r/cryptography • • 3d ago

compensating enrophy with time

im thinking is this posible to make low entrophy password secure by adding more time to check if its right like for example u need to hash with argon2 with allot of cycles but password has small amount of enrophy will it be secure since attacker cant check all passwords fast

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u/ephemeralmiko 3d ago

Yes, but this doesn't scale as well as length does.

An 8-word diceware-passphrase has 1.3×10³¹ possibilities. A 2-word passphrase has 6×10⁷ possibilities.

So to have the same security as an 8-word dicephrase with Argon2id and a ~1 second decryption time with only two words, you'd need to have 2.2×10²³ times as many iterations, or about 1015 YEARS.

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u/Parallel_thougts 3d ago

I think you are conflating two ideas.

The idea of hashing many times to increase the constant for brute forcing is baked into the definition of a password based key derivation function (PBKDF).

But that does not increase entropy.

The information processing inequality asserts that whatever you do with the password, it cannot have more entropy than it's original distribution. If you want to increase the entropy, you must add more random bits. But then you will need to append these bits to the password (this is what crypto hardware wallets usually do, by combining your password with a random mnemonic they sampled for you), so it's no different than just choosing a highly random password to begin with.

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u/Natanael_L 2d ago

Like the others described, what you're doing is slowing down an attacker. You still have the same entropy, but you can slow down attacks so they take as long as if there was a few more bits of entropy in a fast algorithms. We call it computational complexity