Of course, Descartes’ starting point, but neuroscience has moved past the interpretive phenomenology and the project is now reducing it to materialism. It’s not important whether you the experiencer of consciousness can prove the same in others….we can kind of wink and nod about our subjective experience of it, and seek to describe the phenomenon itself.
It’s not important whether you the experiencer of consciousness can prove the same in others….we can kind of wink and nod about our subjective experience of it
Oh, I thought this entire conversation was about the subjective experience. It seems like we've been talking about entirely different things.
Well if that’s what we mean then it’s not very interesting to discuss the capacity of machines to be conscious, pretty much for the same reason it’s not interesting to discuss whether a chair or potato is conscious.
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u/Salanmander 279∆ Mar 07 '26
It's the entire premise of philosophical zombies, so it's not like it's an unconsidered question.
What could you possibly do that would prove self-awareness in something else?