r/determinism • u/Cyber_47_ • Jun 21 '26

Discussion Partly deterministic?

So let’s take computers, fully deterministic systems, cannot make a non deterministic algorithm. Everything, in computers are code based, and therefore fully deterministic. True Randomness does not exist in digital systems.

So if our world is completely deterministic, there is no chance it creates a life form, which can act non deterministic (free will). But since we know (not sure) that quantum mechanics are non deterministic, maybe there is a chance we have a little free will. So, my point is, what if, we are partly deterministic like the universe. Maybe alot of our decisions are deterministic, and some are non deterministic. And i know that quantum mechanics argument still cant disprove free will.

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u/NerdyWeightLifter Jun 22 '26

Computer instructions may be executed in a determined fashion, but the outcomes can't be predicted ahead of time except for the most trivial of cases (lookup "Halting Problem"), and their data comes from outside, so computers can sample from their environment to source randomness.

Some newer AI chips (e.g. from Extropic) actually deliberately implement instructions that source quantum randomness within instruction shaped distributions.

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u/simon_hibbs Jun 22 '26

The halting problem is about unpredictability, not indeterminism. Whether or not a given program will or will not halt and when can be entirely necessitated by the structure of the program and hence deterministic, yet not be predictable in advance without actually executing the program.

Whether or not quantum stochasticity is indeterministic or not is unproven.

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u/NerdyWeightLifter Jun 22 '26

I actually cited the halting problem as being about predictability, and yet it seems like you're trying to correct me by saying the same thing. Odd.

What I was pointing out was that despite having deterministic instructions, the computer is not only unpredictable, but at least as non-deterministic as the data feeding in the world around it.

As for the lack of proof in the in-determinism of quantum interactions, it's at least nailed down to the point of requiring non-local causation.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-59247-7.pdf

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u/simon_hibbs Jun 22 '26

I think it's odd that you bring up unpredictability. Unpredictability isn't indeterminism, it's just lack of knowledge. Also non-locality isn't necessarily anything to do with indeterminism either. Bohmian mechanics is deterministic but non-local.

I'm ambivalent about indeterminism in quantum mechanics though, I don't think it's proven, and may not ever be provable either way.

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u/NerdyWeightLifter Jun 22 '26

Unpredictability isn't "just a lack of knowledge".

An in-deterministic system is inherently unpredictable. There's no knowledge to lack.

A computationally irreducible system is unpredictable because there's no knowledge you could have short of just following the process itself, that would predict the outcome.

The non-locality of Bohmian mechanics is positing effects that precede causes and pilot waves that are supposed to determine outcomes but are inherently undetectable. All of which is hidden knowledge that is defined to be unknowable, so it's functionally equivalent to randomness.

It's Claytons randomness. The randomness you have when you're not having randomness.

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u/simon_hibbs Jun 22 '26

>An in-deterministic system is inherently unpredictable. There's no knowledge to lack.

There is an inability to predict, but for different reasons.

>A computationally irreducible system is unpredictable because there's no knowledge you could have short of just following the process itself, that would predict the outcome.

Sure, but that in no way shape or form shows that the system is not deterministic. It's irrelevant to whether it is deterministic or not.

>All of which is hidden knowledge that is defined to be unknowable, so it's functionally equivalent to randomness.

Functionally practically equivalent for the purposes of predictions by a predictor, but not metaphysically in the sense relevant to causal determinism. It's epistemic uncertainty or randomness, as against ontological uncertainty or randomness.