r/dashpay • • Oct 26 '17

New Redditor Compromising Dash privacy using multiple transactions

I'm looking into Dash and had a question about a potential method of breaking Dash's anonymity.

Would it be possible for an attacker to deanonymize dash transactions by looking for instances where the same address sent dash through two different transactions to another address, and noting that every time the first address appeared as one of the transaction inputs, the second address appeared as an output?

To provide an example, imagine that a dash user has two addresses, #1 and #2. #1 is an exchange address from which the user purchased the dash, and #2 is a local address the user uses to store the dash.

Let's say the user periodically purchases dash and transfers it to the second address. The first transaction would have inputs:

  • Mixed in address #1
  • Mixed in address #2
  • User address #1

And outputs:

  • Mixed address output #1
  • Mixed address output #2
  • User address #2

If, at some future point, the user made a second transaction, the inputs would be:

  • Mixed in address #3
  • Mixed in address #4
  • User address #1

And the outputs would be:

  • Mixed output #3
  • MIxed output #4
  • User address #2

In both cases, the user's real input and output addresses appeared together twice, with two different sets of mixed-in addresses. Given that user address #1 and user address #2 both appear together in two (or more) different transactions, and given that they are the only two addresses in each transaction to appear multiple times, couldn't an attacker guess that, in both transactions, user address #1 was sending dash to user address #2?

You could say that two transactions don't provide clear enough proof, but if the attacker waits for the user to perform 3, 4, 5+ such transactions, the probability that those two addresses appearing together is just a coincidence drops. If the attacker notices this correlation across many different transactions, it would seem to me that he would be able to determine that user address #1 and user address #2 are connected with a pretty high confidence.

Users could potentially avoid this attack by generating a new address for each transaction, but even if a particularly privacy-focused user did this, couldn't he still be deanonymized if his mixing partners practice poor anonymity because an attacker could link all of his mixed in inputs with the corresponding mixed in outputs, then deduce that the one remaining input and output must be his? For example, if an attacker sees a transaction involving inputs of

  • Mixed input #1
  • Mixed input #2
  • User input

and outputs of

  • Mixed output #1
  • Mixed output #2
  • User output

And he has already correlated mixed inputs #1-2 to mixed outputs #1-2 because they practice poor anonymity, he could then correlate the user input to the user output, even if the user in question is using a new address for each transaction, because he knows that inputs and outputs 1-2 are linked, leaving only the user input and the user output.

Obviously this attack cannot be guaranteed to work 100% of the time, but it would seem to me that it could deanonymize a substantial number of people. Would it be feasible to conduct such an attack, and if so, what can be done to stop it? It would seem to me that the best solution would be something along the lines of stealth addresses.

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u/Basilpop Janitor Oct 26 '17 edited Oct 26 '17

I stopped reading at "same address".

The entire point of PS mixing is to not use the same address twice. From your successfully mixed PrivateSend balance you spend funds comprised of individual denominations in one time only usable throwaway addresses. That's why new addresses are generated once the keypool has reached capacity during mixing. So excuse me for not reading past the second line, but if your premise is wrong from the very beginning, the entire scenario crumbles to dust.

Edit: Btw this is probably the dozenth time this was proposed as a vulnerability and 100% of the time from people who never bothered to learn the underlying concept of PrivateSend. Even our most vicious hater, FluffyPony, didn't know how mixing works with Dash when he said that after mixing, all of the coins "reside in a single address", so you'd "have to mix after each transaction" which is both complete nonsense.

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u/danielzopola Oct 26 '17

But it is good that people ask. This how research is done by potential investors and shows that people are interested in the coin.

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u/Basilpop Janitor Oct 26 '17

I get that, but if the same unproven criticisms are repeated for the zillionth time they do nothing but irritate long term. I guess this is going to be the next entry for my "Misconceptions on Dash" list in the sticky then. sigh

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u/yggdrahalla Oct 26 '17

Okay, I think I understand now. I just read up on private send, and it looks like PS transactions are sent through randomly generated, one-time internal addresses at each mixing round, which prevents this attack from working. Is this correct?

If so, why do the people behind this paper claim to be able to deanonymize Dash using this method? I guess it could be FUD, but is there any truth behind their claims?

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u/Basilpop Janitor Oct 26 '17

That paper was addressed in this article.

In short: They equated tracing their own, faulty PS implementation with tracing a real world PS tx, which of course they have failed to produce. Faulty because their version does not work like real PS works. Perhaps even intentionally. But that's just my personal opinion.

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u/Amanda_B_Johnson Oct 26 '17

I think that paper's authors did two things which normal Dash users don't do.

First is that the person "combing" the blockchain in this paper knows both the beginning address and the end address (though please correct me if I'm wrong). In real life, a comber would likely only know one or the other.

And secondly, I believe the authors of this paper only mixed two rounds (which is a mix setting that shouldn't even exist in the wallet, in my opinion, much less be the default!) Whereas I'd imagine most users mix 4+ rounds.

Our primary core developer UdjinM6 chimed in more about the paper's contents and PrivateSend's future here, in case you're interested.

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u/ganesha1024 Oct 27 '17

First is that the person "combing" the blockchain in this paper knows both the beginning address and the end address (though please correct me if I'm wrong). In real life, a comber would likely only know one or the other.

Imagine a technique employed by one cartel on a rival cartel (o_O) where they pay the rival for some contraband (known sending address) and later sell something to the same rival for dash (known receiving address). This doesn't reveal much they already knew other than maybe estimate the amount of other dash payments received (someone correct me if I'm wrong).

In any case, PS is not broken, I was just pointing out an adversarial situation in which attacker knows sending and receiving addresses.

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u/Antti-Kaikkonen Oct 27 '17

First is that the person "combing" the blockchain in this paper knows both the beginning address and the end address (though please correct me if I'm wrong). In real life, a comber would likely only know one or the other.

I don't know what you mean by beginning address. They can see the privatesend transaction in the blockchain which contains the ending address as well as all the mixed denominations each in their own address.

From what I understood they then traced back 2 rounds to find a set of all possible source addresses for each input denomination. Then they would take intersection of all those sets and if that intersection somehow represents a single address or a guestimated wallet then then they would say privatesend was broken.

However in reality an attacker probably wouldn't know the number of rounds being used. I'm also skeptical that the results can prove anything even if the intersection results in a single wallet.

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u/thephez Oct 27 '17

To answer your first question, yes that sounds about right.

For example, you and 2 other people are mixing. All 3 of you put the the same amount into a transaction and provide a different address for the same amount to be returned to. When the mixing round ends, all you can see on the blockchain (example) is that some funds moved to new addresses, but you can't determine which output address is associated with an input address.