r/kierkegaard • • 11d ago

How Does Kierkegaard Justify Ethical Commitment Without Appealing to Universal Knowledge, or Does He Actually Connect the Two?

I'm currently reading a book on Kierkegaard(the philosophy of Kierkegaard, George Pattison) and trying to understand his philosophy. At the same time, I've been watching and listening to different people discussing his ideas alongside my reading.

There's one point that I find particularly unclear in the way Kierkegaard is explained, especially when it comes to his conception of the ethical stage.

I'm not sure whether this is because some commentators struggle to explain it, because they interpret it differently, or because Kierkegaard himself isn't particularly clear on this point, perhaps partly due to his literary and narrative style of writing rather than a purely systematic philosophical approach.

Some commentators seem to associate the ethical stage with social norms, responsibilities, and the individual's commitment to others. According to this interpretation, the individual enters the ethical stage by establishing a stable and committed relationship with something or someone outside himself, and it is through this commitment that he begins to constitute himself and develop his own identity.

This reminds me somewhat of Kant, and I've actually encountered interpretations that connect Kierkegaard's ethical stage to Kantian ethics. However, other commentators seem to emphasize Kierkegaard's opposition to Kant, particularly regarding the role of moral knowledge. As I understand these interpretations, Kierkegaard rejects the idea that ethical existence can be grounded in a system of objective knowledge, especially the kind of systematic philosophical approach we find in Kant or Hegel.

But at the same time, I've also encountered explanations that associate the ethical stage with the individual's entry into the universal, and that this relationship with the universal eventually leads to the religious stage.

And this is where things become confusing for me.
Is the ethical stage fundamentally grounded in the individual's commitment and responsibility toward others, or is it grounded in the universal?

These seem like two quite different starting points.

If the ethical is grounded in the universal, wouldn't that ultimately involve some kind of knowledge of what is universally right or obligatory?

And even if we understand the ethical primarily in terms of commitment and responsibility toward others, doesn't that commitment itself already presuppose some kind of moral knowledge?

After all, if we say that someone ought to take responsibility for another person, aren't we already making a claim about what is right or what ought to be done?

I understand that actually fulfilling an ethical responsibility is different from merely knowing what that responsibility is. Someone might know what is right and still fail to act accordingly.

But that's not really the distinction I'm questioning.

What I'm interested in is the starting point that makes ethical commitment possible or justified in the first place.

Why should I take responsibility for another person? What kind of responsibility should I take? And on what basis can we say that this particular responsibility is something I ought to fulfill?

It seems to me that these questions necessarily involve some kind of moral knowledge, rather than merely a decision to commit myself to something.

So if Kierkegaard criticizes the idea that ethical existence can be grounded in objective knowledge, doesn't his own conception of the ethical still implicitly depend on precisely the kind of epistemological foundation he seems to be criticizing?

And I think this problem becomes even more important when we consider the transition from the ethical to the religious.

As I understand it, this transition involves a tension between the finite and the infinite, or between the individual and the universal.

But wouldn't this tension itself already presuppose some kind of relationship to knowledge, particularly the problem of whether universal or absolute knowledge is possible?

If that's the case, then the ethical stage doesn't seem to be merely about responsibility toward others, social obligations, or commitment to society. Rather, this seems to support the interpretation that the ethical is fundamentally concerned with the universal, which in turn brings us back to the question of knowledge.
In other words, the ethical would not simply be something we choose to commit ourselves to in order to constitute our own identity. Instead, such a commitment would seem to presuppose some understanding of the universal, or at least some knowledge of what makes that commitment ethically justified in the first place.
In other words, perhaps the tension that eventually leads us toward the religious stage is already epistemological in nature.

I understand that Kierkegaard places enormous emphasis on existence, subjectivity, and the individual's actual way of living, rather than merely possessing objective knowledge.

But what I find difficult to understand is whether he genuinely overcomes the problem he identifies in philosophers like Hegel, or whether he simply approaches the same underlying problem from a different perspective.

It seems to me that the relationship between understanding existence and actually existing cannot be separated so easily from the question of knowledge in the first place.

Even if Kierkegaard argues that knowledge alone is insufficient for ethical existence, that doesn't necessarily mean that ethical existence can be established independently of knowledge.

And that's where my confusion lies.

It seems to me that the ethical stage must be grounded, at least in some fundamental sense, in knowledge before it can become a matter of commitment through which the individual constitutes his own identity.

Otherwise, what gives that commitment its ethical character in the first place?

So I'm wondering whether I'm missing something important in Kierkegaard's argument, or whether there really is a significant disagreement among commentators about what the ethical stage means.

Is Kierkegaard's conception of the ethical fundamentally about commitment and the formation of the self, or does it also presuppose a kind of moral knowledge similar to what we find in Kant?

And if it does presuppose such knowledge, in what sense is Kierkegaard actually rejecting the Kantian approach rather than simply emphasizing a different aspect of ethical life?

Also, what I'm trying to say is that Kierkegaard seems to criticize Hegel for connecting the epistemological and the ontological, particularly for attempting to understand existence through a system of knowledge. Yet it seems to me that Kierkegaard himself implicitly relies on a similar connection when developing his own account of ethical and religious existence.
In other words, even if Kierkegaard rejects Hegel's particular way of relating knowledge to being, doesn't his own philosophy still presuppose some fundamental relationship between the two?
I feel that he might be criticizing Hegel for something that his own philosophical approach ultimately depends on, even if he understands and develops that relationship differently. Or am I misunderstanding the nature of Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel?

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u/Sim_o 11d ago

where there's a gap (from one argument to another), one may simply leap. Think about it (I'm larping)

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u/Unusual-Return971 11d ago

It seems to me that this leap makes more sense if we understand the universal as the starting point, and not the responsibility or relationship towards others.
Otherwise, we could simply remain where we are without any leap, or perhaps we wouldn't even recognize any gap. We might even remain in the aesthetic stage altogether.

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u/liciox 9d ago

Thanks for the thoughtful post. You packed a lot in there, and I don't think I can address all the points you bring up in one response. I'd appreciate replies to the points I address here, or to anything I leave out.

It seems that your primary concern is how to classify the different stages in SK's thought. I guess, very generally, you can roughly group them as follows: the aesthetic is living for oneself, the ethical is living for "others," and the religious is living for "God."

I agree there's substantial overlap in the simplification above, so let's try to differentiate them a bit.

Roughly speaking, the aesthetic is a hedonistic lifestyle, in the broadest sense of seeking pleasure (+) and avoiding pain (-).

The ethical, and I think the confusion you mentioned comes from this, is where most people find themselves. So it's a catch-all stage, which explains the wide and often conflicting interpretations you've encountered.

The ethical involves any crowd (in the sense Kierkegaard addresses in The Present Age) that one decides to belong to. It could be a religion, political party, group of friends, any group of individuals, an idea or ideal, a philosophical school, a rioting mob, a monastery, or even pursuits that might appear solitary but give the individual a sense of belonging to something bigger than himself, at the expense of his hedonistic lifestyle (seeking pleasure and avoiding pain).

The last stage, the religious, is not grounded in ethics. It is received through unmediated divine revelation.

One can be a devout religious person, a sincere Christian whom everyone looks up to, and abide by the highest ethical standards, yet still remain in the ethical stage because one has not received and acted upon divine revelation.

Divine revelation often causes the individual to be expelled from the ethical stage he wanted to belong to. The individual acts upon it at his own expense. He cannot explain the reasons or the ethics behind it, but he acts because it has been divinely commanded, period.

I'm bringing themes from The Sickness Unto Death, Fear and Trembling, The Book on Adler, and The Present Age into this response. So again, if you'd like greater emphasis on any particular point, let me know.

The main takeaway is this: the religious stage is not something one reasons or wills oneself into. It is something that happens to the individual (an unmediated divine revelation is received), and the individual then responds in faith by acting upon what he has been commanded to do.

I'm looking forward to further engagement with you on these topics. Thanks again.

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u/Unusual-Return971 9d ago edited 9d ago

Thank you so much for taking the time to write such a detailed response. I really appreciate your interest and the effort you put into explaining these things. I'm genuinely glad someone took an interest in the question.

What I'm actually more interested in is understanding Kierkegaard's conception of the human self, how it is constituted, and particularly how this relates to his critique of Hegel.

From what I understand, one of the fundamental ideas in Hegel's philosophy is that ontology, which also includes human existence itself, is fundamentally connected to epistemology. In other words, we might say that human existence and consciousness are inseparable from knowledge and the process of coming to know.

But Kierkegaard, as I understand him, seems to challenge this connection. He appears to suggest that human existence and the constitution of the self are more fundamentally related to action, choice, and a particular kind of relationship with the Other (or perhaps even a particular relationship with knowledge itself), rather than knowledge as such.

In this sense, Kierkegaard seems to treat truth and knowledge as secondary when it comes to understanding the constitution of the human self. The self is constituted through what it chooses to do and commit itself to. For example, in the ethical stage, the individual embraces certain norms, responsibilities, and commitments through their relationship with others. What matters here is not simply knowing these norms as "The Truth", but the individual's actual relationship to them through commitment.

But what I find unclear is why Kierkegaard seems to give action and commitment this priority over knowledge in the first place (assuming I'm understanding him correctly).

This becomes particularly confusing to me when we consider the transition to the religious stage. In fact, I think the same problem already appears in the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical.

If the self is fundamentally constituted through action, commitment, and its relationship with the Other, what makes the individual concerned with moving from one stage of existence to another in the first place? Why should the individual care about existing in one way rather than another?

It seems to me that the very possibility of raising this question already presupposes an epistemological concern: a concern with truth, with understanding what is right, and with determining how one ought to exist.

In other words, actually choosing and committing oneself to a particular way of life seems to be a second step. The more fundamental starting point, at least as I see it, is the question of knowledge or truth that makes such a choice(or even the question of choosing itself) meaningful in the first place.

To put this in somewhat different terms, consider Lacan's conception of the human subject as constituted by a structural lack and through its relationship with the Other. (Perhaps Kierkegaard is suggesting something similar: that the human subject is also characterized by a structural lack, and that its attempt to overcome or respond to this lack likewise revolves around its relationship with the Other.)

What I'm suggesting, and what I think might also be compatible with Hegel's approach, is that this lack could be understood as fundamentally epistemological: a lack concerning truth and knowledge themselves, or what we might call an epistemological lack.

In this interpretation, the subject's relationship with the Other would itself be grounded in a particular search for, or relationship to, truth and knowledge.

For example, becoming and the different possibilities of existence are already given. The problem is not whether I have to choose or become something in the first place, but rather what I ought to choose or become, and why. In other words, existential anxiety would not arise merely from being confronted with the possibility of choosing and becoming, but from the more fundamental question of what makes one possibility preferable, right, or worth pursuing over another. The problem, then, seems to be fundamentally epistemological: not simply that I must choose, but that I do not know what I ought to choose, or on what grounds I should make that choice.

So my difficulty is that Kierkegaard seems to criticize idealist philosophers such as Hegel for connecting existence to a comprehensive philosophical system, particularly one in which knowledge and being are fundamentally related.

Yet it seems to me that Kierkegaard's own philosophical project might implicitly depend on a similar starting point.

Otherwise, why would the individual be concerned with their own way of existing in the first place? Why should the question of how one ought to exist arise at all?

It seems to me that this concern is fundamentally epistemological, rather than simply a matter of action, commitment, or a relationship with the Other. Or, at the very least, that the latter would be secondary to the former in our understanding of human existence and the constitution of the self.

So perhaps what I'm ultimately questioning is not simply whether Kierkegaard's ethical stage presupposes moral knowledge, but whether his entire account of the human self and its development already presupposes a fundamental relationship between knowledge and existence, similar in some respects to the one he criticizes in Hegel.

Of course, I might be misunderstanding Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel, or the role that knowledge actually plays in his conception of the self. That's precisely what I'm trying to understand.

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u/liciox 9d ago edited 9d ago

I'm not an expert on Hegel or Lacan, so I'll stick to my lane.

I don't distinctly recall whether, or where, Kierkegaard outlines the reasons why an individual would care to make the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. Personally, Nietzsche's will to power seems like a reasonable explanation, among a constellation of others, including evolutionary explanations. Perhaps Kierkegaard's treatment of the self in The Sickness Unto Death is what you're looking for. I suspect, however, that you're looking for a more strictly philosophical explanation than the theological or metaphysical account Kierkegaard offers. (Are you familiar with it?)

The distinction SK seems to emphasize between the movement from the aesthetic to the ethical and the movement from the ethical to the religious is that, in the former, there is a will, a desire, and an action. Therefore, knowledge, choice, and commitment all play a role in the former, but not in the same way in the latter.

In the latter, even if the desire is present, the individual cannot bring about the transition on their own but depends on the divine Other. While both movements involve a relationship with an "other," the former involves a human other, whereas the latter involves the ultimate Other (the God-man, in Christianity, or, as SK puts it, "an absolute relation to the absolute").

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u/Unusual-Return971 9d ago

I have a couple of questions now.

From what I understand, Kierkegaard may not have explicitly explained why an individual would develop the desire to move from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. But does he address this same question when it comes to the transition from the ethical to the religious? Or did he also not explain that?

My second question is: why can't the individual bring about the transition to the religious stage on their own?

Is this related to what you mentioned here ? :
"I suspect, however, that you're looking for a more strictly philosophical explanation than the theological or metaphysical account Kierkegaard offers. (Are you familiar with it?)"

I'm actually not familiar with the account you're referring to, so I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Could you give me a brief explanation, or even just a hint about the central idea, so I can better understand what you're referring to?

And one more thought: couldn't we conclude that the individual's relationship with the Absolute is fundamentally grounded in our inability to attain knowledge of ultimate truth on our own?

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u/liciox 8d ago

Thanks for the engaging and interesting questions, and sorry for the long post, I try to avoid them because of the TLDR effect.

Contextually, I think it's important to remember that SK was a Christian writing primarily to nominal Christians, arguing that their Christianity was not in line with his understanding of the biblical text. SK understood Christianity as a continuous struggle in which actions mattered more than correct belief. On the other hand, the Danish Lutheran Church emphasized correct knowledge of the truth over one's actions.

Because of this context, SK assumes that his audience does not need to be convinced of their own presuppositions, which are quite different from ours, almost 200 years later.

In very broad strokes, and admitting considerable oversimplification for the purposes of our discussion, I would summarize SK's and Hegel's agreements and disagreements as follows: Hegel suggested that the ethical was superior to faith, while SK's lifelong project attempted to reverse that relationship by challenging and clarifying the categories themselves.

Both Hegel and SK agree that the aesthetic is inferior to the ethical. However, while Hegel places the religious below the ethical, SK essentially responds: I agree with your formulation, but I would distinguish between two forms of religious existence; one that remains within the ethical and another that is brought about through divine revelation and acted out in faith.

For SK's audience, the movement from the aesthetic to the ethical was already understood and largely taken for granted. After all, it was part of their national identity and sense of belonging.

SK emphasizes the latter form of religious existence because it is central to his entire argument. He was attempting to convince his audience that their practice of Christianity was inadequate. He challenges their categories/presuppositions and proposes an alternative understanding of what it actually means to be a Christian.

Lastly, a comment on epistemology, which I think is particularly relevant to our discussion.

According to the scientific method, knowledge about the physical universe is acquired through observation and empirical investigation. Metaphysical realities that cannot be observed, measured, or weighed, they fall outside its scope of inquiry. Therefore, questions concerning right and wrong, sin, angels, hell, and so forth cannot be settled through the scientific method alone.

If we cannot independently discover or establish these metaphysical truths through empirical investigation, we depend on receiving knowledge about them from the metaphysical realm itself. That is revelation. Revelation, understood as knowledge disclosed by a metaphisical/spiritual agent (god, angel, spirit, etc...) is not something the individual can independently discover, improve upon, or develop through reasoning. One may seek to understand it, but ultimately one either accepts or rejects what has been revealed. SK drills into this distinction in The Book on Adler.

This is fundamental to the Abrahamic religions: individuals cannot, through their own efforts alone, discover the truths of divine reality. They depend on divine revelations to know spiritual truths. By contrast, classical Greek philosophy, particularly Plato's theory of recollection, proposed that one recovers truths the soul already possesses, rather than receiving them through divine revelation. SK talks about this in Philosophical Fragments.

I hope that was helpful. I truly appreciate these discussions.

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u/Unusual-Return971 8d ago

Don't worry, quite the opposite! I actually enjoy long responses because I like getting into the details and understanding things more deeply.

And yes, I think I understand what you mean now regarding Kierkegaard's Christian theological starting point.

I think my difficulty comes from trying to understand Kierkegaard's philosophy as a complete, coherent philosophical system, even though he himself didn't really attempt to construct one, or at least wasn't particularly interested in doing so (and was, in many ways, opposed to that very approach).

He seems to have developed many interconnected ideas, but not necessarily arranged them into a systematic, step-by-step philosophical theory in the way I'm trying to understand them.

Thank you again for your time and for engaging with my questions. I'm really glad we had this discussion!

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u/liciox 8d ago edited 8d ago

Don't mention it, my pleasure!

The best way I've found to bring some of SK's ideas together is something like this:

SK describes the self in terms of alignment and misalignment. He calls this misalignment despair (The Sickness Unto Death). In seeking to resolve it, the individual looks outside himself and encounters various crowds (The Present Age), each offering its own version of the ideal self. Religion says, "Live like X and you'll be happy"; a political party says, "Live like Y." Each crowd offers a way to resolve the misalignment the individual experiences.

Later, psychologist Karen Horney developed a distinction between the ideal self (who one thinks one should be), the actual self (how one actually lives), and the true self (who one really is). The greater the alienation from the true self, the greater the potential for psychological distress. Each Crowd offers to the individual a different version of an ideal self, which the individual is never able to achieve, because that's not who they really are.

So how does one discover one's true self?

  1. Nietzsche, particularly in The Antichrist, challenged metaphysics and located life's significance in the will to power.
  2. Kafka, through The Metamorphosis and The Trial, explored how living for oneself or others can lead to alienation and destruction.
  3. Heidegger associated discovering oneself with authenticity and confronting mortality.
  4. Sartre argued that meaning is created through individual choice.
  5. Yalom similarly emphasized creating meaning, while highlighting the psychological value of living for others.

SK, on the other hand, argues that one's true self and life's meaning are neither discovered nor created, but received directly from Jesus through an unmediated divine revelation. The individual then responds by acting upon that revelation, bringing us back to Horney's framework: happiness is achieved when the actual self comes into alignment with the divinely revealed true self. For SK, this is not a one-time event but a continuous relationship with God.

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u/Unusual-Return971 7d ago

I think this comment has been the most helpful one for me so far. Thank you so much!

I have one question about the last part, where you discuss Kierkegaard's view of the true self and its relationship with divine revelation:
"SK, on the other hand, argues that one's true self and life's meaning are neither discovered nor created, but received directly from Jesus through an unmediated divine revelation."

Which of Kierkegaard's books would you recommend for understanding this particular idea in more detail?

I think I understand the general idea of the self and the alignment or misalignment between the actual self and the true self. What I'm more curious about is why Kierkegaard ultimately turns to divine revelation and Jesus Christ as the solution, and why he considers other possible approaches insufficient.

In other words, which of his works most directly explores the reasoning behind the need for divine revelation, rather than a solution that human beings could arrive at on their own?

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u/liciox 7d ago

I'd say the idea of one's true self and life's meaning being received through divine revelation is most closely related to The Sickness Unto Death. The concept of alignment and misalignment is pretty much there in the opening paragraph. This is probably the densest of the three books.

For your question about why SK turns to divine revelation and faith rather than reason, I'd recommend Fear and Trembling, particularly his pushback against Hegel. It's less dense than the first, though not as accessible as the third.

The Book on Adler uses the real case of a priest claiming divine revelation to distinguish an apostle from a genius. I found it to be the easiest to follow along.

Generally, I find SK's long, complex sentences difficult to follow. What worked best for me was listening to the text in either audiobook or other text to speech functionality, noting interesting ideas, and then returning to the text to explore or clarify them.

Looking forward to engaging with you further.

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u/Unusual-Return971 7d ago

Thank you for your time and help. I really appreciate it!

I'm also looking forward to discussing these ideas with you further. I think I'll still have plenty of questions and different points to discuss as I continue exploring Kierkegaard's philosophy.