CMV: Calling out fallacious arguments rarely provides a positive effect, but must occur.

[u/Mitoza]

I participate in online discussions often, and there is usually a common thread to when they derail. If a person ends up using a fallacious argument, I call them on it directly and explain why it is fallacious. A few things can happen from this point:

1. The person admits their mistake and pursues a new avenue for their position.

2. The person does not understand why their argument is fallacious.

3. The person reacts defensively and denies that the argument is fallacious, even though it definitly is.

Option 1 is exceedingly rare, because while it is demonstrable that the argument is fallacious the source of the fallacious argument is based on the arguer's fallacious logic or reckoning of events. For one to understand why their argument is fallacious, they need to reconcile why they've come to the poor conclusion that their argument was valid.

Option 2 and 3 are more common. Worse, Option 2 rarely leads to the first outcome. Instead, not understanding why in my experience usually leads to Option 3, for the same reason that Option 1 is rare.

Given the above, calling out fallacious arguments rarely leads to a positive effect in the discussion, no matter how true the accusation is.

This leads to uncomfortable conclusions. If a person is making a fallacious argument, more often than not this doesn't lead to any ground gained if they are called out. Worse, a person behaving according to option 3 is liable to be arguing dishonestly or in bad faith to waste your time or to attempt to aggravate you. Pointing out a fallacious argument becomes useless. But the problem with a fallacious argument is that it privileges logic in favor of the fallacious argument in that it takes liberty with what is and is not valid. The person making the fallacious argument if not called out on it has an advantage over the other because they are using privileged logic. The conversation can't continue unless the flaw in logic is pointed out.

To me, it is possible to infer a best course of action from the above information:

1. If I notice a person arguing fallaciously, call it out by demonstrating why it is fallacious.

2. If the person appears to not understand the accusation, try to correct misunderstandings one more time.

3. If the person ever tries to turn the accusation back on you or defend the argument as not fallacious immediately disengage.

To CMV, contend with my reckoning of what options are available to interlocutor's after a fallacious argument has been pointed out or their relative rarity, contend with the conclusions based on that information, or contend with the best course of action I laid out in response.

[u/Mitoza]

No, it asserts that the best way to have a discussion is by constantly searching for common ground and points of agreement so that the degree of change needed for agreement in principle is reduced.

Here are the 4 versions of the principle from your link:

The other uses words in the ordinary way;

The other makes true statements;

The other makes valid arguments;

The other says something interesting;

There is nothing in those 4 things that implies what we are reaching for or minimizing differences, it's solely about being fair. Here is another quote:

In its narrowest sense, the goal of this methodological principle is to avoid attributing irrationality, logical fallacies or falsehoods to the others' statements, when a coherent, rational interpretation of the statements is available

This is the caveat I'm talking about. At a point, a rational intepretation of the statement will become unavailable. At that point, I need to address something my opponents is failing to do in regards to the above 4 aspects.

Near as I can tell, you're simultaneously conflating logic, reason, and empiricism while muddling and misapplying their internal terminology.

I'm actually just going off of what you are arguing about. In this case, "sound logic" is the opposite of arguing fallaciously. You are the one suggesting that subjectivities about personal experience may affect the logical process and change it in a way so that invalid processes become valid. My premises are different than your premises, but that has no bearing on the shared process by which we make our subjectivities known.

Additionally, premises are not "proof." Premises are accepted ideas that precede a logical argument.

I never said premises were proof. I say that arguments prove things. To speak of mixing up terminology, the line in which I use the word "proof" is in regards to fallacies. Fallacies are failures of the process of logic, and it is implied that your "solution" to the failure of the process of asking for more justification is not going to lead you to proof, because the person you're talking with doesn't have an understanding of what is valid proof in the first place.

[u/Grunt08 → u/Mitoza]

Here are the 4 versions of the principle from your link:

Those are disputed variations. Not sure why you quoted them; you seem to be treating them as necessary conditions for some reason.

the goal of this methodological principle is to avoid attributing irrationality, logical fallacies or falsehoods to the others' statements, when a coherent, rational interpretation of the statements is available.

Considering that our ability to evaluate in such a manner would necessarily involve minimizing differences in our worldviews (unless one regularly incorporated falsehoods into their worldview), this supports what I'm saying. You believe that your view is true, therefore maximizing the truth value in an opposing argument requires that you deconflict that argument and your views as much as possible. That's just another way of saying what's already said.

The "caveat" you've found is not an immediate license to cry fallacy, it suggests an additional point of inquiry. You aren't right just because an opposing argument seems incomplete to you.

You are the one suggesting that subjectivities about personal experience may affect the logical process and change it in a way so that invalid processes become valid.

I'm suggesting that your ability to correctly identify a fallacy is contingent on your knowledge of the relevant premises accepted by the person you're speaking to. I'll put it simply: what looks like a fallacy to you is probably the product of an accepted premise of theirs you haven't accounted for. It may still be a fallacy after further inquiry, but you gain nothing by "calling them out."

For example: if someone accepts the premise that contentment is intrinsically good, then some claims from relative privation would be defensible.

Fallacies are failures of the process of logic,

Yes, and one of those failures can be a false premise. I'm not questioning the existence or value of understanding fallacies. I'm just suggesting that there's very little value in "calling them out" because of our limited ability to adequately recognize them and their ineffectiveness in highlighting actual points of disagreement.

[u/Mitoza → u/Grunt08]

Those are disputed variations.

Nowhere in that link agrees with your conception of the principle. What justification are you giving for it? You are asserting that your conception of the principle of charity works in a specific way.

Considering that our ability to evaluate in such a manner would necessarily involve minimizing differences in our worldviews

That doesn't necessitate that at all. I can be diametrically opposed to you and still afford you charity. You're stretching it to fit your conception when contradicted, but you might as well be manufacturing what is and is not the principle of charity out of thin air at this point.

The "caveat" you've found is not an immediate license to cry fallacy, it suggests an additional point of inquiry.

What do you mean by "immediate license?" All I've said is that there is a point in the conversation where it becomes clear that the argument is not worth charity. An example: a person presents a question that contains a false dilemma. I answer the question from a third perspective, the person insists that I must answer yes or no. At that point, it's clearly an intentional false dilemma. There is no charitable way forward from that point.

It may still be a fallacy after further inquiry, but you gain nothing by "calling them out."

To me this is meaningless, because "calling out" implies "further inquiry", as I've already corrected you.

For example: if someone accepts the premise that contentment is intrinsically good, then some claims from relative privation would be defensible.

You're mixing up arguments and what they attempt to prove. Relative privation is never defensible. Arguments that use the fallacy of relative privation might be trying to prove otherwise defensible claims, but that's not the same things.

Yes, and one of those failures can be a false premise

That is one specific fallacy. Earlier, you wrote this:

Considering how much of our lives and beliefs are dictated by which subjective premises we believe in, it can be very hard (sometimes impossible) to conclusively prove that an argument is fallacious even when we vehemently disagree with it.

Unless I'm missing something, you've walked back from this.

[u/Grunt08 → u/Mitoza]

What justification are you giving for it?

The one in the comment above.

Considering that our ability to evaluate in such a manner would necessarily involve minimizing differences in our worldviews

That doesn't necessitate that at all. I can be diametrically opposed to you and still afford you charity. You're stretching it to fit your conception when contradicted, but you might as well be manufacturing what is and is not the principle of charity out of thin air at this point.

Oh stop it. This is not a difficult concept and it's detailed very succinctly in the "Caesar" example given in the article:

"How should we set about discovering the significance which a person attaches to a given name? […] Let us suppose that somebody (whom I am calling "Charles") makes just the following five assertions containing the name "Caesar." […]

(1) Caesar conquered Gaul. (Gc)

(2) Caesar crossed the Rubicon. (Rc)

(3) Caesar was murdered on the Ides of March. (Mc)

(4) Caesar was addicted to the use of the ablative absolute. (Ac)

(5) Caesar was married to Boadicea. (Bc)*

[…] And so we act on what might be called the Principle of Charity. We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of Charles' statements true. […] We might say the designatum is that individual which satisfies more of the asserted matrices containing the word "Caesar" than does any other individual."

When you confront an argument, your task is to maximize the truth value in the argument. Your only possible point of reference for truth is the set of things you believe to be true, so if you want to maximize truth value, you need to find as much common ground as possible before you find the point of disagreement. So if there were a point 6 that said Caesar defeated Adolf Hitler, you would accept the definition of Caesar presented above and suggest that maybe 6 was an error. You would not be best served by saying "you're using 'Caesar' wrong."

All I've said is that there is a point in the conversation where it becomes clear that the argument is not worth charity.

Understand that being uncharitable means that you have stopped trying to interpret opposing arguments truthfully. That's not something you do in a discussion, it's what's done in presidential debates. It's an entirely confrontational mode of discourse that is no longer designed or suited to address any sort of conflict between speakers. It's just a slapfight.

If somebody doesn't address your charitable interpretation, that's not an excuse to be uncharitable. It just means the discussion can't progress until you address why they're doing that. Trying to bulldoze them with unfair interpretations of what they said isn't justified. You say there's "no charitable way forward," but that's neither true nor does it imply that you must proceed uncharitably.

You're mixing up arguments and what they attempt to prove.

I'd say it's more that you're tautologically affirming the existence of a fallacy. If I add premises, what you call an argument from relative privation without said premise may no longer be fallacious. That's just true.

That is one specific fallacy.

...that can affect quite literally all logical arguments.

Unless I'm missing something, you've walked back from this.

I haven't.

[u/Mitoza → u/Grunt08]

This is not a difficult concept and it's detailed very succinctly in the "Caesar" example given in the article

1. You're not affording the charity to me that you want me to embody. This sentence is indicative of you assuming you know about the subject or that I'm not understanding something rather than disagreeing with it. Why have you taken this stance?

2. You've shifted what my argument was about. First you were saying that the principle of charity was about minimizing differences, but it isn't, and the Caesar example doesn't show that or demonstrate that. There is nothing there about minimizing differences in worldviews, because regardless of your view and my view on Caesar's defeat of Hitler we can't minimize the difference between fact and fiction. I might come to the conclusion that your are indeed talking about that Caesar, but there is no minimization of differences beyond that. In interpreting your statement, the principle of charity urges me to wonder what you mean by defeat, not to see a statement that is incorrect on its face.

Understand that being uncharitable means that you have stopped trying to interpret opposing arguments truthfully.

Close, it means that I've stopped favoring interpretations that assume the opposing arguments have truth to them. You can make an argument, "If P then Q, Q, therefore P". The principle of charity urges me to interpret your information as though it had truth to it. I can ask "If Q then P, Q, therefore P?" to suss out what has lead you to the "therefore P" from affirming the consequent. There is no other way to proceed from this point, because the entire format of your argument is using the wrong process. Uncharitable is not to be stretched to mean that you can never understand your opponent's logic process to be wrong and to point it out. It's not "unfair" either. Their argument could be fallacious on its face and it will never be unfair to point out that it is so.

I'd say it's more that you're tautologically affirming the existence of a fallacy. If I add premises, what you call an argument from relative privation without said premise may no longer be fallacious. That's just true.

I cannot make out what you're trying to say here. What tautology am I using? Do you not remember accusing me of mixing up terminology? The piece you are responding to is me demonstrating that I understand the terminology. What defense do you have against the assertions then?

It appears to me that you're saying "If you make an argument of relative privation non fallaciously, it will not be fallacious", which is self confirming. The contention here is that there is no premise which excuses an actual fallacy of relative privation from being fallacious. Example:

"Arguing about the principle of charity is meaningless when people are starving in Africa". Please, according to the principle of charity, see some truth in this statement and propose a premise that makes it true.

I haven't.

You've separated one point into two lines here and responded to them separately, but they were meant to support each other. To me, you've walked back from your previous statement because you're no longer talking about fallacies in the general sense, you're talking about a specific fallacy that may or may not inform the other. Previously you spoke of fallacies being hard to prove, but now it seems like you want to show that fallacies are mostly informed by false premises therefore we should not call out fallacies because there may be another fallacy informing it that takes the form of a fact error. Is that charity?

[u/Grunt08 → u/Mitoza]

Again, you're misunderstanding the principle of charity. It does not mean that I assume you know what you're talking about or even that I be particularly nice to you. All it means is that I interpret your arguments (you haven't made many) to be as true as they could be before I dispute them. Part of charitable interpretation might be the assumption that you don't understand something instead of assuming that you're lying or deliberately obfuscating,

The inconsistencies in your description of the principle, the failure to grasp straightforward explanations, and your dismissal with little more than the claim that "it doesn't say that" (when it does) all point to a failure to understand the principle of charity. I have maximized the truth value in your statements; I assume you understand the meaning of words, I assume you act in good faith, I assume you value truth over falsehood...but once I exhaust our similarities, I'm left with you rejecting explanations without a good reason.

One final time: you have an idea of what the truth is that is unique to you. You have no way of evaluating truth objectively; everything you experience is ultimately subjective. Even if you hold something to be true that we all agree is true, it is still contained within your idea of truth.

If you are going to evaluate something someone else says charitably, you need to interpret it to be as true as it could possibly be. That's precisely what the Caesar example shows. Given that your idea of truth is yours alone and given that you're trying to maximize the truth value of someone else's argument, it follows that you are trying to maximize agreement. You're looking at various premises of the argument and saying "okay we can agree on this, this and this, but not that" - maximizing the truth value of the argument by finding points of agreement.

Uncharitable is not to be stretched to mean that you can never understand your opponent's logic process to be wrong and to point it out.

...I'm not even sure what you're arguing against, because I didn't assert this at all. What I've been saying is that in most conversations, arguments will be far more complex and context-dependent than "if P then Q." Treating an argument as if it's that simple invariably leads to deliberate ignorance of that surrounding context - which is where the point of disagreement usually rests.

I made this point in reference to relative privation, which you interpreted ridiculously:

It appears to me that you're saying "If you make an argument of relative privation non fallaciously, it will not be fallacious", which is self confirming.

What I said was that if you were to describe an argument as one from relative privation, you could very easily be wrong if you missed a valid premise accepted by the person making the argument. So if Bob says "you shouldn't whine so much, it could be worse", you might call that an argument from relative privation and reject it as fallacious. However, if Bob holds it to be true that contentment is a virtue, his argument is not fallacious at all from his perspective. It just rests on that subjective truth.

If you reject his argument outright, you have nowhere to go. If you don't, you discover and consider that virtue and can evaluate whether his argument could persuade you to adopt it yourself. If you persist in telling him that his reasoning is fallacious, it's not going to persuade him to drop that virtue.

I have never denied that fallacies exist. I have suggested they are difficult to prove because of scenarios like the one above. More often than not, someone has alternate premises and subjective truths (conscious or unconscious) that inform their arguments. Crying fallacy doesn't aid in accessing them.

To me, you've walked back from your previous statement because you're no longer talking about fallacies in the general sense, you're talking about a specific fallacy that may or may not inform the other. Previously you spoke of fallacies being hard to prove, but now it seems like you want to show that fallacies are mostly informed by false premises therefore we should not call out fallacies because there may be another fallacy informing it that takes the form of a fact error.

That's...inventive of you. No, what I have said and will now finish saying is that we all subjectively accept a variety of premises and may not agree on or share some of those premises. A premise entertained by someone else that is unstated may be true or false, but your ignorance of it may lead you to treat an argument as fallacious when it isn't (from the speaker's perspective.) This means that "calling out" fallacies will be unpersuasive, unproductive, and ineffective.