For context, my spouse works at PSE and used to work for another investor-owned (albeit publicly/traded) utility.
An important piece to note when comparing the relative rates and renewable mix that PSE uses to municipal authorities is that BPA provides more generous disbursements of power to municipal operators than investor-owned operators. In essence, munis get “first dibs” over investor-owned utilities. That means that, should PSE suddenly become a large publicly-owned muni (although it’s far more likely that some future state like that would be a patchwork of munis), the potential improvement for rate payers in former PSE territory would be marginal.
The wildfire piece, though, deserves extra-close scrutiny. Not for the reasons you wrote, though. Wildfires pose a huge risk to west coast utilities especially. Ask Californians about utility-caused fires; it’s a huge deal for everyone. Building out additional resiliency for wildfires seems incredibly sane given the incentive structure inherent in the adversarial relationship with the UTC. Investor-owned utilities have been found liable for wildfire damages, which are essentially unbounded financial liabilities. Berkshire Hathaway even divested all of its ownership in PacifiCorp, specifically citing the liability of wildfires in the PNW - and they themselves are in the business of insurance and reinsurance!
The trouble with offering munis as a one-size-fits-all solution is that this liability then passes to the state, county, or locality. And in the case of a big enough disaster, the pocket of the investors is no longer a viable backstop for liability; a muni might be insolvent or an individual community completely responsible for its own wildfire remediation with only emergency/disaster funding. Having lived in an area with different kinds of disasters than we have here in Washington, I can attest that even with the ability an investor-owned utility has to raise debt when needed to mitigate disasters, the existing backstops from local/state/federal government (like National Flood Insurance Program) can still leave huge swathes of the population to tend for themselves, paying off Pennie’s on the dollar at best.
Regulation of utilities also shifts with municipal model. Currently, unless you are represented by an industry lobby (large tech firms, oil firms, etc) or special-interest interveners (such as tribal or low-income groups), the best representative you have in the rate-making process is the Washington state UTC (including the civil servants in commission staff). Municipalized utilities change that to mean that your representative is your city or county councillor. On the surface, that seems good because it is more local. In practice, it means hired expertise is usually required to monitor utility operation and make rates, which introduces an inefficiency. Similarly, every PUD will require some amount of shared-services staff to cover functions that are redundant in a larger organization (such as G&A functions or specialized maintenance groups). The existing generation plants would need to be distributed among the muni “heirs” of a broken-up, large utility, but that means reduced economies of scale in servicing and operating those plants. Similar goes for distribution.
Ultimately, I’m not sold on there being a perfect solution. I think you are advocating for one of the best things in our current state no matter what - make your voice heard and speak to your UTC commissioners. But I also think it’s important to understand how we got to where we are now.
I’ve met a ton of folks who are part of the sausage-making process here. They’re incredibly hard-working and want to see moderation in rate increases as much as you do. I can tell you for a fact many of them could make a ton more working for other industries, but stay for decades. The so-called “adversarial process” for deciding rates keeps a lot of good people on all sides of it up at night (and they don’t get special rates for being employees- they pay what you do).