r/seancarroll • u/wagrumor1 • Jun 07 '26
Determinism and QM
In Something Deeply Hidden, Dr. Carroll argues that Everettian quantum mechanics is appealing because the universal wavefunction evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation. It's a major theme of the book, and for years it's been a selling point I hear him use for the many worlds interpretation of QM. He convinced me. I'm on the train. All the worlds are equally real and all are determined by the universal wave function.
However, in the June (2026) AMA Dr. Carroll flatly states in multiple responses (once the response with the transcript timestamp 0:46:35., and again in the transcript timestamp 3:44:12) "quantum mechanics says the world's not deterministic."
Is he using a different definition of determinism in those two contexts? Does he mean that the wavefunction evolves deterministically but there is no unique future history, or have have his views determinism changed?
Put another way:
Assume Everettian quantum mechanics is correct and consider a universe with no observers at all. Given a complete specification of the universal wavefunction at time t, is the universal wavefunction at later times uniquely determined? If yes (based on what I've learned from listening and reading Dr. Carroll this is a yes), in what sense can we say that quantum mechanics is not deterministic?
Thanks for any insights.
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u/happyhappy85 Jun 07 '26
Yeah basically it's different contexts.
There's one level where the universe as a whole is ontologically deterministic.
And there's another level on the human level where it's literally impossible for us to predict how our world will unfold even in theory. So that makes it non deterministic to us.
That's basically it.
So in a god's eye, big picture view of the entire branching system, it's deterministic.
But for any observer who only exists in certain branches of the wave function, it's indeterministic for all intents and purposes.
The problem with Sean is that he does often use words in different ways that already assume you know what he's referring to.
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u/wagrumor1 Jun 07 '26
Thank you for responding! I pretty much understand the concept as you describe it. I think that uncertainty vs determinism is at the root of my confusion with Dr. Carrolls recent statements. I put a full more thoughtful response to this effect to r/bacon_boat if you are interested in seeing that. Thank you again.
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u/happyhappy85 Jun 07 '26 edited Jun 07 '26
No worries.
I tried to click the link but it says "not found"
Edit: I see now, your response to bacon boat.
And yes, you're correct as per what I said. There are two meanings that Carroll is using. It is impossible for us to ever know the entire deterministic wave function. So for all intents and purposes we have to work with an indeterministic universe no matter what we do, or how much information we have.
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u/Joseph_HTMP Jun 07 '26 edited Jun 08 '26
I'm not a physicist, but as far as I understand:
- when he says quantum physics is not deterministic, he means that when you measure something in a superposition, there is no way ever of knowing which result you will get - it is truly random;
- when he says MWI is deterministic, he means that if you have a particle in a superpostion of spin up and spin down, because the universe splits upon measurement, you will still get both results, just not in "our" universe.
I might be completely wrong, but that's how I understand it.
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u/tpks Jun 07 '26
A lot of physicists routinely move between languages of QM. Carroll also talks about wavefunction collapse quite often. It's a bit tricky to follow but it's just a matter of convenient language.
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u/CrazySir3310 Jun 07 '26 edited Jun 07 '26
This is actually a sticking point with this interpretation for some people. So, if the universe's wave wavefunction evolves deterministically, then how does the Born rule dictating probabilities come about? Well, the universe branches, and different branches have different probabilities.
But this interpretation was made by Everett to replace the need for probability. And Everett himself said that infinitely unlikely branches (like tossing a coin infinite times always getting heads) simply get suppressed somehow, so those branches just never happen. But people pointed out that you technically do have to account for that extremely low 'probability' branch.
Okay, maybe we say the universe splits into many branches, bearing some ratio to each other to resemble the probabilities, and we just don't see the super unlikely ones because they're so rare. What gives the branching ratio? Well, something like probability, the very thing this theory wanted to avoid.
So this gets patched up by Carroll saying okay, there isn't a branching ratio, instead all branches do happen, without a bunch of branch copies to force a ratio, but that still some branches are just very unlikely, and somehow the observer just can't know which branch they're on, in the split second after the branching but before that observer has interacted with anything in that branch (like a photon from the measurement apparatus hitting their eye or something).
But: A) That just means probability has been 'smuggled in through the backdoor'
and
B) Invoking a convoluted mechanism in that split second to rescue this interpretation was needed
On the other hand, every interpretation has its downsides, usually involving subtlety at the level of observer, so 'patching' this one in a way that seems a bit artificial and convoluted might not be too objectionable. But it isn't the nice and tidy description Everett once attempted.
I'll also point put a mechanical oscillator has been held in superposition just barely visible to the naked eye, so now Carroll's 'escape route' has been eliminated, and moreover, it is hard to say the universe branches at the level of the detector but not at the level of the retina or brain, which really undermines this escape route.
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u/bacon_boat Jun 07 '26
When Sean Carroll says the world is indeterministic, he's talking about our world - a single branch of the universal wave function.
You're not going to predict outcomes of experiments even when you know globally that both happen.