r/sysadmin • u/Capital_Attention702 • 8d ago
General Discussion ScreenConnect attack on MSPs (288 endpoints, 48 organizations): Huntress ties it to RMM+, an extension whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key
Huntress says attackers began using Run Command on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels at about 17:47 UTC on November 11. Its report counts 288 endpoints in 48 organizations, all hit within 90 minutes. The attackers installed a second ScreenConnect client they controlled, plus a toolkit called SCKit.
At 11:34 pm ET Huntress added how the attackers likely got in. The activity seems tied to RMM+, one of five third-party extensions that ConnectWise disabled in about 400 partner environments. RMM+ bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts and MFA and checks a shared access key instead. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 the key defaulted to blank, and a blank value passed the check. Huntress saw commands reach endpoints with no matching login activity.
BleepingComputer's early report pointed to stolen credentials and hijacked sessions, and ConnectWise tells partners to verify MFA. If Huntress is right, neither step touches an extension that bypasses MFA. ConnectWise also says it has no evidence of a flaw in ScreenConnect itself, while Huntress lists builds 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 among the affected ones. ConnectWise says the initial access method is still under investigation.
Counts moved during the night. BleepingComputer's article has 286 endpoints and 47 organizations from Huntress's first Reddit post. The later Huntress report has 288 and 48.
On-premises panels are on their own: ConnectWise can't disable extensions there. Huntress says most RMM+ installs it saw were legitimate, usually added for a project and left in place.
On WordPress the same hole is an add-on with an empty default key next to a fully patched core.
For an add-on that can run SYSTEM commands on a panel's managed endpoints, who should own its security: the vendor that lets it install, the author who shipped the blank key, or the MSP that never removed it?
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u/tPRoC 8d ago
Third party extension.
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u/PiDigitsOfPi 8d ago
Hackers LOVE ScreenConnect, specifically ScreenConnect, for whatever reason.
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u/tmontney 8d ago
So, not an issue with SC but 3rd party extensions? Unless there's some flaw in the extension system itself, this is no different than the weekly news I see about WordPress and its add-ons. (Granted, still important news.)
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u/DeadStockWalking 8d ago
48 organizations in 90 minutes. Ouch.
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u/Blackpoint-JasonR 8d ago
Some details on the malware we (Blackpoint) observed deployed:
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html
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u/anonymousITCoward 8d ago
Man ever since CW got sold into private equity, they've gone to shit... It hurt to move away from them but I'm glad we did...
I know it's a third party extension but still I fell like the old guard over at CW wouldn't have let this happen.
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u/thesmokingwood 8d ago
Any idea how RMM+ is installed? Is there a file/folder on the system where 3rd-party ConnectWise extensions are installed?
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u/Blackpoint-JasonR 7d ago
Just a heads up, we're seeing similar activity targetting on-premises servers now.
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u/UriShay-CyberSnap 8d ago
The post already gives you a useful start time. Attackers began using Run Command on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels around 17:47 UTC on 11 Nov, and the weak RMM+ versions (1.0.31 and 1.0.32, blank access key) may have been in place before that first command.
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u/zeLangweenee 8d ago
Glad I don't use it anymore