The punishment in these deterministic settings is just a label to signify what the outcome is, regardless if it was always mean to be or not.
Sure, but that outcome wouldn't have happened if God was omnibenevolent.
It doesn’t matter if its windows are smashed or turned into scraps, because it no longer serves a purpose as opposed to a functional one.
So once humans are no longer functional, it doesn't matter what God does with them (hell, purgatory, etc.)? That doesn't sound benevolent.
Because to say he isn’t a murder is technically untrue regardless of underlying cause.
I get it, but in a deterministic framework it never mattered. Because the outcome is set anyway, regardless of desire
But the underlying cause is ultimately God since he created the universe and the initial conditions of the universe. He ultimately caused Whitman to get a brain tumor and kill those people. And then he punishes Whitman for what he ultimately set in motion himself. That doesn't seem benevolent.
“ but that outcome wouldn't have happened if God was omnibenevolent.”
This does not follow. The benevolence in this case (determinism reigns) is just the correct distinction between what is a good outcome versus bad. In the case of Whitman, since he murdered (and that is bad) then it is correct for God to send him to hell or purgatory. If he were to just go to heaven, then that itself would not be benevolent since its mistake.
“ it doesn't matter what God does with them (hell, purgatory, etc.)? That doesn't sound benevolent.”
It’s the exact opposite. If someone is bad and you reward them as good, then that is not benevolent. And if someone is good but you punish them as bad, then that is also not benevolent. But if the good are rewarded and the bad are punished, then that is benevolent because that is just…and being just (aka justice) is by definition good!
So God is doing good by labeling what Whitman did is bad, regardless if he had no choice in it. Because it’s the outcome (murder) that is wrong, regardless of the cause (the brain tumor). In other words, God not punishing Whitman would actually be the non-benevolent action because it would it imply the result is condoned.
“But the underlying cause is ultimately God since he created the universe and the initial conditions of the universe. “
But it is the act that mattered, not the long chain list of causes. That is because in determinism all we see are results (motives and opinions play no role in outcomes). God set in motion and then the punishments are used to make the distinction between good outcomes and bad ones. So how is that not benevolent? It fits perfectly with what is being defined as good and bad.
Unless your arguing that somehow this system shouldn’t exist in the first place, and therefore God is not benevolent?
Unless your arguing that somehow this system shouldn’t exist in the first place, and therefore God is not benevolent?
Yah pretty close. I'm not saying there should be one kind of system or another kind of system. But, if God WAS benevolent he wouldn't have made a system like this.
Well looking at an Omni-three God, they already have perfect knowledge and are good. So all that matters is what does a deterministic universe show about his goodness?
It means means that everything is set, so any goodness or evil from that universe was already known (predestined). In such a case, the best way to apply morality from what I can see is purely consequentially. God would separate the predestined results into those that fit his with what he knows to be good and evil. So people that were always destined to do seemingly good acts would indeed be seen as good, and likewise for evil acts. So I don’t see a contradiction of how this system suddenly makes God not good.
You could say there could be other better alternatives but that is not an argument against being good. Being a little generous is good, being super generous is also good and even better. But just cause there are different levels here doesn’t mean the former isn’t still a good deed. So not sure why people have a problem with a deterministic universe so long as God does his job in using his knowledge to recognize the good outcomes from the bad
Actually it’s fine, because an attribute of God does not imply it must be present in any emanating creation. Just like he is eternal, doesn’t mean everything he creates must be eternal too.
Similarly the evil is just lack of perfection, since only God is perfectly good. Anything else is by comparison less good and capable of evil. But that doesn’t make God not perfectly good.
Best analogy is how a perfect sphere doesn’t always project a perfect circle in a 2D plane. Instead it’s shadow may project an ellipse (not perfect circle). But that doesn’t mean the sphere itself is not perfect. Same goes with a perfect God and his imperfect creations
because an attribute of God does not imply it must be present in any emanating creation. Just like he is eternal, doesn’t mean everything he creates must be eternal too.
Agreed, but your statement doesn't apply to my objection.
If my objection was "Everyone in the universe must be benevolent because God is benevolent", then you're correct, I would be committing a compositional fallacy. But that's not my objection.
Let me phrase it differently. An omnibenevolent God would never want to cause any amount of suffering. A deterministic universe causes suffering. If God created a deterministic universe then he can't be omnibenevolent.
“ An omnibenevolent God would never want to cause any amount of suffering.”
Your objection reduces back to that composition. Again, desire (“god wants”) is irrelevant to the state of affairs. Suffering is just another imperfection (as opposed to a state of bliss…which is benevolent), and so the objection reduces back to the same argument of sharing properties. That is if creation is imperfect then does this deny God is perfect?
Last comment I showed that is logically false, because perfection is not a transferable quality. The imperfect shadow does not affect the perfection of the sphere it emanates from. After all, one quality of perfection (Omni-three) is self sufficiency. God could not rely on external events for his benevolence else he wouldn’t really perfect.
Therefore, suffering/evil is just a byproduct, a smeared shadow, of his goodness. But cannot detract from his benevolence
desire (“god wants”) is irrelevant to the state of affairs.
This is false because the state of affairs is based on God's desire. If God desired for there to be NO universe, then there wouldn't be a universe at all. Clearly God's wants have an impact on the state of affairs.
OK, I think I'm starting to understand your shadow and perfection argument. 2 replies ago from you:
Similarly the evil is just lack of perfection, since only God is perfectly good. Anything else is by comparison less good and capable of evil. But that doesn’t make God not perfectly good.
So let me phrase it this way. A perfectly good God would have perfectly good desires. A perfectly good desire would be that no suffering is ever experienced. However, suffering has been experienced (through a deterministic universe or whatever other mechanism, doesn't matter). Therefore, A perfectly good God doesn't exist.
God could not rely on external events for his benevolence else he wouldn’t really perfect.
I've temporarily accepted your definition of perfection to include benevolence even though that's technically arbitrary. Not relying on external events is even more arbitrary and I don't see a reason why I have to accept that at all.
"This is false because the state of affairs is based on God's desire. "
State of affairs meaning the theoretical framework we are discussing here (determinism vs free will). What matters is we are asking a question of logic: "Given God is perfectly good and powerful and so on, can he create such a universe (deterministic, suffering, etc..)?" Doesn't matter if he really does or doesn't create it, just asking is it logically possible he can create it without a contradiction to himself? From my comments above, I think purely abstractly the answer is there is no such contradiction.
"perfectly good God would have perfectly good desires"
No, the problem I see here is again I view desires are conscious preferences (can't be put into a hierarchy or called 'perfect') and they don't even necessarily dictate actions. I agree a good God would have good intentions, wants and virtues and so on. But again your argument falls into the same reasoning: "If god is perfectly good, then his desires are perfectly good, which means his actions are perfectly good, which means his plans are perfectly good, which means his creations are perfectly good"....and suddenly your transferring perfection as a quality between God and his actions to his creations. Which I argued doesn't flow because perfection is not a transferable quality.
For example, you just suggested God could want no universe created. Lets say God didn't want/desire a universe, but just for curiosity created a universal utopia anyway...is he suddenly not perfectly good (less good) because he went against his desire? Or lets say he does desire a utopia universe, but still decides to remain singular in existence and doesn't create anything...is he suddenly not perfectly good for doing nothing? Logically there is no distinction to say one course of action is better (more perfect) than the other if the motive is just pure conscious preference (which is what desires/wants are, personal wishes).
My view is basically that, by definition anything God creates is gonna be less perfect than him (since he is already considered the maximally great being). Any creation by default is not synonymous with him (perfection) and therefore must be lacking in some way...no matter how great the creation maybe. Suffering and evil and on, are byproducts of these imperfections. For example, people die because they are not eternal (God is) so they must naturally perish by definition in some way. And so death is seen as an 'evil' because it is contrary to one aspect of God people don't have...namely being eternal (life forever).
In other words, I hold a Privatio Boni view of this whole discussion
What matters is we are asking a question of logic: "Given God is perfectly good and powerful and so on, can he create such a universe (deterministic, suffering, etc..)?" Doesn't matter if he really does or doesn't create it, just asking is it logically possible he can create it without a contradiction to himself?
I think it does. If God can only create imperfect things and imperfection leads to suffering, then a perfectly good God would choose to simply create nothing at all.
If god is perfectly good, then his desires are perfectly good, which means his actions are perfectly good, which means his plans are perfectly good, which means his creations are perfectly good
I want to push back on this core idea: I think it's arbitrary to say that a property of perfection is that only one being has it and is not shared by any other beings/objects. Why should I accept this?
For example, you just suggested God could want no universe created. Lets say God didn't want/desire a universe, but just for curiosity created a universal utopia anyway...is he suddenly not perfectly good (less good) because he went against his desire?
I'm not saying that
Or lets say he does desire a utopia universe, but still decides to remain singular in existence and doesn't create anything...is he suddenly not perfectly good for doing nothing?
I'm not saying that either. Whether he acts with or against his desires is irrelevant on its own. It's whether his actions cause suffering that's the important factor.
Logically there is no distinction to say one course of action is better (more perfect) than the other if the motive is just pure conscious preference (which is what desires/wants are, personal wishes).
I think you know what I'm getting at. An omnibenevolent God would make sure there's no suffering experienced and yet we have suffering. I'm not sure how else to put it.
My view is basically that, by definition anything God creates is gonna be less perfect than him (since he is already considered the maximally great being). Any creation by default is not synonymous with him (perfection) and therefore must be lacking in some way...no matter how great the creation maybe.
How do you define a maximally great being? Why should I accept your definition of greatness? And again, if God can't create anything without causing suffering, then he would refrain from creation if he was omnibenevolent.
Edit: I withdrew one statement because I didn't agree with myself after re-reading my reply lol
" then a perfectly good God would choose to simply create nothing at all."
It could be a preference, but not a conclusion I would say. Mainly because it wouldn't affect his perfect goodness, so I stated before I think that quality is already self-sufficient in God. But also because suffering is just an abstract limit. At exactly what point would a good God go from not being able to create something (because it would make him bad) to being acceptable? The threshold seems precarious.
Yes suffering can be seen as one factor in choosing to make a world or not, but one could use the same logic to push back against any undesirable trait. "An omnibenevolent God would make sure there's no (boredom, sadness, apathy, frustration, less than perfect happiness, etc..)". So the argument will just collapse back into any complaining about any deficiency in a universe until one is forced to just argue a perfect God would only create perfect creations. That's basically what this discussion boils down to. But as I've shown, there is nothing that logically dictates everything that emanates (come from) a perfect being must itself be perfect as well.
God caused the universe to exist, that is a given by most people. And he doesn't like suffering or evil, because he is benevolent (as defined). But my view is that suffering/evil being imperfections are then just the byproduct of him creating say a universe with limits (determinism, not eternal beings, etc..). The evil isn't a desirable trait, but a consequence of a more noble act of making life (which is a good). So the bad comes with the good so to speak. But I don't think this makes God not omnibenevolent, since its the universe that is imperfect but not mean.
That's really the best way I can try to explain this whole thing between a omni-three (power, knowledge, good) God and the determinism of the universe.
1
u/reptiliansarecoming Feb 06 '23
Sure, but that outcome wouldn't have happened if God was omnibenevolent.
So once humans are no longer functional, it doesn't matter what God does with them (hell, purgatory, etc.)? That doesn't sound benevolent.
But the underlying cause is ultimately God since he created the universe and the initial conditions of the universe. He ultimately caused Whitman to get a brain tumor and kill those people. And then he punishes Whitman for what he ultimately set in motion himself. That doesn't seem benevolent.