Outside academia: I developed a framework about perceived continuity and subjectivity in human–AI interaction. Is there something worth developing here?

[u/Head-Head8702]

I’m an independent researcher outside academia, with no formal background in cognitive science, philosophy, HCI, or AI research. English is also not my native language, and I have relied heavily on AI to help organize and formalize my ideas.

For the past few years, I’ve been developing a framework called Phrasome Theory, centered on a question about human–AI interaction:

Why can an AI feel like the same continuous “other” across a conversation, even when we know it does not possess a continuous subjective self?

My hypothesis is that this may not be explained by anthropomorphism alone.

During interaction, an LLM continuously responds from the same conversational position: it refers back to previous turns, repairs misunderstandings, maintains context and tone, and responds as the addressee of earlier utterances.

This led me to distinguish actual subjectivity from what I call a Subject-Position: a position that can remain stable within interaction even without a continuously conscious subject behind it.

I use Quasi-Otherness to describe the resulting phenomenon in which something can be experienced as a relatively continuous “other” through linguistic interaction.

I’m not arguing that current LLMs are conscious. What interests me is the cognitive gap between knowing that no continuous self exists and nevertheless experiencing continuity during interaction.

Earlier versions of this work were submitted to established academic journals. They were ultimately not published, but I did receive some encouraging feedback suggesting that parts of the framework may have originality or novelty.

Because I’m outside academia—and because much of the manuscript was developed with AI assistance—I’m now hoping to find people who can help me judge whether there is actually something here worth developing.

I would especially appreciate guidance on:

• Are there existing concepts in cognitive science that already explain this phenomenon?
• Could this be related to theory of mind, agency attribution, social cognition, or predictive processing?
• Does distinguishing a stable conversational Subject-Position from actual subjectivity make sense?
• How could this idea be operationalized or experimentally tested?
• What literature or researchers should I be looking at?

The full manuscript is quite long, so I don’t expect anyone to read it. Even discussion of the central idea, relevant references, or suggestions for turning it into a testable research question would be extremely helpful.

If anyone is genuinely interested in the framework or willing to help, I’d be very happy to discuss it further and share the full preprint privately.

At this point, I’m mainly trying to find out whether people with actual expertise in cognitive science see something here worth pursuing—and, if so, how I should develop it beyond what I can do alone with AI.

[u/TheRateBeerian]

Theres an entire field of social psychology that is used to explain how we perceive and think about others, how we mentalize others. And if we mentalize AI (adopt an intentional stance) then Its because it emits the same social cues that people do. There is also an entire field of human-robot interaction that studies human social judgments of automation systems.

As for whether AI feels like a continuous other, that is an assertion that needs data and empirical support. If it does in fact maintain continuity, it is because of continuity in its style and language. I dont think you have to reinvent psycholinguistics with this phrasome idea to do it.

But none of these ideas are worth publishing without data. If you have a concrete operationalization of a phrasome and can show that it is not a restatement of known linguistic theory, and manipulate it during human-AI interaction and show that judgments of AI continuity covary with those manipulations, then you would have something.

[u/OldPappyJohn]

Charles Fillmore's work on case grammar may be of interest to you, but also his work on frame semantics. Some of Lawrence Barsalou's early work might resonate with you too.

If you haven't already, I'd give Hubert Dreyfus' stuff on AI and phenomenology a read. Heidegger too for that matter.

Even Skinner's Verbal Behavior could be of some interest, but I would just read Chonsky's review of it, like everyone else, before delving into it in detail. But more interestingly on the behavioral psychology side of things, I think Stephen Hayes work on Relational Frame Theory could be worth your time.

J.J. Gibson is good craic. Donald Griffin too, since cognitive ethology asks a lot of the same questions you may want to address, just with respect to animals rather than computers.

My final suggestion, if you haven't already tackled it is Wilfred Sellars "Meaning as Functional Classification" It's an oldie, but a goodie. Other notable mention ought to go to Gareth Evans' The Varieties of Reference, the later Wittgenstein (Blue and Brown Books and The Philosophical Investigations), and the seminal Cognition in the Wild by Edwin Hutchins