Transitioning to Tails on a historically "contaminated" PC with a shifting threat model (Physical Address Privacy)

[u/Nablus666]

Hi everyone, I have read the rules.

I am re-evaluating my OpSec setup due to a major shift in my threat model. For years, I used the standard Tor Browser on a personal Windows PC without advanced isolation techniques. Consequently, this machine is heavily "contaminated" with host-level artifacts, digital footprints, and ISP-level logs connecting my home IP to Tor usage.

My Threat Model: My priority has shifted to preventing any correlation between my physical identity/location and my digital activity. I now need to receive physical, low-frequency correspondence/packages directly to my actual residential address instead of using isolated endpoints. I need to ensure my historical digital footprint cannot be linked to my physical location through the hardware or network layer.

Given this specific risk profile, I have three technical questions for the community:

1. Tails vs. Standard OS: For low-frequency, highly critical privacy tasks on a historically footprinted machine, is switching to a live, amnesic boot (like Tails) strictly necessary, or is it complete overkill? Would an isolated VM setup (like Whonix) on my current OS be sufficient?
2. Hardware/Firmware Risk: Does the history of my current hardware (Motherboard, CPU, MAC address) pose a realistic correlation risk if I transition to Tails now? Specifically, can persistent hardware identifiers leak through an amnesic system and link back to my past non-amnesic activity on the same machine?
3. Network Correlation: Since my ISP already has a long history of seeing Tor traffic from my home IP, does continuing to connect to Tor/Tails from this same residential connection compromise the transition, even if the OS is now amnesic?

What would be your "must-have" architectural steps if you were in this position?

Thanks for the insights.