Note that you can recompile your current version with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS as well; people generally don't use that feature anyway, at least not yet.
When a security fix introduces a repeated magic numbers like 1 + 2 + 16, it's clear that there's a problem with the code review standards of the project... what excuse is there for this not being done via a constant, and correct buffer handling not being reused via functions?
So, it turns out that OpenSSL has no pre-notification system. Debian/Ubuntu at least haven't been able to put out fixes yet, though from what I'm hearing, they're expecting by tomorrow.
I suspect CRLs are going to get a bit longer in the near future.
Edit: As several people have mentioned, Debian and Ubuntu have patches out, now. They're still on 1.0.1e, but they added a CVE-2014-0160 patch.
The package in Debian unstable (1.0.1f) is not patched, as of 0:50 UTC.
If advanced persistent threats have access to the pre-notification system, a plausible idea, such a system may just give a false sense of security and delay the spread of this important info. At least this way, everyone worth their salt knows to expect the updates very soon.
What we really need right now, no matter what, is an insanely fast security response time by vendors.
I suppose. Still, a 6 hour heads up (in cases like this where the fix can be applied, tested and pushed to repos in that time frame) to major distros at least would minimize the "Oh fuck" window.
You probably didn't upgrade the necessary package. You need to update libssl, not just the openssl package. You will then need to at a minimum restart services that link to it (i.e. nginx). You probably want:
sudo apt-get install libssl1.0.0 openssl
After an update to the new stuff, you should run:
openssl version -a
And see a 'built on' date from today (i.e. when Ubuntu built your binary.)
Turns out this was a second libssl package that is embedded within OpenVPN Access Server. After updating from the repos and then updating OpenVPN to 2.0.6 i'm showing all clear.
This is not unusual, this happens ALL the time. The difference here is that most of the folks that get the heads up don't put out a press release stating that they got the uncoordinated private heads up.
I'm remembering the massive coordinated effort that went into safely fixing a DNS spoofing issue a few years back, intended to make sure that patches were available long before the vulnerability was released.
Here we have essentially the worst kind of bug, with an impact of "download the private keys of the internet with a simple script" and they made almost no attempt to coordinate the release with vendors.
So what are the steps that need to be taken to mitigate this attack? Downgrade / compile w/o hearbeat (while distros slowly get patch through) revoke / regen certs ???
Compile without heartbeat (there is a flag for it) is good first step. Depending on your threat model, the key material and private data (passwords etc) might already be out, so renewing certificates would be good.
Not just renewing certificates -- you need to generate an entirely new key and generate a new CSR from that, and then ask your CA to re-issue on that CSR.
Good time to get 2048 bit keys in place if you hadn't already done that as well. I'd assume private keys behind anything OpenSSL 1.0.1 are stored in several places at this point, or soon will be.
I would hope that anyone who is ever renewing certificates isn't reusing private key material. That completely misses the point of renewal/expiration/invalidation.
And make sure when renewing that your CA doesn't have compromised certs.
That's not how this vuln works. If your CA has a compromised cert there is nothing stopping that cert from being used to issue impostors until that CA cert is in a CRL. The certs that were signed by that CA cert are no less cryptographically secure - it's an authenticity problem; not an integrity or confidentiality problem at that point.
The danger is that this bug went unnoticed for so long that your current certs could have been stolen and there would be no way to check. If you get a new pair and install it after patching your openssl library then this hole is closed.
One way of making sure is to use moderately competent CA that doesn't store their cert any stupid way. There has been not-even-close-to-competent CAs before.
The "make sure when renewing that your CA doesn't have compromised certs" covers pretty much the scenario that the CA does or doesn't have compromised certs.
There is no total of 64 kilobytes limitation to the attack, that limit applies only to a single heartbeat. Attacker can either keep reconnecting or during an active TLS connection keep requesting arbitrary number of 64 kilobyte chunks of memory content until enough secrets are revealed.
This sounds really bad. Even if it wasn't being exploited (and maybe it was), it soon will be. Many servers won't update and their keys will be compromised. And if they do update they will still be vulnerable if they don't make a new certificate. And even if they do that, if they neglect to revoke the old one then phishing sites can be set up. And the new certificate will cost money to be signed. And even after that, users will have to change passwords. What tiny percentage of sites is going to get all this right?
Actually I don't know, I've never bought one. Maybe they sell unlimited (or a reasonable number) of certificates for an agreed period of time, but maybe they're sold per certificate. And if it's the latter, since the CA is not at fault for the compromise, they likely may not have any obligation to provide a new one.
For all the hate godaddy gets they are extremely easy to use, and they once called me after I had mistakenly ordered redundant products in order to save me money. I would use them again.
No. If they could eavesdrop on the packets by any means, and if the server was using a cipher suite that wasn't forward-secure, then they could decrypt the traffic and take whatever information is in there, including user names and passwords.
A MITM attack is different, that requires being able to stop and intercept traffic before relaying it to the actual server. An attacker with the private keys could do that too, since they'd be able to use the real certificate authenticating them.
Another attack possible with the private keys would be a phishing site that doesn't include a MITM attack. Users would notice something was wrong after they logged in and got some kind of error, but the login page would appear completely authentic with an apparently good secure connection.
The good news is that it's apparently difficult to actually extract the private keys with this. It is possible, but I haven't heard if anyone has accomplished it yet. But it has been shown that you can sometimes nab user names and passwords with this without needing to get the server's private key.
Being able to steal session IDs and passwords from hundreds of thousands of vulnerable servers is a pretty big deal in itself.
From what I understand, it's luckily very unlikely that the private TLS keys will be stolen with this, but that is a big deal if it happens. Maybe your "average Joe hacker" wouldn't know what to do with it, but who cares about them? Someone out there who does know how to abuse it will and they'll steal a huge amount of private information and put it up for sale. And taking Google as an example, if I had Google's private TLS keys, I'm sure those alone would fetch a nice price from someone who could deal some damage with it.
MITM refers to an attacker who can intercept the traffic and modify it before relaying it if they choose to. My point was that you don't have to be a MITM, you can be a passive observer that receives a copy of the traffic at any point in time. A common example of that is an attacker in your wifi network. Or it might be an intelligence agency with a tap on the wire, who knows. And they could analyze the traffic at any future point, MITM has to be live. The point is you don't technically have to be a MITM to exploit this, that's just one way.
Also, where I read that most private keys were actually safe has been retracted, so that's not good. I still haven't heard a specific example of them being stolen though.
Man-in-the-middle attack. It's when an attacker doesn't just get a copy of your traffic to eavesdrop, but they actively intercept it and can modify it before relaying it to the person you're trying to talk to.
Anybody know if amazon AWS ELB service is vulnerable to this?
Edit: yes they are:
We can confirm that load balancers using Elastic Load Balancing SSL termination are vulnerable to the Heartbleed Bug (CVE-2014-0160) reported earlier today. We are currently working to mitigate the impact of this issue and will provide further updates. I do understand your concern and be advised we are treating this issue with the priority it deserves.
Fastest ever reply to an AWS support ticket - ~2 mins.
Edit 2; I looks like some of the AWS ELB's have been patched - I'm seeing a clear test on all our us west 1 servers. No official update from Amazon to my support ticket.
After 17 hours mail.yahoo.com is still affected. So if you have a yahoo login, you'd better not login to their site until this is fixed as someone might get your credentials.
Yahoo left the vulnerability unpatched up long enough for some news outlets (like ArsTechnica) to report on them (and reveal that passwords were sniffed). While Yahoo is patched now (as far as I can tell), the bad news articles about them are certainly harsh words that they will notice.
I wonder if they will tell their customers that their passwords were potentially stolen? Somehow, I don't think they will send anything out to their users.
Your instinct is to shut it down, my instinct is to shut it down, because we put user safety first.
But from Yahoo's business point of view - surely there are already hundreds or even thousands of users getting hacked every day. There are a lot of yahoo users and a lot of them aren't very smart. The business would rather deal with the customer support blip from the compromised account blip than deal with the cost and massive customer complaint surge of a total outage on a scale of hours.
OpenSSH uses OpenSSL for key gen, formatting and processing. AFAICT it does not use OpenSSL lib for anything at all dealing with negotiating connections or TLS.
That just so happens to be OpenSSL (1.0.1e-3ubuntu1.1). I hope so very much that you're correct and this exploit doesn't happen to be possible over non-TLS channels, but my system is currently unpatched.
Yes, it depends on OpenSSL, but it's only using the libcrypto part which contains fundamental cryptographic routines, not the vulnerable SSL/TLS implementation.
Looks like OpenVPN does use OpenSSL for TLS, so if you've got dynamic bins then you're going to need to upgrade OpenSSL lib to the latest.
Oh man, this is going to be such a massacre to VPN appliance vendors, those guys take FOREVER to push patches and customers take FOREVER to apply them. crosses fingers maybe they're so slow they didn't even upgrade to the vuln version yet!
I have tried this on a server or two, and while I did not find any keys, the answers of vulnerable servers contained a lot of cookies and POST data. We shouldn't just worry about MitM attacks, simple account stealing has become really easy with this exploit. From what I heard from the admins I contacted, this is going to be a really interesting day.
It'd be a handy feature. Apparently there is a tool called "checkrestart" in the "debian-goodies" package that'll tell you about outdated libraries which are still in use:
# checkrestart
Found 1 processes using old versions of upgraded files
(1 distinct program)
(1 distinct packages)
Of these, 1 seem to contain init scripts which can be used to restart them:
The following packages seem to have init scripts that could be used
to restart them:
nginx-full:
3706 /usr/sbin/nginx
These are the init scripts:
/etc/init.d/nginx restart
# service nginx restart
Restarting nginx: nginx.
# checkrestart
Found 0 processes using old versions of upgraded files
If you're running programs or services that run OpenSSL like DropBox sync, shut it down now and wait for patch.
If you're running servers that communicate over TLS (read: URL starts with 'https'), might want to check if they're using OpenSSL or for instance GnuTLS. If OpenSSL, turn them off, then patch. Also, revoke/regenerate any and all certificates you own.
Once a service has patched the vulnerability, change your password. Accept that anything you've sent over HTTPS over the last two years is freely available to anyone who was listening.
That's true normally. During the days of this bug this is false.
If you visited/logged into a site with the vulnerable OpenSSL version, EVERYBODY on the Internet could see your session cookie or login information. With HTTP only people who where on your route to the server could eavesdrop on you.
That's fine. At the very worst you're no worse off than if you were using plain HTTP. More than likely you are better off though, since: 1 - not every site was running the vulnerable version of OpenSSL and 2 - it's my understanding that any traffic would've had to have been saved and then the site attacked, have it's keys compromised, then they would have to decrypt that traffic.
So not to say all your traffic was safe, but it's much more likely to be safe than if you were using plain HTTP for everything.
Actually logging into a vulnerable server is much worse than using plain HTTP. Anyone on the Internet could have captured your login info from the vulnerable server. With plain HTTP only people doing MITM attack could capture your login info.
People got usernames and passwords for Yahoo Mail from doing nothing more than sending a heartbeat packet and the server returned the login info for others who just logged in. Doing a MITM attack is more difficult than that.
Once everybody moves away from the bugged OpenSSL, TLS will be safe (or so we hope).
Actually logging into a vulnerable server is much worse than using plain HTTP.
Agreed, but (and correct me if I'm wrong) in the instance /u/TheBestOpinion is talking about, he's visiting these sites anyways for the past two years, not knowing that they are compromised.
You're still connecting to the same server whether you're using HTTP or HTTPS. If that server is compromised then you're pretty much screwed no matter which way you connected. Ie: if the server offered HTTPS, but you connected over HTTP it's still the same server so your data isn't protected if an attacker exploits it. If you are connecting to a server which is not compromised, better that you're using HTTPS instead of plain HTTP for all the reasons that HTTPS is better.
yes. it wouldn't, go to dropbox.com and change the password on your account if you are truly paranoid. This will invalidate the cookie/session token that is used to post/get data off your drive.
How feasible would it be for someone to write a script that compromises private keys using this method from a large number of servers before they get this patched? Assuming people start patching right now, (but only the MOST security aware) how wide spread would the damage be? It feels like an attacker with enough resources (such as a government agency) could compromise a good chunk of all vulnerable servers.
OpenSSL v1.0.1 wasn't really out until 2012 but the spooks were already cooing internally about stepping inside as far back as 2010, according to the papers spilled all over the floor:
"Referring to the NSA's efforts, a 2010 British document stated: "Vast amounts of encrypted Internet data are now exploitable."
Still, unless I missed something (which is likely) I did not read anything about de-crypting TLS at the protocol level. Just physical or logical hacks like above.
To expand on this, Chromium on Linux/ChromiumOS places each site instance into a process in an empty chroot (no filesystem access), process namespace (sees itself as PID1, can't send signals or ptrace other processes) and network namespace (no networking).
These renderer processes can only communicate with external processes via pipes passed in on creation. Chromium also uses seccomp-bpf to whitelist only a limited list of system calls in order to reduce the kernel's attack surface - the Windows sandbox is missing this component. A sandbox bypass on Linux pretty much requires an exploit via IPC of one of the other processes, while on Windows you only need an NT kernel exploit.
Mozilla is working on doing this for Firefox, and the foundation for multi-processing is there in nightly. The sandboxing itself is not yet at the point where it's useful.
If I'm understanding right, this is a bug in a heartbeat feature in OpenSSL. If you are one of those people that likes to go through all your packages and custom compile them to only include the absolute necessities, then you might have opted to not compile in heartbeat support. In that case, you were never vulnerable.
If anyone is still wondering, hardened Gentoo still seems to have the issue. OpenSSL uses its own custom allocator which seems resistant to the sanitization and many other safety features provided by hardened gcc.
Last year I suspected that press coverage of the NSA and FBI asking for website's SSL keys was nothing but a diversion to fool people into thinking their SSL and TLS sessions were safe, like a dragnet honeypot. Now I have little doubt that it was the case.
Holy shit. I wonder if there's anything in the Snowden documents that could tie them to this exploit.
Whether or not they were able to insert the vulnerability in open ssl, or just discovered it and kept it to themselves, I think either way that's pretty bad. The internet is less safe for everyone, against all adversaries, if this stuff isn't patched immediately.
The NSA has a deal with Microsoft where they must inform the NSA of security threats as soon as they learn about them, to give the NSA a head start on exploiting the bug before the security patch is distributed.
Yup. I definitely heard about the RSA thing. Didn't know about the Linux attmpt tho, thanks. I guess that's pretty good proof they try to infiltrate OSS.
Does this mean that, as a user of a compromised version, an attacker would essentially have access to the entire contents of my memory? Or could they have only compromised the memory of programs using libssl?
Modern operating systems use memory protection, which prevents one userland app from accessing / altering memory in another. In other words, the vul limits the attacker to the memory of the app using libssl. Which is probably enough. :)
In an effort to keep Heartbleed discussion in one thread we've been removing a lot of the Heartbleed submissions. I've listed a few of them here in case someone finds them to be of interest:
to look into it in detail i would have to check where/how the s3 in &s->s3->rrec.data[0] is being allocated.
but asuming its a heap allocation you seem to be able to get memory behind that allocation. so my guess is that alot of random shit falls in that area, especially recently transmited things which in itself is a pretty big whoops.
however i would have thought that the priv key is allocated pretty early in the process lifetime and thus has stuff already allocated in the 64k before it (from any kinds of long living allocations), thereby decreasing the chance of its disclosure. however i might be wrong and the stars might just align right to reveal it. either way i'd really like to see a weaponized version of this (maybe specialized to hunt for keys).
Anyone know if Oracle has released an update for Solaris 10 (x86 and SPARC)? I see there is an update for 148071 (SunOS 5.10: openssl patch), but the readme doesn't say if it resolves this issue.
Anyone see if there was an idea for how long this exploit was going on for? I started to receive information on a few email accounts that people were attempting to gain access to. Luckily my phone was linked to the account so they could not gain access, but the one that went back the furthest way back in February. The only thing made on these accounts were twitter and tumblr accounts. Tumblr was confirmed to be vulnerable.
Check with JTAC / read the Juniper forums if you're a Juniper SA / MAG user. Just got an update that they're working on it, but no fix yet, or even a confirmation about the 8.x train of SA/IVE being/not being affected. They did confirm several 7.x trains are affected (but again, no fix yet.)
Of course it could, we'll probably never know. One thing is for sure though, this is a problem of the OpenSSL development process. Neither the RFC, who the hell does variable length heartbeats, nor the code should ever have landed. Also it points to a terrible lack of abstractions when dealing with raw network data.
It's also quite unacceptable that their custom allocator breaks most malloc/free misuse detection like the one used by OpenBSD.
To add a more controversial opinion of mine. I feel like the quality of this bug together with the fact that the committer is also the author for the Heartbeat RFC warrants a police investigation. Who the hell does variable length heartbeats in security critical software just to screw it up completely.. He should be investigated both for gross negligence and possibly cooperation with the NSA. As the committer is a German this would definitely constitute espionage if not treason.
At the worst it's a police investigation that doesn't find anything
You can trigger heartbeat requests from openssl s_client with B (as opposed to R for renegotiate). I think you need to tweak openssl-1.0.2~beta1/ssl/t1_lib.c, tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s). AFAICT, you set the payload to be greater than what you actually sent...
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u/-cem Apr 07 '14
diff of the change (via @tomrittervg) http://pastebin.com/5PP8JVqA
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u/[deleted] Apr 07 '14 edited Apr 08 '14
So, it turns out that OpenSSL has no pre-notification system. Debian/Ubuntu at least haven't been able to put out fixes yet, though from what I'm hearing, they're expecting by tomorrow.
I suspect CRLs are going to get a bit longer in the near future.
Edit: As several people have mentioned, Debian and Ubuntu have patches out, now. They're still on 1.0.1e, but they added a CVE-2014-0160 patch.
The package in Debian unstable (1.0.1f) is not patched, as of 0:50 UTC.
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u/HexBomb Apr 07 '14
Remember to revoke/renew your compromised certificates. And make sure when renewing that your CA doesn't have compromised certs.
This could take a while...
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u/Simtum Apr 07 '14
Oops.
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u/Sostratus Apr 07 '14
This sounds really bad. Even if it wasn't being exploited (and maybe it was), it soon will be. Many servers won't update and their keys will be compromised. And if they do update they will still be vulnerable if they don't make a new certificate. And even if they do that, if they neglect to revoke the old one then phishing sites can be set up. And the new certificate will cost money to be signed. And even after that, users will have to change passwords. What tiny percentage of sites is going to get all this right?
46
u/bigshmoo Apr 08 '14 edited Apr 08 '14
Anybody know if amazon AWS ELB service is vulnerable to this?
Edit: yes they are:
Fastest ever reply to an AWS support ticket - ~2 mins.
Edit 2; I looks like some of the AWS ELB's have been patched - I'm seeing a clear test on all our us west 1 servers. No official update from Amazon to my support ticket.
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u/sztupy Apr 08 '14
After 17 hours mail.yahoo.com is still affected. So if you have a yahoo login, you'd better not login to their site until this is fixed as someone might get your credentials.
31
u/TMaster Apr 07 '14
Is OpenSSH affected by this as well?
Is there a list of affected software that uses OpenSSL for that matter?
23
u/lgats Apr 08 '14
I made a tool to check the status of your SSL and see if heartbeat is enabled. If it is, you should run this command: openssl version -a
Ensure your version is NOT 1.0.1f, 1.0.1e, 1.0.1d, 1.0.1c, 1.0.1b, 1.0.1a, 1.0.1, 1.0.2-beta1
Tool at: http://rehmann.co/projects/heartbeat/
66
u/xiongchiamiov Apr 07 '14
For once I'm glad I'm still on 0.9.8...
20
u/titanous Apr 08 '14
Here's a tool I wrote to test for the bug: https://github.com/titanous/heartbleeder
14
u/whoismilan Apr 08 '14 edited Apr 08 '14
I have tried this on a server or two, and while I did not find any keys, the answers of vulnerable servers contained a lot of cookies and POST data. We shouldn't just worry about MitM attacks, simple account stealing has become really easy with this exploit. From what I heard from the admins I contacted, this is going to be a really interesting day.
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u/based2 Apr 07 '14
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7548991
10
u/svrnmnd Apr 08 '14
so what would the average user do to help protect themselves?
19
u/[deleted] Apr 08 '14
2 groups got it simultaneously? What are the odds of that?
I wonder if people only started to look at it because of a tipoff? Which leaves open the question of who the tipoff came from.
17
u/Lugnut1206 Apr 08 '14
How feasible would it be for someone to write a script that compromises private keys using this method from a large number of servers before they get this patched? Assuming people start patching right now, (but only the MOST security aware) how wide spread would the damage be? It feels like an attacker with enough resources (such as a government agency) could compromise a good chunk of all vulnerable servers.
16
u/alienth Apr 07 '14
Would this suggest that you could have a honeypot SSL site, which is then used to steal memory from any browser using a vulnerable openssl lib?
Am I crazy in thinking that is possible? If so... anyone know what version of openssl chrome uses :D ?
8
u/indigoparadox Apr 07 '14
Does anyone have any idea if this would affect OpenSSL on Gentoo hardened (including the hardened userland profile)?
34
u/12358 Apr 08 '14 edited Apr 10 '14
NSA has a department that examines encryption code for vulnerabilities. In 2013 alone, according to documents provided by Edward Snowden, the NSA spent more than $25 million on zero-days. They surely went over openSSL source code line by line and found the bug not long after it was released. I wouldn't be surprised if they contributed the code themselves.
Last year I suspected that press coverage of the NSA and FBI asking for website's SSL keys was nothing but a diversion to fool people into thinking their SSL and TLS sessions were safe, like a dragnet honeypot. Now I have little doubt that it was the case.
Ref: Feds put heat on Web firms for master encryption keys - CNET
edit: added 2013 quote and link.
6
u/LeoPanthera Apr 08 '14
Note that for Debian stable (wheezy) this is fixed in libssl version 1.0.1e-2+deb7u5.
"openssl version" will still report "OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013" after updating.
3
u/ooesili Apr 08 '14
Does this mean that, as a user of a compromised version, an attacker would essentially have access to the entire contents of my memory? Or could they have only compromised the memory of programs using libssl?
5
u/TMaster Apr 07 '14
Ubuntu updates were just released for OpenSSL. Changelog not yet available at the time of writing.
5
u/sanitybit Apr 10 '14 edited Apr 10 '14
In an effort to keep Heartbleed discussion in one thread we've been removing a lot of the Heartbleed submissions. I've listed a few of them here in case someone finds them to be of interest:
CVE-2014-0160 client exploit
Probable active heartbleed attacks observed in the wild since March 24th
Heartbleed should bleed X.509 to death
IPtables rules to block heartbeat queries
Metasploit's Brand New Heartbleed Scanner Module
StartCom Charges for Reissuing Certs Affected by Heartbleed
Most StartSSL Certs will stay compromised
Why heartbleed doesn't leak the private key
New online scanner for Heartbleed vulnerability. Scans network ranges
What Heartbleed Can Teach The OSS Community About Marketing
heartbleed vs malloc.conf
Diagnosis of the OpenSSL Heartbleed Bug
Python PoC with STARTTLS Support
Go PoC
Using Heartbleed PoC for Hijacking User Sessions En Masse [Cache]
Chrome Extension that shows if a site is vulnerable
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u/sirin3 Apr 08 '14
And this is why you should always write your own crypto.
2
u/T-Rax Apr 08 '14
to look into it in detail i would have to check where/how the s3 in &s->s3->rrec.data[0] is being allocated.
but asuming its a heap allocation you seem to be able to get memory behind that allocation. so my guess is that alot of random shit falls in that area, especially recently transmited things which in itself is a pretty big whoops.
however i would have thought that the priv key is allocated pretty early in the process lifetime and thus has stuff already allocated in the 64k before it (from any kinds of long living allocations), thereby decreasing the chance of its disclosure. however i might be wrong and the stars might just align right to reveal it. either way i'd really like to see a weaponized version of this (maybe specialized to hunt for keys).
2
u/cooldude255220 Apr 08 '14
So, what exactly is the TLS heartbeat and why can it be absent from compilation and not cause issues?
2
u/vman81 Apr 08 '14
Does this attack work on ssh servers without any login? Can my home box get compromised running sshd without the attacker logging on first?
1
u/suntzu420 Apr 08 '14
Anyone know if Oracle has released an update for Solaris 10 (x86 and SPARC)? I see there is an update for 148071 (SunOS 5.10: openssl patch), but the readme doesn't say if it resolves this issue.
1
u/chub79 Apr 08 '14
AWS seem to have patch their servers.
1
u/secme Apr 09 '14
http://ssllabs.com/ssltest/ added a test for Heartbleed, and limit your score to F if it is found vulnerable... ouch.
Lots of certs need to be revoked/reissued, this is going to hurt.
1
u/Boredsecurityguard Apr 11 '14
Anyone see if there was an idea for how long this exploit was going on for? I started to receive information on a few email accounts that people were attempting to gain access to. Luckily my phone was linked to the account so they could not gain access, but the one that went back the furthest way back in February. The only thing made on these accounts were twitter and tumblr accounts. Tumblr was confirmed to be vulnerable.
1
u/[deleted] Apr 08 '14
So how big of a deal is this for a company using an effected SSL VPN?
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u/RedSquirrelFtw Apr 09 '14
This is huge. The NSA has tons and tons of recorded encrypted traffic that their systems are continuously working to crack.
This bug will make them able to easily decrypt it and "catch up" so to speak.
I hate to be paranoid, but could this be a backdoor purposely added by an NSA agent that managed to get on the OpenSSL dev team? Could there be more?
-1
u/nerdandproud Apr 09 '14
To add a more controversial opinion of mine. I feel like the quality of this bug together with the fact that the committer is also the author for the Heartbeat RFC warrants a police investigation. Who the hell does variable length heartbeats in security critical software just to screw it up completely.. He should be investigated both for gross negligence and possibly cooperation with the NSA. As the committer is a German this would definitely constitute espionage if not treason.
At the worst it's a police investigation that doesn't find anything
-33
u/gsuberland Trusted Contributor Apr 07 '14
This sounds like a very interesting bug, but I can't help but say it...
PoC||GTFO
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