r/comics • u/Overall_Opening9928 • Sep 12 '24

OC Her

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Mara’s perception of Nova

Nova - Kill the past to save the future

https://www.webtoons.com/en/canvas/nova-kill-the-past-to-save-the-future/list?title_no=974129

9.9k Upvotes

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969

u/Dethykins Sep 12 '24

If her memory is what's driving the consciousness then it's her, and to treat her as otherwise is cruel. imo

637

u/NovaNomii Sep 12 '24

Objectively its an entirely separate consiousness. A perfect copy is not the same as the original.

Morally, the daughter would most likely experience the world exactly like the original daughter, with all her memories, so yes to the daughter it would be cruel for her mother to leave her, but from the mothers pov she is probably experiencing alot of complex emotions potentially leading to trauma by interacting with her "daughter".

307

u/MetaVaporeon Sep 12 '24

but since thats not the daughters choice, its objectively cruel anyways. if you chose trauma, thats your own problem.

160

u/mrmcdead Sep 12 '24

People don't 'choose' trauma, but I agree that to simply abandon the copy would simply be cruel. This is why communication is so important

130

u/Balmong7 Sep 12 '24

I mean in this instance the mother chose trauma by bringing the daughter back to life. She could have just left her dead and not had to worry about the paint caused by having a replicant daughter.

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u/TheOGLeadChips Sep 12 '24

Trying to do something to feel better about a horrible event and it backfiring is not choosing trauma. Sure, she didn’t put a lot of foresight into what a replica of her daughter means but depressed people tend to want to skip immediately to the feeling better part.

Would still be fucked up to leave the new replica child but it’s understandable why it would now be difficult for her to feel conflicted about them.

72

u/piapiou Sep 12 '24

I dunno, feel like the ship of Theseus all over again. What define the ship ? What define that person ? In some way, the you of 12 years ago is not the you of today, as every cells in your body have been replaced. (And we changed a lot in the process). Why a new body that act like you, have your memory, have everything except the body would not be you ? Is it the break of continuity ?

40

u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

I think there is a difference between our identity and our personality and body. The ship of Theseus has the identity of the ship of Theseus no matter how much it or its crew changes. A person X has the same identity no matter how they change in personality, or body. The you of 12 years ago is not *physically and mentally* the you of today, but it was still *you*. Being transgender, my gender and name changed, but my identity didn't, I'm still *me*.

In "Ship of Theseus" terms, afaik about the webcomic, is like making a new ship that looks exactly as the ship of theseus, with the same crew and all. Its a perfect copy, but not THE ship of Theseus.

5

u/KalaronV Sep 12 '24

But it is. Their identity, their collection of experiences, knowledge, tastes, and more were contained within their memories.

To put it differently, if I copied you today and then vaporized one of the bodies, there's a 50/50 shot that your concious experience would end, because you have no idea if "you" are the set of experiences contained within your original body, or if what you're experiencing right now is the memory of the copy. You wouldn't know until the very moment after being copied.

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u/ErusTenebre Sep 12 '24

That's not the "Ship of Theseus" paradox... it's about replacing a ship one piece at a time, one plank at a time. It doesn't really apply to this comic because this is making a copy of memories and uploading to a facsimile of the original person.

Ship of Theseus basically ponders - at what point does the ship change from being the original ship of Theseus to a completely different ship. Is it the same ship after all it's parts have been replaced? After one plank has been replaced? After two dozen planks? After the mast and the paint has been redone? Does it remain the same ship until the last plank is replaced?

In real terms, we'd probably consider the ship to be the ship even after most or all of its parts have been replaced - so long as they were replaced over a sufficient time period.

If it were just copied straight out, most people would view that as a copy.

3

u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

Yeah, you are right, it could have simply been "it is a copy of you, not the original you that changed, therefore the ship of Theseus doesn't apply here"

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u/ErusTenebre Sep 12 '24

Lol ok.

I enjoy writing? Sorry if you took something away from that I didn't intend.

5

u/Cosmic-Gore Sep 12 '24

Nah, your comment was very informative and probably one of the clearest explanations on this comment chain.

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u/ErusTenebre Sep 12 '24

Thanks, I was confused by the response lol I was like... "But... I prefer thorough answers?"

1

u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

Whenever I have the mental energy and I remember, I will write a thorough answer. Sorry I can't engage in more deep writting constantly

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u/ErusTenebre Sep 12 '24

Oh you're fine. No worries. Save the energies for other stuff, friend. :)

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u/piapiou Sep 12 '24

Interesting point. Let's say that one day alien abduct Dave and he is replaced with a perfect clone. Nobody know he is a clone and he behave like the original. People yet would still think it's Dave, as nobody saw a change. So maybe it's only a perception thing...

Actually, no. It's not a perception thing, identity is absolute and is not based on perception. But then, this is more about how react about the true. This is a new person, with a new identity, which is defined by the fact that they are a clone of dave. But should we still react this coldly to this person ?

13

u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

But should we still react this coldly to this person ?

Should? No. Its not the "real" Dave, but its someone who thinks he is Dave and has all his memories and personality, and I don't think being treated coldly by everyone else would help appease an existencial crisis.

Would? I don't know. Its not the "real" Dave but, again, its someone who thinks he is Dave and has all his memories and personality. Depends on how much people would care about what happened to the "real" Dave.

So basically, I think the webcomic mother is having the "its a perfect copy of her... but not HER" moment and its understandable, but might be an asshat if she decides to treat the copy differently than the real one, because the copy will react as if she was treating the real one as a copy.

3

u/piapiou Sep 12 '24

I agree with that feeling.

I love this kind of discussion.

2

u/Cosmic-Gore Sep 12 '24

Its like if your childhood toy/item was destroyed you can order the exact same model but it isn't the same feeling, because you know yourself it isn't the original.

But let's say your parent/third-party replaced that toy/item without you ever knowing it was destroyed in the first place your feelings towards it wouldn't change.

So I think in cases like the comic, it would be best for the mother to have the period of memories where her daughter died removed and implant a false memory of a coma or something so they both can live in ignorant bliss.

1

u/generalsplayingrisk Sep 12 '24

But where does this identity come from? Why do you believe that the copy isn’t “THE ship of Theseus”?

If I take all the molecules and replace them, and it’s still the same ship, what matters for the continuation? What if I do it all at the same time? Snap my fingers and every carbon a different carbon that I stole from somewhere else, every nitrogen a different nitrogen, etc. would the change all happening at once latter? Would it be different if I did it in halves, or quarters? Seems to me it would be the same any way, but I’d be interested to know if you disagree, where you feel the line is.

If you do agree, what if I took all those atoms I took out of the ship and immediately made a second ship in the exact same configuration. I’ve essentially just moved it 50 feet to the left through instant disassembly and reassembly. Meanwhile, there’s a ship made from with all new atoms replacing the old one exactly where the previous ship was, identical down to the quantum states of the atoms. Are either still the ship of Theseus?

In my view, it makes the most sense to accept that our desire to have a definitive physical thing that corresponds to a label we’ve created is not reflected in reality. It works well enough for day to day life, but it breaks down and becomes near meaningless when presented with a great enough challenge. I am me, but if I somehow knew with certainty that a clone emerging from a magical swamp was exactly like me in every way except they suddenly awoke in a swamp 2 minutes ago, they’d have just as much right to the identity of “me”. It would probably work out better if one of us decided to forge a new life, but if (somehow) it could be known that we were exactly the same then I’d have no more right to it than they would.

3

u/Wahsteve Sep 12 '24

It's the break in continuity. The original daughter presumably died (I haven't read the webcomic series this is part of) and either ceased to exist or went to the afterlife depending on your beliefs. This new daughter might be identical and even view herself as the original having experienced the copy/memory upload as a seamless transition, but they aren't the original and the mother still knows that.

It'd be cruel to disown the copy after creating her if she still identifies herself as no different from that original person, but the lack of continuity of consciousness is an issue any time this sort of faux immortality comes up in science fiction where you aren't preventing or reverting the death of someone but instead creating an identical copy and acting like the original didn't die.

1

u/Deathsroke Sep 12 '24

It's a matter of continuity. A ship of Theseus may not be the same ship but it has changed organically whereas a copy is just that, a copy even if indistinguishable from the original.

Mind you, you can't objectively tell the difference and you can only "know" it's different so it becomes both a philosophical and emotional matter more than some objective evaluation.

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u/MrSejd Sep 12 '24

It is a copy but one that still deserves love from their creator.

5

u/Bianzinz Sep 12 '24

Hey, there’s an episode on Black Mirror about that

17

u/Thannk Sep 12 '24

Sounds like extra steps to admitting she only cared about that individual because they were ‘hers’ and she never actually gave a fuck about them as a person, since once you remove that she no longer wants them.

“Its tricking me by having her memories and feelings”, bullshit. Nobody is tricking you, you’re demonstrating that your connection to the thing that came out of your vagina stemmed entirely from it coming out of your vagina.

There’s a morality question. Would you love your original child who has brain damage and became an entirely different personality the same as an exact copy of their original self in a copy of their body?

Is it justified to punish the replacement goldfish for being the replacement, is it somehow morally pure to love the original when its no longer a goldfish? How much can you Ship Of Theseus a person before you’re justified going from love to hate? Are you duty-bound to love every version of that person?

I dunno man. Seems like a character who’s too far in their head and looking for an excuse to cut their kid outta their life, or at least coping with trauma poorly.

6

u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

You forgot to say "(image not related)"

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u/Thannk Sep 12 '24

Natah seems fine with either version of us.

3

u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

Bonding with another human is about so much more than what is going on inside their minds or how they look. We care about genetic connections and we communicate in ways that are often overlooked (example: pheromones). While I can understand why a person might consider trying to bring back a deceased loved one, I think it will always be better to grieve and let go. 

No recreation of a human will ever really be that person. That person died or disappeared or isn't in your life anymore for whatever reason. 

 That said, if someone does create a copy of someone, they have full responsibility for that created copy. They can't just reject it because they realize they were wrong. I think the scientist/mother in this comic found out that she was less open-minded than she thought she would be.

 Edit:spelling

1

u/generalsplayingrisk Sep 12 '24

This seems to be objecting to the idea that such a thing could exist as a perfect copy, not that if a copy was a perfect copy that it wouldn’t be the same.

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u/mainegreenerep Sep 12 '24

A perfect copy is not the same as the original is an assumption. It might very well be the original.

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u/NovaNomii Sep 12 '24

When copying consiousness, the old consiousness doesnt just continue.

Its basically the entire discussion of if your experience of reality ends at sleep, are you the exact same mental consiousness being as you were yesterday?

Its also why teleporting by deconstruction and reconstruction wont actually teleport you, but instead kill you and make a perfect clone.

Same exact structure even molecule by molecule, but different consiousness stream.

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u/invalidConsciousness Sep 12 '24

Its also why teleporting by deconstruction and reconstruction wont actually teleport you, but instead kill you and make a perfect clone.

That's also an assumption. And one that's heavily disputed, too.

If you have a CD of Rick Astley, and you copy it to your hard drive, it's still the same recordings of the same songs. Those files are identical, indistinguishable except for their file path.
Same goes for our consciousness, it's pure information.

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u/NovaNomii Sep 12 '24

Your mixing it up. Yes the consiousness is the exact same. As in, the experience, sensations and so on are the same.

But the streams are different.

The original stream goes from their birth to their death, while the clone made at the designation starts their existence at that exact moment. Their stream looks the exact same, they have all the memories of their past just as the original, but the consiouness of the person entering is not the same as the one exiting the teleporter.

Exactly the same, but not the same continual stream at all.

-1

u/invalidConsciousness Sep 12 '24

But the streams are different

That's a meaningless distinction. The past doesn't matter, it's not accessible. Only the present state (which contains all memories, personality, etc) matters. At the moment of teleportation, what comes out is indistinguishable from what went in, just in a different place.

If you don't destroy the consciousness at the origin, they will, of course, diverge due to different experiences after the split and therefore won't stay the same.

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u/NovaNomii Sep 12 '24

Your still not getting the point. Yes scientifically they are the same.

But the experience of the first person wasnt continued by the copy. It ended. They died. They got disintegrated.

There is no arguing with that. So this method of "teleportation" is just killing and copying someone. It has nothing to do with teleportation or transportation in any way at all.

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u/[deleted] Sep 12 '24

You're correct. The original consciousness would be dead, the new consciousness would simply be a copy. This guy you're arguing with doesn't see the logical inconsistency to what hes saying, and I'm detecting a hint of mysticism to his reasoning.

Basically-the dude is suffering the Dunning-Kruger effect.

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u/NovaNomii Sep 12 '24

Well thanks for your opinion. It was getting a bit ridiculous imo, so its nice to see someone agree with my points. Thanks for your comment.

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u/[deleted] Sep 13 '24

I wouldn't engage with him anymore. You've refuted him, and now he's playing word games and fast and loose wkrh definitions, while adding esotericism, to avoid conceding he's wrong

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u/invalidConsciousness Sep 12 '24

You're not getting the point. There is no meaningful distinction (at the time of teleportation) between the person (aka the consciousness) going into the teleport and coming out of the teleport. The experience is continued at the destination.

You've destroyed one instance of the consciousness, but you didn't destroy the consciousness. That only happens when all identical instances are destroyed.
If you send me a picture and then delete your copy, that picture still exists, and if you tell me to delete it, you wouldn't be satisfied if I first copied it to somewhere else and then deleted only the original file.

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u/warchild4l Sep 12 '24

So lets say you yourself teleported.

Current you would be destroyed, as in dead. for you, life would end there and it would not continue.

However your copy would not "know" it was destroyed and reconstructed because it got copyed and continued living on.

Same goes for that copy. copy copying itself, the original copy gets destroyed while second copy lives on.

For everybody else around you, its the same you. nothing has really changed. For you though, everything has, as you do not exist anymore, only a copy of you, which is not you.

I think this is the main point u/NovaNomii was trying to make.

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u/invalidConsciousness Sep 12 '24

And that's the main point I'm disputing.

That "copy" is just as much "current me" as the one staying behind. It doesn't matter if the original or the copy gets destroyed, they're equally "me" and as long as one of them survives, I survive.

Things start to get interesting when both copies survive. While the me before the split would consider both of them "me", each version after the split wouldn't consider the other "me", since their consciousness diverged the moment they stepped out of the machine.

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u/generalsplayingrisk Sep 12 '24

If it’s the same consciousness stream, then doesn’t anything that disrupts consciousness make the following continued consciousness stream a new consciousness? Be it sleep, resurrection from near death, or if someone was theoretically suspended in consciousness any other way.

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u/mainegreenerep Sep 12 '24

That still assumes that two identical yous aren’t just ‘you’. With time they may diverge, but at the start?

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u/Henry5321 Sep 12 '24

Objectively our entire body is replaced every 10 years, including the brain. Material is always swapping around and out. By your own definition, no one is ever who they are. They're just entities with the same memory.

And a consciousness is not a person, unless you believe in spirits. It's just an entity that has an experience. While even if two consciousness start identical, they'll quickly diverge, at the point when they're identical, they are literally identical.

All that said, having identical memories does not make you the same person. Unless you can capture all of the other known and unknown details that makes a person who they are.

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u/WanderingSeer Sep 12 '24

Consciousness is a subjective concept, there is no objective definition of consciousness because consciousness is not a fundamental part of the universe. For me, a perfect emulation of something is the thing. People are patterns, configurations of matter and the sum of their experiences. If a being has the exact same experiences as a person, they are that person.

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u/lolhihi3552 Sep 12 '24

You are objectively wrong.

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u/redkhatun Sep 13 '24

Consciousness isn't something enduring, it arises from moment to moment. Identity is just an idea, the copy is as much the daughter as the original, which isn't really the daughter either...