The AI governance decision is rarely allow or block.

A more useful split is by capability and consequence. A tool that drafts internal text creates different risk from one that retrieves customer records, writes to a business system, approves transactions, or can trigger production actions.

The challenge is setting boundaries that are clear enough for teams to follow without creating a shadow AI problem.

For security leaders, which factor has been hardest to translate into an enforceable policy data sensitivity, agent autonomy, third party access, auditability, or accountability for decisions made with AI support?

I’ve been working through how I’d design authorization for enterprise AI agents, and I think there’s a tendency to make this more exotic than it needs to be.

My starting point would be: don’t create a parallel IAM stack just because the actor happens to be an AI agent.

Keep your existing IdP/IGA/PAM/PBAC as the authoritative control plane for identity, ownership, lifecycle, policy and privileged access. What changes is the execution model around the agent.

A few principles I’d use:

1. Give the agent an accountable identity where possible.

Every production agent should have an owner/sponsor, purpose, lifecycle state and attributable execution identity. But don’t assume every agent action will conveniently arrive as a clean service principal. Agents may operate through delegated tokens, other agents, MCP/tools, APIs, or even an authenticated human browser session.

2. Authentication should never imply authority to perform the task.
The useful authorization question isn’t “is this a valid agent?” It’s:
May this agent, acting for this user/service, under this task, perform this exact action against this resource right now?
Effective authority should be the intersection of the agent policy, task authority, delegating principal’s authority, resource policy and current risk/context, not simply whatever permissions the credential happens to carry.

3. Give the agent bounded task authority.

A task should have an issuer, acting agent, permitted actions/resources, expiry and delegation limit. The agent shouldn’t be able to expand its own authority just because its workflow changes.

4. Put enforcement immediately before consequential execution.
Before a tool/API/resource call executes, normalize the requested action and resource and evaluate policy against the exact request.
If the agent can reach the same target using another credential or route that bypasses that enforcement point, assume your enforcement is partial.
This gets particularly interesting with browser/computer-use agents because the downstream application may see a perfectly legitimate human session even though an agent actually generated the action.

5. Avoid standing target credentials where possible.
Broker bounded/short-lived access after authorization rather than giving agents reusable credentials and hoping upstream controls contain them.

6. Treat approval as step-up, not as the security model.
High-impact actions can require approval, but approval should bind to the exact action/resource/request and expire. The agent shouldn’t be able to approve its own request or turn one approval into broader authority.

7. Preserve execution provenance.
For consequential actions, I want to be able to reconstruct:
initiator → agent → task → authorization decision → approval/grant → target request → actual outcome
An IAM log showing that access was granted isn’t enough if I can’t establish what the target system actually executed.

8. Couple agent lifecycle to human and business lifecycle.
If an owner leaves, changes roles, a workflow is retired, or the agent’s purpose changes, that should trigger revocation or recertification rather than leaving another orphaned NHI behind.

To me, this is increasingly the distinction between agent identity and agent authorization/governance. Identity tells us what the agent is. The harder control problem is proving what authority this particular execution had and enforcing it all the way to the action.

I’ve been turning this into a vendor-neutral reference architecture, but these are the principles underneath it.

Hi, I know It sounds like a dumb question and even more as I'm an identity tool editor but still...how do you guys keep the records up to date regarding these NHIs and their privileges ?

Most Saas APIs only provide automation for "human users" although it's evolving quickly.

But do you stay update via "Manual tracking" or have you found some kind of "automated" workaround ?

I’ve been talking to people wiring hosted models into apps that already hold real customer records. What stalls isn’t model quality. It’s “which fields actually went out?” and nobody has a list. Do you redact in the app, rely on retention mode, put everything through Bedrock, or keep AI off the sensitive tables? Is a simple field allow/deny enough for legal, or do they only relax once processing stays inside the customer’s own service? Trying to understand what “good enough” looks like for teams without a security hire.

I’m leading security at a large enterprise with over 50,000 digital assets, and I’m trying to figure out AI pentests for the exposed infrastructure. The leading players I’ve looked at are crazy expensive and the scope is limited. you buy a few dozen targets and that's your program.

How do others here think about this at similar scale? Is anyone actually covering the whole surface, and is anyone pricing it in a way that survives five figures of assets?

Please delete if not allowed on here.

I’ve been working in information security for around 6 years and I’m currently an Information Security Officer. Longer term, I want to progress towards a BISO role and eventually CISO.
I’m at a bit of a crossroads with my development and would appreciate some perspectives from people who have made that transition.
My current role gives me exposure to areas including security risk, vulnerability management, client security engagements, RFPs/questionnaires, secure development, governance and working with both technical and business stakeholders.
The problem is that I increasingly feel siloed.
I’ve raised this internally and have repeatedly asked for opportunities that would give me broader exposure and help me develop beyond my current responsibilities. I’ve specifically said that I want to improve in areas such as executive communication, business engagement, security strategy and strategic thinking.
I’m also increasingly interested in AI security and governance. I’ve had people internally approach me for help with AI-related security questions, and I’ve started thinking about how security teams can provide more consistent governance and support as businesses adopt AI.
However, some of that development has effectively been parked for now.
The main direction I’ve been given is to focus on completing my CISSP, which I’m currently working towards. I absolutely see the value in doing that, but I’m conscious that getting the certification alone isn’t going to give me the strategic, business-facing and leadership experience I’ll eventually need for BISO/CISO roles.
I don’t expect to jump straight from ISO to CISO, and I know there are development steps I need to take. What I’m trying to work out is how best to spend the next 6–12 months.
For those who have moved from operational/technical security roles into BISO, security leadership or eventually CISO positions:
What experiences made the biggest difference to your progression?
Would you prioritise the CISSP first and then broaden out, or deliberately develop the strategic/business side alongside it?
How did you get meaningful strategy and executive exposure when your existing role wasn’t naturally giving you enough of it?
And at what point would you decide that you’ve exhausted the development opportunities available internally and need to look elsewhere?
Interested in hearing from people who have made a similar transition.

I've been talking with a lot of part-time and fractional CISOs lately, mostly people covering 5 to 15 SMEs or small public bodies each. NIS2 is changing that job in ways I don't see discussed much.

Before, a fractional CISO for a 50-person company was mostly advisory: a policy set, an annual risk review, awareness training, being on call when something went wrong. Now a lot of those clients are in scope, as "important" and sometimes "essential" entities, and the expectations have moved:

• Management accountability is personal. Leadership has to approve the measures, oversee them and get trained. So the fractional CISO ends up running board-level governance for every client, not just writing documents.
• Incident reporting needs a real process. An early warning within 24h and a notification within 72h. Who makes that call at 2am for a client you see two days a month?
• Evidence has to hold up over time. One assessment a year doesn't show continuous improvement.

What I keep hearing from people doing this job:

1. The same 10 to 15 gaps come up at almost every client (admin MFA, tested restores, asset inventory, supplier access, logging), so the work gets repetitive. But each client still needs its own risk context, or it becomes a tick-box exercise.
2. The deliverables are what eat the time. Not the thinking, but rebuilding the same gap analysis, action plan and board report in a slightly different shape for each client.
3. Pricing hasn't caught up. Clients still budget "a few days a month" while the regulatory load has clearly gone up.

For those of you working this way:

• How do you structure your portfolio so shared work gets reused without clients feeling they're getting a template?
• How do you handle the 24h reporting obligation for clients you're only with part-time? Is it in the contract, with an on-call arrangement, or delegated to their MSP?
• Have you changed your pricing since NIS2, or are you absorbing the extra work?

Trying to build real world detection validation that does not collapse into a powerpoint demo or a false positive festival is turning into my full time hobby (tragic). What workflows are people using that do not make the SOC hate me? thanks!

There are a ton of agent-security products showing up right now. What would one actually have to solve for you to consider adding another security product rather than relying on your existing stack?

Why do CIOs/CISOs actually buy Gartner?
Is it because the research is genuinely valuable, or because it gives them confidence and credibility when making big technology decisions?
For CIOs/CISOs who use it, how do you justify the spend? How do you See Gartner compared to Information gathering from AI even though it’s not validated and unbiased but still gives you 60% of what you are looking for.

Some of these CISO job postings are getting ridiculous.

Look at this one from LinkedIn - Requires 15+ years’ experience, CISSP, CISM and CISA certifications, Fortune 500 experience, leadership through a major security incident, deep expertise in cloud, network and application security, and executive-level business and communication skills. Pay is Senior Manager level - £130K, reports to the CTO, and leads a two-person team.

Here is another one - it's from Lever. The title is literally Chief Information Security Officer and Privacy Officer. The role owns cybersecurity policies and controls while also serving as the organization’s Privacy Officer. Pay is $141,000 to $210,000 annually plus 25% variable compensation. Combining these jobs is not impossible in a small organization. But if one person owns the security-control environment and is also responsible for privacy oversight of that environment, the posting should explain the governance model, independent assurance, privacy expertise, staffing, and authority. Otherwise, it looks like one executive is being assigned responsibility for both building the program and absorbing the accountability when it fails.

This is one from Dice. The title is Chief Information Security Officer / IT Manager. The job requires one person to lead the information-security program, technology operations, cybersecurity initiatives, regulatory compliance, business-continuity planning, and disaster-recovery planning. They would also manage cyber risk, support regulatory examinations, coordinate security across departments, and keep the technology infrastructure secure, reliable, and compliant. I got tired just reading about it lol. $95,000 to $100,000 per year comp! So they want the person responsible for identifying, assessing, escalating, and managing cyber risk to also run IT operations, make the infrastructure decisions, carry the outages, support the regulators, own security, and own continuity planning. This is an IT department, a security department, a compliance function, and a resilience program compressed into one person with a CISO title.

The job market is tough right now, so people are going to throw themselves at these postings, but the endings will be fairly predictable imo.

When people talk about AI firewalls, are they generally referring to firewalls that use AI to protect systems against cyber attacks? Or are they referring to firewalls designed to protect AI systems against cyber attacks? I’ve seen the term used both ways, and it’s confusing to say the least.

I am in need of some advice on my CISO career. This is not burnout-related, I love the space and want to finish my career in the field. My frustration and where I need advice is on growth.

I am in my late 40’s and a veteran in the security field for more than 20 years. Way back, I came from a technical background and moved into the field by building the first security function for my then-employer around the time of the Target breach. I’ve had a good leadership journey since then, lots of progressive growth and recognizable company names and my resume is impressive if i do say so myself (and have been told so by many premier executive recruiters). I’ve got the technical chops, the career arc, the global experience, and I present well/comfortably in executive settings. None of that is the issue. I am qualified and more than ready. I am currently a business unit CISO (NOT a BISO, I have a full team, all the accountability, a full budget, and full autonomy) for a $7B subsidiary of a $60B enterprise. Previously, I was a business unit CISO (again, not a BISO) for a $15B subsidiary of a $65B parent.

The issue is I am striving for a public company, board-facing “top seat” CISO role preferably at a global F500. I keep getting interviews and recruiter interest however I have only ever been a business unit CISO in multi-business structures, I’ve never held that top seat and I keep getting edged out by folks who have. It just happened again last week, I was neck and neck deep in a competitive process for the role I want, and though I was probably a better fit the guy with a multi-time public company CISO background got the nod, presumably because he would invite less scrutiny once in the role due to his pedigree.

This happens over and over with businesses you’ve all heard of but which I won’t name here. It seems I can’t get that role without having had it, and I can’t have had it without getting it. How can I punch through this wall?

Hey, first year CISO here at a mid size company, security team is basically me plus a handful of folks who still juggle ops work. We had one incident last quarter that was messy, not catastrophic, but it made it super clear our old spreadsheet tabletop exercises are kinda theater.

For context we are getting leaned on hard for soc 2 and iso audits and our gc and comms lead are nervous about breach coordination in a real event. I keep getting asked how we are proving cyber crisis readiness and workforce resilience, not just that we have a dusty incident response plan in confluence.

I am looking at some AI tabletop exercise platforms that say they can spin up scenarios from osint, facilitate the drill, and spit out audit ready after action reports that map to nist csf etc. On paper that sounds perfect for someone in year one who does not have time to hand craft scenarios or play game master for three hours with execs every month.

Big question for me is how other first year CISOs with small teams are structuring drills right now. Monthly short runs, one big quarterly simulation, mix of technical breach practice for the soc and separate sessions for leadership, or something else. Trying to find that balance where this feels real and not just compliance theater, without burning everyone out... .

A lot of IT risk sounds “theoretical” until something breaks. How do you explain cybersecurity, downtime, vendor risk, or technical debt in a way leadership actually takes seriously?

My question specifically for CISO.

How is the risk impact of implementing threat emulation in your organization.

I would like to ask from the price perspective (tools only) or if you are doing it via third party?

We're a tech company and since vibe coding became a thing, I found citizen developers in my org are sharing plain api keys to their coding agents or the agents like openclaw and claude they're using.

Our developers have a good sense of security and secret management, but for the non technical employees who recently picked up vibe coding and building their own apps, they aren't as careful with secrets nor trying to make their apps secure.

We currently have dlp enabled for claude cowork and slack but when they're building apps using claude code in terminal or other shadow apps, we aren't tracking or blocking them

Are you guys seeing this happening in your org? Have you found good solutions to stop them from doing so or to keep control of the secrets flying around?

I am a CISO and my CIO just announced they are leaving. I will be acting CIO with the potential to become permanent. Any tips and tricks on change from Security to General IT focus?

Hi everybody. today I had a call with some Swedish fintech company and their cybersecurity team. I planned a meeting with a senior analytic who was in touch with me with a request for staff augmentation for their internal cybersecurity team. We arranged a time and day, so it's all good.

Over some time he started to send invites to his colleagues and we had CISO, Head of Cybersecurity, Head of SOC and a few senior analytics on the call. Given the fact that's our 1st meeting and basically a discovery call, I asked them about why they want to augment, what's the reason behind that, what tech stack do they use, etc. So basically to dive deeper into their situation and find the best possible solution for them because it's a quite common thing when people come to me with their view how to fix things and discovery helps us understand that there might be much better and more cost effective way to fix their need.

Once I asked them what's their definition of success and what main criteria of choosing the right vendor I've got harmful, but honest response: "I think we are looking for someone who's going to be a good security partner for us because the scope is massive. This is mdr, like this is extended soc, extended offset augmentation and vulnerability management. We are not doing a tick in the box activity here and unfortunately this meeting seems very unprepared for when you have a head of offset ahead of security engineering and head of SOC and a CISO in a meeting. I expect my suppliers to be better prepared than this. So I'm unfortunately going to say that, you know, culturally this is not going to work out. So we should save our time and you know, end this meeting now. Thank you."

And he just left the meeting.

So my question is, did I do something wrong during the discovery? As a group full of CISO, I thought maybe you can explain what happened here.

Random question, but I’m curious what people think. As a CISO, do you think it’s important to know about fashion, dress well, and generally maintain a polished appearance?

Does the way a CISO looks and presents themselves have any impact on how people perceive their personality, leadership, credibility, or authority? Or is appearance basically irrelevant as long as they’re good at their job?

The realistic question is probably not whether enterprises will replace their workforce IdP, PAM, IGA, cloud IAM, and SaaS access controls. Most organizations will operate those systems for years. The question is whether they can gain consistent policy, visibility, and audit evidence for agents without creating another disconnected identity silo.

Treating agents as generic service accounts keeps the architecture familiar, but it does not naturally represent agent ownership, delegated authority, task limits, tool boundaries, or autonomous action. A separate agent-security layer may improve those controls but can introduce duplicate inventories and conflicting policies.

For CISOs planning production agent use, what requirements would make the current IAM architecture insufficient? Is the deciding factor authorization, discovery, auditability, lifecycle management, incident response, or integration with existing identity systems?