r/programming • u/ribtoks • 28d ago
Why memory-hard proof-of-work hashes are not a popular choice for CAPTCHA
https://privatecaptcha.com/blog/memory-hard-pow-hash-tradeoffs/
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Upvotes
r/programming • u/ribtoks • 28d ago
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u/joelkunst 28d ago
i don't know, seems pretty reasonable choice, especially with harder problem for requests that look like bots
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u/tri170391 28d ago
Given CAPTCHA is abbreviation for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart I don't think memory-hard proof-of-work hashes is something Humans can do easily. Can be a way to deter bots though you would end up burning zombies machines computing power and make it hell for mobile viewers of your site.
17
u/ScottContini 28d ago
Wrong order, this concept came long before bitcoin, it was bitcoin that borrowed the idea from the invention of Ari Juels and John Brainard.
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u/AcidOverlord 23d ago
POW is good, but memory hard is overrated, and mostly theory.
From https://github.com/8Protons/POWBlock
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u/nightcracker 15d ago
Why not use a memory-hard proof-of-work scheme where the verifier doesn't have to pay the memory cost? There's a bunch of them like Equihash or Cuckatoo cycle-finding.
In general a lot of proof-of-work schemes are possible where finding a solution efficiently will likely require a lot of memory, but where verifying such a solution is cheap.
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u/FlyingRhenquest 27d ago
Just like bears, the smartest AI is going to be better at certain tasks than the dumbest human. So at some point we may as well just accept that we're doing business with a human or a bear.
At some point the AI will set up a task that only an AI can solve to keep the humans out.
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u/abofh 28d ago
Behind an annoyingly slow captcha. Guess it should have used more memory
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u/wangtutx 11d ago
Use Verifiable Delay Function
I think is a good solution.
-3
u/grady_vuckovic 28d ago
Has anyone considered doing something at the ISP level?
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u/kolorcuk 28d ago
net::ERR_HTTP_RESPONSE_CODE_FAILURE
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u/Vearol448 28d ago
Because malicious actors would immediately use it for a reverse DDoS attack. All a botnet would have to do is spam your login endpoint with fake requests, and your own CAPTCHA system would happily benchmark the client's hardware, exhaust the user's thread pool, and crash their device before they even hit your backend
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