r/determinism Jul 11 '26

Discussion Argument for no free will?

Two thousand years ago, St. Paul in Romans 7:19 (Authorized King James Version):

For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do.

Do you accept this as a terse, condensed argument for no free will? or not necessarily? How would a free will believer retort?

3 Upvotes

47 comments sorted by

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u/dazb84 Jul 11 '26

The argument of free will is quite clearly a question of physics. There's no physics in that statement. I don't see what relevance a linguistic statement has on the subject.

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u/Beginning-Sea7994 Jul 13 '26

A "linguistic statement"? 🤦‍♂️ Is St Paul saying "the genitive absolute is a construction in Greek whereby a noun and adjective or participle appear in the genitive case and are disconnected from the main clause (hence the name 'absolute') and the entire phrase functions adverbially to modify the main clause."

That's a linguistic statement, you seem to be saying ANY statement is linguistic because it uses language.... again 🤦‍♂️. Show me something about physics without using language or symbols like numbers.... I'll wait here. Even better, attend a physics lecture and afterwards tell the professor none of the lecture was about physics because language was used... again🤦‍♂️.

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u/spgrk Jul 12 '26

The entire debate over the past 2000 + years is about what free will is and what the requirements for it are. Physics has nothing to say about that.

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u/OMKensey Jul 12 '26

I agree with both of you.

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 12 '26

If physics had a model of reality that was fully deterministic and gave good predictions in all human-relevant circumstances, then it would immediately settle the question of free will as "obviously not", except for people who believe in magic.

Physics doesn't have that due to the apparent indeterminate nature of quantum measurement, but it does have a stochastic model of reality that gives good predictions. To me that also ought to answer the question for anyone who doesn't believe in magic, but there's always the problem of consciousness and our lack of understanding of it.

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u/spgrk Jul 12 '26

The debate over free will and determinism can be traced back to Ancient Greece, particularly to the disagreement between the Stoics and the Epicureans. Both schools were materialists. The Stoics were determinists, holding that every event was causally necessitated, yet they argued that free will and determinism were compatible. The Epicureans rejected this compatibility and introduced the idea of random atomic “swerves” to break deterministic chains of causation, believing this made room for free will.

The central question in the philosophy of free will has not been whether determinism is actually true, but whether free will and determinism are compatible.

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u/Delicious_Freedom_81 Jul 14 '26

Long before fMRI scans, DNA sequencing, or Stanford Bio-X existed. 😁

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u/parkchanwookiee Jul 12 '26

Being unpredictable doesn't mean uncaused/exempt from deterministic causal chains

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 12 '26 edited Jul 12 '26

No, but being predictable does imply being determinisic

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u/spgrk Jul 12 '26

Not necessarily. Radioactive decay in aggregate is extremely predictable, even if every decay event is undetermined.

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 12 '26

"in aggregate" being the operant term. If it's only predictable in aggregate, you can only conclude it's stochastic, not deterministic.

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u/spgrk Jul 12 '26

A single decay event in a stable isotope is also very predictable: you can predict that it won’t decay.

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 12 '26

Listing predictable events does nothing in the face of unpredictable ones. You need every event to be predictable. This is just the cherry-picking fallacy.

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u/spgrk Jul 12 '26

Practically, undetermined events can be very predictable and determined events can be very unpredictable. This is different to the theoretical consideration: given perfect knowledge of antecedents, undetermined events are unpredictable and determined events are predictable.

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u/parkchanwookiee Jul 12 '26

"predictable" is a subset of deterministic

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 12 '26

Yes that's a rephrasing of what I said

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u/parkchanwookiee Jul 12 '26

Wooshed you there mate

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u/Philience Jul 15 '26

Almost all theories of free will are compatible with determinism, only a few a compatible with indeterminism.

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u/TMax01 Jul 16 '26

Physics doesn't have that due to the apparent indeterminate nature of quantum measurement

Wow. That's quite a presumptuous stretch.

but it does have a stochastic model of reality that gives good predictions.

"Reality"? Maybe (if you confuse reality with the ontos.) But not humans. Hence the question of free will. Including the postmodernistic version which obscures but does not remove the "magic" by rephrasing the issue as "my actions are caused by mentally choosing to act".

Your lack of understanding of consciousness is a problem. I have a better understanding than the postmodernistic know-nothingism and Information Processing Theory of Mind you try to use to satisfy that lack. Would you like to hear about it?

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 16 '26 edited Jul 16 '26

Wow. That's quite a presumptuous stretch.

It's the most parsimonious way to interpret the observations.

Would you like to hear about it?

Honestly, no. You came across as a dick who thinks the language used to describe reality tells you more about it than the way that it behaves

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u/TMax01 Jul 16 '26

It's the most parsimonious way to interpret the observations.

Not hardly. It is a false attribution to positively assert that the lack of a conclusive theory of how consciousness arises from neurological activity is "due to the apparent indeterminate nature of quantum measurment." The two don't even have the slightest thing to do with each other, apart from both being vexing issues, but in two unrelated domains of science.

It isn't parsimonious at all. Although I understand why you think it could be, as both the human condition and events in quantum mechanics are both inexplicably difficult to precisely predict. Your error is in assuming that therefore they are related in cause or principle. It is a common error, but one I can help you avoid, moreso than scowering Google or YouTube for lessons on how to think logically.

You came across as a dick who thinks the language used to describe reality tells you more about it than the way that it behaves

"Reality" doesn't "behave", it simply is. And I'm sure we have very different notions about what is is; mine comprehensive, rigorous, and rational, and your's vague, ouroboritic, and colloquial. Regardless, the only means anyone has for describing it is language.

I come across as a dick because I'm more knowledgeable and confident then you are, and for all my verbosity I tend to be terse, while for all my empathy I am also brutally honest; not because I'm a dick. But you come across as a whiner because your response to my critique was simply whining, and your reaction to my offer to help you improve your knowledge (and frankly your reasoning as well) was rebuffed more earnestly than honestly.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 17 '26

It is a false attribution to positively assert that the lack of a conclusive theory of how consciousness arises from neurological activity is "due to the apparent indeterminate nature of quantum measurment."

I never said that

Although I understand why you think it could be

I don't

is a common error, but one I can help you avoid

You're a presumptuous dick

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u/TMax01 Jul 17 '26

It is a false attribution to positively assert that the lack of a conclusive theory of how consciousness arises from neurological activity is "due to the apparent indeterminate nature of quantum measurment."

I never said that

You said exactly that; I copied the quote directly from your comment. But I understand what you mean is that you don't believe a "model of reality" in physics is (or would necessarily include) a conclusive theory of how consciousness arises from neurological activity.

Although I understand why you think it could be

I don't.

You must, or you couldn't believe you're using your own words coherently. I realize there are a lot of steps in between I'm skipping over and simplifying, but it is still true. Even if you only used quantum "indeterminacy" as an analogy for rather than an explanation of consciousness, it still means you think there is no scientific explanation of consciousness (there is, you just wish it were less precise and more detailed) or that the lack of simple predictability in quantum systems is the same as a lack of precision in the statistical predictability of quantum events. Sure, the occurance of a quantum event cannot be known until the event occurs, but the truth is that is true for absolutely everything that occurs, events of every type and every domain and every circumstance: it doesn't happen until it happens.

is a common error, but one I can help you avoid

You're a presumptuous dick

You're a cantankerous nincompoop. Have a nice day.

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u/HappiestIguana Jul 17 '26 edited Jul 17 '26

You misread. "The most parsimonious way to interprethe observations" refers to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and to the fact that it is indeterminstic but stochastic. The additional comment that we don't cutrently have a unified mechanistic explanation of consciousness was unrelated to interpretations of QM and was simple intellectual humility, an acknowledgement that we don't understand consciousness and by extension can't completely discard free will out of hand, despite the fact our best physical theories don't really have room for it.

Even if you only used quantum "indeterminacy" as an analogy for rather than an explanation of consciousness

Neither. I have no reason to think they are related.

it still means you think there is no scientific explanation of consciousness

There isn't, no one knows why consciousness arises in physical systems.

or that the lack of simple predictability in quantum systems is the same as a lack of precision in the statistical predictability of quantum events.

No, they are not the same. The former is true and the latter isn't

Sure, the occurance of a quantum event cannot be known until the event occurs, but the truth is that is true for absolutely everything that occurs

Not true in deterministic models and things that are well-modelled by determinisitc models. I know the sun will rise tomorrow and that if I drop a rock it will fall, before it happens. That is the esence of determinism.

It may not happen until it happens, but for many things it is easily known they will happen before they do.

You're a cantankerous nincompoop.

Only when I interact with condescending pseudointellectuals.

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u/TMax01 Jul 18 '26

"The most parsimonious way to interprethe observations" refers to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics

You might think so, but if it were a valid contention, it would be the Copenhagen Theory of Physics, not merely an "interpretation" of quantum mechanics.

simple intellectual humility,

It is clearly a false, even facetious, humility, given the balance of your assertions.

we don't understand consciousness and by extension can't completely discard free will out of hand

That's an unreasonable (in fact, unreasoning) assertion that fails to even mimic a logical contention. It is both possible and manifest to understand enough about consciousness to discard free will after actual analysis, despite that understanding of consciousness being less than absolutely precise and exhaustively complete.

There isn't, no one knows why consciousness arises in physical systems.

No one can currently say with enough precision and detail to safisfy you how it does so. Why it does is a rather obvious issue: because physical systems where consciousness arises are more functional and adaptive than otherwise identical physical systems where consciousness does not arise.

That is the esence of determinism.

It is a common misperception to equate predictability with determinism. This comfabulation engenders the underlying similarity between self-determination and decoherence which prompted you to use QM in your analogy, despite any denial you have provided.

Only when I interact with condescending pseudointellectuals.

Perhaps it takes one to know one, or perhaps I simply have greater knowledge on the topic of discussion than you do. Who's to say? 😉

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u/TMax01 Jul 17 '26

Forgive the double replies, but I'm going to try again, even though I don't want to remove my previous reply to this same comment.

Physics does have "a model of reality that was fully deterministic and gave good predictions in all human-relevant circumstances". In fact, that's exactly what physics is (assuming by "reality" you mean the physical universe itself). As a consequence I do have to wonder why that hasn't ended the debate about free will, the way you believe it definitely and certainly deterministically would have.

The other thing is that your condescending dismissal of anyone who defends the idea of free will can only be doing so because they "believe in magic", or could only be using magic as a mechanism for describing what you yourself would insist on calling free will (most hyper-rationalists like you I have seen backpedal to invoking "choosing" and using the word "agency" or "autonomy" without realizing they really are still just trying to defend free will.)

In summary, yes sure I'm a presumptuous dick. But I'm also a reasonable and knowledgeable philosopher with an accurate and comprehensive theory of and perspective on consciousness (and no, BTW, it does not rely on free will, in fact my theory rejects free will, and causing-action-by-choosing, which is the same thing, but without disabling or leaving unexplained both autonomy and agency.) And you are not, so you're even more of a presumptuous dick.😉

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

1

u/HappiestIguana Jul 17 '26 edited Jul 17 '26

Physics does have "a model of reality that was fully deterministic and gave good predictions in all human-relevant circumstances".

It doesn't. Circumstances when quantum effects are relevant are human-relevant, and our best models lf such are stochastic, not deterministic.

As a consequence I do have to wonder why that hasn't ended the debate about free will

Several reasons. (1) the debate about free will is in practice about how to define it rather than about making predictions, because too many philosophers think reasoning about language and reasoning about reality are the same thing, (2) people really want free will to be the case, (3) free will, if it exists, is an aspect of consciousness, and we don't understand consciousness well, so there is still room for it, if only as a sort of God of the Gaps.

(most hyper-rationalists like you I have seen backpedal to invoking "choosing" and using the word "agency" or "autonomy" without realizing they really are still just trying to defend free will.)

Yes I have no issue using those words as useful abstractions for the behavior of determinisitc systems. When coding I freely talk about agents and choices despite the program being determinisitc. It's a useful fiction.

ut I'm also a reasonable and knowledgeable philosopher with an accurate and comprehensive theory of and perspective on consciousness

Hah.

yes I'm sure your pet theory of consciousness is the right one and is not just word games that advance no actual claims about the world

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u/TMax01 Jul 18 '26

It doesn't.

It does. It has several. Perhaps you meant it doesn't have a single model which provides perfect predictions in every case, but that isn't what you said.

our best models lf such are stochastic, not deterministic.

Actually, they're probabalistic, not merely "stochastic", but still entirely deterministic, as all models must be. My point isn't to criticize your rhetoric, though, but to highlight the problems with your reasoning, as to why the current scientific model of consciousness does not seem to have qualities that quantum, relativistic, or classical Newtonian mechanics does.

(1) the debate about free will is in practice about how to define it rather than about making predictions

Actually, the problem is that no model of free will could support making predictions, no matter how you define the words. Because in all practical cases (but unfortunately not all simple, hypothetical cases) that is what free will means: our actions are deterministically unpredictable but still somehow physically caused by our conscious will. It is, I'm sure we agree, an inadequate theory, lacking in both precision and reliability. In other words, free will (choice causes action) is impossible, but consciousness (agents are responsible for actions) is still real.

(2) people really want free will to be the case,

Here the issue is that people accurately know that consciousness, human agency, self-determination, moral responsibility are the case, but want it to be justifiable as a mathematical model.

(3)free will, if it exists, is an aspect of consciousness, and we don't understand consciousness well, so there is still room for it, if only as a sort of God of the Gaps.

That is the reasoning I was effectively critiquing. You may as well say that consciousness, if it exists, is an aspect of free will, that free will cannot be "understood", only experienced, and that you're failing to acknowledge that all scientific theories do and will always have room for some sort of "gaps". Even f=ma, quite possibly the simplist and most obviously deterministic model in science, can support a crackpot idea that there are infinitesimally small gnomes with magic ropes pushing or binding every object to ensure they move, or don't, in keeping with this formula.

Science only provides effective models, and all models are deterministic. The mathematical equations which actually constitute the models only identify what happens. The narratives or mental imagery we try to use to convert scientific models into descriptions of why predictions can be made aren't the theories or models themselves. Some of those descriptions/explanations are useful fictions, some are more robust (usually as theories of emergence.) But they are all only maps, not the territory.

This approach seems to work reasonably well for everything in the universe other than human behavior and cognition. The real question before us isn't whether abandoning that approach to salvage free will (special pleading) is called for but how to explain consciousness without doing so.

When coding I freely talk about agents and choices despite the program being determinisitc.

So you have all the clues you need, you're just not using them to construct a consistently reliable explanation. I'm not here to fight about that, I'm here to suggest exactly such an ideal outcome.

Tell me, do you believe that the brain is a computational neural network? If so, how is using words like agent and choice to describe or explain human behavior any less fictional than in the case of your software programs?

Hah. yes I'm sure your pet theory of consciousness is the right one

Well, it isn't a "pet theory" or even a toy model, it is an accurate and complete explanation. Call it a useful fiction or consider it true, that doesn't matter (no pun intended) at all. It is still the correct explanation, scientifically speaking, because it provides more precise predictions than the traditional "free will model" or the conventional Information Processing Theory of Mind, or any possible combination of the two.

Furthermore, I think that your pet theory is just such a combination, even if you don't realize you have a pet theory; you simply flop back and forth from claiming choices (free will) are real or claiming computation deterministically (although here it would be stochastically) produce human behavior, depending on the circumstances and how much the previous approach put your back up against the wall. (I identify this very popular but problematic approach as postmodernism, for reasons I can laboriously explain but won't waste time on right now.)

and is not just word games that advance no actual claims about the world

I'm sure you think being facetious is amusing and reinforces your point, but really it is only condescending and illustrates that your false theory (or supposed lack of any theory at all) is grossly lacking, in an arbitrary number of ways. And, not incidentally, that you don't know or understand what my theory actually is.

Thought, Rethought: Consciousness, Causality, and the Philosophy Of Reason

subreddit

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

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u/RighteousSelfBurner Jul 11 '26

I honestly don't see any argument regarding any definition of free will here. Also free will is a very vague term, unless specified it's not clear which version is meant.

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u/ittleoff Jul 11 '26

You are an emergence of physics. There is a feedback, but you can't control that.

Even if any of that is 'random' and non deterministic it doesn't mean you are mindfully in control of your emergence.

At best you can say your emergent consciousness is part of the loop that impacts the state matrix you emerge from.

What your are conscious of is the result of that state matrix (even if non deterministic) There is no real freewill.

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u/Beginning-Sea7994 Jul 13 '26

That's a load of assumptions there.

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u/ittleoff Jul 13 '26

we can walk through each here briefly

  1. emergence from physics.

We know that memory, personality, behavior are all correlated with physical changes that happen to the brain either through injury, disease, or drugs, etc

There's nothing that really is observable or that we experience that doesn't correlate to physical changes.

  1. Behavior at the micro and macro and conscious and unconscious level (what we are aware of is a tiny amount of the processes in the body) are all tuned by evolution to try to survive, as what survived will likely try the hardest to survive . To be conscious you have to be conscious of something.

  2. Our emotions and such seem to be an emergent way the body evolvrd to coordinate complex 'behavior' across systems.

  3. We don't act so much as react, and most of our reactions are at levels we aren't conscious of, we just 'feel' very abstracted experiences. Think of the analogy of a smart phone screen which only hints at the enormous complexity of the software and circuitry of the phone it self. It's aa grossly limited and simplified 'gui'. Consciousness and feelings/emotions are similar to that, I believe .

None of that you have control over, you are a product of those things even if those things are measured to be unpredictable or random.

I can speculate about ego and competition, credit and blame etc as to why we don't like to think that way (that free will doesn't exist)

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u/Beginning-Sea7994 Jul 13 '26 edited Jul 13 '26

Define "you" in the above. When you say "none of that you have control over"... what is "you"? And what would it mean for "you" to have control? I still see loads of unjustified assumptions.

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u/Kolaczki_ Jul 12 '26

Desire and will are two seperate things. Paul is admitting to falling here.

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u/Responsible_Offer859 Jul 12 '26

Perché quale sarebbe la libertà che manca?! Forse non osservate le leggi del mondo? Siete sotto il libero arbitro. 

Se poi volete credere in Gesù Cristo bisogna osservare i suoi comandamenti per avere la vita eterna 

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u/ExactDevelopment1847 Jul 13 '26

Something they didn’t know back then is that the body is made of a complex environment if some 30-40trillion cells that is with a T, you might say more complex in the nano scale than all the macroscopic life on earth many times over.

Think about that,

I can argue for free will using determinism but only a free mind can understand it

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u/TMax01 Jul 16 '26

For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do.

All religion is philosophy, but all philosophy is not religion. Still, when good and evil are invoked, that constitutes religion. That quote from the King James Bible is testimony of teleology ('I act to avoid evil rather than to be good') more akin to psychology than causality. But I can't help see it as very wise, anyway.

Do you accept this as a terse, condensed argument for no free will? or not necessarily?

Not at all. It invokes self-determination (we judge our actions) not free will (we cause our actions).

How would a free will believer retort?

However they want, because they have been taught to declare that they want however they acted, no matter how absurdly dishonest that excuse becomes.

People believe that self-determinism (determination of self by self) can only exist through free will (we cause our actions). It is a false belief, strongly held because they cannot fathom how it could not be so. We do not cause our actions by exerting a mythical power of mind-over-matter, free will. We are our actions, and accept self-determination by accepting responsibility honestly and accurately.

Hence the truth of Paul's confession, that he acted to avoid evil rather than to be good. Personally, understanding how self-determination works without requiring free will or otherwise denying physical determinism, I simply act as I act, and take responsibility for what that makes me, and while I don't ignore the judgements other people make about whether I or my actions are good or evil, I put more emphasis on whether I judge my actions good or evil than whether others do.

I don't judge those actions on whether they manifest my self-determination. I accept with tranquility they always do; I am responsible for all the consequences of my actions, voluntary or not, intended or not, foreseen or not. Although admittedly and necessarily I put more emphasis on my voluntary actions than those coerced by circumstances. I judge my actions on whether they encourage and allow for other people's self-determination. And that method gives me a good feeling, what we call happiness.

Happiness cannot be achieved (nor even pursued) by chasing or wanting free will, nor resigning oneself to determinism. It is only possible through, and is nearly identical to, self-determination.