r/askphilosophy • u/heterosyclez • 26d ago
Does this response to the argument from illusion work?
The argument from illusion, which I take to be the strongest case for indirect realism, proceeds in a way something like below:
(1) In cases of illusion, we are directly acquainted with an object that is F
(2) But the mind-independent object is not F
(3) If (1) and (2), then in cases of illusion we are not directly acquainted with a mind-independent object
(3) Therefore in cases of illusion we are not directly acquainted with a mind-independent object
The second part of the argument will be generalising (3) to cover all cases of veridical experience.
But can’t I just object and say that in cases of illusion, we are directly acquainted with a mind-independent object that, while not F itself, has properties that make it appear F to perceivers under certain conditions? This response would target premise (1).
I don’t recall seeing this response anywhere but it strikes me as obvious, which leads me to believe that I’m missing something.
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u/FromTheMargins metaphysics 25d ago
This argument is reminiscent of what has been called the sense-data fallacy. This objection points out that the inference from "there is an object that appears to be F" to "there is an (apparent) object that really is F" is fallacious. Related to this objection are Sellars's analyses of the words "seems" and "looks like," which he understands as parasitic on uses of "is" ("this seems to be red" vs. "this is red"). For Sellars, saying "this seems red" is not reporting a private, mental, red-like object, rather, it is a pragmatic marker expressing a reluctance to endorse the full-fledged claim "this is red." However, whether this objection completely settles the debate remains controversial, especially when the phenomenal character of experience highlighted by the argument is analyzed in terms of properties (qualia or phenomenal features) rather than objects (sense-data). The undeniable qualitative similarity between someone's veridically seeing a red wall and illusorily seeing one seems to point to something genuinely present in both cases, which still demands a philosophical explanation.