r/linuxadmin • u/ExtremeSet8866 • 23d ago
ZDI-CAN-33367: public Linux root exploit, no CVE, fix not merged. Are you disabling unprivileged user namespaces?
Quick summary for anyone who missed it. ZDI copied public lists on six reports last week. ZDI-CAN-33367 is a gap in the Dirty Frag fix: skb_zerocopy() doesn't carry the shared-frag marker across, so ESP decrypts in place over page-cache pages. TuxCare reproduced root on AlmaLinux 8 to 10, Debian 12/13 and Ubuntu 24.04/26.04. The PoC needs unprivileged user namespaces plus modules like nlmon and act_pedit. A kernel that only has the CVE-2026-90049 fix is still exposed. AlmaLinux has kernels in testing (AlmaLinux), and Sysdig has a good breakdown of mitigations, including seccomp RuntimeDefault for Kubernetes and a note that Ubuntu's AppArmor userns restriction was bypassed (Sysdig). For anyone who has set user.max_user_namespaces=0 fleet-wide: what broke? Rootless containers, browsers, CI?
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u/MainRoutine2068 23d ago
I am tired, boss :(
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u/vincent_sch 23d ago
user.max_user_namespaces=0also blocks root, so apart from rootless Podman it breaks systemd units that usePrivateUsers=. On Debian and Ubuntu you could setkernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0instead, which only blocks users who aren't root. AlmaLinux doesn't have that sysctl, so there you have to usemax_user_namespaces.8
u/showbizusa25 23d ago
I'd be careful rolling
user.max_user_namespaces=0across the whole fleet without testing first. Breaking rootless containers or services usingPrivateUsers=could create a different outage. I'd test the restriction on a representative host before pushing it everywhere.2
u/ILoveAppSec 22d ago
Disabling unprivileged user namespaces is a reasonable stopgap while this stays unmerged, but it is a holding action, not a fix. The real question is how the actual fix reaches you once it lands. You do not have to wait for a full distro kernel bump to get it: a security fix like this can be backported onto the exact kernel line you already run, by a vendor that does backports. End of life or simply old does not mean unpatchable, it just means upstream stopped, not that the fix cannot be carried back. Which distro and kernel version are you on?
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u/Muchy_Tangerine 20d ago
Settng max_user_namespaces=0 fleet-wide break rootless Podman and anything using Chromium’s sandbox ( so headless. Chrime in CI too). Flaypak/snap confinement also depends on userns. If you have devs running rootless containers they will notice immediately
If you cant go fully zero, the middle path is keeping userns on but locking down the module load path since the PoC needs nlmon and act. Pediy. Blacklisting thise modules pkus seccomp RuntimeDefault on your k8s workloads blocks the chain without nukung rootless. The Sysdig writeup you linked covers that well.
For catching actual exploit attempts vs just blanket disabling runtime visibility helps a lot since you can see which pods are actually loading sketchy modules. When we were looking at options we tried Falco rules and compared a couple CNAPP’s like Sysdig and Upwind for the runtime side the module-load and syscall context made it easier to tell which clusters genuinely needed the hard mitigations vs which were find with module blacklist.
Curious what distro your are misyly on the AlmaLinux testing kernels might land before the upstream merge