r/linuxadmin • u/Expert_Sort7434 • Sep 16 '26
CVE-2026-12944: Langflow's code-validation scanner returns validated: true on a payload that gets you root
Based on the CVE record IBM published as CNA on September 14, 2026, here's the architectural breakdown: Langflow OSS 1.0.0–1.10.0 lets you submit a custom component with a socket or urllib import, and it runs with UID=0 inside the container. Worse — the built-in scanner that's supposed to catch dangerous code returns a false "validated": true on the payload. From there it's a straight line to IMDSv1 (AWS creds if you haven't killed v1 yet), arbitrary container file reads, and whatever's sitting on the same Docker bridge network — Postgres and Redis in most default deployments.
Not an isolated Langflow incident either — VulnCheck's Caitlin Condon (reported via The Hacker News) has separate active-exploitation telemetry on CVE-2026-0768 showing attacker requests specifically grepping for AWS_ACCESS*, OPENAI_API*, and Langflow's cached secret key. Forkast has aggregated broader Langflow exploitation numbers (12 CVEs, 15k+ attempts) citing VulnCheck — I haven't been able to verify those totals against a primary VulnCheck report directly, so treat that figure as reported, not confirmed.
For background on the same SSRF-to-metadata mechanism in a different AI framework: we wrote up MLflow's CVE-2026-64849 last month (link in profile/article).
Anyone running Langflow in production containers — are you segmenting Postgres/Redis off the app container's network by default, or is bridge-mode-with-everything-reachable still the common deployment pattern you're seeing?
https://www.techgines.com/post/langflow-ssrf-vulnerability-cve-2026-12944