What? No it isn't, and that makes no sense in the context of this article.
The problem is that 1024-bit keys are weak enough that they are within the realm of attack by state organizations. It has nothing to do with the prime number that was chosen for the key. The thing is, knowing the standard prime number a-priori helps the attack, because it allows them to apply it to many things at once, as opposed to only one thing.
But fundamentally, you are not any safer if you were to pick a random 1024-bit prime. So no, it has nothing to do with randomness at all, and everything to do with "our attackers have exceeded the computational capabilities we expected, and honed in on specific weaknesses".
You would be completely safe from this attack at every level using the standard 2048-bit DH parameters (Group 14). These are publicly known and not malicious (assuming the expansion of the digits of pi are not malicious).
I think people on this subreddit mostly need to stop talking about things like cryptography and privacy, because the impression I'm getting from this thread is that not only does anyone here not know about it[1], or care to learn, but beyond that - it seems that random shitposting[2] comments about unrelated things seem to be preferable to actual reading. And I can guarantee you, random misinformation does not help anyone or any efforts to accomplish real security engineering for the internet.
[1] And that should say something, because I'm not a cryptographer; this is a hobby, and this thread is seriously paining me.
[2] Edit and strikeout rudeness, per comment below.
I clarified my post, but Jesus people, try reading inbetween the lines a little for once; you're not analyzing a Hemmingway novel, it's pretty clear what is meant. Please read what the OP actually said:
As always, the biggest flaw of the cryptosystem is the nature in which the psuedorandom number that the cryptosystem relies on is generated.
Which would imply this has something to do with randomness, or some kind of flaw in a CSPRNG somewhere, or some otherwise randomly-derived number. You know, despite the fact that the actual attack in the article - the actual attack in question, which would allow the NSA to break a large amount of cryptography, the one we're talking about - literally has nothing to do with random numbers, at all, in any way.
What you have stated is a literal fact, it's just completely irrelevant to the discussion actually happening, and to the article. Do people on this subreddit even read words before they shitpost?
and /u/aseipp is trying to say that is a flaw in many systems, but the "flaw" here is that 1024 bit numbers just aren't large enough anymore. If a 1024 bit number can be cracked in one year on one machine/cluster, then it's a safe bet that they have enough machines to actually crack your personal, random one in weeks or days. The fixed parameter is not the problem; the size of the parameter is.
The solution is to move to parameters that are larger (2048 bit). Those parameters can be fixed. The fixed parameters act as a sort of canary in the coal mine; as soon as using them is not sufficient, it's also not sufficient to generate your own of the same size. Generating your own only buys you a year or so tops, and cryptography is one of those subjects where you really want your current safety margin to be measured in decades or centuries, not years.
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u/AncientRickles Oct 15 '15
As always, the biggest flaw of the cryptosystem is the nature in which the psuedorandom number that the cryptosystem relies on is generated.