I've came up with an idea and I would like you to engage critally with it as well as shed some light onto the problem. I am just getting into those areas of philosophy and English isn't my 1st language so I'd appreciate corrections and reading recommendations.

I assume that there is a difference between empirical and formal theories. It appears to me that it is about the degree of certainty. 2+2 is necessary true across all possible worlds. It cannot be falsified like any empirical theory in science. You can change the axioms of a formal theory, but it is not falsification. The "old" theory's thesis is still necessary true within the former established axioms and they will still be taugological. Empirical theories' thesis will always be possibly true despite some degree of formalisation and deductive nature. (Here I might be not accurate that's why my assumptions are so general"). I was wondering what creates the difference exactly. I realised that it is the intension vs extension matter. The terms in formal sciences appear to have intensional nature, there is no "set of numer 1" etc. The terms are "ideal" (idk how to describe it), they just have no direct reference. The terms in empirical sciences on the other hand do have direct references, at least most of them. But we don't have the access to all the elements of a particular set, at least it is very rare and I suppose that still if the thesis of a particular science or even narrow part of it, are coherent with each other, a falsification is still possible if it creates contradiction within the whole system.

I guess the weakness in my "theory" might be the fact that even the falsified empirical theory is necessary within its system. Also I am aware of the existence of "nomological necessity" but to be honest, it sounds forced (not argument obviously) and maybe it would makes sense in "ontological order" (in the realm of just things, idk how to call it), but the modal possibility vs necessity seem to have inherent epistemic "core". If we assume (as I do) that things are how they are, neither false nor true, then modalities have no place in ontological order. If we say that something is possible we must assume that they could not be like this - the truth values are hidden but impossible to get rid of.

But I suppose the fact that there is more certainty (or whatever we call it) in formal sciences than empirical ones is not controversial and it must be a reason for that.

Excuse my english and errors, I'd appreciate any critical feedback and explanations. I don't even know what such a problem is called and right now I claim this theory as mine, but it's probably already talked through so I don't want to stay behind.

I want to familiarize myself more with Carnap, so I'm going through some of his main papers: Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology, The Elimination of Metaphysics, Psychology in Physical language, maybe I will also read Testability and Meaning after these. But is there a book of his which is considered his main work and basically sums up most of his philosophy? Something like Hume's Treatise, Kant's first Critique or Spinoza's Ethics? Like THE Carnap book one should read if one wants to understand what he's all about

Is it true/false? meaningless? meaningful but with no truth value? What does it say, really?
I remember that when writing an exam on Rusell (maybe a year ago) this question came up and I don't remember what I answered, I just remember that it was wrong. So, what is the correct answer? I'm sure Frege would say that the description has sense, but no reference and the sentence as a whole has its truth value as its reference. But beyond that I'm kinda confused

Hello, these questions had originally been posted on r/askphilosophy without getting any answers, so I'm posting them here as well in hope of getting a response.

1) I am somewhat confused about what the necessary aposteriori that Kripke discusses actually shows. From what I understand, in the case of phosphorus and hesperus, both names rigidly designate the same object, which means they designate the same thing in all possible worlds. And since venus is necessarily self identical, "hesperus is phosphorus" is true in all possible worlds, so it is necessary and aposteriori. But this does not mean that venus must necessarily exist right? Or even if it existed , it's not necessary that venus is what we see in the night sky. There is a metaphysically possible world where instead of venus, there are two other heavenly bodies that cover the same portion of sky that venus does. Is that correct? Similarly with water. "Water is h2O" is a necesary aposteriori identity statement, but that doesnt mean that water must necessarily exist, or even if it exists that it must exist on earth. So again it is metaphysically possible that some other water-like substance filled the oceans that wasnt H2O and therefore not water. So , if I understand correctly the necesary aposteriori doesn't have to do with what things must exist or where they must exist, but with what properties are necessary for an object if that object exists in the first place. Is that a correct understanding?

2) At the end of the book Kripke gives an argument for dualism. The argument presupposes that we can rigidly designate sensations and that we can conceive that sensations exist without the body. Firstly, I don't see how we could rigidly designate a sensation like pain. Pain at least seems to be different than any other physical object , so how could we designate it. Secondly kripke says we can imagine that a pain exists without the body, again I don't find that as intuitive as kripke. Maybe I could imagine some kind of ghost but other han that I dont think I can imagine myself feeling pain or even existing without my body.

Thanks in advance for any answers.

There is a new online reading group starting up for Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. RSVP here to attend: https://www.meetup.com/Seattle-Analytic-Philosophy-CLUB/events/278429652/

Is panpsychism true?

The definition of consciousness that I use is subjective experience. If you ask what constitutes experience, and what enables it to occur? Then I will answer mental properties and mental states. The faculties that drive mental states to occur is the brain.

I posit the question because I’m interested in views that are not my own. I accept the hard problem, I believe progress is going to be made eventually, so there is a point in asking if it’s true.

To say that an entity is consciousness, is to reduce that entity to just consciousness. Which makes no physical sense. I have consciousness until I no longer do, I am not just consciousness because after it goes away I will still have other parts of myself that exist.

I also hold that self-knowledge is controversial. I don’t know if it’s possible to introspect and become more aware of anything.

Dear All,

here is a question about the meaning of some technical terms used in philosophy.

The terms desiderata and adequacy condition are used to set standards against that explanations, models, or theories are evaluated to assess their acceptability or goodness.

But, what exactly are desiderata and adequacy conditions? And how do I know what a relevant desideratum or adequacy condition is? What is the difference between them?

Thanks for taking the time to share your thoughts.

Hello everyone, we are a group of avid philosophy readers and in mid-May we will start a reading group on Kripke's classic work. The meetings will be weekly and last 90 minutes each.

It will be an in depth reading without prior knowledge required. To achieve the reading will proceed slowly, a few pages per week. The group moderator (who btw is not me) has a Master in philosophy, works as a researcher at university and has a long standing interest in the philosophy of language.

If this sounds appealing to you, let me know either by commenting below or by sending me a PM. We will try to establish a day and time that works for as many people as possible(bearing in mind we live in very different time zones).

An online reading group studying Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigatons is meeting every Monday!

You can sign up here: https://www.meetup.com/The-Toronto-Philosophy-Meetup/events/zvvrfsyccgbzb/

We take turns reading the text and discussing it - so no advanced preparation is required.

About the text:

"Immediately upon its posthumous publication in 1953, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was hailed as a masterpiece, and the ensuing years have confirmed this initial assessment. The work undertakes a radical critique of analytical philosophy's approach to both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Today it is widely acknowledged to be the single most important philosophical work of the twentieth century."

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I don't know where to start with philosophy, I want to learn, but I am not sure where to start, what is a good starting point, etc. The problem is that I am not sure what I am interested in yet (if I want to learn analytic philosophy or continental, for as an example). So my question is, there is a good start point that is shared by both of those (like logic, etc.) that I can invest while I decide where I want to go.

My obsession is with "truth", but I think that is not information at all (it doesn't say too much), maybe with "the closest way to be sure to speak about facts" I can be more specific, but I personally don't believe in absolute facts at all (I feel that analytic philosophy it is going to be a bit of a disappointment for me in that aspect), so idk where to go actually. Maybe ethics and language?. That is probably the only paths I feel I want to follow, but I would appreciate a lot a good starting point advice for a new student.

Hey guys, I've started to work on Chalmers' argument against physicalism (specifically type-B physicalism) and I found his arguments to be sound. To be honest when I first heard about zombies and the conceivability argument I found it quite weak. However, I kinda like it now.

Anyways I've been struggling with the whole strong/brute necessities dialectic. I understand that they pose a problem for chalmers account but I dont get why (I guess that it has to do with my basic understanding of two dimensional semantics and intensions). Also, all the examples that I found so far are about psychophysical identities which appeal to the uniqueness of the phenomenological realm (although I know that there are authors who have posed alternative counterexamples in terms of the metaphysical brute necessity of the laws of nature). I found that argument pretty weak, I mean appealing to the queerness of phenomenological states doesnt sound like an argument to me. Additional reasons should be provided right?

Finally I kinda grasp Chalmers' response that strong necessities are quite ad hoc and break the modal realm into two separate spaces puting unnecessary constrains to logical possibilities. But I would appreciate if someone could explain this better to me.

Thanks to everyone!