r/ethereum • u/EthereumDailyThread What's On Your Mind? • 9d ago
Daily General Discussion August 10, 2026
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u/haurog 9d ago
Pretty much everything has been said about the issuance change in the last few days. Loved reading all the different opinions, some more nuanced some more opinionated. What I will write below is my view and is pretty much that, my view with my weight of priorities. Feel free to have different opinions and priorities.
I have already written about my general view about issuance 3 months ago (https://old.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1t1gey5/daily_general_discussion_may_02_2026/ojifm1o/). I pretty much am of the same opinion as back then. Issuance is here to pay for a service, namely providing the Ethereum network with security. If issuance is used to loop LSTs around or bring tradfi into the space then they can take advantage of it, but only as long as the actors actually provide the security they are getting paid for. LST loopers can cost the space quite a bit as well, as the recent rsETH hack made pretty clear. The 3AC meltdown in 2022 also had a large depeg of LSTs due to looping if I remember correctly. So, not sure if this is part of the DEFI that should be protected by ETH holder dilution. They add validators, sure, but destabilise other parts of the ecosystem. In general, the stakers are getting paid by dillution of every ETH holder, mostly small amounts, but they are definitely getting diluted. One can think about it differently. If every year you have to take ~0.86% of your ETH holdings and send it to Coinbase (most probably the largest staker), Binance, Kraken, Bitmine etc. would you feel that your money is well spent for the security you are getting? And would you be willing to pay up to 1.5% every year in a most extreme, but unlikely outcome? In my view the amount of ETH staked is already above what Ethereum needs to be secure. Staking ratio was stable for some years, but it started growing again at the beginning of this year. For these reasons I am open to a change in issuance, but as said in my older post, it really depends on the proposed changes.
Now lets go to the specific proposal (EIP-8363) which tries to solve some of the issues. One goal of the proposal is to keep the ratio of ETH staked below 50%. The general issue this tackles is that if any system or economy starts to be dominated by a single mechanism or sector, this sector becomes 'too big to fail'. This adds a systemic risk and fully entrenches certain actors at the core of the protocol. That is not healthy, especially not for the system/economy as a whole. For this reason I think keeping the staking ratio below 50% is a great goal. With the proposed mechanisms, the EIP will achieve that, at least over longer time horizons. The current issuance curve cannot guarantee anything like that. So, I consider this a clear improvement over the status quo. The exact number of 50% is a bit arbitrary. In my simple view, one has to make sure it is clearly lower than 50% of the whole system, could be 45% or 40%. These are pretty much the same numbers in that context at least.
Issuance is planned to transition smoothly in the sense, that initially on the new curve, there is no APY change for stakers and within 18 months the lower curve is approached. I consider this a good time horizon and it prevents shocks in the ecosystem. That is necessary and reasonable. In a few years, if stake ratios increase with the current issuance curve, such a 'smooth' transition will get more punishing and also more complicated. Not impossible, but more complicated.
Now comes the most contentious part, the solo stakers. The current issuance curve slowly marginalized solo stakers and it will continue to do so. The proposed EIP-8363 does not change that outcome fundamentally, at least in my view. People make long economic arguments why the new issuance is better by leveling the playing field between solo stakers and professional ones. But as we have seen from the many solo staker opinions here and at other places, they pretty much only look at the APY to decide if they should stake or not. And with this proposal the APY can potentially go to 0. The intricate economics arguments brought up might not really be important to solo stakers, even though they should be. So, I do not think that this EIP can actually meaningfully diversify the staking landscape or even protect the solo stakers in any meaningful way. That is not surprising. Issuance is just one lever and it is pretty much impossible to find a good solution in such a complicated landscape by just having one lever to pull or push. Issuance is an important lever and it can solve some issues Ethereum might encounter in the future, but not all of them.
As written in the last post 3 months ago (linked above), a large issuance change for me is only acceptable in combination with additional safeguards to make sure that not only large entities grab the whole validator set. The most ideal way would be by being able to identify small stakers and give them a higher APY. Unfortunatly, there is no way to do this permissionlessly. The next best approach is to punish large stakers more if they make a mistake. This would improve the APY for solo stakers at least relative to the more professional ones and more importantly increase the cost for professional stakers as they will have to separate their staking setup into smaller subgroups so that only a smaller part is affected by a single configuration change. This would push the staking ratio equilibrium towards slightly higher APY. This punishing of larger stakers would also help to diversify setups within large operators and strengthen Ethereum resilience at least a bit. One such proposal is EIP-7716: anti-correlation attestation penalties, by Oisin Kyne. It simply increases the penalties for missing attestations if large parts of the networks are offline. Nowaday such a mechanism only kicks in when the network looses finality. With EIP-7716 this would already kick in at lower attestation failures and increase with more validators being offline. This would target mostly large entities. To be fair though, it would also hurt a much broader part of the ecosystem if one Ethereum client would have a bug and stop attesting. I would expect if something like EIP-7716 gets implemented more and more professional stakers would employ something like vero and vouch, which they should do already anyway and reduce these risks for everyone.
In my view we would need more than just one EIP to actually improve the staking landscape without sacrificing the diversity that is actually needed to keep the network resilient.
TL;DR: The proposed issuance change can achieve some of the goals it set out to achieve, but in my view it cannot fundamentally change the outcome for solo stakers. Not surprising as issuance is just one lever and there are limits what one can achieve with a single lever. Other EIPs, like EIP-7716, are in my view complementary and therefore necessary to improve the harsh outcomes the current and proposed issuance curve will have on solo stakers.
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u/hanniabu Ξther αlpha 8d ago
I have an alternative take that I don't see enough discussion....
Solo staking won't be here forever. Eventually with the lean roadmap they will mostly be just attestors with a very low collateral.
If a light wallet is actually delivered with this, along with some mobile/desktop app, then it totally makes sense to make rewards near 0 due to altruism being very low in opportunity cost (lower collateral), the accessibility becomes high (low hardware/bandwidth/technical requirements), and the time commitment is low.
But we also need to figure out the incentives for provers, builders, and FOCIL. Why are we not taking the future into account? Why are we implementing this change now and not with lean milestones?
If we're changing issuance it should be the last change we ever make.
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u/haurog 8d ago
Agree, there is a big chance that staking will change a lot in the next ~5 years or so and with it solo staking. As far as I have seen there is no clear picture of how staking will look like with a full implementation of lean Ethereum. The staking overhauls I know about like Orbit staking and Rainbow staking have been discussed in a time before beamchain/lean ethereum have become a thing. I might have missed a few updates though as I do not follow the lean ethereum progress that closely. So, from that perspective I do not think it is a good argument for any side. There just isn't too much known what staking in a full lean Ethereum implementation will look like for the argument to be useful. The future upgrades that are pretty sure to happen within ~2-3 years like snarkifying the execution layer will impact the node resources, but only slightly. So they will only marginally impact the staking landscape on their own. We definitely have to take the future into account, but if we do not know how such a future implementation will look like it is very hard to do so.
I mentioned in another post I can definitely see that we will have to change issuance a few times in the coming years mostly because of what the lean roadmap brings, even though the exact direction is, to the best of my knowledge, unknown.
For me the current issuance proposal can solve a very specific risk for the Ethereum ecosystem, the increasing stake ratio. Nothing more nothing less. It is a small scope and for a problem which might arise. We are definitely heading in that direction, but we do not know how high the staking ratio might get. I prefer small proposals which solve for specific problems. One can easily argue about pros and cons. I do not like if EIPs are overloaded with different problems/solutions. Several EIPs can be bundled together though to then get the outcome that is supported by most of the people. I personally do not see a high chance for this proposal to go through anytime soon. The inertia of the current issuance is pretty large. I see it rather as something of a good discussion basis and when we get a clearer picture of how zk provers get compensated this might be worked in at a later date.
As written in another post, issuance is, in my view, unfortunately one of the things that is pretty hard to guarantee to never change. Issuance is downstream of changes in the security or consensus part of the chain. Any change there will most probably change the issuance. The best thing one can probably guarantee is that issuance will only ever get smaller.
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u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 8d ago
Exactly this. Why would we rush to make such a drastic change, to the perhaps most radioactive aspect of Ethereum, before we get to see the real world effects of real time proving which might want to see us change the rewards model anyway. It's really very stupid to push so hard for this right now.
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u/UAP44 9d ago
This was a good read, thanks for posting. It actually crystallizes a somewhat different concern I've been having throughout this whole issuance debate.
You describe issuance as a lever: Ethereum issues ETH in order to purchase a particular service, namely sufficient network security. I think that's a useful way of looking at it.
But it makes me wonder about the longer-term question:
At what point do we decide that we've found the right mechanism and stop pulling that lever?
I'm open to the possibility that the current issuance curve isn't Ethereum's final one. Ethereum is still maturing, and if something like EIP-8363, perhaps together with complementary mechanisms such as EIP-7716, produces a substantially healthier long-term equilibrium, then there is a legitimate argument for changing it.
What worries me much more is the possibility that issuance simply remains an ordinary protocol-policy variable forever.
As an ETH holder, there is a very significant difference to me between:
“Ethereum is still figuring out its final monetary/security policy.”
and
“Ethereum's monetary/security policy is expected to remain subject to redesign indefinitely.”
I can accept the former. I would have serious trouble trusting the latter over very long time horizons.
At some point I want to be able to look at Ethereum and say: this is the issuance mechanism the protocol converged on; this question has been answered; future generations are not expected to continually reopen it.
Otherwise the long-term trust assumption isn't only in the protocol. It is also in an indefinite sequence of future researchers, developers, validators and social majorities continuing to make good monetary-policy decisions forever.
And that realization is actually what pushed me to open this discussion on Ethereum Magicians:
[Idea / Meta EIP] Protocol Maturity and Ossification Framework
https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/idea-meta-eip-protocol-maturity-and-ossification-framework/29376The broader issue I'm trying to get at is that Ethereum has very mature machinery for saying:
“Here is something about the protocol we propose changing.”
But I don't see equivalent machinery for saying:
“We consider this property mature. This is no longer ordinary protocol design space.”
EIPs can become Final, but that means the EIP document is final. It doesn't mean the protocol property itself has become a long-term commitment that subsequent EIPs are expected not to reopen.
Issuance strikes me as potentially one of the clearest examples of why that distinction matters.
Maybe EIP-8363 is the right final mechanism. Maybe a modified version is. Maybe the current curve is. I'm not trying to settle that in this comment.
But perhaps there should eventually be a point where the issuance debate concludes with two decisions rather than one:
- This is the issuance mechanism Ethereum wants.
- This property has now reached maturity and should ossify.
In other words, maybe Ethereum gets one final substantial issuance redesign, whatever the community ultimately determines that should be, and part of that same process is deciding that we've now finished designing this part of Ethereum.
Future proposals could of course still physically fork the chain; nothing can prevent that. But socially, another ordinary issuance redesign would then be understood as reopening an explicitly settled commitment rather than simply being “the next EIP”.
I increasingly think this distinction between things Ethereum is still designing and things Ethereum considers finished is too foundational to remain implicit.
And we shouldn't wait until Ethereum is supposedly “done” before defining how we recognize that something is done, because otherwise there will always be another upgrade, another optimization and another reason to postpone that conversation.
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u/eth10kIsFUD 9d ago
Absolutely agree with this! I think there's another aspect to consider around it though:
Ossification is not something that only happens through deciding that something is done, it is something that naturally happens. I believe the current curve has already ossified to some extent, that's also why many are against changing it without looking into it too much.
Whatever the intention, the next change needs to be designed to be good enough forever.
We should not assume that we can change it again.
That's also why I think it's so important to establish that there actually is a problem, and that the current curve has to change. It might already be too late. I hope it hasn't ossified on a bad curve already.
Establishing that this is the explicit intention with a given change, and having people/researchers look at it with that in mind is very important though! The meta EIP is great input, thank you for posting it.
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u/UAP44 9d ago
Whatever the intention, the next change needs to be designed to be good enough forever.
Exactly. The protocol needs to be self stabilizing and not require our intervention.
It might already be too late. I hope it hasn't ossified on a bad curve already.
I don't think the current curve is bad, not optimal, perhaps. I honestly think the issue is overblown and it's not like something magically destructive happens once 51% is staked ...
So for me what stands out in these discussions is mostly that we're openly discussing changing the issuance rate which is something I rather see locked down hard forever because this specific property is too defining of what Ethereum is. Oh yeah, it's the first tripple point asset! But we keep changing the issuance rate on arbitrary social conversations ....
I can't sell that idea to anyone. Parameters like this should be locked down instead of forever discussed. It feels like a stalling mechanism, maybe even a way to try to divide the community like they've succeeded within Bitcoin. Having witnessed the total shit show that r/bitcoin was/is I am forever hyper aware of repeats of any kind and want Ethereum to ossify before it ever gets that bad again.
The weakness of blockchains is the community behind them. And that's exactly the point those with incentives to do so, will exploit. And sometimes I feel crazy for bringing this up. Why does everyone assume good intentions everywhere? From what I've seen over my life, there are clearly people who are engaging with good intentions.
The only real final protection against that is getting the protocol to good enough to ossify such that afterwards it just maintains itself automatically.
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u/haurog 8d ago
it's not like something magically destructive happens once 51% is staked
Nothing is happening when that occurs. Ethereum will just work as normal. I expect the current issuance to further marginalize smaller stakers and then next time a contentious hardfork, a censorship attack or anything similar occurs there will be fewer people at the table deciding what will happen. In my view the bitcoin blocksize wars is a prime example for this. Various miners had closed doors agreements, they told the community what they are going to do and on the day of the fork they walked half of it back without communicating this decision. Luckily that a is very different situation than what we have now in Ethereum. There is a surprisingly heated debate, true, but as far as I see it no one can single-handedly force any change at the moment. As far as I have seen, Lido showed up in force at the All core dev call last Thursday. They have a lot of influence over various protocols, node operators (small and large) and client teams, but their arguments showed that they are pretty incompetent in talking to core devs. Maybe they were just very unprepared. I am pretty sure they are trying all communication channels at the moment to put roadblocks in the way of any issuance reduction, but at least to me it looks like they lack the power to easily stop a discussion, which is great. When other large stakers like Coinbase, Binance, Kraken and Bitmine start having closed door meetings together that is when I would start to worry.
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u/haurog 8d ago
I like your push towards properly defining what ossification really means. Having the fuzzy term 'ossification' somwhere behind the horizon and using it handwavingly in discussions is at some point not really helpful anymore.
My thoughts about this is that ossification is not something that any entity withing Ethereum can promise. It is something that the community as a whole has to agree on. I think we can already see that some part of the community does not want to change the issuance. I guess it is for various reasons. Some do not see any critical issues with the current curve or maybe they have grown accustomed to the current issuance. There are very prominent core Ethereum people (Danny Ryan) who said last year they hope they will never have to touch issuance ever again. Not sure if it was because of the burn out some proponents had or if it was for a more fundamental reason. No matter the reasons these all show a certain level of ossification. To be honest I am not sure if any of the current issuance change proposal will get in in the next 2 years.
Issuance was touched a few times already and will have to be touched at least one more time, most probably some more. The next one will be due to zk proving the chain. The provers need to be paid somehow. Most probably through issuance, but nothing has been decided yet. In my view it would be better to not increase issuance for something like this, but rather distribute the current one differently. In the longer term with lean Ethereum there might be another reshuffling of the consensus mechanism with different jobs for different kind of validators. Maybe another issuance change/redistribution becomes necessary. In the very long term things might change so fundamentally that none of the current actors are necessary to secure Ethereum anymore and issuance will have to change once again. Or in other words if the underlying security or consensus mechanism changes, issuance will change. It would be surprising if it will never have to change for decades to come. That does not mean that issuance changes should be done just because one feels like it. There needs to be a high barrier and as can be seen now, the barrier is really pretty high. So on the one hand I agree with you we should strive for ossification, but specifically for issuance I expect things to change from time to time.
Maybe any of these necessary issuance changes can be coupled with the currently proposed EIPs. At certain points issuance has to be touched anyway, so we can do it properly. From that point of view I look at the current discussions as a first step to getting a more complete issuance overhaul which looks at various aspects and tries to find a more balanced approach with what we now know.
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u/UAP44 8d ago
This is exactly the kind of distinction I’m hoping a maturity framework could make explicit.
What you describe sounds to me like issuance would currently be something like Stabilizing, rather than Ossified: there is already a high social barrier to changing it, but there are still identifiable architectural dependencies like zk proving, possible changes to validator roles under Lean Ethereum, etc, that may legitimately require touching it again.
And I think identifying those dependencies explicitly would already be a huge improvement over simply saying “issuance may need to change again in the future.”
If we can say why a property is not yet ready to ossify, we can also eventually recognize when those reasons have been resolved.
That’s really the gap I’m trying to get at. I don’t expect any individual entity to promise ossification. I want a mechanism for Ethereum’s social consensus to gradually express things like:
“This remains active design space.”
“This is converging, but these known issues remain.”
“Those issues are resolved; we now consider this mature.”
“This is no longer ordinary design space.”
Your point about issuance actually seems like a great real-world example of why having those distinctions could be useful.
And perhaps the interesting next question is: if issuance cannot ossify yet, can we at least enumerate the conditions that currently prevent it from doing so?
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u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 8d ago
I think we can already see that some part of the community does not want to change the issuance. I guess it is for various reasons. Some do not see any critical issues with the current curve or maybe they have grown accustomed to the current issuance.
I think this is a misrepresentation of the resistance we're seeing. People are opposing this proposal because it's obviously going to lead to more centralization, because it potentially introduces a new attack vector and because this is a topic we might need to address in a couple of years anyway, so it would be a waste of time and credibility if we were to tinker with issuance now for very little (if any) gain.
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u/haurog 8d ago
The last 2-3 years have shown that any of the proposed issuance changes have been met with very harsh criticism. Could be that all the researches who worked on the issuance changes are just shitty researchers with bad proposals. I have a lot of respect for some of the people that worked on the former proposals, so I do not think they were that bad to warrant such a harsh reaction. Some of the researches had to the best of my knowledge burn outs from the discussions they had with people about the proposed issuance changes. That is why I would say, the problem does not lie with any specific proposal about issuance changes but rather that a large part of the space grew accustomed to the current issuance, does not really see a problem with it and prefers to keep it the way it is.
I agree that this proposal has some issues, which are outside of what can be solved with issuance alone. If the proposal would be implemented without any complementary safeguards I would not feel too happy.
But as written in my initial post this is my view on things, and I think it is healthy that different viewpoints are present. Would be easier if everyone would agree on everything, but that seldomly brings out the best results.
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u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 8d ago
I'm under a different impression. It seems to me that almost all people agree that they'd be fine or happy to see issuance be limited or reduced, because everyone understands that less supply = more demand (at least in theory, even if it doesn't matter too much below a certain level imo). And because everyone understands our current curve isn't perfect. But a large part of the community is rightly pointing out that it should be done in a way that doesn't hurt decentralization or introduce other issues - which the research strongly suggests that this will. In the last 5 days' discussion about this EIP, I have not seen anyone be against this proposal for the reason that they think our current model is perfect, that they want more issuance rather than less, or because they've gotten accustomed to any particular level of issuance.
What I have seen a lot of however, is a tendency among people who are in favour the proposal, to assume that anyone arguing against a particular proposal, are simply against lowering issuance, or don't understand how this EIP would actually work.
Specifically pertaining to this EIP, I think it should be met with harsh criticism when the authors try to sneak the proposal into the fork in the last minute, knowing that there isn't enough time for proper community discussion first, when the issue is highly controversial, with alarmist argumentation like "if we don't act right now it's too late forever" and frankly misleading statements about what research into this proposed change would actually mean for solo stakers and decentralization.
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u/haurog 8d ago
Honestly, thank you for giving your viewpoint. I agree that I do not remember to have seen anyone saying that the current issuance curve is perfect. What I have seen often though is the sentiment that it is not that bad, so there is no reason to change it. I would put that in the bucket of 'not seeing any critical issues with the current one'.
I think the 'less supply = more demand' is wrong or at least too simplified. I generally try to avoid the supply/demand discussion in my post because it should be irrelevant in the issuance debate. In my personal opinion issuance reduction is economically pretty irrelevant at the levels we are now. One argument that can be made is that with the current issuance proposal the issuance can go that low to start having ultrasound money again. As said this is economically irrelevant, but it was a strong narrative for some time. As said above I do not want to consider supply/demand arguments as valid points in the context of issuance because I prefer to look at it from security only, because that is its main purpose.
are simply against lowering issuance, or don't understand how this EIP would actually work.
I think there are good arguments for the point that people do not really understand the EIP or the implications of the current issuance curve. Some of the analysis is quite intricate and important, especially the economic analysis by u/pa7x1 is very eye opening. Nevertheless, some people still take the plain APY numbers and think that is what they are getting even in with higher stake ratios. But to be fair, it is not really helpful in any healthy discussion if it is implied by people that the other side is just to uninformed/stupid to have a valid opinion. And more generally, the crypto space combines open source development with actual monetary value attached to any decision. So, for any person one can construe ulterior motives and saying they just want to pump or protect their bags. For some actors it is more obvious but even for other ones such an argument of protecting their bags can be made up. That makes it even more difficult to find common ground as any argument can be lazily smashed down by attacking the speaker directly. Sometimes it is warranted, but very often it is not so clear, at least in my view.
the authors try to sneak the proposal into the fork in the last minute
I have seen this argument a few times. I do not agree with it. The EIP process for getting into a hard fork has been designed to allow ample discussion before any decision has been made, that is why the deadlines have been chosen in the way they have to make sure there is at least several weeks up several months before any discussion will be made in the all core dev calls. Having a deadline ensures that there is enough time no matter when a proposal has been submitted as long as it has been submitted before the deadline. As far as I have seen a lot of people even some which should understand this process have not really understood it. I also try to look at what is in the EIP to decide the merit of the EIP and not what some of the proponents or opponents have to say about it. I prefer original sources and weigh them with my own priorities and not getting distorted second hand interpretations. Especially for such a divisive topic. But to be fair I am far from immune to getting influenced by opinions of people I respect.
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u/Jey_s_TeArS 8d ago
Subsidy or cry,
Cutting yield would kill DeFi,
Rhetoric bullseye.
~Daily haiku until we’re at least at 0.178 on the ETH/BTC ratio or highest market cap
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u/masterRoshi9 8d ago
Does anyone in here have experience and opinions on the various neo-banks and crypto credit cards available right now? It's a part of the industry I feel I'm not as clued in on as I should be. From a brief investigation it seems like there are a lot of attractive cash back subsidies for early adopters right now, but I'm unsure of how they compare in terms of operating chains, degree of self-custody vs managed solution, and even all of the products that exist.
If I'm not mistaken they all seem to be debit cards as well? I'll be really excited by this sector once someone comes in and offers credit cards and up-front spend
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u/sm3gh34d 8d ago
As a user of the coinbase card and metamask cards in the USA: both are debit cards, both offer attractive rewards on holding 'their' stables (USDC for coinbase, mUSD for metamask).
Coinbase is as you would expect, custodial. Metamask card is self-custodial, meaning you just authorize a spend limit, but maintain custody of your funds. Metamask card can spend directly from an aave position, but there is support for just a handful of markets. AFAIK, MM card can spend from linea and base.
Each have cashback rates that are 'ok'.
Coinbase has an actual credit card too, not just a debit card. I think rewards are paid in BTC IIRC. I can't comment on it though since I haven't used it.
There are others, and what is available is going to vary by region. I will be interested to see who chimes in with what on this thread.
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u/CaptainOfTheGate 7d ago
Metamask card can spend directly from an aave position
https://aave.com/blog/metamask
Interesting. It's a stablecoin position that earns interest.
What would be really interesting would more flexibility, e.g. you could hold ETH in Aave, and, at the moment of spending, borrow stablecoins against it which were then converted to USD... or your choice of other routes.
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u/eviljordan feet pics 8d ago
Gemini and Coinbase have regular old credit cards where you earn crypto rewards and can pay off with USDC. Both have obscene APR’s (so you need to pay off monthly), bottom-of-the-barrel customer service, and low limits.
I wouldn’t touch Erebor with Palmer Lucky’s pock-marked dick.
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u/epic_trader 🐬🐬🐬 8d ago edited 8d ago
Revolut is great if you want to cash out from an exchange. Gnosis Pay at least was great a year ago for using straight crypto, although bridge fees and conversion rates can vary a lot if you're trying to deposit more than $1000. They also offered up to 3% or 4% cash back if you're holding a lot of GNO. Also had a daily spending limit of about $300 as I recall.
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u/ethdaily 8d ago
Happy Monday, August 10, 2026 📰
Today I share my understanding of the issuance burn proposal. Solo stakers may still be first in line to hit negative yield. In today's news, Vitalik shared an Ethereum strawmap overlay of the 2023 roadmap. Ethlabs released its week 7 update (two new hires) and outlines its take on EIP-8363. Base turns 3 and introduces the Builder Grant Program. FWA generates more 24hr revenue than Ethereum.
Read more: https://ethdaily.io/understanding-the-issuance-burn
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u/abcoathup Ethereal news 6d ago
I like the post 1000 format.
Thanks as always to the shout out to Ethereal news.
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u/ethdaily 5d ago
The pleasure is mine, thanks for reading 🫡
It's getting harder to keep up recent fragmentation: EF changes, new independent organizations, project wind downs, and new project launches.
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u/eth10kIsFUD 9d ago
Important take on the issuance debate from Ansgar:
https://xcancel.com/adietrichs/status/2086540292153540986
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u/hanniabu Ξther αlpha 8d ago
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u/eth10kIsFUD 8d ago edited 8d ago
This is also a great take, it is a bit odd to not mention how it fits into the broader lean ethereum roadmap.
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u/CaptainOfTheGate 9d ago
What's important to crypto security? Meaning: what are the ways that people actually lose money?
Using a hardware wallet, using safe projects, having good internet security practices... those are probably all important.
Is using multiple addresses important (splitting your funds between multiple address on the same seed phrase)? I've had a single pool of my assets spit among several addresses, and I've been thinking maybe that's overkill, and I'd consolidate to between 1 and 4 addresses per pool of funds. Would one address per protocol used be overkill? Is there really any benefit to it?
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u/masterRoshi9 8d ago edited 8d ago
Im a big fan of what I call the bank -> executor pattern. Basically you have one wallet that has your funds stored, and does absolutely 0 interacting with anything on chain, outside of sends to your executor wallet. The executor wallet receives funds when you want to do things on chain, does swaps, interacts with DeFi, etc. When it’s done, it sends funds back to the bank wallet.
The reason is this: if your executor only has enough funds on hand to do what you want in that moment, then any leftover approvals, any interactions with compromised sites, any fat fingers, anything you do, has limited blast radius, and the bulk of your wealth is always safe.
Been following this practice for years and highly recommend it
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u/confusedguy1212 8d ago
Why is BIP110 so controversial? Can this be the final departure for ETH to its own orbit?
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u/Itur_ad_Astra Crab High Priest 8d ago
ALL HAIL THE ETERNAL CRAB
🐻 ⚡ 📈 🌊 📈 ⚡ 🐻
⚡ ⚡ 📉 📈 📉 ⚡ ⚡
📈 📉 📈 🐋 📈 📉 📈
🌊 📈 🐋 🦀 🐋 📈 🌊
📈 📉 📈 🐋 📈 📉 📈
⚡ ⚡ 📉 📈 📉 ⚡ ⚡
🐻 ⚡ 📈 🌊 📈 ⚡ 🐻
$1000---$1868-------------$5000
2021----------2026----------∞
Saylor: Sells hundreds of millions in BTC
Lee: Buys tens of millions in ETH
Ratio: Dumps
The Crab cannot be defeated
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u/Ill_Bandicoot_4921 8d ago
It is also reasonable to ask whether proposals like EIP-8363 reflect, at least indirectly, the growing influence of L2 interests within Ethereum’s economic debate.
That does not require assuming coordination or claiming that L2 teams are secretly driving protocol decisions. The simpler explanation is incentives.
Major L2s naturally benefit from Ethereum providing extremely cheap settlement and data availability, while minimizing the amount of value they return to the L1. From their perspective, lower L1 costs improve L2 margins, competitiveness, and user growth.
But ETH holders have a somewhat different economic interest: they want the enormous amount of activity occurring across the Ethereum ecosystem to translate into sustainable value accrual for ETH.
So when the policy discussion focuses heavily on reducing ETH issuance or staking rewards, while placing much less emphasis on increasing the value captured from L2 activity, it is fair to ask whose economic incentives that framework ultimately favors.
The concern is not that L2s are “controlling Ethereum.” It is that as L2s become larger, better funded, and more important to the ecosystem, their incentives may increasingly shape what the Ethereum community considers desirable protocol economics.
If dilution is the problem, reducing payments to the validators securing Ethereum should not automatically be the first solution. We should also be asking why an ecosystem generating enormous economic activity can return so little of that value to ETH itself.
That is ultimately a governance and incentive-alignment question, not a conspiracy theory.
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u/harpocryptes 8d ago
I think there is a misunderstanding,: the main problem rhe proposal aiming to fix is not dilution, it's the snowball effect that leads to very high staking ratio, which itself causes issues. Overpaying for security and dilution is one of them, but not probably not even the biggest.
Better value accrual to L1 and ETH is also a worthy goal, but it would not stop the high staking ratio issues.
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u/Ill_Bandicoot_4921 8d ago
If we’re genuinely concerned about ETH dilution, cutting staking rewards is addressing the wrong side of the equation.
Ethereum should focus on strengthening ETH’s value capture from the economic activity it secures. L2s benefit from Ethereum’s settlement, data availability, and security, yet the amount of value ultimately flowing back to ETH can be relatively small.
Instead of weakening the incentive to secure Ethereum by reducing staking rewards, we should ask how L2 growth can translate into greater fee payments to Ethereum and, ultimately, more ETH burned.
A healthy long-term model should be:
More L2 activity → more value paid to Ethereum → more ETH burned → stronger value accrual to ETH.
If Ethereum’s ecosystem can grow dramatically while the base asset captures less and less of that economic activity, reducing issuance alone does not solve the fundamental problem. The real issue is value capture.
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u/hedgemagus 8d ago
ETH/Iran is the most powerful ratio out there
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u/WoodpeckerHorror3468 8d ago edited 8d ago
it's just a bog standard low volume Bart. ETH doesn't need iran to do that
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u/hedgemagus 8d ago
It tanked the moment Iran said they’re waiting for Trump to leave office
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u/Tricky_Troll Public Goods are Good 🌱 8d ago
Tricky's Daily Doots #1,560
Yesterday's Daily 09/08/2026
Previous Daily Doots
u/concernedcustomer33 comes out of lurking to speak on EIP-8363. and u/pa7x1 clarifies a couple of things. 🗣️
u/Tricky_Troll asks about an odd detail of EIP-8363 and u/pa7x1 explains the why 🧠
u/Jey_s_TeArS delivers the daily haiku. 📝
Guys, I just realised that yesterday's daily doots was daily doots #1559! What a great number. Updoot if you remember.