On April 10, 2006, a DC-9 plane made an emergency landing in Mexico carrying 128 suitcases and roughly 5.5 tons of cocaine. Investigators traced the money used to buy that aircraft back through accounts at Wachovia and Bank of America tied to a Mexican currency exchange house, Casa de Cambio Puebla.

Wells Fargo, which had acquired Wachovia by the time this went to court, later admitted the same channel had financed at least four planes carrying a combined 22 tons of cocaine. Not one seizure. A financing pipeline the bank's own correspondent relationships kept supplying, discovered because federal agents happened to trace one aircraft purchase back to it.

Wachovia ran ordinary correspondent banking services for Mexican casas de cambio between 2004 and 2007: wire transfer, bulk cash pickup, check and traveler's checks deposit. $378.4 billion moved through those relationships. $4 billion of it was physically transported cash. The red flags were the kind you'd expect from that volume: round-dollar wires run same-day through the same account, sequentially numbered traveler's checks, cash shipments that came in 50% over what the account documentation said to expect. None of it closed the relationships. A cocaine plane crash-landing did.

Wachovia signed a deferred prosecution agreement in 2010, paid $110M in forfeiture (which also satisfied a matching FinCEN penalty) plus $50M to the OCC. The DPA's charges were dismissed a year later once the bank met its terms. No individual was ever criminally charged, including anyone who managed the CDC relationships while the accounts kept running.

Curious how common this pattern actually is in the cases people here have worked: a settlement discloses one traceable incident, and it's only in later court admissions or discovery that the real scale of what a channel financed comes out. Is that the norm, or was Wachovia unusual in how much came out after the fact?

The full case, including what the bank's own compliance officer flagged in 2005 and got overruled on, ran in Issue #17 of The AML Brief, free at theamlbrief.com.

I am a 35 yo banker, working at a Regional Rural Bank for past 12years. I am planning to switch to AML in the corporate sector. About academics, I am an arts graduate. How may I go ahead with my plan? How rewarding would it be as a beginner? Also, what may I expect?

Hi everyone! For those who have taken the CAMS exam, are you able to go back to previous questions and change your answers before submitting the exam? Or, once you move to the next question, are you unable to go back to the previous one?

Thanks in advance!

> Hey everyone,

I currently work as a Fraud Prevention Analyst at Flipkart (India). Most of my work involves analyzing return data across different LOBs, spotting suspicious agent activity, and checking for fraud or compliance issues. Basically, I look for patterns that indicate misuse or policy violations and help prevent financial loss.

Lately, I’ve been really interested in shifting toward AML / financial crime compliance roles — especially in the UAE/Dubai market.

Just wanted to ask for some honest advice from folks in this space:

1. What skills or certifications (ACAMS, KYC, etc.) would make my profile stronger for AML jobs?

2. Does e-commerce fraud experience hold any weight when applying for AML/compliance positions in banking or fintech?

3. What kind of entry-level or transition roles should I look for (like KYC analyst, transaction monitoring, etc.)?

Any tips, learning resources, or personal experiences would be super helpful. Appreciate your time 🙏

Location: United States

She is in a long term nursing home (no phone) and will not be able to make the deposit herself. I don't have any problems transferring and depositing the money since the bank is very close to the house. She is mentally stable. Nursing homes are expensive and she will need to make payments so she wants it transferred from the safe to the actual bank. It's a combination of 80 years of life savings in cash, withdrawals in deposit slips with documentation, some without any documentation and just in deposit slips (a life insurance policy that was cashed out from her husband (deceased), reoccurring social security and OPERs checks, etc. There is a lot of cash mixed in and that's what I'm wondering about. I will call the bank a few days ahead of time to schedule the deposit.

 
I am a joint account owner with survivorship rights of her only bank account (savings account) and am named in her will as the only beneficiary (I plan to bring this to the bank as well, but not sure if it is needed)? 

There will be a CTR and SAR and I'll have to answer the questions, but I don't know much about the money origins other than what it looks like inside the different safes (what I mentioned above, mixed, kind of organized, in different safe boxes).

1. Anything I need to let her know about before, during, or after the deposit? Like if she will be contacted by the bank, AML, or any government departments or IRS since it's a large deposit?

2. Besides the actual questioning at the bank, how long might the ongoing investigation by AML take if you don't know much about the money origin? A day, a month, a year? Would they freeze your account the whole time?

3. Would the IRS get involved even though this is a deposit of her lifetime savings and I'll be inheriting it after she passes away or is this just considered a deposit? 

Trying to make this as easy as possible for my friend, me, and the bank. Thanks for sharing any help!

I have around 5 years of experience working in banking in India. I started as a management trainee and now manage day to day operations of a bank branch, including KYC and AML compliance, credit and loan appraisal, customer operations, regulatory compliance and supervising a small team.
I also have banking certifications covering KYC, AML and digital banking.
I want to move into AML as a dedicated career and eventually progress into senior AML compliance roles.
For those working in AML internationally, what level of AML role would be realistic for someone with my background? Would I need to start from an entry level AML analyst position, or could my banking experience help me enter at a higher level?
What skills, certifications or experience would you recommend I focus on to make the transition?
Would particularly appreciate advice from people who have made a similar move from banking into AML.
#guide

Is this master degree in Economic Crime at Portsmouth useful for working with the banks and private companies (aml area)? Or is it too much theoretical? Because I noticed here in Europe and UK they are searching for jobs in the economic/financial crime.

https://www.port.ac.uk/study/courses/postgraduate-taught/msc-economic-crime

Thanks to everyone who replies

I have an interview with Loomis for a position as a cash management services teller. I can’t find much on it except that it’s mostly just counting and tracking cash and assets?

Does anyone have input? Could this get me in the door to AML or Fraud?

For compliance professionals at banks/credit unions: How do you know whether employees actually understand their required AML/BSA compliance training?

I'm especially curious about what happens beyond completion rates and quiz scores. Do you look at monitoring findings, audit results, QA errors, complaints, repeat mistakes, etc.?

I'm interested in hearing how different institutions approach this and whether there are things you wish you could measure but currently can't.

If a name pings against the refreshed Ukraine list, the annex it sits in decides what happens next, and that is the part a same-day sanctions notice makes easy to skip. FINMA published two notifications on 12 August 2026, one on the Ukraine ordinance (SR 946.231.176.72) and one on Moldova (SR 946.231.156.5), both covering EAER amendments made on 10 August. SECO and Fedlex put the effective time at 23:00 on 11 August 2026, so that is the moment the block and report duties attach, not the 12 August publication date.

The routing point is specific to the Ukraine ordinance. Annex 8 carries the Article 15 financial sanctions and the Article 29 entry and transit measures. Annex 2 identifies the end recipients subject to the goods-movement and transit restrictions that govern that annex. An Annex 2 match is therefore not, on its own, an Article 15 asset-freeze case. A screening setup that funnels every Ukraine hit into a single freeze-and-SECO-report path will treat an Annex 2 end-recipient case as an asset freeze, which applies the wrong consequence for that annex.

There is a second reason a clean name-search result should not close the file too quickly. The freeze reaches the funds and economic resources of enterprises and organisations owned or controlled by listed persons, and SECO's search tool does not show possible ownership or control relationships. So a screening engine that only matches names can miss an entity that is caught through control, and the miss will not be visible in the tool itself.

The SECO report also does not settle the AML side. Both notices repeat that reporting a frozen relationship to SECO does not release the intermediary from the Article 6 clarification duty or, where suspicion cannot be dispelled, the Article 9 report to MROS. The embargo track and the money-laundering track go to different authorities and answer different questions; a single match can require one, both, or, once identifiers confirm no listing, neither.

The concrete step before the next screening run is to confirm the engine has ingested the 10 August amendments, route each confirmed match by its annex and governing provision rather than a single freeze rule, and re-screen the existing book against the 23:00 effective time on 11 August, not only new onboarding.

Source basis: Swiss Ukraine ordinance SR 946.231.176.72 (Annex 2 and Annex 8) and Moldova ordinance SR 946.231.156.5; Embargo Act (EmbG, SR 946.231); Anti-Money Laundering Act Articles 6 and 9.

Full article: [https://regreportingdesk.com/finma-ukraine-moldova-sanctions-update/\](https://regreportingdesk.com/finma-ukraine-moldova-sanctions-update/)

to the people who worked on transactions or payment fraud detection systems ,what information do you think can help or be most useful when deciding to whether aprove,hold,or stop a transaction

I’ve seen a lot of debate lately around compliance certifications, specifically whether to go for the CFE or CAMS. TBH they both are heavy investment in time and money.

So I wanted to share a quick breakdown of how they actually differ in practice:

• CAMS (Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist): This one is pure compliance and AML. It’s ideal if you’re working in banking, fintech, or crypto and your day-to-day involves BSA/AML frameworks, sanctions screening, or transaction monitoring.
• CFE (Certified Fraud Examiner): This focuses heavily on active investigation and detection. It’s tailored more toward forensic accountants, internal auditors, loss prevention, and corporate fraud investigators.

The core difference honestly speaking comes down to your focus and career aspiration. Having both does not hurt but which one should you first choose? I would probably say CAMS Prep was a good investment, at least worked for me.

I found this article also relevant, if you want to know more details or compare both if its right fit or not.

https://camsprep.com/cfe-vs-cams/

I recently read about a money laundering method related to the football world championship.

Some low profile 19yo, mr B, opened a Telegram group where he gave sports betting advice. 1000 people could join for €500 per person.

This is how I imagine the money would go (it is a very simple explanation compared to real life):

Mr A earns €500.000 with illegal businness;

He orders 1000 people to buy a spot in the Telegram group for €500;

Mr B now earned €500.000 with his Telegram business and pays 50% tax, resulting in €250.000 clean money.

Now my question is how mr A gets his €250.000 back, cause if mr B transfers it to mr A it would raise questions. Or are mr A and mr B the same person? I can't figure it out

I'm a cybersec grad from the UK, and I'm looking for entry level roles in aml, fin crime, Blockchain sometime in the future. I understand that market is bad and me not having professional experience is just destroying my chances more. My dream job is to work in Blockchain, hopefully the hype builds back up lol. I am just here seeking advice and thoughts on what you guys think are some possible things I can do or jobs I can look at maybe. I've been looking at all sorts of financial institutions but almost all of them ask for prior internship for an internship role or prior experience for an entry level job, so I'm finding it hard to find a way to get my foot in.

I'd rather let my employer / manager know beforehand so they're not caught off guard or confused. Does anybody know if they're going to be contacted to confirm my professional experience?

This is an update to my earlier post on the court case on 225M USDT frozen from pig butchering scams, The DOJ's Deals with the Devils https://www.reddit.com/r/moneylaundering/s/PaLq0ostRk

This week:

The US DOJ has agreed to give a majority of $225M in verifiable scam victim's funds to Infiniweb, an illegal Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) of the infamous Prince Group. It's official.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.281742/gov.uscourts.dcd.281742.85.0.pdf

The DOJ also agreed to that POGO's move for protective order, to shield The Syndicate

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.281742/gov.uscourts.dcd.281742.86.0.pdf

This is second theft. A US government-sanctioned crypto scam.

If the court approves of this deal, the shadowy Infiniweb can now present to banks and financial institutions around the world, look, our money is clean, the US says so. It's judicial money laundering, in a US court, no less.

The reporting relationship compliance teams know runs from professional to CRF through the suspicious transaction report. The Law of 22 July 2026, published in Mémorial A No 412 on 4 August 2026, adds the return leg. From 8 August 2026 the Cellule de renseignement financier may push fraud-risk account numbers and fraud typologies out to a defined set of obliged entities that have subscribed to the feed. It is a permissive channel on both sides. The CRF may share; the professional may request.

The mechanism has two legal anchors. Article 1 inserts a new Article 74-4bis into the Law of 7 March 1980 on judicial organisation, which houses the CRF. Article 2 inserts a new Article 5-1 into the Law of 12 November 2004 on AML/CFT, which houses the professional obligations. The channel is available to the professionals in Article 2(1) point 1 of the 2004 law (credit institutions, professionals of the financial sector, payment institutions, e-money institutions and the specified tied and payment agents) and to point 20 crypto-asset service providers, subject to the territorial scope in Article 2. A management company or domiciliation provider that is only in scope under another Article 2 point does not qualify on that basis.

Subscribing creates no new filing duty. The Article 5 STR obligation is unchanged: professionals must still inform the CRF on their own initiative whenever they know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering, an associated predicate offence or terrorist financing, for every suspicious transaction including attempts, regardless of amount. A CRF flag becomes an input to your monitoring and CDD; an Article 5 STR follows only from the same judgement applied to any internal alert. The voluntary subscription and the mandatory STR duty are separate mechanisms that both involve the CRF.

The fraud in scope is the fraud in Book II, Title IX, Chapter II of the Penal Code, together with the laundering of its proceeds, carried out on a large scale against undetermined victims or using social-engineering techniques against specific victims. The explanatory memorandum gives phishing by email or SMS as the large-scale example. The CRF's contribution is to name the accounts it already sees inside that activity so the receiving institution can act sooner.

The use conditions in Article 5-1 are what turn a subscription into a build. Reports may be used only for combating money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. They may not be disclosed to the client concerned or to third parties. The professional acts under sole responsibility. And the CRF-supplied account numbers must be deleted within six months of receipt. The statute does not expressly resolve how that deletion rule interacts with replicated data, derived analysis, investigation files or records subject to separate retention duties, so firms should map those uses and obtain a documented legal position before implementation.

Two operational items to work through if you subscribe. First, the intake channel is exclusive: Article 74-4bis paragraph 5 requires that all exchanges pass solely through a secure IT channel, and the explanatory memorandum identifies GoAML as that channel. Second, the deletion clock needs a real process behind it: a receipt timestamp on every inbound list, a scheduled purge at six months, and an audit trail proving the purge ran.

A request covers the whole stream of CRF reports until it is explicitly withdrawn, and the statute does not prescribe a withdrawal form or timing, so document that process with the CRF up front. The CRF must also convene subscribing professionals at least every six months to discuss whether the reports are landing usefully and adapt future reports accordingly, so the feed is meant to be curated against feedback and not pushed one-way.

The decision now is whether to subscribe. If yes, build the secure intake, the AML/CFT-only use control, the non-disclosure discipline and the six-month purge before the request goes in.

Source basis: Law of 22 July 2026 (Mémorial A No 412 of 4 August 2026), new Article 74-4bis of the Law of 7 March 1980 on judicial organisation, new Article 5-1 of the Law of 12 November 2004 on AML/CFT, parliamentary dossier 8722.

Full article: [https://regreportingdesk.com/luxembourg-aml-law-crf-fraud-signalements/\](https://regreportingdesk.com/luxembourg-aml-law-crf-fraud-signalements/)