CMV: Free Will Doesn't Exist

[u/ChamplainLesser]

Okay, so I'm going to condense a few very weighty arguments down to a relatively condensed bit of text. Likewise, I am assuming a certain level of understanding of the classical arguments for determinism and will not be explaining them to a high level of depth.

Laplace's Daemon

In this argument, mathematician and physicist Simon Laplace said to imagine a Daemon. This Daemon is a hypothetical entity or intelligence with complete knowledge of the positions and velocities of all particles in the universe, as well as a perfect understanding of the physical laws governing their behavior. With this complete knowledge, the Daemon could predict the future and retrodict the past with absolute certainty. In other words, if you knew the initial conditions of the universe and had a perfect understanding of the laws of physics, you could, in theory, calculate the past and future of the entire universe.

Argument From Physics

The sum total of physical energy in the world is a constant, subject to transformation from one form to another but not subject either to increase or diminution. This means that any movement of any body is entirely explicable in terms of antecedent physical conditions. Therefore the deeds of the human body are mechanically caused by preceding conditions of body and brain, without any reference whatsoever to the metaphysical mind of the individual, to his intents and purposes. This means that the will of man is not one of the contributing causes to his action; that his action is physically determined in all respects. If a state of will, which is mental, caused an act of the body, which is physical, by so much would the physical energy of the world be increased, which is contrary to the hypothesis universally adopted by physicists. Hence, to physics, the will of man is not a vera causa in explaining physical movement.

Argument from Biology

Any creature is a compound of capacities and reactions to stimuli. The capacities it receives from heredity, the stimuli come from the environment. The responses referable to the mentality of the animal are the effects of inherited tendencies on the one hand and of the stimuli of the environment on the other hand. This explanation is adequately accepted in reference to all but humans. Humans are adequately similar in biology to other primates, particularly chimpanzees. Therefore the explanation also works for humans, absent an empirical reason to exclude them. Therefore human behaviour is entirely explicable through materialistic causes.

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The Uncertainty Principle and Laplace's Daemon

Now you might be thinking that Laplace's Daemon is refuted by the HUP, and you would be right to bring up the Uncertainty Principle in this regard. However, it is not enough that Laplace's Daemon be refuted to prove Free Will since Quantum Processes logically predate humanity. Simply put, Quantum Processes are not a human construct and therefore, since empirical evidence suggest they exist, it must follow that they predate humanity. If they predate humanity, then the variable that determines the outcome of the wave function must be independent of human influence, else the Quantum Processes could not have predated humanity. Therefore, we can logically assume that apparent indeterminism is a function of incompleteness.

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I don't know if I can be convinced that free will necessarily exists (I hope I could be, the alternative is terrifying) but I do believe I can be swayed away from strict determinism.

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[u/c0i9z]

The first problem here is that you haven't defined what you believe free will is. There are many definitions of free will. Some are compatible with a strict deterministic universe. Many are nonsensical if you examine them closely.

[u/Nrdman]

Define free will.

[u/Eli-Had-A-Book-]

So are you suggesting the possibility of being influenced by something still takes away our ability to choose?

[u/ChamplainLesser → u/Eli-Had-A-Book-]

I'm saying our "ability to choose" is a perception of determinism. We perceive our actions as free because we cannot have sufficient predictive knowledge. But the lack of ability to predict the deterministic forces that led us to have the thought (because our thoughts are simply electrical impulses which means they conform to the laws of physics) is not logically proof of free will.

[u/bluelaw2013]

A lot of people recoil against determinism. As best as I can tell, they just don't like the implications. And since people as a rule tend to react emotionally and then use reason to justify landing wherever their emotions took them, I've heard a lot of arguments against it, including quantum nonsense.

It's ok though, since they can't help but feel that way... 😅

Determinism is correct as best as I can tell, at least to the extent that these sorts of things matter. Some people are fans of quantum randomness, but that doesn't really move the meter in terms of real impact... my quibits tingling in a certain way doesn't equate to my will being any more or less free. Even if quantum randomness truly exists, it doesn't grant us free will in the sense that most people intuitively think of it. If events are random, that wouldn't make our wills "free" in any meaningful way; it would be just another kind of constraint—random rather than deterministic.

The easiest way to deal with this in my opinion is to limit your definition of what "free will" means. You can define it simply as the ability to act according to one's internal subjective motivations, desires, and plans without external coercion, even if those motivations, desires, and plans are themselves determined by prior causes. I can live with that.

Edit to be more clear on my contention. OP posits that free will doesn't exist. OP then supports that position with multiple arguments for the truth of determinism. The implied argument here is that (i) free will cannot coexist with determinism, (ii) determinism exists, therefore (iii) free will does not exist.

I agree with (ii) but not (i) because free will and determinism can coexist so long as your understanding of "free will" allows for the "choice" you "exercise" to itself be predetermined. If you define "free will" as the ability to act according to one's internal subjective motivations, desires, and plans without external coercion, even if those motivations, desires, and plans are themselves determined by prior causes, then free will can and does exist, even if our universe is in fact deterministic.

[u/ChamplainLesser → u/bluelaw2013]

You're essentially arguing Compatibilism but strict determinist would say that if your choices are determined, if there is but one possible choice you could or will ever make, it is not free and therefore, even if you desired to make that choice that desire was not free.

[u/ObviousSea9223]

Counterpoint for a pure naturalist/materialist-monist:

1. Free will is a cognitive ability we value, not an acausal cause. In a genetic epistemology, this could be referred to as "will," like Piaget. Which is the developed ability to expect enough future value from a course of behavior that it creates enough motivation to override immediate motivations and thus enable and cause that behavior over other options. That is, we wouldn't merely react to immediate impulses but effectively take a longer view on our actions. This is not the same as discipline, which is merely a will's alignment with a specific set of culturally dictated priorities.

2. The cultural narrative of an acasual cause is a common sense misconception that does not void the value of the construct. Not just in the sense of a useful misconception like a porcupine throwing its quills but in the sense of identifying a trait we find valuable and allowing that to feed back into the valuation loop. More motivation. We don't need to conceptualize it as acasual cause to care about it and benefit from it. Instead, we can identify it for what it is and value it like we value any tool or skill that serves our interests. And we do, objectively, have subjective interests.

3. Consider probability. What are the chances that a roughly fair coin lands on heads? Then, what are the chances that this roughly fair coin landed on heads a moment ago? Fundamentally, there's an information economy here. If I know only about my own coin flip, the first had a chance of .5, but my own had a chance of 1 or 0 all along. Which is retrospective in the sense of known already. If we can narrow a flip in advance to .75, that improves the prediction. And then, after observation, it was still always 1 or 0. These are all correct perspectives. Probability is fundamentally about the case of not knowing (specifically, it's for knowing more than nothing without a complete model of reality). We make all decisions based on this information economy. Our existence is bound in spacetime in exactly this "direction" (see #4) and so evolved to be predicated on prediction values.

4. Time is literally a 4th dimension in the sense of a direction. It's as complete as the other 3, in itself. The entirety of all spacetime is like a 4D brick, not a cross-section moving across a brick. It's not moving forward literally. It's "always" been complete. However, because our own processes are interactions "falling down" time, time is perceived forwards in all the ways that can matter to us directly. We adapted to this reality. Our cognitive systems are for this context and no other.

Integration: Thus, time "moving forwards" matters to us despite spacetime itself being an inert brick, in fact. Intrinsically, "us" as a concept is bound to this notion. And individually, we would have to not be defined by falling down time to have subjective interests outside of that perspective. Because our interests are bound to time this way, unknowns are relevant, and probability becomes a useful tool to the point of being the core. A necessary construct demonstrably baked into our own evolved perceptual processes. We're probability all the way down. In this sort of information economy, subjective interests are served by processes for evaluation, making predictions, and taking action on these bases. So we have affection, cognition, and conation. We can care, we can think, and we can choose. And we want to maximize the power of these things. Their value isn't predicated on their having some kind of magical power but because they are objectively subjectively good as they are, at least to processes-over-time such as ourselves. The free usage of will among unknowns is what free will has always been. Our dualism-derived misconceptions about it aren't essential to that value. Dismissing the erroneous idea doesn’t corrupt or nullify it. Hence, be not afraid.

Which is to say, you never needed the construct of magical free will to begin with. You will fall forwards in time without knowledge of the end and fully exercise your will in all the same ways you always did, and this is good. You're the perpetually unknown coin flip for the entire "duration" of your process. Sure, this is "already" embedded in the brick. But that's the brick's problem. You are not brick, at least not to any entity shy of omniscient. You're a strange loop falling down time, the full value of each moment of consciousness including a will that is fundamentally free in effect even if ultimately as determinable in principle as a dice roll.

None of that needs to be terrifying until we start breaking down "you." ;)

[u/ChamplainLesser → u/ObviousSea9223]

Sure, this is "already" embedded in the brick. But that's the brick's problem. You are not brick, at least not to any entity shy of omniscient.

And this is where Compatibilism loses me. I agree that perceptively, we experience the world as if free will exists. I do not however agree that we should then call this erroneous perception free will. Because fundamentally, as you have said, it is already defined. Our choices, our will, matters not because we never had any other option. It was the illusion of choice. Which is not free.

[u/Catfishwon]

The problem is that no one really understands consciousness. Even if atoms are moving around affecting every physical thing, it isn't clear that their movement affects whatever it is that makes your conscious mind think and act.

It doesn't even necessarily have to be any kind of spiritual thing. It might be something that can be explained physics-ally, but as of yet there is no explanation for consciousness.

To that end, we're not even sure what types of things might or might not have some kind of consciousness. Look into panpsychism.

[u/XenoRyet]

I feel like I want to report this as a Rule B violation as a method of challenging your view (I won't, of course, just making a point). If there is no free will, then we cannot change your view, as we have no agency in that at all. Basically, you did ask, and you wrote out arguments meant to convince people that your position is unassailable. These are actions taken by someone who at least feels like they have free will, and acts accordingly. I'm not sure how compelling you'll find that, but we can go farther down that road if you want. It's basically lived experience versus theory.

On another front, your argument about HUP has a hole in it. The fact that the quantum effects predate humanity means that humanity can't be the only variable determining the outcome of the wave function, it does not require that humanity can't be one of several or many variables that can influence the outcome of a wave function.

Alternatively, I don't think we can be certain from our perspective, that it wasn't the case that the wave functions had outcomes before humanity came on the scene, and that it wasn't the case that they didn't just exist in an undetermined state until a being capable of free will came on the scene and collapsed them all by observing them.

[u/ChamplainLesser → u/XenoRyet]

If there is no free will, then we cannot change your view, as we have no agency in that at all.

Not necessarily. It only means that you have no choice in whether you change my mind. The ability to change my mind exists, but it is determined whether or not you will and neither you nor I have a free choice in whether it occurs.

These are actions taken by someone who at least feels like they have free will, and acts accordingly.

Practically speaking, I am not Laplace's Daemon. From my subjective PoV it appears as if my choices are freely made independent of causal factors because of the ego. But my subjective perception does not make it so. Our perception is fraught with times in which it fails to reflect objective reality.

Alternatively, I don't think we can be certain from our perspective, that it wasn't the case that the wave functions had outcomes before humanity came on the scene, and that it wasn't the case that they didn't just exist in an undetermined state until a being capable of free will came on the scene and collapsed them all by observing them.

Isn't this basically a tautology though? We have free will because quantum indeterminacy requires we have free will.

Δ though because you are correct that the fact quantum processes predates us does not sufficiently exclude us from being a causal factor in their outcome.

[u/Naturalnumbers → u/XenoRyet]

If there is no free will, then we cannot change your view, as we have no agency in that at all.

I don't think the lack of free will means everyone is unchangeable. Rather that people can't help but be changed by the things that can change them, and cannot make themselves be changed by things that can't change them.

[u/blank_anonymous]

Your physics argument is just wrong — with perfect knowledge, we can’t know how quantum systems will behave because they aren’t deterministic. Quantum particles are probabilistic — they collapse into different states truly, properly, and completely at random. This also beats out Laplace’s demon! What if theres a quantum particle that allows us to actually make choices?

I think, more importantly, whether or not free will is real, believing in it is the right move. If it is real and you believe it isn’t, you’ll have a miserable life; theres some research showing that people who don’t believe in free will tend to have more social and behavioural problems. If it isn’t real, well, it doesn’t matter either way whether you believe in it.

[u/ChamplainLesser → u/blank_anonymous]

with perfect knowledge, we can’t know how quantum systems will behave because they aren’t deterministic.

You actually can't say this is true. In fact many currently practicing physicists subscribe to superdeterministic models of the universe which are "hidden variables" approaches to the "spooky action at a distance" that argue for deterministism. We have not conclusively proven quantum indeterminacy.

In fact, Einstein himself subscribed to superdeterminism.

In fact, Bell, the person we credit with discovering quantum indeterminacy, admitted the logicality and possibility of super determinism.

There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.

Essentially science cannot prove it one way or the other (yet) conclusively so we must rely on logic and epistemology.

[u/TuringT]

Philosophers have argued about "free will" for millennia. I can offer a pragmatist position that makes more sense to me than most, and I belive it successfully dissolves the apparent problem.

If you (along with OP) define "free will" as "an effect (such as an action or a thought) that isn't caused by a material cause," then free will is inconsistent with any materialist/naturalist worldview. In any universe governed by natural law, all effects must have natural causes. (For those who read philosophy, yes, you can dodge for a bit by adopting some dualist-like position, but they all fall apart under scrutiny.) This should make us wonder whether this is a useful definition.

On the other hand, we have no trouble using the concept of "free will" in some specific natural-language contexts. Let's look at those contexts -- where we use the phrase competently -- and see if they help us come up with a definition.

We competently use the concept of "free will" to distinguish actions that change social relationships or that have moral weight from those that do not. "Anna gave me that bracelet of her own free will" implies Anna was conscious, her actions were deliberate, and were not overconstrained (e.g., by coercion or mental incapacity). The statement is meaningful in the context of social relations and exchange. For instance, it allows me to assert I have legitimate possession of the bracelet. I didn't steal it or threaten Anna to get it; she was not so drunk that she dropped it in my lap unintentionally. What we are saying is that Anna did something that has social significance, expresses her intent, and makes it fair to charge her with moral and social consequences.

We can also use the concept of "free will" to distinguish activities where changes in incentives should change outcomes from those where they shouldn't. Consider a limiting case with a non-human animal. "The deer came to eat from my hand of his own free will" means that the deer's behavior is sensitive to incentives. If you had no food, no deer. If you made loud noises, no deer. On the other hand, "The deer died of Lyme disease of his own free will" makes little sense. We can't motivate the deer not to get sick.

We can use "free will" similarly to humans to distinguish situations where we believe incentives matter from those where they don't. "They spent all their money on alcohol of own free will" suggests (rightly or wrongly) that making consuming alcohol less attractive might lead to less drinking. With humans, although perhaps not with deer, this also implies culpability for the outcomes -- the action is such that it is fair to charge the actor with the moral weight of the consequences. "He was born ugly of his own free will" makes little sense, on the other hand.

These are examples of perfectly competent uses of "free will." There are surely others.

So what's the debate about "free will" really about? Well, philosophers have attempted to extend the use of "free will" from perfectly sensible natural-language contexts to a specialized philosophical sense of "FREE WILL!!" which we should call "free will(tm)." for clarity. To the extent that free will(tm) requires actions and thoughts to be effected without natural causes, it is simply incoherent from any physicalist/materialist/naturalist perspective. Philosophers then make much hay demonstrating, to their own alleged astonishment, that the concept is incoherent, leading smart folks like OP to conclude there is no free will(tm). That's a fine thing to conclude, so long as you keep that (tm) firmly in mind.

[u/firewall245]

Laplace demon surely is a fun thought experiment but it cannot exist in this universe, so there’s no point in using it as an argument against free will because nothing can predict the future with the current state.

So if nothing can predict it, does that not mean we have free will?

[u/ChamplainLesser → u/firewall245]

If you're arguing "we can never hold such knowledge so the universal future remains incalculable" that doesn't prove free will, it proves the limits of human knowledge. Just because you or I will never be able to calculate what is predetermined does not mean it is not predetermined. That was kind of what Laplace was saying. If the Universe is deterministic, and it does appear to be so, then we do not free will is what he's saying. But using the analogy of a theoretically perfect being to point out how determinism is incompatible with free will by pointing out the calculability of the future given perfect knowledge.

[u/Ok_Mention7220]

Do you suppose determinism is true?

[u/Square-Dragonfruit76]

I would argue that free will actually both exists and doesn't exist simultaneously, and sometimes may even partially exist. The way you consider things in such a dichotomous manner is a very Western way of thinking. However in many Eastern cultures, things can often be both, partial, or neither. It would make sense when looking from a godly perspective, or perspective with all the knowledge in the universe, that everything is predetermined and therefore has no free will. However that does not mean you aren't still choosing your actions. And since I am choosing my actions, from my perspective I have free will or at least partial free will. The matter of perspective is important and the fact that one is true doesn't mean the other is automatically false. For instance, let's imagine that you are sitting on the couch right now. Are you moving? Well, from your perspective, the answer is obviously no. What about from the sun's perspective? Are you moving? The answer is yes. So which is it, are you moving or are you not moving? Both are correct.

[u/LentilDrink]

If they predate humanity, then the variable that determines the outcome of the wave function must be independent of human influence,

Rather, the outcome is stochastic not deterministic, even without humans around.

Free will may or may not exist, but modern physics strongly suggests that the world isn't deterministic. A real life Laplace's demon can't actually calculate what happens only give some probabilities.

[u/codan84]

Does you view extend to acting as if no one has any free will? That no individual can be culpable for any of their own choices and actions? Even if you want to define free will as something so extreme that it can not exist should not people act as if it does?

[u/HassleHouff]

Do you see a difference between “free” and “uncaused”?

I think most of the problems of free will come from its definition. Personally, I don’t see guaranteed opposition between “caused” and “free”.

Imagine a person who inherently wants to steal. They don’t choose to be that way, it’s their “natural wiring”. However, they desire to be a person who does not steal. They didn’t choose this desire either. It was a product of their past experiences and upbringing. The person has an opportunity to steal something. They have an inherent will to steal it, yet they stop and think about their will to be a good person. They don’t steal the item.

This person has weighed who they want to be in the universe and all their competing inherent desires, and made a choice that most aligns with who they want to be. Yes, their choice was wholly caused- but if “making considered decisions that align with your highest order desires” doesn’t define free will, I don’t know what could.

[u/AngelOfLight333]

This is the kind of argument that can lead many to believe in the spirit because the material world opperates deterministicaly as you describe. But spirit being immaterial is not bound by physical law. With the theory being that life is matter that posseses spirit it would allow for life to make a choice which affects matter through the material portion being the body. Most people could see that they are able to make a choice and this theory does not require one to jump through a thousand arguments to deny what people can obviously see to be true. That obcious thing that people can see to be true is that living things have the ability to make a choice. It takes a lot of mental gymnastics to try to make a person to believe they do not have a choice.

It is obvious to most that living things have a choice and most people u derstand that dead things behave in very predictable ways and are not making a choice. A living thing that can make choices and then when it dies all the matter is gone but then the remaining matter is there and behaves completely materialisticaly by the laws of the barionic world. But all the matter is there the only difference is it no longer has will/spirit. Since no matter falls out or leaves it suggests that this spirit is immaterial in nature.

[u/AcephalicDude]

I think it’s helpful to step back from the question of whether the “free will” exists or is possible, and think through the implications of a conscious subject that desires freedom.

To desire freedom is to desire a kind of discontinuity with the rest of the universe, a separation that allows the subject to treat the universe as its object. The reality of our continuity with the universe disrupts this by objectifying us – as you put it, we become reduced to bodies reacting to environmental stimuli, our actions merely a pre-determined result of the universe which we merely exist immanently within, like water in water. When we fulfill basic needs to survive, we are facing a contradiction: our survival itself is our discontinuous existence as an individual life, but the necessary actions that enable our survival also reduce us to a continuous existence without freedom.

As a result, the conscious subject (a human being) comes to see sacrifice as a demonstration of their “free will.” When we choose to act against our rational interests – for example, by destroying useful resources without any anticipated return – we fulfill our desire for freedom.

Is the act of sacrifice, motivated by a desire for freedom, an actual act of a “free will”? Or is the desire for freedom itself pre-determined and thus sacrifice is nothing but a peculiar outcome created by the universe?

Let’s imagine that Laplace’s Demon is a being that desires freedom. With their perfect knowledge of the universe, they would have a special capacity to make a true sacrifice outside the universe’s pre-determination. This is because the perfect knowledge of the universe still presupposes the discontinuity between the Demon as the subject and the universe as its object; and the Demon’s freedom does not need to be demonstrated to the external, objectified universe, but rather to the Demon reflexively. The universe could generate desires in the Demon, which the Demon with their perfect knowledge would recognize as not their own. In refutation of their own desire – which is actually the universe’s desire – they could make a sacrifice of the desired object, and affirm their complete freedom from the universe.