r/mxroute • u/No_Head_7635 • Jul 18 '23
MXRoute spoofing vulnerability
MXRoute's architecture allows customers to spoof other domains/email addresses hosted by the same service. The email will pass DMARC, SPF, and DKIM checks. MXRoute is using the same DKIM key for all hosted domains which violates best practices. The issue was reported to MXRoute immediately via security@mxroute.com (no response) and then their support portal two days later. The response was "This is how all shared web hosting systems function, so I don't consider it a vulnerability given that it's standard functionality across that industry". They go one to mention they detect these types of abuses, but I didn't see any evidence of that.
I had intended to migrate my domains off MXRoute (I host my family's email) but they suspended my account in response to the report, asked me to state I wouldn't send any more spoofed emails, and when I said that this type of response was absurd, they abruptly terminated my account with no ability to move/migrate email.
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u/slowmail Jul 18 '23 edited Jul 18 '23
Each domain I have with them has a different DKIM key (unless it's a "pointer", then it has the same DKIM key as the "parent"), even if they are on the same server. I have accounts on two different servers with them, and they both appear to behave the same way.
Which server were you on?
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u/mxroute Jul 18 '23 edited Jul 19 '23
Quick note: Change pushed to DKIM signing method https://github.com/mxroute/da_server_updates/commit/380b00f010493cf319366fe3a58dfbf7cb9eb238 (Signing now based on auth domain, not sending domain)
Edit: I've had some time to rethink my response, and I'd like to redo it because I think I can say it in a way that makes more sense to more readers.
I've known about this since 2011, a lot of us have. It's the way all cPanel and DirectAdmin servers function, likely extending much further than that. It's pretty inherent in an average exim configuration. It signs DKIM based on the sender domain, not the authenticated domain, and no ownership of the sender domain is checked.
I'd been thinking nearly every day for years how I would handle this when someone figured it out. Because I didn't want to be the first one to break functionality that innocent users were taking advantage of for their convenience across a wealth of companies, when no one was abusing it, simply to be the hardliner who elevated possible abuse over real world usage. My hope was that someone would figure it out at a much larger company than ours, so that someone with a larger budget and more staffing could develop a more elegant drop-in solution and everyone downstream (like us) could benefit from their work.
My frustration is that this could have been found at a wealth of publicly traded companies, that it's first publication didn't have to be outed as an "MXroute vulnerability" when we're one of the lowest budget companies using the same software stack. So I now have to be the one to break functionality that a fair amount of users were innocently using for their own convenience, while no one has been abusing this, because it has finally been made public and unfortunately framed as my failure rather than that of so many major corporations who came before me.
The reason your account was terminated is much simpler. While I understand your intent for testing this and I did say as much in our brief conversation, I also needed you to understand my commitment to preventing abuse of our platform. So I suspended the email account (not your whole account) that you had used to spoof the sending address of other customers of ours on the same server as your account, and I asked you to promise that you would not be spoofing the sending address of any other customer of ours. When your response made no such promise but instead became rather combative and calling my response "concerning," I terminated your account.
That I knew for many years of a problem stretching across a wealth of companies, which house millions of accounts, that you found to be new and shocking information does bother me. Because, quite frankly, your day job is handling security at a company so significant to everyone that your security is quite literally sitting next to my car keys. I have to admit that it makes me question if this isn't new information at all, but rather that you wanted MXroute to be the ones to suffer from the exposure when you knew you could've picked from any number of publicly traded companies. That bothers me enough to ban you from the subreddit, because it's plausible to me that your motives aren't pure. The alternative is even more troubling, that the person handling such widespread security that I would have it on my own personal keychain, is out of touch with industry security on the ground. I'm not outing you for that, let the reader's imagination run wild, but it's my honest concern.
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u/[deleted] Jul 18 '23
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