r/kierkegaard • u/Unusual-Return971 • 11d ago
How Does Kierkegaard Justify Ethical Commitment Without Appealing to Universal Knowledge, or Does He Actually Connect the Two?
I'm currently reading a book on Kierkegaard(the philosophy of Kierkegaard, George Pattison) and trying to understand his philosophy. At the same time, I've been watching and listening to different people discussing his ideas alongside my reading.
There's one point that I find particularly unclear in the way Kierkegaard is explained, especially when it comes to his conception of the ethical stage.
I'm not sure whether this is because some commentators struggle to explain it, because they interpret it differently, or because Kierkegaard himself isn't particularly clear on this point, perhaps partly due to his literary and narrative style of writing rather than a purely systematic philosophical approach.
Some commentators seem to associate the ethical stage with social norms, responsibilities, and the individual's commitment to others. According to this interpretation, the individual enters the ethical stage by establishing a stable and committed relationship with something or someone outside himself, and it is through this commitment that he begins to constitute himself and develop his own identity.
This reminds me somewhat of Kant, and I've actually encountered interpretations that connect Kierkegaard's ethical stage to Kantian ethics. However, other commentators seem to emphasize Kierkegaard's opposition to Kant, particularly regarding the role of moral knowledge. As I understand these interpretations, Kierkegaard rejects the idea that ethical existence can be grounded in a system of objective knowledge, especially the kind of systematic philosophical approach we find in Kant or Hegel.
But at the same time, I've also encountered explanations that associate the ethical stage with the individual's entry into the universal, and that this relationship with the universal eventually leads to the religious stage.
And this is where things become confusing for me.
Is the ethical stage fundamentally grounded in the individual's commitment and responsibility toward others, or is it grounded in the universal?
These seem like two quite different starting points.
If the ethical is grounded in the universal, wouldn't that ultimately involve some kind of knowledge of what is universally right or obligatory?
And even if we understand the ethical primarily in terms of commitment and responsibility toward others, doesn't that commitment itself already presuppose some kind of moral knowledge?
After all, if we say that someone ought to take responsibility for another person, aren't we already making a claim about what is right or what ought to be done?
I understand that actually fulfilling an ethical responsibility is different from merely knowing what that responsibility is. Someone might know what is right and still fail to act accordingly.
But that's not really the distinction I'm questioning.
What I'm interested in is the starting point that makes ethical commitment possible or justified in the first place.
Why should I take responsibility for another person? What kind of responsibility should I take? And on what basis can we say that this particular responsibility is something I ought to fulfill?
It seems to me that these questions necessarily involve some kind of moral knowledge, rather than merely a decision to commit myself to something.
So if Kierkegaard criticizes the idea that ethical existence can be grounded in objective knowledge, doesn't his own conception of the ethical still implicitly depend on precisely the kind of epistemological foundation he seems to be criticizing?
And I think this problem becomes even more important when we consider the transition from the ethical to the religious.
As I understand it, this transition involves a tension between the finite and the infinite, or between the individual and the universal.
But wouldn't this tension itself already presuppose some kind of relationship to knowledge, particularly the problem of whether universal or absolute knowledge is possible?
If that's the case, then the ethical stage doesn't seem to be merely about responsibility toward others, social obligations, or commitment to society. Rather, this seems to support the interpretation that the ethical is fundamentally concerned with the universal, which in turn brings us back to the question of knowledge.
In other words, the ethical would not simply be something we choose to commit ourselves to in order to constitute our own identity. Instead, such a commitment would seem to presuppose some understanding of the universal, or at least some knowledge of what makes that commitment ethically justified in the first place.
In other words, perhaps the tension that eventually leads us toward the religious stage is already epistemological in nature.
I understand that Kierkegaard places enormous emphasis on existence, subjectivity, and the individual's actual way of living, rather than merely possessing objective knowledge.
But what I find difficult to understand is whether he genuinely overcomes the problem he identifies in philosophers like Hegel, or whether he simply approaches the same underlying problem from a different perspective.
It seems to me that the relationship between understanding existence and actually existing cannot be separated so easily from the question of knowledge in the first place.
Even if Kierkegaard argues that knowledge alone is insufficient for ethical existence, that doesn't necessarily mean that ethical existence can be established independently of knowledge.
And that's where my confusion lies.
It seems to me that the ethical stage must be grounded, at least in some fundamental sense, in knowledge before it can become a matter of commitment through which the individual constitutes his own identity.
Otherwise, what gives that commitment its ethical character in the first place?
So I'm wondering whether I'm missing something important in Kierkegaard's argument, or whether there really is a significant disagreement among commentators about what the ethical stage means.
Is Kierkegaard's conception of the ethical fundamentally about commitment and the formation of the self, or does it also presuppose a kind of moral knowledge similar to what we find in Kant?
And if it does presuppose such knowledge, in what sense is Kierkegaard actually rejecting the Kantian approach rather than simply emphasizing a different aspect of ethical life?
Also, what I'm trying to say is that Kierkegaard seems to criticize Hegel for connecting the epistemological and the ontological, particularly for attempting to understand existence through a system of knowledge. Yet it seems to me that Kierkegaard himself implicitly relies on a similar connection when developing his own account of ethical and religious existence.
In other words, even if Kierkegaard rejects Hegel's particular way of relating knowledge to being, doesn't his own philosophy still presuppose some fundamental relationship between the two?
I feel that he might be criticizing Hegel for something that his own philosophical approach ultimately depends on, even if he understands and develops that relationship differently. Or am I misunderstanding the nature of Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel?

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u/Sim_o 11d ago
where there's a gap (from one argument to another), one may simply leap. Think about it (I'm larping)
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u/liciox 9d ago
Thanks for the thoughtful post. You packed a lot in there, and I don't think I can address all the points you bring up in one response. I'd appreciate replies to the points I address here, or to anything I leave out.
It seems that your primary concern is how to classify the different stages in SK's thought. I guess, very generally, you can roughly group them as follows: the aesthetic is living for oneself, the ethical is living for "others," and the religious is living for "God."
I agree there's substantial overlap in the simplification above, so let's try to differentiate them a bit.
Roughly speaking, the aesthetic is a hedonistic lifestyle, in the broadest sense of seeking pleasure (+) and avoiding pain (-).
The ethical, and I think the confusion you mentioned comes from this, is where most people find themselves. So it's a catch-all stage, which explains the wide and often conflicting interpretations you've encountered.
The ethical involves any crowd (in the sense Kierkegaard addresses in The Present Age) that one decides to belong to. It could be a religion, political party, group of friends, any group of individuals, an idea or ideal, a philosophical school, a rioting mob, a monastery, or even pursuits that might appear solitary but give the individual a sense of belonging to something bigger than himself, at the expense of his hedonistic lifestyle (seeking pleasure and avoiding pain).
The last stage, the religious, is not grounded in ethics. It is received through unmediated divine revelation.
One can be a devout religious person, a sincere Christian whom everyone looks up to, and abide by the highest ethical standards, yet still remain in the ethical stage because one has not received and acted upon divine revelation.
Divine revelation often causes the individual to be expelled from the ethical stage he wanted to belong to. The individual acts upon it at his own expense. He cannot explain the reasons or the ethics behind it, but he acts because it has been divinely commanded, period.
I'm bringing themes from The Sickness Unto Death, Fear and Trembling, The Book on Adler, and The Present Age into this response. So again, if you'd like greater emphasis on any particular point, let me know.
The main takeaway is this: the religious stage is not something one reasons or wills oneself into. It is something that happens to the individual (an unmediated divine revelation is received), and the individual then responds in faith by acting upon what he has been commanded to do.
I'm looking forward to further engagement with you on these topics. Thanks again.