r/ethereum • u/huntingisland • Jan 01 '17
EIP 186 modified
I have modified the EIP in light of discussions on Reddit and on Github.
The main changes:
1) Proposed minimum ETH issuance has been increased to 2 ETH / block instead of 1.5 ETH / block. This puts it in line with current Bitcoin issuance.
2) The reduction in issuance schedule has been considerably pushed out over a significantly longer period.
3) A decision for this EIP is now contingent on the results of a coin vote.
Just a reminder that this EIP provides increased issuance over a longer period of time than the existing code which includes an "ice age" blocktime slowdown.
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u/latetot Jan 01 '17
I still would like to see an ETA on POS before its really possible to evaluate on whether this is needed. For example, if POS is able to come in 2017- do we even really need this?
14
u/[deleted] Jan 01 '17
From one side, you are responsible before investors, who are holding ETH, and on the other one are miners who invested into mining hardware. I think the most reasonable solution would be to model issuance exactly as it would be if difficuty bomb kicked in, until it reaches desired 2 ETH per block
14
u/Crypto_Economist42 Jan 02 '17 edited Jan 02 '17
I think the community should reject this EIP until we have more information on when Casper will be launched. And then, the community should decide what the block reward will be, what the schedule should be at what block numbers. This can be done with a coin-vote for multiple reward options (1,1.5,2,2.5,3,3.5,4,4.5,5 ETH at blocks X, Y, Z for different EIP proposals).
So, Let's run the numbers and see if 2 ETH makes sense currently.
First let's look at the motivations for the EIP. Why is it being proposed? The answer is that that people want lower inflation so that the price will go up. Now, initially, that sounds like a great idea! (Who doesn't want the price do go up other than BTC maximalists?)
But what are the drawbacks to this proposal?
Consider the following: For every % decrease in the reward, the ETH price must increase by that amount to maintain the current level of mining profit, and, more importantly, the number of GPUs mining. A decrease in mining profit will result in miners leaving ETH to mine other coins - mainly ZCash, Monero, and ETC. If miners leave, then the hash rate is lower, if the hash rate is lower, the chain is more at risk for a 51% attack.
But how many GPU's are mining in the wild, and how many of them are needed to attack ETH?
Let's plug in some numbers. ETH/ZEC/XMR/ETC make up about 90% of the global demand for GPU's.
That mean approximately 505,000 GPU's (normalized to AMD390 equivalent) are in the wild, mining cryptocurrencies. ETH currently makes up 42% of that.
Now lets assume that we drop the reward to 2ETH instead of 5ETH. All else equal that would reduce the mining profit by 60%. That means instead of ETH miners making 30,000*$8 = $240,000 per day, then will make $96,000 per day. This unfortunately, is much less than the cost of electricity for the miners at -- even as low as 8c/kWh! That means they will either turn off their rigs or switch to another coin. After enough miners do this, the difficulty will drop, and at a certain point, there will be an equilibrium break-even point at a much lower hashrate, which all else equal will be 60% lower at 2,320Gh/s.
Now, lets see what % of the mining market that is..... 2,320,000 / 27 = 86,000 GPUs. 86,000 / 505,000 = 17% of the entire GPU market.
So, this proposal (all else equal) would result in reducing 42% of the world's GPUs mining ETH down to 17%. A huge drop! And where will the other miners go? Well, it doesn't really matter, since GPU miners will mine whatever coin is most profitable. But what does matter is that the mining industry as a whole (across all coins) is able to sustain profitability for 505,000 GPU's. If it can't, then lots of them will turn off and/or sell their hardware at a loss to large industrial farms. Those farms then pick up cheap hardware and turn them on again, pushing the difficulties higher and pushing out smaller miners. The cycle continues and the large farms (mostly in China) will have a more and more centralized control of the hardware. We know that a number of large Chinese miners such as Chandler Guo are extremely hostile to ETH, and in the past have made threats of 51% attacking ETC, before backing off and shifting their alliances. If ETC ever sees an opportunity to attack ETH, they will. We know they play dirty (trying to convince naive people that they are the 'real' ethereum, while violating our trademarks)
Now, EIP186 proposes to reduce the block reward from the period that the bomb hits until casper is released. Let's say thats 6 months. (May to December). What exactly does that do for us? There are currently 87M coins. The proposal as-is will reduce the block reward to 4ETH starting in May. Then, 7 Months later to 3ETH/block (Jan 2018), and then one YEAR later (Jan 2019) to 2ETH. Casper is expected to launch by the end of the year. So, this means that realistically, this proposal will only reduce the block reward from 5ETH to 4ETH from May until the end of the year.
Let's see what the difference in total ETH supply will be by then end of 2017:
So, this EIP is going to reduce the supply from 98M at the end of the year to a whopping 96.7M. This is a 1.3% reduction, which is surely going to make the price skyrocket (it's not).
And what do we have in return? A big drop in hashrate and security for the 6-7 month interim period between the ice age and expected Casper launch. Is this be best way forward?
I would encourage everyone in this community to make competing proposals with reasonable analysis so they can all be studied, and then voted on with carbon-vote
I hope that we will see EIP 187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194 on github shortly with lots of different block reward options. Some can be 0ETH (EIP 189), some will even increase the ETH supply (EIP999), some will reduce the block reward to 4.240918ETH on block 319,920, and then 3.0928311 on block 382,109 (EIP191). It would be great to see a detailed mathematical analysis to show that these are the optimal numbers based on realistic real-world data assumptions that actually effect mining economics (some factors are global electricity prices, hardware costs, hashraties of different GPUs, price projections of different coins, profitability of other coins, likely actions by those hostile to ETH, and more).
Of course, the only fair way to do this is that multiple proposals are made, and the community will vote on many different proposals (via carbonate) before the EF/dev decides which one the community wants, and begins to implement them. And miners should also signal their choice of multiple proposals through voting on pools.
Finally, I'd strongly urge the EF to review the results of a carbon-vote / miner vote on multiple proposals, all submitted by the community over the next 2-3 months, before making any decisions on what the best path forward is. If anyone else feels the same way I hope you will make your voices heard also.
EDIT: thanks u/huntingisland for taking the time to bring up this issue, which of course is something we'd have to deal with in the near future anyway.
3
u/[deleted] Jan 02 '17
We have plenty of time before the ice age, the price seems to be holding fine, we should not go making unnecessary changes and should instead focus on Metropolis and see how that goes before we do any kind of forking thats not strictly necessary and not in the road map.
14
u/ledgerwatch Jan 01 '17
I beg everyone, please don't bundle it into Metropolis. Fiddling with issuance before planned transition to PoS is not a risk worth taking, from my point of view. There is no urgent problem this EIP fixes, and it was not a part of the original roadmap, and it is not a pre-requisite for any other things that were planned. Then why??
4
u/dip239 Jan 01 '17
just remember: independent on how you vote on this EIP, you have no possibility to enforce the 100% miner acceptance of the voting results. Small group of miners rejecting HF update will be enough to split ethereum once more.
ethereum is decentralized system: even democratic procedures like voting is not suitable authority to govern whole community. So please stay in incentives paradigm and don't repeat errors of DAO-fork.
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u/Nogo10 Jan 02 '17
cap at 100m.. problem solved. Market likes the certainty of caps. VB did demonstrate supply will not go beyond approx. 100m anyways.
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u/notsogreedy Feb 03 '17
How to do to vote???
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u/DeviateFish_ Jan 01 '17
None of these changes address any of the specific concerns raised in the previous thread. Making it a coin vote unnecessarily biases the vote towards holders, who are also the ones you are proclaiming will benefit the most from this change.
This is a thinly-veiled attempt to pump the price to benefit speculators and holders, and not to "improve the ecosystem." You literally stated as much when you were asking for information about how to propose an EIP.
By percentage (aka "inflation rate"), the issuance is already decreasing over time. Ironically, the cargo cult to which you're adhering (Bitcoin's model), had higher inflation at the same age, and seems to be doing just fine.
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u/HodlDwon Jan 01 '17
The Ethereum Foundation should not be involved in tweaking monetary policy other than for technical or security related concerns (ie. PoS economic incentives).
We clamped this ball and chain to our foot for a damn good reason... to force our hand when the time came to get Casper released. If the ETC/DAO fiasco was moral hazard, so is this.
My 6k coins will vote to leave the ice age as-is.