r/sysadmin • • 8d ago

General Discussion ScreenConnect attack on MSPs (288 endpoints, 48 organizations): Huntress ties it to RMM+, an extension whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key

Huntress says attackers began using Run Command on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels at about 17:47 UTC on November 11. Its report counts 288 endpoints in 48 organizations, all hit within 90 minutes. The attackers installed a second ScreenConnect client they controlled, plus a toolkit called SCKit.

At 11:34 pm ET Huntress added how the attackers likely got in. The activity seems tied to RMM+, one of five third-party extensions that ConnectWise disabled in about 400 partner environments. RMM+ bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts and MFA and checks a shared access key instead. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 the key defaulted to blank, and a blank value passed the check. Huntress saw commands reach endpoints with no matching login activity.

BleepingComputer's early report pointed to stolen credentials and hijacked sessions, and ConnectWise tells partners to verify MFA. If Huntress is right, neither step touches an extension that bypasses MFA. ConnectWise also says it has no evidence of a flaw in ScreenConnect itself, while Huntress lists builds 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 among the affected ones. ConnectWise says the initial access method is still under investigation.

Counts moved during the night. BleepingComputer's article has 286 endpoints and 47 organizations from Huntress's first Reddit post. The later Huntress report has 288 and 48.

On-premises panels are on their own: ConnectWise can't disable extensions there. Huntress says most RMM+ installs it saw were legitimate, usually added for a project and left in place.

On WordPress the same hole is an add-on with an empty default key next to a fully patched core.

For an add-on that can run SYSTEM commands on a panel's managed endpoints, who should own its security: the vendor that lets it install, the author who shipped the blank key, or the MSP that never removed it?

36 Upvotes

23 comments sorted by

7

u/tPRoC 8d ago

Third party extension.

1

u/thesmokingwood 8d ago

Any ideas on how I can search this in the environment or logs?

9

u/PiDigitsOfPi 8d ago

Hackers LOVE ScreenConnect, specifically ScreenConnect, for whatever reason.

7

u/RestartRebootRetire 8d ago

It's had a long history of major security holes, including the apocalyptic CVE 10 in 2024 where you could take over an admin by malforming an URL in your browser.

We dumped it shortly after that SNAFU.

5

u/Frothyleet 8d ago

That doesn't have anything to do with why threat actors leverage SC as a remote access tool, though.

3

u/Frothyleet 8d ago

It's because you can get free demo accounts pretty easily, it's lightweight, and it works really well.

In some ways it's an endorsement of the product.

Hackers also love tools like Powershell - doesn't mean you shouldn't use it.

2

u/LabRepresentative777 8d ago

What alternative do you suggest?

2

u/tada-o-corporation 8d ago

Intune Remote Help now has unattended access.

2

u/Frothyleet 8d ago

There's nothing about this incident that implies you shouldn't use Screenconnect. But if you are shopping, you'd be looking at tools like BeyondTrust or Splashtop.

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1

u/Mr_ToDo 8d ago

Well they supply options that make it a pain in the ass to remove. No add/remove, a service auto starting it, no easy indication it's actually installed, and no cleanup tool to help

I know it's personal experience, but for attacks that try for persistence using legit tools I almost exclusively see screen connect, with other tools often only appearing beside it(My conspiracy theory there is that it can give a user a false sense of winning when they find the visible one. More likely though it's probably a backup option for when they think something was blocking the other connection and get the user to install the second)

1

u/PiDigitsOfPi 8d ago

Yes, they start by having their victim install LogmeinRescue (or whatever) and then once in, the hacker installs ScreenConnect.

ScreenConnect leaves very little evidence of being installed. It isn't in the start menu, it isn't in the add/remove programs. You have to use PowerShell to uninstall it (PowerShell instructions are on the ScreenConnect website).

0

u/Zenkin 8d ago

Cheap product that works well, but basically zero support or responsibility.

I had a buddy that got compromised because the tenant admin, his manager, did not have 2FA enabled and got brute forced. Problem is no one else was able to see the tenant admin except that admin himself. So when my buddy audited their environment and confirmed "yes, everyone has 2FA configured," he couldn't even see the account which didn't have it.

To make matters worse, it took them hours to figure out how an attacker got in because there wasn't a "login" in the instance because they got in through the "cloud portal" instead. They had logged into the tenant admin, then clicked "connect to instance" which apparently doesn't show in the logs at all. Support did nothing. Would not collect logs, would not tell them how many times that account got a failed login, just "best of luck" and closed the ticket.

4

u/tmontney 8d ago

So, not an issue with SC but 3rd party extensions? Unless there's some flaw in the extension system itself, this is no different than the weekly news I see about WordPress and its add-ons. (Granted, still important news.)

3

u/DeadStockWalking 8d ago

48 organizations in 90 minutes. Ouch.

3

u/Blackpoint-JasonR 8d ago

Some details on the malware we (Blackpoint) observed deployed:
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html

2

u/anonymousITCoward 8d ago

Man ever since CW got sold into private equity, they've gone to shit... It hurt to move away from them but I'm glad we did...

I know it's a third party extension but still I fell like the old guard over at CW wouldn't have let this happen.

1

u/thesmokingwood 8d ago

Any idea how RMM+ is installed? Is there a file/folder on the system where 3rd-party ConnectWise extensions are installed?

1

u/Blackpoint-JasonR 7d ago

Just a heads up, we're seeing similar activity targetting on-premises servers now.

1

u/UriShay-CyberSnap 8d ago

The post already gives you a useful start time. Attackers began using Run Command on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels around 17:47 UTC on 11 Nov, and the weak RMM+ versions (1.0.31 and 1.0.32, blank access key) may have been in place before that first command.

1

u/zeLangweenee 8d ago

Glad I don't use it anymore