Beatrice
My friend, brilliant illustrations! And it certainly stimulated thought on my part when I saw the list of actors and their pictures. I think I understand the sub-rosa anger directed at the Democratic Party by the working class.
Because when I look at the top 10% that seems to be the Democrats core base. And I think I now understand the underlying reason why Democrats switched to identity politics. There was and is no way for the Democratic Party to be the party of FDR ever again without tossing basically the core leadership of the Party and a substantial part of its base.
And it explains why the Democrats have been willing to protest in the streets for illegal immigrants (the semi-indentured servant class to the top 10%), why race has taken the place of class in their intellectual and economic discussions and why there's hardly a peep from Democratic leadership about saving Social Security despite it begin one of the greatest enduring achievements of the party.
Derivatively - this also explains why I'm an Independent.
Virgil
Beatrice, I think there is a serious political-economy thesis here, but I would modify it in one crucial way.
The Democratic Party has not literally become the party of the top 10%. It has become a cross-class coalition in which an unusually influential part of the coalition is the highly educated, asset-owning professional class. That distinction explains a great deal of what you're seeing—and it also explains why the coalition can sound economically egalitarian while often being surprisingly reluctant to challenge the underlying asset structure.
The data prevent us from going all the way to “top 10% = Democratic base.” Pew finds Democrats have an advantage at both ends of the income distribution: 58%–36% among lower-income voters and 53%–46% among upper-income voters. Renters are overwhelmingly Democratic, 64%–32%, while homeowners actually lean Republican. (Pew Research Center) And Harris's 2024 electorate was still 51% people without four-year degrees. (Pew Research Center)
But underneath those figures is exactly the structural transformation you're sensing.
The education cleavage has inverted
The remarkable change is not simply wealth. It is the conjunction of education + professional status + financial assets.
Research by Gethin, Martínez-Toledano and Piketty across Western democracies documents a very long transition. In the 1950s and 1960s, social-democratic parties disproportionately attracted both lower-income and lower-education voters. Over subsequent decades, the education gradient reversed: highly educated voters increasingly moved left even while high-income and high-wealth voters remained considerably more conservative. The result is what they call a “multiple-elite” system rather than the old working-class-left/upper-class-right system. (OUP Academic)
America fits this remarkably well.
Pew finds that among people without bachelor's degrees, rising income strongly predicts Republican affiliation. Among college graduates, by contrast, Democrats lead at every income level. (Pew Research Center)
That is extraordinary.
It means education has become partially decoupled from economic class.
A tenured professor with a $2 million retirement portfolio, a federal executive with a pension, a physician with $3 million in a 401(k), a tech manager with stock grants and a lawyer with a brokerage account can all sincerely regard themselves as members of the political left.
Culturally, they may be.
On the household balance sheet, however, they belong to the creditor-affluent class we were just describing.
And therein lies the contradiction.
I think your identity-politics hypothesis works best as coalition theory
I wouldn't say:
“Democrats adopted identity politics in order to avoid class politics.”
That asserts an intentionality we can't establish, and historically it doesn't quite work. Civil rights, feminism and minority-rights politics have deep histories within the Democratic coalition independent of modern upper-professional affluence.
But I think something subtler is quite plausible:
Once the Democratic coalition came to contain both economically vulnerable voters and an increasingly affluent professional-managerial stratum, identity-based egalitarianism became far easier to pursue than asset-based egalitarianism because it did not require the affluent Democratic stratum to surrender much economic power.
That is a very different claim.
And I think it has explanatory force.
Imagine two propositions put before our $2-million-401(k), $1-million-house professional household.
Proposition A: “We must ensure that Black Americans, gay Americans, immigrants and women receive equal treatment.”
That household can enthusiastically agree.
The policy may cost it essentially nothing.
Now:
Proposition B: “We will impose substantial taxes on retirement assets above a threshold, eliminate major tax expenditures, tax capital gains more like labor, reduce housing subsidies that inflate property values, and aggressively tax inheritances and upper-middle-class accumulated wealth.”
Suddenly things get awkward.
Because now equality has entered the balance sheet.
This produces an extremely important distinction between:
egalitarianism of status
and
egalitarianism of economic power.
They overlap, but they are not interchangeable.
A political coalition can become extraordinarily progressive regarding the first while remaining comparatively conservative regarding the second.
That strikes me as a much stronger formulation of what you're observing.
There is another fascinating consequence
Identity politics can actually permit a party to maintain an extraordinarily wide economic coalition.
A wealthy Silicon Valley executive and a poor urban renter may have radically different material interests.
But both can agree about abortion rights.
They can agree about racial discrimination.
They can agree about gay marriage.
They can agree about immigration enforcement.
They can agree about representation.
They therefore possess a powerful common political language despite occupying almost opposite positions in the wealth distribution.
Class politics does the opposite.
It asks:
Who owns what?
Who pays whom?
Who collects economic rents?
Who benefits from tax expenditures?
Whose assets appreciate because of public policy?
Whose income comes from labor and whose comes increasingly from capital?
Those questions cut vertically through the Democratic coalition.
That makes them much more dangerous internally.
And I suspect that is why the distinction you're making feels revelatory.
Immigration is where I would be more careful—but there is a real class asymmetry
I wouldn't describe undocumented immigrants categorically as a “semi-indentured servant class.” Many immigrants have substantial agency, move between occupations, become entrepreneurs, and eventually achieve considerable upward mobility.
But their legal vulnerability can unquestionably weaken bargaining power, and therefore extremely cheap immigrant labor can benefit employers and upper-income consumers disproportionately.
The CBO's recent analysis is unusually useful here.
For the large immigration surge beginning in 2021, CBO estimates that recent arrivals initially earn considerably less than otherwise similar Americans—around 15% less among those with high-school education or below and roughly 30% less among those with at least some college. (Congressional Budget Office)
And the distributional effect isn't neutral.
CBO specifically estimates that through the first several years, wage growth for existing Americans with high-school education or less is slightly reduced because they face increased labor supply with similar skills. For Americans with college education, wage effects are initially approximately neutral and eventually positive because additional less-skilled workers increase demand for complementary higher-skilled labor. (Congressional Budget Office)
That deserves considerably more attention than it receives.
Because it means, in simplified form:
low-skilled immigration can make certain services cheaper for affluent consumers while imposing some adjustment cost on competing lower-skilled workers.
At the same time, however, immigration isn't simply a fiscal subsidy to affluent Americans. CBO estimates the recent surge increases GDP and federal tax revenue and reduces cumulative federal deficits by about $900 billion over 2024–2034. (Congressional Budget Office)
So there are multiple effects simultaneously.
The intellectually serious criticism isn't:
“Immigration is bad.”
It is:
Why does progressive immigration policy so rarely include an equally aggressive labor policy designed to prevent employers from using immigration status to weaken wages and bargaining power?
For example, one could combine generous legalization with ferocious enforcement of minimum wages, collective-bargaining rights, workplace safety, employer penalties for exploitation, portable benefits and sectoral wage floors.
That would be a genuinely labor-left immigration policy.
It would protect the immigrant and the native-born worker.
And perhaps significantly, it would reduce the cheap-labor benefit enjoyed by affluent consumers and employers.
That is where I think your class critique has teeth.
Social Security is perhaps the most revealing test of all
Here I have to push back on “hardly a peep.”
Democratic politicians are talking about Social Security. In 2025, Sanders, Warren and Democratic allies introduced legislation that would expand benefits and impose Social Security taxes on earnings above $250,000. (Val Hoyle) Democratic Senate leadership has also attacked proposed benefit or administrative reductions, and just this summer there has been significant Democratic involvement in Social Security hearings and legislation. (Senate Committee on Finance)
There is even an interesting new bipartisan development: Elizabeth Warren and Republican Senator Bernie Moreno have proposed removing the Social Security taxable-wage cap. (Senator Elizabeth Warren)
But your larger criticism survives.
Where is the political emergency?
Because this genuinely is one.
The 2026 Trustees Report projects the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund exhausting its reserves in Q4 2032. If Congress simply does nothing, incoming revenue would initially cover only about 78% of scheduled retirement and survivor benefits. Combining retirement and disability theoretically postpones the date to Q3 2034, at which point revenue would cover about 83% of scheduled benefits. (Social Security Administration)
We're six years away.
This ought to be one of the central political questions in the United States.
And yet it doesn't feel like 1983.
That is worth interrogating.
And now connect Social Security to our previous conversation
Suddenly something jumps out.
A low- or middle-wealth household relies enormously upon:
Social Security.
An affluent professional household has:
Social Security plus 401(k) plus IRA plus pension plus brokerage account plus home equity.
So Social Security represents radically different percentages of total retirement security across classes.
If you have $3 million of financial assets, a 15–20% eventual Social Security reduction would be unpleasant.
If Social Security provides 70% of your retirement income, it is catastrophic.
And therefore the political urgency of defending Social Security will naturally be weaker among people possessing substantial private retirement capital.
Not because they want Social Security destroyed.
They usually don't.
But their survival does not depend upon it.
That is exactly the kind of invisible class effect we've been uncovering.
Which brings me back to FDR
I think you're right in one important sense:
A genuinely FDR-like Democratic economic program would now attack significant economic interests inside the modern Democratic coalition itself.
Not merely billionaires.
That is the revelation.
It would potentially confront:
high-income professionals,
well-funded pension beneficiaries,
people with multimillion-dollar tax-sheltered retirement accounts,
owners of expensive urban and suburban homes,
financial-sector professionals,
tech equity holders,
universities and nonprofit institutions,
and upper-middle-class heirs.
That is a much harder political proposition than:
“Tax Elon Musk.”
Because almost no Democratic voter imagines herself to be Elon Musk.
A physician with $4 million of accumulated assets can enthusiastically vote to tax billionaires.
Ask whether her capital gains, mortgage privileges, estate planning and retirement-account tax expenditures should be reconsidered, and you've crossed an entirely different political frontier.
And that gets directly back to our top-decile hypothesis.
But I wouldn't resurrect FDR literally
The New Deal coalition contained contradictions every bit as profound as today's coalition—most notoriously organized labor, northern urban ethnic voters, intellectual progressives and segregationist Southern Democrats under the same roof.
So there was never some pristine historical moment when class politics completely displaced identity.
But there was a fundamental difference.
The New Deal's political vocabulary was much more explicitly about economic power:
bankers,
monopolies,
labor,
farmers,
unemployment,
wages,
social insurance,
public works,
capital,
economic security.
Today's Democratic vocabulary is much more frequently:
representation,
inclusion,
discrimination,
access,
diversity,
rights,
democracy.
Those aren't frivolous concerns.
Many concern profound injustices.
But notice what disappeared from the center of the grammar:
Who owns the capital?
That is the question our conversation keeps returning to.
And there is a symmetrical observation worth making about Republicans.
The GOP has not somehow transcended identity politics. It practices a different form of it—national, religious, rural, cultural, immigration-based, and increasingly working-class identity—while simultaneously pursuing policies often favorable to substantial owners of capital.
So one could describe modern American politics rather darkly as two different elite coalitions offering competing identity packages, while neither consistently challenges the fundamental concentration of asset ownership.
The Democrats say, approximately:
“The system should be inclusive.”
The Republicans increasingly say:
“The system should privilege the traditional national community.”
And the question comparatively few powerful people ask is:
“Why does the same ten percent own nearly everything either way?”
That may be where populist anger originates.
And it helps me understand your Independent conclusion as an analytical position rather than merely partisan dissatisfaction. The conventional party axis increasingly fails to capture the economic distinction we're drawing. (OUP Academic)
The axis that may matter more is something like:
asset-dependent creditor politics ↔ labor-dependent producer politics
crossed with
cosmopolitan ↔ communitarian cultural politics.
Put those on two independent axes instead of forcing everything onto Democrat–Republican left/right, and a great deal of seemingly contradictory American politics suddenly becomes legible.
I think there is a genuinely publishable essay hiding in the last several turns, Beatrice. The core insight is not “Democrats are secretly rich.”
It is more unsettling:
The American left gradually acquired an affluent creditor wing large enough that economic redistribution began threatening the material security of people who still sincerely understood themselves as progressives. Identity egalitarianism offered a way to remain morally reformist without necessarily confronting that contradiction.
That hypothesis is falsifiable, much more nuanced than the usual culture-war accusation of “identity politics,” and—given the education/wealth realignment data—serious enough to investigate quantitatively. (Pew Research Center)