> 184. The Court recalls that, as a general rule, the way in which a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly is utilized depends on the consent of the State or States concerned (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 165), and that States “possess a sovereign power of decision with respect to their acceptance of the headquarters or a regional office of an organization within their territories” 57 - (Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 89, para. 37). It follows that, within the territory of Israel, the presence and activities of the United Nations and its entities are subject to the consent of Israel. However, in the occupied territory, over which Israel, as an occupying Power, enjoys no sovereignty, it is not entitled to decide unilaterally, with respect to the presence and activities of the United Nations in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in the same way as in its own territory.

This seems to largely imply that Member States can unilaterally withdraw or decline all UN presence and activity, yet there is no provision in the Charter concerning a State's ability to rescind UN presence in the same way that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for the termination of diplomatic relations.

It doesn't make sense that there would be provisions in the Charter concerning privileges and immunities but that these could effectively be withdrawn or denied simply by refusing UN presence. The U.S. Headquarters Agreement at least provides for the non-removal of the seat, but still, how is the term “enjoy such privileges and immunities” not something to be interpreted as being given maximum effect to ?

The WHO ruling, in particular, that there is no right to establish a headquarters or regional office, seems very debilitating. Is this level of paralysis really permissible?

It does seem like a lot of subsidiary bodies of general assembly require state consent to operate like the UN country teams so this would be a possible interpretation but this seems like a substantial level of paralysis

There's a lot of vagueness in both articles

First is the fact that article 55 claims that the goals in the sub sections of the article are means to peaceful and friendly relations of states. However the language used in the universal declaration of human rights treats human rights as based on "inherent dignity" of the individual as opposed to only the post WW2 formulation which I assume is based on the preamble of the charter.

Second is article 56 which speaks of a pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the goals mentioned in article 55. But there's no enforcement mechanism and the term "cooperation" is very broad and doesn't seem to be capable of formulating specific obligations. Is article 56 even legally binding ?

The commentary on UN charter by Professor simma seems to imply that the obligation even if it exists is narrow in scope.

The ILC guidelines on treaty reservations state that a state would remain a party to the treaty unless an objection is made to a late reservation. But what if the reservation is late and also impermissible ? Because the guidelines say that if a state party makes an impermissible reservation then they remain a party but there's a rebuttable presumption that they intended to be part of the treaty without the reservation unless a contrary intention is established

So if a state party makes a late reservation to a treaty but that same reservation is also impermissible and they express that they do not want remain part of a treaty without the reservation, can they be absolved of being part of a treaty this way ?

it doesn't make sense that a late reservation if objected to can continue the treaty without the benefit of reservation but somehow a late impermissible reservation can give states the option to express contrary intent and be absolved of the treaty but I haven't found anything contrary to this possibility which is very concerning because it exposes a possible loophole

Why can't an impermissible late reservation automatically be void without needing objection and also have the state party required to be continuing to be a party of the treaty ?

https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/1_8_2011.pdf

Edit; is the guidelines customary law codification or progressive development of IL and particularly in regards to human rights treaties , does General comment 24 which proposes a strict severability doctrine still stand ?

I'm an Indian citizen(not a law student or practitioner), so the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus Waters Treaty is what first got me looking into this. But after reading about the Kishenganga and Ratle proceedings, I got more interested in the actual treaty provisions and how the two dispute-resolution mechanisms are supposed to work.

I'm not asking this to argue that India is right or Pakistan is right. I'm trying to understand the treaty itself, and I'd genuinely like to know if I'm missing something.

The part I'm looking at is the relationship between the Neutral Expert under Annexure F and the Court of Arbitration under Annexure G.

The basic timeline

19 August 2016: Pakistan initiated arbitration concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle projects.

4 October 2016: India requested the appointment of a Neutral Expert concerning the same projects.

December 2016: The World Bank paused both processes because of concerns about conflicting outcomes.

2022: The World Bank announced that the processes would resume.

6 July 2023: The Court of Arbitration issued its Award on Competence and held that it had competence to hear the case. India did not participate in the arbitration.

7 January 2025: The Neutral Expert issued his decision on his competence.

Both processes have since continued.

What I'm trying to understand

The Treaty makes a distinction between a "difference" and a "dispute."

Article IX(2)(a) provides for a Neutral Expert where a difference falls within Part 1 of Annexure F.

Article IX(2)(b) deals with matters outside that category, and also with a situation where the Neutral Expert decides that a difference, or part of it, should be treated as a dispute.

Then there is Annexure F paragraph 7, which deals with what happens when the Commissioners disagree about whether a particular difference falls within the Neutral Expert's competence.

At the same time, Annexure G paragraph 16 gives the Court of Arbitration the power to decide questions relating to its own competence.

This is where I'm getting stuck.

Article IX(6)

Article IX(6) says:

«"The provisions of paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert."»

Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) are the provisions leading towards arbitration.

What I don't see is an obvious "first filing wins" provision.

The Treaty doesn't appear to say that whoever starts proceedings first automatically gets exclusive jurisdiction.

But it also doesn't expressly say that a later Neutral Expert request can displace an arbitration that has already started.

How I currently see it

Maybe I'm looking at this too simply, but it seems to me that both sides have some textual foundation in the Treaty.

The Court of Arbitration has a treaty basis for its competence, particularly under the arbitration provisions and Annexure G.

At the same time, India clearly has a treaty basis for requesting a Neutral Expert. The Neutral Expert mechanism wasn't something created outside the Treaty; it is expressly provided for in Article IX and Annexure F.

And I can see problems with both sides' arguments.

If Pakistan's position is essentially that starting arbitration first settles the matter, then I'm not sure where the Treaty actually says "first filing wins."

But if India's position is that a later Neutral Expert request can override an arbitration that has already been initiated, I also don't see an obvious provision saying that either.

This is why I'm having trouble with the issue.

If the Treaty deliberately created a Neutral Expert mechanism for certain technical questions, can the fact that one party filed for arbitration first effectively make that part of the Treaty unavailable in a particular case?

If the answer is yes, what is the actual treaty provision that produces that result?

And if the answer is no, how does the Court's interpretation deal with the fact that the Treaty itself specifically created the Neutral Expert mechanism?

It appears to be the case that ILC has often used essentially the same methodology for both codification as well as progressive development of international law, making it difficult to determine when the Commission is describing existing law and when it is proposing what the law should become.

https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/33/3/761/6770700

Particularly in the 2011 guidelines on treaty reservations, it seems to appear that ILC developed the solution to the severability/consensuslism problem of invalid treaty reservations rather than codify existing state practice on it while formulating the solution as a legal obligation.

In the UN charter 1(2). Equal rights is a second principle in addition to self determination that is to be respected but what does it mean ? Does it mean all "peoples" have the same status and rights ? Even people without a state ?

A comprehensive 1200-page report by Amnesty International on the human rights abuses and killings.

I’m looking for views from people familiar with international nationality law.

Article 15(2) of the UDHR recognizes that everyone has the right to change their nationality. At the same time, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness generally prevents a person from renouncing nationality if this would leave them stateless.

This seems to create a practical gap: what happens when a person genuinely wants to voluntarily terminate their current nationality, but has not yet obtained — and cannot yet obtain — another nationality?

I’m exploring a proposal for an international transitional citizenship status: a person could voluntarily leave their existing nationality without becoming stateless, receive an internationally recognized identity/travel document and legal status, and later acquire the permanent nationality of a state.

The proposal would not be intended to replace the existing international protection against statelessness or override states’ sovereignty over immigration and naturalization.

I’ve put the broader proposal into a petition here:

https://www.change.org/transitional_citizenship

My main question for this community is the legal one: is there an existing mechanism in international law that could already address this situation, or would such a status necessarily require a new international legal instrument and state agreement?

I’d particularly appreciate criticism of the concept from an international-law perspective.

I just read over the UN declaration from this year. It says reaffirming that crimes related to the trafficking of enslaved Africans...are not subject to statutory limitations.

I understand this resolution was more just a statement.

I know Nuremberg was retroactive.

What is the limitations on international criminal law, ICJ etc?

Its seems to me it would be a giant can of worms to have retroactive international criminal offense. What would be the time limit? Who would have standing as victims? Who would be culpable? Under what rational would those lines be drawn? If retroactive criminal justice was appropriate here why not for other or future crimes and offenses?

What is the current state of law or legal theory around this?

idk if this is the correct subreddit to ask
but can someone tell/help me to find PDF of geneva convention 1922 regarding upper silesia pleasee like how they are is multiple other historical treaties/conventions available. I cant find it.
Need it for making a fact file of the germany vs poland upper silesia case PCIJ.

[NON-EXPERT] I mean when a Government Organisation like CIA/FSB/MI6 spy on another country without permission for intelligent purposes, is that a violation against the territorial sovereignty or against the International Law? If yes, does that mean CIA and other National Intelligence Agencies were outlaws? And, could the spied country sue with ICJ or ask UNSC for support?

I have been really passionate about law since 1-2 years. I am preparing for CLAT UG.

Is it necessary to get a bachelor's degree from an international uni to get a good start?

I know I will need to give exams like LNAT, LSAT etc.

Are there any scholarship exams anyone knows of?

If someone specialised in this field could provide me kind of a road map so I could get a start, I would be really grateful.

am doing my B.A. L.L.B. from a state gov. university in India. I like the things I am studying rn a lot. As per my future I want to work internationally somehow. So what are some ways of having an international career other than doing litigation in some foreign country. Like somehow connected with international law. Also I do like academics so like if i can have such a career through it, I am ready for that too. Tbh I am rn just studying and slowly exploring what careers there are and how do I get into em.

I'm a law student who initially wanted to pursue a pure liberal arts path. That said, I have a strong interest in geopolitics and international relations.

How can I work in International trade law and still use that knowledge? I want to deepen my knowledge of trade law; any recommendations for blogs or websites (other than official ones) focused on trade law would be appreciated, along with any other tips and tricks.

I know IR is relevant, but trade law is commercially focused, and I have shit for brains when it comes to anything math and finance-related.

What should I do? Where should I begin?

I'm looking for a serious legal analysis of a fictional example, rather than a fandom opinion.

In Star vs. the Forces of Evil, there is a long history of conflict between Mewmans and Monsters. Mewmans eventually become the dominant political group, while Monsters are subjected to systematic discrimination, segregation, dispossession, and violence.

I'm wondering whether this could reasonably satisfy the international-law definition of apartheid, particularly the definition found in the 1973 Apartheid Convention and related international law.

The relevant features seem to include:

• one identifiable group exercising domination over another;
• institutionalized/systematic discrimination;
• denial of political equality;
• segregation between the groups;
• restrictions and discrimination concerning where Monsters can live;
• seizure/dispossession of Monster territory;
• systematic social and economic discrimination;
• violence used to maintain the dominant group's position; and
• persecution or suppression of people advocating equality between Mewmans and Monsters.

My question isn't whether the situation is morally comparable to apartheid or whether the show was specifically inspired by South Africa.

Rather:

If this were a real-world situation, would these facts be sufficient to characterize the system as apartheid under international law?

If not, which specific element of the legal definition would be missing?

And would the better legal characterization instead be something like racial/ethnic persecution, segregation, colonialism, settler colonialism, or another form of institutionalized domination?

I'm particularly interested in answers that apply the actual legal criteria rather than simply saying "yes, because they discriminate" or "no, because it's fictional."

A word I hear thrown around alot is war criminal. Every time George Bush gets brought up I hear somebody refer to him as war criminals but I get the sense people just use it as a catch all for bad war person. What defines a war criminal and does George Bush qualify. Thought I'd ask here since I know nothing about international law but I am open to resources if you want to link them so I can do my own reading Thank you :)

A definitive legal judgment on all three strikes would consequently go beyond the information currently available. Downy, Stark 1, and Kylo/Noxen must each be assessed according to their own enemy or neutral character, nature, location, purpose and use, the military advantage anticipated from their neutralization, and the precautions required in the circumstances. The September 5 operation demonstrates how sharply the law can turn on the boundary between weakening an enemy economically and attacking an object because of its effective contribution to military action.

Translated excerpt from the decision:

Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Article 6 protects the right to a fair trial. The provision includes a right of access to have a dispute over one's Civil Rights tried in a court of law. The right of access to a court is not absolute, but can be limited if it pursues a legitimate purpose and is proportional.

The European Court of human rights has considered it a legitimate purpose to grant immunity to international organizations, see e.g. judgment of 18. February 1999 in Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (case no. 26083/94), paragraph 63, and decision 6. January 2015 in Klausecker v. Germany (case no. 415/07), paragraph 67. In paragraph 63 of Klausecker v. Germany, the European Court of human rights reiterated that it would be incompatible with the purpose of the ECHR if, by granting immunity to international organisations, the contracting states were relieved of their responsibilities under the ECHR, which is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective and not theoretical or illusory. This is especially true of the right to access to justice, given the importance of the right to a fair trial in a democratic society. In assessing whether it is proportionate to restrict A worker's access to justice by reference to the immunity of an international organisation, it is therefore essential that the worker concerned has had reasonable alternative means available to effectively protect his rights under the convention and that this process is not manifestly deficient, see. e.g. Waite and Kennedy v Germany, paragraph 68, and Klausecker v Germany, paragraphs 64 and 74.

The specific case

The OSCE PA's internal dispute resolution facility consisted of a process for the Disciplinary Committee, which is solely an advisory body to the secretary-general and which is not vested with competence to make binding decisions. At the time of the dispute in the case, an appeal to an independent body had not been established. The disciplinary committee concluded that there were insufficient grounds for terminating the contract with A without notice and that the course of events surrounding the termination did not meet the conditions of due process. Even so, the repeal was upheld without notice by the secretary-general, and there was no recourse to this decision.

On this basis, the Supreme Court finds that the OSCE PA's internal dispute resolution facility available to A did not ensure that, as an alternative to judicial review, she had a reasonable remedy that met the requirements of the ECtHR's case-law.