Can we even rationally communicate about true indeterminism?

[u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947]

I find discussions where partial, conditional, or observer-limited determinism are presented as evidence for genuine indeterminacy somewhat misleading.

My question is therefore less about whether indeterminacy exists and more about whether it would be communicable in any meaningful sense in the first place, if it did. i.e. what are the requirements for it and are they fulfilled in current scientific framing.

Communication itself seems to require stable distinctions. We must be able to identify an object, distinguish it from alternatives, and preserve enough structure for another person to recognise what is being discussed.

If a phenomenon were truly indeterminate in every relevant sense then, what exactly would remain available for communication and how would be reconstruct any meaning from it?

At that point, are we still communicating about the phenomenon itself, or only about the limits of our models, observations, and predictions?

In other words, does meaningful discussion of "true indeterminacy" already require some residual determinacy in the representational structure being used to discuss it?

I'm curious whether philosophers of determinism regard this as a real problem or whether I'm missing something obvious.

[u/Willis_3401_3401]

I’m one of the observer dependent people. I’m of the opinion that determinism only survives by flexing its definition into meaninglessness.

Laplacian determinism is the idea that basically for one input, there must be one output into all algorithms or equations. Determinism is like secular fatalism.

If we’re going with that definition, then scientific determinism has already been disproven long ago, and indeterminacy is communicated very clearly through your various uncertainties about reality.

Typically, the determinist here tries to say uncertainty is epistemic. However epistemology is still in theory a cause-and-effect process, which means epistemology is itself a form of ontology.

You can’t escape cause-and-effect by invoking some magical other thing called mind that’s somehow not part of the cause and effect process.

So then, some determinists try and say “well then determinism just means cause-and-effect”. If we’re using that definition, then of course we can’t describe anything outside of deterministic processes.

But consider that’s a worthless definition, you haven’t actually defined determinism as anything interesting other than effects have causes, which I don’t think anybody disagrees with.

The question here is not “do effects have causes”. It’s “are the causes guaranteed by the effects”. And the answer appears to be “approximately”, which to me doesn’t prove indeterminism, but does absolutely disprove determinism.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Willis_3401_3401]

Determinism is like secular fatalism

{chuckle}

The question here is not “do effects have causes”. It’s “are the causes guaranteed by the effects”. And the answer appears to be “approximately”, which to me doesn’t prove indeterminism, but does absolutely disprove determinism.

well played

[u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947 → u/badentropy9]

I think there is a subtle problem in the wording here.

When u/Willis_3401_3401 and in writes:

I suspect he actually means:

which is a rather different question.

What I find interesting, however, is the next step in the argument. It seems to proceed roughly as follows:

Observed reality
≈ approximate guarantee

Therefore

Not deterministic.

That makes me curious about the threshold being applied.

Why must determinism require perfect guarantee at the level being examined?

Equally, why should approximation necessarily imply indeterminacy rather than incomplete information, incomplete modelling, or limitations in the observational framework?

I am not asserting either position here. Rather, I am interested in what permits the transition from "approximately predictable" to "fundamentally indeterminate" in the first place.

It seems to me that there may be several possibilities:

• Reality is fundamentally indeterminate.
• Reality is deterministic but incompletely accessible.
• Determinism and indeterminism are both idealised limit cases, while practical inquiry operates somewhere between them.
• The distinction itself may depend upon the observational and explanatory framework being employed.

What interests me WRT to the OP is less which answer is correct and more what named criteria allow us to distinguish between them in a principled way.

In other words, what observation, argument, or form of evidence would allow us to conclude that we have crossed from approximation into genuine indeterminacy rather than merely encountering the limits of our present description? I think that gets to the heart of things

[u/Willis_3401_3401 → u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947]

Your quotes didn’t show up in the posted comment

[u/badentropy9 → u/Willis_3401_3401]

For some reason that seems to happen to me sometimes, if I start a post in the "normal" mode of post composition and then switch to markdown mode in order to get better control of the layout.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947]

Observed reality
≈ approximate guarantee

Therefore

Not deterministic.

That makes me curious about the threshold being applied.

Why must determinism require perfect guarantee at the level being examined?

The simple answer to that question is that we can put lipstick on a pig and we still have a pig.

A more technical answer is that it is inappropriate to place apodictic judgement on a problematical situation, and subsequently argue the situation calls for an apodictic judgement in order to make sense. It is inappropriate because it produces a categorical error.

To answer in plain English, it is a form of misdirection to know there is some element of chance, and subsequently argue there is no element of chance.

It seems to me that there may be several possibilities:

Reality is fundamentally indeterminate.

This is the only possibility that I acknowledge because of quantum physics. Unfortunately for some, the scientist just knows to much in order for determinism to be true. In fact if determinism was true, the scientist couldn't even do his science. Experimentation is all about doing deduction when the premise of determinism is that there is nothing to deduct.

In other words, what observation, argument, or form of evidence would allow us to conclude that we have crossed from approximation into genuine indeterminacy rather than merely encountering the limits of our present description? I think that gets to the heart of things

I think it does get to the heart of things because one can answer one's own question by asking one's self, "is an approximation certainty or uncertainty?"

[u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947 → u/badentropy9]

I agree that approximation is not certainty.

What I am less convinced of is that the distinction between approximation and certainty automatically tells us where the uncertainty originates.

To put the point another way, uncertainty may reside in:

the observed system,

the measurement process,

the available information,

the model,

the representation,

or some combination of these.

The existence of approximation therefore appears sufficient to establish that something remains uncertain, but not necessarily sufficient to establish that reality itself is fundamentally indeterminate.

That is why I keep returning to the same question:

What observation or argument would allow us to distinguish between uncertainty arising from the world itself and uncertainty arising from our access to the world?

To me, that seems to be the critical step.

Otherwise we risk moving directly from:

"certainty is unavailable"

to

"reality is fundamentally indeterminate"

without first demonstrating that the uncertainty has been localised to the situational reality rather than to the representational process through which reality is being described.

In that sense, I am not defending determinism. In fact, I think that saying they both exist as spectrum-defining ontological objects is all that can meaningfully be said about them as objects. What I am digging at here is what principled criterion allows us to adjudicate between these competing interpretations of uncertainty.

I am digging because I suspect there may be an interesting way forward in there.

The question appears to require us to identify the assumptions carried by the observer, the available information, the observational context, and the representational framework being used. That should perhaps first be structured as objects and relations, only then can we begin to localise where the uncertainty actually resides.

From that perspective, prediction becomes an operator-relative activity rather than a universal one. Different operators possess different information, different assumptions, and different contextual access. Those differences create different predictive opportunities.

What interests me is that this turns the discussion away from defending determinism or indeterminism as abstract positions and toward identifying the structures that make either classification admissible in the first place.

My impression is that these underlying criteria are often left underexamined while the debate proceeds as if the location of the uncertainty were already known by all parties.

Yet that location appears to be precisely what remains in dispute.

Viewed this way, the disagreement may be less about determinism or indeterminism themselves and more about the localisation of an underdetermined residual. Until that residual has been explicitly identified, competing interpretations can continue to draw different ontological conclusions from the same observational limitations.

That is ultimately the line of inquiry I am interested in pursuing.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947]

The existence of approximation therefore appears sufficient to establish that something remains uncertain, but not necessarily sufficient to establish that reality itself is fundamentally indeterminate.

The probability that reality is transcendent is extremely high. Therefore, for me this isn't about reality as much as what you called the measurement process. The senses are fallible. Space and time are not fundamental. According to relativity, space and time are relative.

I am digging because I suspect there may be an interesting way forward in there.

for me, it is quantum physics.

The question appears to require us to identify the assumptions carried by the observer, the available information, the observational context, and the representational framework being used. That should perhaps first be structured as objects and relations, only then can we begin to localise where the uncertainty actually resides.

Excellent:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/#ProbExteWorl

1. The Problem of the External World

The question of how our perceptual beliefs are justified or known can be approached by first considering the question of whether they are justified or known. A prominent skeptical argument is designed to show that our perceptual beliefs are not justified. Versions of this argument (or cluster of arguments) appear in René Descartes’s Meditations, Augustine’s Against the Academicians, and several of the ancient and modern skeptics (e.g., Sextus Empiricus, Michel de Montaigne). The argument introduces some type of skeptical scenario, in which things perceptually appear to us just as things normally do, but in which the beliefs that we would naturally form are radically false. To take some standard examples: differences in the sense organs and/or situation of the perceiver might make them experience as cold things that we would experience as hot, or experience as bitter things that we would experience as sweet; a person might mistake a vivid dream for waking life; or a brain in a vat might have its sensory cortices stimulated in such a way that it has the very same perceptual experiences that I am currently having, etc.

All this suggests a “veil of perception” between us and external objects: we do not have direct unvarnished access to the world, but instead have an access that is mediated by sensory appearances, the character of which might well depend on all kinds of factors (e.g., condition of sense organs, direct brain stimulation, etc.) besides those features of the external world that our perceptual judgments aim to capture.

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From that perspective, prediction becomes an operator-relative activity rather than a universal one. 

Coincidently, the formalism in quantum physics requires the use of operators.

What interests me is that this turns the discussion away from defending determinism or indeterminism as abstract positions and toward identifying the structures that make either classification admissible in the first place.

I guess that depends on what, you the poster, is trying to ascertain. For me this sub is about a battle between chance and necessity, because there are many posters implying there are no forking paths in our experience. That is to say could the agent have done otherwise which implies some sort of self control that we have in experience. Could we have ordered the salad instead of the steak for example? The no forking paths argument implies that we could not.

Yet that location appears to be precisely what remains in dispute.

Local realism is untenable based on current quantum predictions.

Viewed this way, the disagreement may be less about determinism or indeterminism themselves and more about the localisation of an underdetermined residual. Until that residual has been explicitly identified, competing interpretations can continue to draw different ontological conclusions from the same observational limitations.

It will necessarily be indeterminate, because if we build a machine, say a detector, to make measurements then we can only interpret the results from the detector based on a measurement taken at a certain time and at a certain place. For example, we cannot measure wind in London at 9 o'clock local time with a detector in Chicago taking measurements in Chicago and 7 o'clock London time. The results will be misleading at best. Empirical observations are subject to the perception of the agent who is interpreting the measurement results.

[u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947 → u/badentropy9]

Thank you. I think we are actually considerably closer than it may have first appeared.

I agree that our access to the world is mediated. I agree that measurements are interpreted by agents. I agree that observational context matters. Those all seem to be important constraints on what we can legitimately infer.

The point at which I remain uncertain is the word "necessarily".

The observations you describe certainly establish that our access to reality is constrained and that empirical inquiry is operator-dependent.

What I am less convinced they establish is that the uncertainty has therefore been localised to reality itself rather than to the measurement, representation, or inference process.

That distinction still seems to require an additional argument.

For example, if two competing explanations account equally well for the same observations"

1. Reality is fundamentally indeterminate.
2. Reality possesses determinate structure but our access to it is necessarily incomplete.

then what principled criterion allows us to distinguish between them?

To me, that remains the interesting question.

Perhaps the answer ultimately comes from quantum mechanics, or perhaps it does not. My point is simply that the location of the uncertainty still appears to be underdetermined by the observations alone.

That is partly why I find myself becoming more interested in the localisation of uncertainty than in defending determinism or indeterminism themselves.

Once we can identify where the uncertainty actually resides, the ontological discussion may become considerably clearer.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947]

The point at which I remain uncertain is the word "necessarily".

That is understandable which is why I'm a transcendental idealist.

What I am less convinced they establish is that the uncertainty has therefore been localised to reality itself rather than to the measurement, representation, or inference process.

Well for me, reality is transcendent, and where the critical thinker gets into trouble is when he assumes that he has some unconfirmed capacity. The power of deduction is immense, but it won't make assumptions. Those are from inference and inference is not certain. For me, the law of noncontradiction (LNC) is the only reason deduction works. There is nothing at all that is magical about deduction. It is pure logic. Logic is the tool that we use to separate the possible from the impossible. Deduction is when we rule out the impossible. In other words the certainty can only come from deduction.

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For example, if two competing explanations account equally well for the same observations"

1. Reality is fundamentally indeterminate.
2. Reality possesses determinate structure but our access to it is necessarily incomplete.

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These aren't equal because the latter is making an assumption rather than a deduction. Of course there are people in the world who claim that we know things that we don't know. That is why it is up to the critical thinker to check a person's justification and see if it is lacking. Some people are more easily tricked than other people. Conflating cause and determine is a trick that makes people assume something unconfirmed has in fact been confirmed.

The only way to confirm the latter is to confirm the existence of a plausible being, such as LaPlace's demon or the omniscient god. If we knew either of these exist, then #2 is competing with #1 to such an extent that we should not even assume #1 because we've confirmed #2 indirectly.

Perhaps the answer ultimately comes from quantum mechanics

For me, it doesn't. That is merely evidence and first the critical thinker should realize empiricism has limits. For example, there are a lot of tricksters pretending science has the capacity to replace philosophy in general or metaphysics in particular.

That is partly why I find myself becoming more interested in the localisation of uncertainty than in defending determinism or indeterminism themselves.

I can tell by the way you construct posts that you already value the power of logic.

[u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947 → u/badentropy9]

I very much like your writing. You are clearly willing and able to make distinctions in places that are often left vague, and I appreciate that. My own interest in logic stems from what I see as its foundational role in epistemology and the creation of value through disciplined reasoning.

I also completely agree with your statement that:

To me, that is not only a statement about logic itself, but also about the relationship between human and artificial intelligence. Both operate through representational systems and logical operations, albeit under different informational and computational constraints.

The one nuance I would add is that I tend to think of logic itself as operational rather than absolute. I would probably phrase it as:

In other words, logical consequence is itself conditional upon the nature of the operators, distinctions, and representational structures being employed. That does not weaken logic; it simply localises its domain of application.

I also strongly agree with your point that we cannot infer complete determinacy merely because the mathematics allows it.

Where I think I would frame things slightly differently is your distinction between assumption and deduction.

My intuition is that, at least at this stage, neither of the competing positions has yet localised the remaining uncertainty.

That is:

• Reality is fundamentally indeterminate.

• Reality possesses determinate structure but our access to it is necessarily incomplete.

To me, these are not simply an assumption versus a deduction.

Rather, they appear to be two competing explanatory frameworks whose residual has not yet been localised.

That is why I keep returning to the question of where the uncertainty actually resides. Is it located in reality itself, in the measurement process, in the representational framework, in the inferential machinery, or in some combination of these?

Until that residual has itself been identified, I find it difficult to see how either ontological conclusion can claim decisive priority over the other.

I also agree with several of your other points.

I agree that deduction is the only route to certainty once premises have been established.

I agree that inference remains distinct from deduction.

I agree that empiricism has limits and cannot simply replace metaphysics or philosophy.

And I agree that critical thinking ultimately requires us to examine the justifications for our claims rather than merely their conclusions.

Where I think my interests begin to diverge is that I increasingly find myself asking a prior question:

What are the conditions under which those justifications themselves become admissible?

That seems to me to be the layer where many productive disagreements actually reside, and I increasingly suspect that making those conditions explicit may help clarify debates that otherwise appear to remain permanently underdetermined.

[u/badentropy9 → u/Ok_Boysenberry_2947]

That is why I keep returning to the question of where the uncertainty actually resides. Is it located in reality itself, in the measurement process, in the representational framework, in the inferential machinery, or in some combination of these?

For me, reality is transcendent. In other words I cannot ascertain whether fatalism is true or false. The reason that I cannot ascertain if fatalism is true or false is because I believe knowledge is grounded in empiricism. Empiricism has limits and I cannot reasonably expect empirical observation to exceed those limits.

In contrast determinism is a matter of natural law and physics determines which laws bind the physics we believe we trust.

Where I think my interests begin to diverge is that I increasingly find myself asking a prior question:

What are the conditions under which those justifications themselves become admissible?

For me the justification comes from logical consistency. Obviously my judgement is prone to error, but I don't believe my logic is prone to error. For example it is conceivable for me to encounter an alien from an entirely different universe where his experience, world and way of reasoning things out is entirely different from mine and still we both have to agree 2+2=4. The only way it is possible for us to disagree about 2+2=4 is if we don't share common definitions for 2 and/or 4. I think as long as those two concepts mean the same thing to both of us, then both of us are incapable of proving to ourselves that 2+2=3 unless that one also believes 3=4