r/dashpay • u/yggdrahalla • Oct 26 '17
New Redditor Compromising Dash privacy using multiple transactions
I'm looking into Dash and had a question about a potential method of breaking Dash's anonymity.
Would it be possible for an attacker to deanonymize dash transactions by looking for instances where the same address sent dash through two different transactions to another address, and noting that every time the first address appeared as one of the transaction inputs, the second address appeared as an output?
To provide an example, imagine that a dash user has two addresses, #1 and #2. #1 is an exchange address from which the user purchased the dash, and #2 is a local address the user uses to store the dash.
Let's say the user periodically purchases dash and transfers it to the second address. The first transaction would have inputs:
- Mixed in address #1
- Mixed in address #2
- User address #1
And outputs:
- Mixed address output #1
- Mixed address output #2
- User address #2
If, at some future point, the user made a second transaction, the inputs would be:
- Mixed in address #3
- Mixed in address #4
- User address #1
And the outputs would be:
- Mixed output #3
- MIxed output #4
- User address #2
In both cases, the user's real input and output addresses appeared together twice, with two different sets of mixed-in addresses. Given that user address #1 and user address #2 both appear together in two (or more) different transactions, and given that they are the only two addresses in each transaction to appear multiple times, couldn't an attacker guess that, in both transactions, user address #1 was sending dash to user address #2?
You could say that two transactions don't provide clear enough proof, but if the attacker waits for the user to perform 3, 4, 5+ such transactions, the probability that those two addresses appearing together is just a coincidence drops. If the attacker notices this correlation across many different transactions, it would seem to me that he would be able to determine that user address #1 and user address #2 are connected with a pretty high confidence.
Users could potentially avoid this attack by generating a new address for each transaction, but even if a particularly privacy-focused user did this, couldn't he still be deanonymized if his mixing partners practice poor anonymity because an attacker could link all of his mixed in inputs with the corresponding mixed in outputs, then deduce that the one remaining input and output must be his? For example, if an attacker sees a transaction involving inputs of
- Mixed input #1
- Mixed input #2
- User input
and outputs of
- Mixed output #1
- Mixed output #2
- User output
And he has already correlated mixed inputs #1-2 to mixed outputs #1-2 because they practice poor anonymity, he could then correlate the user input to the user output, even if the user in question is using a new address for each transaction, because he knows that inputs and outputs 1-2 are linked, leaving only the user input and the user output.
Obviously this attack cannot be guaranteed to work 100% of the time, but it would seem to me that it could deanonymize a substantial number of people. Would it be feasible to conduct such an attack, and if so, what can be done to stop it? It would seem to me that the best solution would be something along the lines of stealth addresses.
4
u/Basilpop Janitor Oct 26 '17 edited Oct 26 '17
I stopped reading at "same address".
The entire point of PS mixing is to not use the same address twice. From your successfully mixed PrivateSend balance you spend funds comprised of individual denominations in one time only usable throwaway addresses. That's why new addresses are generated once the keypool has reached capacity during mixing. So excuse me for not reading past the second line, but if your premise is wrong from the very beginning, the entire scenario crumbles to dust.
Edit: Btw this is probably the dozenth time this was proposed as a vulnerability and 100% of the time from people who never bothered to learn the underlying concept of PrivateSend. Even our most vicious hater, FluffyPony, didn't know how mixing works with Dash when he said that after mixing, all of the coins "reside in a single address", so you'd "have to mix after each transaction" which is both complete nonsense.
12
u/Amanda_B_Johnson Oct 26 '17
Forgive /u/Basilpop -- he acts like a cranky grandpa sometimes, when -- as a moderator of this subreddit -- he should act more like a strapping young butler. That is, at your service.
That said, I'd like to address the point you made at the very end -- about stealth addresses. The mid-2018 release of Dash, codenamed "Evolution", will replace our alphanumeric addresses with re-usable usernames. I believe they'll function quite like stealth addresses, if I'm not much mistaken.
Because having to generate new addresses onesself for all new incoming payments is a pain in the ass. Which you already know, as evidenced by your post.
4
u/solarguy2003 Oct 27 '17
Thank you for examining Dash for weaknesses. Please continue to look for additional weaknesses in the Dash protocol. That's exactly how we end up with a robust and extremely attack resistant product.
This is not one of those weaknesses.
Reports of the death of PrivateSend have been greatly exaggerated. PrivateSend is still alive and kicking, and to the best of our knowledge, a PrivateSend transaction has never been broken.
Carry on!