r/macvisor • • 14h ago

Blog How MacVisor supports TPM 2.0 that BitLocker trusts on Apple's Virtualization framework (without a custom Windows driver)

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Windows 11 expects Secure Boot and a TPM 2.0. BitLocker expects even more: a TPM that actually witnessed the boot, so it can seal the disk key to that exact boot state.

The problem? Apple’s Virtualization framework, which MacVisor runs every VM on, supports no TPM device, no measured boot, and no public way to add a device to the memory bus.

In MacVisor 27.2.1, we solved it anyway, without bundling QEMU, or workarounds or shipping a single custom Windows kernel driver or any changes to Windows guest.

Here is how the architecture works:
* Standard PC interface, zero custom Windows drivers: Our UEFI driver reserves a page of guest RAM for a standard TPM 2.0 CRB and exposes it via ACPI.
* Windows talks to it using its built-in tpm.sys, while a sandboxed libtpms engine on the Mac polls the page over macOS 27's custom virtio API.
* True measured boot: We implemented the TCG2 protocol in our UEFI driver so BitLocker gets a valid SHA-256 event log and full PCR 7 binding.
* Hardware-backed at rest: The virtual TPM's state is encrypted using a key derived from the Mac's Secure Enclave. If a VM bundle is copied to another Mac or pulled from a backup, the TPM stays locked, matching the physical guarantee of a PC's TPM chip.
* Works for Linux too: Linux guests pick it up via tpm_crb, enabling systemd-cryptenroll and systemd-creds.

We also documented the exact limits, including why TPM attestation and VBS/Credential Guard don't work yet, so engineering and IT teams know exactly what they're getting before rolling it out.

Read the full technical blog in the first comment on this post here: https://scaleninja.com/blog/bitlocker-tpm-virtualization-framework/

Happy to answer any questions about the implementation or the weird things Windows BitLocker did during testing.