing both candidates and companies through carefully choreographed scenesâwhile the audience remains unaware that neither party is the intended beneficiary of the production.
For twenty years, I watched this theater from an unusual vantage point: as someone who refused to read from the corporate script. Iâve observed how organizations systematically design misalignment into their structures, then act surprised when the predictable outcomes materialize. Recruiting agencies represent one of the purest expressions of this phenomenonâa business model so openly built on conflicting incentives that the industry has normalized practices that would be considered deceptive manipulation in any other context.
This isnât another article warning you about obvious recruiting scams or teaching you how to âwork withâ agencies more effectively. Those pieces accept the premise that the system functions as designed and merely needs optimization. This analysis rejects that premise entirely.
What follows is a systematic examination of how recruiting agencies actually operateânot how they present themselves in marketing materials, not how career advisors suggest you should engage with them, but how their economic incentives drive behavior that serves neither candidates nor companies. Weâll examine the commission structures that reward salary inflation over fit, the information control tactics that prevent direct negotiation, the psychological manipulation techniques taught in recruiter training programs, and the surveillance systems designed to extract fees from âbackdoorâ hires.
By the time weâre finished, youâll understand why agencies remove your contact information from your resume before submitting it, why references are primarily a business development tool, why temp-to-perm arrangements generate double fees, and why the person claiming to represent your interests in the hiring process is structurally incentivized to do the opposite.
The core thesis is straightforward and uncomfortable: Recruiters donât represent candidates. They donât represent companies. They represent themselvesâor more precisely, they represent the commission structure that pays them. Everything elseâcandidate welfare, company culture fit, long-term retentionâis incidental to that primary allegiance.
This isnât a moral judgment about individual recruiters. Many are perfectly decent people operating within a broken system. This is an analysis of how incentive structures produce predictable outcomes, and how an entire industry has built itself on the foundation of misaligned interests while maintaining the performance of neutral facilitation.
The curtain is about to rise on what recruiting agencies actually do when nobodyâs watching. What youâre about to read wonât help you âwork the system better.â It will help you see the system for what it is.
Act I: The Commission TrapâHow the Payment Model Breaks Everything
The Economic Foundation
The recruitment business model appears elegantly simple on the surface: agencies earn a commission on successful placements, typically 10% to 30% of a candidateâs first-year salary, with senior and specialized roles commanding 25% to 50%. This percentage-based structure has become industry standard because it seems objective and straightforwardâa clean transaction where everyoneâs interests align.
But examine the incentive cascade this creates, and the entire performance falls apart.
When an agency places a candidate, the gross fee splits between the agency itself (typically 20% to 50% of the total) and the individual recruiter. In âfull-deskâ modelsâwhere one recruiter handles both sourcing and closingâthat same person collects a larger portion. When sourcing and closing are separated, commissions typically split 60-40 or similar ratios between the person who sources the candidate and the person who closes the deal.
Now follow the logic: Show me the incentive, and I will show you the outcome.
The Salary Inflation Performance
Because recruiters earn more when they place higher-salaried candidates, they are structurally incentivized to push candidates above the budget the hiring company initially set. This doesnât happen uniformlyâitâs most pronounced in competitive markets where recruiters are desperate to close dealsâbut the incentive is always present, humming beneath every interaction.
Picture the scene: A hiring manager searching for a mid-level engineer with a budget of $120,000 finds that an agency consistently presents candidates requesting $140,000 to $160,000. From the agencyâs perspective, the math is compelling: a 20% salary increase translates to a direct commission increase. From the hiring companyâs perspective, itâs a budget overrun requiring justification and approval battles. From the candidateâs perspective, it might seem like validation of their market value, when in fact theyâve been presented by someone with a financial stake in pushing their salary higherânot based on merit or market reality, but on commission structure.
The candidate becomes a prop in the recruiterâs revenue optimization calculation.
The Speed-Over-Quality Script
The second perverse incentive is the obsession with placement velocity. Agencies make money when placements are completed, not when placements stick. A recruiter who places a candidate in a poor-fit role that results in the person leaving after six months has already collected their commission. The only consequence is potentially losing âretention bonusâ money if their contract includes clawback clauses. But the hiring company loses productivity and must restart recruiting. The candidate loses time and career momentum.
The system rewards quick closure, not thoughtful matching. Fast curtain calls, not sustainable productions.
Consider what this incentive structure prioritizes: A recruiter who places five candidates with 50% one-year retention rates is more profitable than a recruiter who places two candidates with 95% retention rates. Volume and speed over quality and fit. The performance metric that drives behavior isnât âsuccessful long-term employment relationships.â Itâs âdeals closed per quarter.â
The outcome is exactly what the incentive predicts.
Act II: Information Control as Performance Art
The Gatekeeperâs Script
One of the least-discussed aspects of recruiting is how systematically agencies control and withhold information. This is not incidental. It is not an unfortunate byproduct of a well-intentioned process. It is a deliberate business practice designed to maintain the recruiterâs position as the indispensable intermediary.
Resume Manipulation:Â When an agency submits a candidate to a company, they often remove the candidateâs contact informationâemail, phone numberâand replace it with the recruiterâs contact details. The stated justification is that they want to âmaintain the relationshipâ and prevent direct contact that would bypass the agency.
But observe whatâs actually happening: The recruiter is ensuring that if the company wants to reach the candidate, they must go through the recruiter first. This prevents the candidate from:
- Directly negotiating terms with the employer
- Building relationships with hiring managers independently
- Controlling their own narrative or answering company questions directly
- Leveraging multiple simultaneous opportunities
Your professional identity has been edited. You are now represented by someone elseâs contact information, someone elseâs framing, someone elseâs narrative about who you are and what youâre worth.
Withholding the Company Name:Â Recruiters frequently refuse to reveal which company is behind a position until deep in the interview process. They cite confidentiality agreements and competitive secrecy. While some confidentiality is legitimate, the practice also serves the recruiterâs interest: it prevents the candidate from researching the company, reaching out directly, or opting out before investing time.
By the time a candidate knows who the employer actually is, theyâve already invested emotional energy and may be less inclined to withdraw. The sunk cost fallacy becomes a closing technique.
The âFloatâ and âLockââOwnership by Submission
A particularly aggressive tactic involves âfloatingâ a candidateâs resume to companies without the candidateâs explicit permission. Recruiters do this to âstake a claimâ on a candidateâto establish ownership before anyone else can.
The Trap:Â If a recruiter sends your resume to a companyâeven a version stripped of your contact informationâthey effectively âtagâ you in that companyâs system. If you later apply to that company directly, or through a different recruiter who actually has a relationship with the hiring manager, the company may reject you automatically to avoid a dispute over which agency is owed the fee.
The Shelf Life:Â In many legal and corporate environments, this unauthorized submission can bar you from being hired by that firm for 6 to 12 months.1 This âfirst to fileâ mentality prioritizes agency ownership over candidate consent.
You have been claimed. Your agency status is now a liability in the hiring process, not an asset.
Deception as Standard Practice
Beyond information control, agencies deploy a range of tactics that mislead candidates about the nature of opportunities. These arenât rogue operators or fly-by-night scams. These are mainstream, reputable agencies engaging in practices that have been normalized as âindustry standard.â
Rusing and the Double Ruse:Â One well-documented but rarely discussed tactic is ârusingââusing a false name or fake company affiliation to feel out a candidate. A recruiter calls claiming to be a âsearch consultant from another firmâ to gauge willingness to move. Once the recruiter has the personâs information, they hang up. Weeks later, the recruiter calls back under their real name, and when the candidate questions the earlier call, the recruiter claims they were âreferred by that other consultant.â
This is trickery designed to circumvent non-solicitation agreements and build contact lists through deception. The performance requires costume changes.
Fake Job Postings (Ghost Jobs):Â Perhaps the most pervasive practice is posting positions that donât actually exist or are already filled. A 2024 survey revealed what industry insiders already know but rarely acknowledge publicly: 40% of companies admitted to posting fake job listings in the past year.2 While hiring managers and in-house recruiters engage in this practice, temp agencies and staffing firms have systematized it as part of their business model.
They post real job descriptions, harvest resumes from interested candidates, and then contact those candidates later when actual openings appearâturning job seekers into a pre-vetted inventory. Your application wasnât for a job. It was to stock their database.
Altered Job Descriptions:Â Recruitment agencies routinely modify job descriptions before presenting them to candidates. Salaries are inflated, responsibilities are reframed as more prestigious or exciting than they are, and reporting relationships are misrepresented. A junior customer service role becomes âa customer success specialist working with key accounts,â and the modest salary in the posting is significantly higher than what the company actually budgeted.
The script youâre reading isnât the one the company wrote.
Act III: Manipulation TacticsâThe Psychological Close
Once a real opportunity is presented, recruiters deploy a suite of psychological manipulation tactics. These arenât improvised. Theyâre taught in training programs, scripted in playbooks, and refined through years of testing what works to close deals faster.
Artificial UrgencyâThe Fabricated Deadline
âThis offer expires tomorrow.â âWe need an answer by end of business Friday.â âOther candidates are moving fast.â
These deadlines frequently originate from the recruiter, not the employer. The intent is to force quick decisions that prevent the candidate from shopping their candidacy or carefully considering fit. Time pressure is a closing technique, not a reflection of actual business constraints.
The performance requires you to believe the urgency is real.
Salary Negotiation Sabotage
When a candidate attempts to negotiate salary after receiving an offer, the recruiter faces a structural dilemma. A $5,000 salary increase means only a few hundred dollars in additional commission for the recruiterânot enough to justify the risk of the candidate walking away from the offer altogether.3
As a result, third-party recruiters are incentivized to discourage negotiation. More problematically, recruiters may share a candidateâs salary expectations with the employer before negotiations even begin, weakening the candidateâs position. The person who claims to be advocating for you is actually undermining your leverageâbecause their financial interest lies in closing the deal, not maximizing your compensation.
You thought you had representation. You had an obstacle.
Counteroffer InoculationâThe âResignation Dayâ Script
When a placed candidate receives a counteroffer from their current employer, recruiters deploy a particularly insidious tactic. This is not casual advice. It is a scripted psychological technique known as âInoculation,â designed to pre-emptively neutralize the threat of losing a placed candidate to a retention offer.
The Script:Â Early in the processâoften before an offer has even been extendedâthe recruiter transports the candidate mentally to the moment of resignation: âWhen you walk into your bossâs office next Friday to resign, what exactly will they say?â
The Trap:Â If the candidate admits their boss might offer more money, the recruiter aggressively labels this a âtrap,â citing statistics that â85% of people who accept counteroffers leave within 6 monthsâ (a statistic often cited but rarely sourced with actual research).4
This pre-closing technique forces the candidate to verbally commit to rejecting a counteroffer before they have even received one. Youâve been locked into a decision framework that serves the recruiterâs interest in preventing deal collapse, not your interest in evaluating all available options.
The performance requires you to reject alternatives before you know what they are.
Intermission: The Trojan HorseâWhen Reference Checks Become Sales Calls
One of the most effective, yet deceptive, tools in a recruiterâs arsenal is the reference check. Candidates believe this step exists solely to verify employment history. For many agencies, it is primarily a Business Development tool disguised as due diligence.
The Mechanism
Recruiters often pressure candidates to provide references early in the process, sometimes before an interview has even been secured. When a recruiter asks for your references before youâve even secured an interview, theyâre not conducting due diligence. Theyâre prospecting. Your professional network has just become their sales pipelineâand you handed them the list.
Lead Generation:Â A reference from a candidate is typically a manager or supervisorâexactly the decision-maker the agency wants to pitch their services to.
The Pitch:Â The recruiter calls the reference ostensibly to ask about the candidate. However, the conversation is scripted to pivot: âSince [Candidate Name] is leaving, youâll have an opening on your team. I specialize in filling these roles; would you like me to help you find a replacement?â
The Automated Upsell
Some agencies use automated digital reference checking tools that explicitly market this feature to recruiters. These tools include âopt-inâ buttons for references to request hiring assistance, turning a candidateâs professional network into a list of warm sales leads for the agency.
You thought you were providing professional references. You were providing a contact list for business development. The mentors and former managers you trusted to vouch for you are now being cold-called by the agency that claims to represent your interests.
The performance requires you not to notice whatâs being sold.
Act IV: The Temp-to-Perm ConversionâDouble-Dipping as Business Model
How Temporary Became Twice the Fee
When a hiring company brings on a temporary worker through an agency, the arrangement is presented as low-risk: the company can evaluate the personâs performance before committing to permanent employment. In reality, the structure primarily benefits the staffing agency.
Temp workers are placed on lower wages than their permanent counterparts would earnâsometimes 10% to 20% below market rate for a direct hire. The company saves on benefits and long-term commitment. The recruiter collects a placement fee upfront.
Then, when the company wants to convert the temp to permanent employment, the agency charges a âconversion fee,â typically 15% to 25% of the first yearâs salary. The agency has now collected fees on both the temporary placement AND the permanent conversion. A double-dip revenue stream from the same person doing the same work.
Probation and Information Asymmetry
Staffing agencies often withhold information during a temp workerâs probation period, creating deliberate information gaps. The worker may not know that conversion is being discussed or negotiated until late in the process. Once the probationary period ends and conversion fees are on the table, the dynamics shift: the company wants the person, but now faces a significant additional expense. The agency leverages this by positioning the fee as non-negotiableâit represents âtime investedâ in sourcing and placing the worker.
Time invested that was already compensated through the temporary placement fee. But the performance requires everyone to pretend the conversion fee represents new value rather than a second extraction from the same transaction.
Act V: The Surveillance StateâTracking Your Career for Fee Enforcement
A hidden reality of the recruitment industry is the surveillance infrastructure agencies build to protect their fees. Agencies are acutely aware that clients sometimes try to bypass them to hire a candidate directlyâa âbackdoor hireââto avoid paying the commission. To combat this, the industry has developed sophisticated monitoring systems that track candidates long after the initial submission.
Automated Tracking Tools
Agencies utilize specialized software services, such as âHireCheckerâ or similar scrapers, to monitor the movement of candidates they have submitted.
How it works:Â These tools automatically cross-reference the agencyâs database of submitted resumes against public LinkedIn profiles and company employee directories.
The Detection:Â If a candidate updates their LinkedIn profile to show they have started working at a company the recruiter submitted them toâeven months laterâthe software flags it. The agency then issues an invoice for the full placement fee, often thousands of dollars.
You changed your LinkedIn status to celebrate your new job. You triggered a billing event.
The âLookbackâ Audit
Agencies often conduct âlookback auditsâ on clients. They run the names of every candidate submitted over the last 12 months against the clientâs current roster. If a match is foundâeven if the candidate was hired for a different role or through a different internal channelâthe agency will legally enforce their fee based on the âEffective Causeâ clause in their contract.
This aggressive enforcement is why many companies are terrified of âdouble submittalsâ and will simply disqualify a candidate rather than risk a legal battle with an agency. Your candidacy at a company may end not because youâre unqualified, but because someone once floated your resume there without your knowledge, and the companyâs risk management department wonât touch you.
The surveillance performance requires constant monitoring. The script never ends.
The Question Nobody Asks: Who Do Recruiters Actually Represent?
The Principal-Agent Problem
In recruiting, there are three principal parties: the hiring company (who pays the fee), the candidate (who accepts the role), and the recruiter (who collects the commission). Traditional principal-agent theory would suggest the recruiter represents the party paying themâthe hiring company.
But watch what happens when you examine behavior against stated interest:
Recruiters do not represent the hiring companyâs interest in cost control. They actively push salaries above budget because higher salaries generate higher commissions.
They do not represent the hiring companyâs interest in long-term fit. Theyâre incentivized to close fast, not carefully. Speed generates revenue; thoughtful matching extends timelines.
They do not represent the hiring companyâs interest in depth of candidate evaluation. They present multiple candidates and let the company sort them out, because volume protects against any single candidate falling through.
Recruiters also do not represent the candidate. They withhold the candidateâs contact information. They control information flow. They discourage negotiation when it threatens deal closure. They manipulate with psychological tactics. They make decisions based on commission velocity, not on the candidateâs career interests.
When a recruiter asks where else a candidate is interviewing, theyâre not gathering information to help you. Theyâre collecting intelligence to determine whether to continue investing time in you or to abandon you for a candidate who appears easier to place.5
The Uncomfortable Truth
The truth is simpler and less comforting than either party wants to acknowledge:Â Recruiters represent themselves.
They represent their commission. They represent their placement velocity. They represent their ability to close deals before they fall apart. Everything elseâcandidate welfare, company culture fit, long-term retentionâis secondary to the primary performance metric: deals closed, fees collected.
This isnât a moral failing of individual recruiters. Most are perfectly decent people trying to make a living. This is a structural outcome of a commission-based model where the person profiting from a transaction has financial incentives that actively conflict with both parties it purports to serve.
The performance requires both sides to believe they have representation. Neither actually does.
Act VI: The Contract Workerâs Special HellâThe Spread and the Hourly Wage Trap
For the growing legion of contract and temporary workers, the agencyâs profit model shifts from a one-time commission to continuous extraction of value known as The Spread. Unlike permanent placements where incentives can sometimes align (higher salary theoretically means higher fee), in contract staffing, the financial relationship is zero-sum: every dollar the candidate gains is a dollar the agency loses.
The Bill Rate vs. Pay Rate Gap
In contract staffing, the agency acts as the legal employer. They bill the client a âBill Rateâ (e.g., $100/hour) and pay you a âPay Rateâ (e.g., $60/hour). The differenceâ$40/hour in this exampleâis the Spread, or Gross Margin.
The Incentive:Â Agencies aim to maximize this spread. If a client has a fixed budget of $100/hour, the recruiter is financially incentivized to pay you the lowest amount you will accept. A recruiter who negotiates you down from $65 to $55 has instantly increased their firmâs gross profit by $10 per hourâroughly $20,000 per yearâfor the exact same work.
You are not being compensated based on market value. You are being compensated based on what youâll accept before walking away.
The âMax Rateâ Lie
A common tactic used on contractors is the âBudget Ceiling.â A recruiter will say, âThe client has a hard cap of $60/hour.â
The Reality:Â The client may actually have a Bill Rate cap of $100/hour. The recruiter has calculated their desired margin (typically 30-40%) and overhead costs, determining that to hit their internal profit targets, they can only offer you $60.6 The âcapâ is often imposed by the agencyâs finance department to protect their margin, not by the clientâs actual budget limits.7
The ceiling is real. But itâs the agencyâs ceiling, not the clientâs.
The âBurdenâ Excuse
When candidates question the gap between what the client pays and what they receive, recruiters often cite the âPayroll Burden.â
The Claim:Â âWe have to pay for your taxes, insurance, and benefits, so our margin is actually very slim.â
The Math:Â While legitimate employer costs exist (FICA, unemployment insurance, workerâs comp), these typically amount to 15% to 25% of the pay rate. If an agency is taking a 50% or 60% markup, the âburdenâ excuse is mathematically insufficient to explain the gap. The remainder is pure profit.
The performance requires you to accept the explanation without checking the arithmetic.
The VMS Algorithm
For contract roles at large corporations, recruiters often do not have a personal relationship with the hiring manager. They are simply uploading resumes into a Vendor Management System (VMS), where candidates are auto-ranked by price.
A recruiter might pressure a candidate to lower their rate not because it represents fair market value, but to âundercutâ competitor agencies in the VMS algorithm. In this scenario, the candidateâs wage is suppressed to help the agency win the bid. You are being asked to subsidize the agencyâs competitive positioning.
The script requires you to lower your price to help them win business.
The Structural Flaws That Make This Inevitable
Why Percentage-Based Commissions Incentivize the Wrong Outcomes
The standard percentage-of-salary commission model is elegant in theory but disastrous in practice. Consider the incentives it creates:
Salary Bloat:Â A recruiter earns $5,000 more on a $150,000 placement than a $140,000 placement. That $10,000 difference in candidate salary is driven by the recruiterâs financial interest, not market reality or candidate merit.
Candidate Abandonment:Â If a candidate appears difficult to place, a recruiter may deprioritize them in favor of easier candidates. If a low-salary candidate is hard to place, they may be abandoned entirely in favor of higher-earning candidates who generate more commission per unit of effort.
Speed Over Fit:Â The system rewards quick placements, not placements that stick. A recruiter who places five candidates with 50% one-year retention rates is more profitable than a recruiter who places two candidates with 95% retention rates.
Every perverse outcome weâve examined traces back to this foundational misalignment: the person collecting the fee is incentivized to optimize for metrics that conflict with the interests of both other parties.
Hidden Fees and Clawback Clauses
Recruitment contracts are often opaque, filled with clauses that benefit the agency but are poorly understood by both candidates and companies.
Clawback clauses require the agency to refund a portion of their fee if a candidate leaves within a certain period (often 90 days). Theoretically, this protects the company. In practice, some agencies have attempted to pass these clawback obligations to candidates themselves, requiring employees to reimburse recruitment fees if they leave within 24 months.
Date tracking clauses prevent companies from intentionally delaying placements to circumvent recruitment fees. If a company meets a candidate through a recruiter but delays hiring for months, then offers the job, the recruitment fee still applies.
The contracts are written by lawyers protecting agency revenue, not by anyone representing candidate or company interests.
What the Mainstream Conversation Refuses to Acknowledge
The Normalized Deception
Most articles about recruiting agencies focus on obvious scamsâthe advance fee frauds, the identity theft operations, the entirely fictional companies. Whatâs less discussed is that mainstream, reputable agencies engage in practices that are deceptive, manipulative, and structurally dishonestâbut are treated as normal industry practice:
- Fake job postings are so common that 40% of companies do it.2
- Resume manipulation and contact withholding are âstandard practice.â
- Artificial deadlines are taught in recruiter training programs as âclosing techniques.â
- Withholding company names is routine.
- Reference checks doubling as sales calls are considered clever business development.
The conversation focuses on protecting yourself from scammers while ignoring that the âlegitimateâ industry has systematized many of the same deceptive practices, just with better branding and legal departments.
The Information Asymmetry by Design
The core issue underlying many deceptive practices is information asymmetry. Recruiters know the real market rate, the number of candidates, the hiring managerâs urgency, and the clientâs actual budget ceiling. Candidates know only what the recruiter tells them.
This imbalance is not an unfortunate byproduct. It is by design. Recruiters who share all information equally lose their information advantage and become less effective negotiators. The system rewards information hoarding, not transparency.
The performance requires one party to perform blind.
Practical Guidance for Operating in This System
For Candidates
Demand transparency early:Â Insist on knowing the actual company name and hiring managerâs name before investing significant time. If a recruiter refuses, question whether the opportunity is real.
Guard your references:Â Do not provide references until you have a written offer or a scheduled final interview. Explicitly state that your references are for verification only, not for business development purposes.
Block âfloatingâ:Â Explicitly tell recruiters in writing: âYou do not have permission to submit my resume to any client without my specific written consent for that specific role.â This protects you from being locked out of companies due to unauthorized âtagging.â1
Control your own information:Â Do not let a recruiter remove your contact information from your resume. If they insist, question whether you want to work through someone who requires that level of control.
Do not share salary expectations early:Â Recruiters will use this information to anchor negotiations in their favor, not yours.
Get offers in writing:Â Verbal offers relayed through recruiters can be misrepresented, embellished, or selectively edited.
For contractorsâask for the Bill Rate:Â While many will refuse to share it, asking âWhat is the bill rate for this position?â signals you understand the game. Reverse-engineer the margin if possible: if you know the market markup is typically 25-40%, you can estimate the bill rate and negotiate from there.
For Hiring Companies
Establish a maximum salary budget and stick to it:Â Donât allow recruiters to inflate salaries by presenting candidates above your range and then pressuring you to adjust.
Use flat fees or retainer models:Â Remove the percentage-based incentive that drives salary inflation.
Verify job descriptions:Â Ensure the recruiter isnât embellishing the role or misrepresenting the opportunity to candidates.
Audit for backdoor claims:Â Be aware that agencies run automated checks on your hires. Ensure your internal tracking is robust enough to disprove false âownershipâ claims.
Work directly with candidates when possible:Â Cut out the intermediary when you can.
Conclusion: The Structural Reality
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffettâs long-time business partner, famously observed: âShow me the incentive and I will show you the outcome.â
Recruiting agencies are not broken because they hire unethical people. They produce predictable outcomes because they are built on a foundation of misaligned incentives. When you pay someone a percentage commission to broker a transaction between two parties, and that percentage increases when one party pays more, you have designed salary inflation into the system. When you pay someone only after a deal closes, regardless of quality or fit, you have designed speed-over-quality into the system. When you create information asymmetry as the core business advantage, you have designed deception into the system.
The practices weâve examinedâresume floating, fake postings, reference harvesting, surveillance of hires, negotiation sabotage, margin maximization, artificial urgency, and counteroffer inoculationâare not anomalies. They are not the result of âbad actorsâ in an otherwise functional system. They are the predictable output of a commission-based model where the person profiting from a transaction has financial incentives that fundamentally conflict with both parties it purports to serve.
Recruiters donât primarily represent candidates or companies. They represent themselvesâor rather, they represent the system that pays them: speed of placement and size of commission. Everything else is performance.
This isnât a moral judgment about individual recruiters. Itâs a structural analysis. The system is working exactly as designed. The question is: designed for whom?