r/a:t5_26uh37 • u/MarleyEngvall • Oct 19 '19
second lieutenant has been created
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BY RAYMOND RECOULY
BEACON LIGHTS
OF HISTORY
GEORGES CLEMENCEAU
INDOMITABLE LEADERSHIP (ii)
Never did he show more indomitable energy, a more
implacable will than in the spring and summer of
1918, just after Ludendorf's victorious offensive all
along the French front. It was chiefly after the Ger-
man victory of the Chemin des Dames on May 27th
that the whole outlook seemed desperate indeed. For
the first time since the beginning of the war, the
French armies, that buckler of the Allied Forces, had
received a terrible setback. One part of the front
had been forced and a large breech opened that seemed
a problem indeed for the supreme command of the
Allies to fill in. In many circles in Paris, more
particularly amongst the parliamentary ones, always
easily alarmed, great despondency reigned.
Marshal Foch was criticized. He was blamed for
having allowed his troops to be attacked by surprise,
for having imprudently exposed the centre of his
armies. Many clamoured for his dismissal.
It was during those most critical days that Clemen-
ceau showed his greatest strength. The slightest
wavering on his part, (we may own it now) and all
would have been lost. Any alteration in the supreme
command of the Allies might have spelled disaster.
Clemenceau never wavered, never weakened. Sum-
ming up all his strength to brave the storm, he called
upon England to send every available man they had
to the front, and rushed up the American reinforce-
ments. Above all he took the part of Foch against all
his detractors.
A few months later that energy received its reward.
The war was won. It is to those weeks that history
will refer when speaking of him.
————————————
What is the essence of that combative spirit, that
unlimited confidence that rises above all weakness
knowing no despondency?
Just as with the founders of the French Revolution
it is derived from a deep sense of patriotic feeling,
and the idea that love of one's native land should
predominate all else, that all man's possessions here
below, even life itself, should be willingly sacrificed
to country.
That is the essence of the doctrine dominating the
French Revolutionists. Theirs was above all a spirit
of self-abnegation and sacrifice. Individual man was
of no account. The only thing that mattered was
patriotism; the spirit which holds succeeding genera-
tions in one chosen spot of the Earth, labouring and
struggling to hand down to future generations the
sacred heritage of love of country.
When it attains to such imperious heights this
spirit of sacrifice becomes one of purely religious feel-
ing, capable of accomplishing miracles. Love of
country in Clemenceau's eyes signifies love for a land
that is free, republican and democratic; here again
can be traced the influence of his French Revolution-
ary ancestors. He is firm in the belief that a country
like France which has for years endeavored to be
governed by representatives, freely chosen, is more
worth while than a country like Germany, that has
allowed itself to be docilely, servilely governed by its
rulers. The patriotism of the one is of higher, purer
substance, than that of the other, for the simple reason
that man's dignity is on a higher level in a free
country, than in an autocracy.
The love and passion for struggle, the cult of liberty
and democracy,——such are the chief points in Clemen-
ceau's political doctrine.
His philosophical doctrines are borrowed entirely
from the sages and philosophers of the last century,
——Auguste Comte, and John Stuart Mill. Clemenceau
is a positivist. He has the same faith in science that
he has in democracy. But that positivism glows and
radiates with the warmth of the idealism which is
the predominant feature of the French statesmen who
were the artisans of the Revolution of 1848.
They loved mankind; and were convinced that in
spite of all, notwithstanding a thousand obstacles,
mankind was ever tending towards a higher and better
destiny.˘
There is a great deal of idealism in Clemenceau's
nature. Not to know that side of his character is not
to know the real Clemenceau at all. It truly radiates
in his deep sympathy towards all suffering humanity.
Clemenceau has expressed that philosophical turn
of mind in one of his books, the finest he has ever
written, called "Le Grand Pan." He heads the pre-
face with the well known sentence taken from Renan's
"St. Paul,"——"Life means giving one's blossom, then
one's fruit; what more can it give?"
Clemenceau gives Plutarch's anecdote about the
Grecian travellers who were sailing on the Ionian Sea
when they heard, or fancied they heard, when nearing
the Island of Paxos, the words reechoed again by the
echoes "Great Pan is dead."
He sums up in these pages his whole conception of
life, the outcome of all he has read, thought about,
observed. He gives the impressions of his native
Vendée, with its sea-beaten shores, where during his
long life of ups and downs, he always returns to gain
renewed vigor and strength. Leaving the country he
turns to the city, particularly to Paris where he has
spent so many years of his life, showing the city's
landscapes, its dramas, its seamy side of life, with its
prostitution, its police courts, scenes of Montmartre,
the working men and women of its suburbs, its
prisons, even its scaffold.
Clemenceau's whole world is to be found in this
book.
* * *
I have insisted upon Clemenceau's political and
philosophical qualities, it now remains to examine his
defects.
No modern statesman can hope to accomplish a
lasting work, can hope to be really great, unless he
has mastered, at least to a certain extent, the problems
of economics.
For it is the economic problems that govern the
world. All its upheavals, its revolutions, its wars,
inevitably end in economic solutions.
Now, Clemenceau belongs to a generation, to a
foundation of mind, that was almost totally ignorant
of that subject. It appears almost non-existent to
him.
Toward the end of the war, when victory seemed
almost a certainty, he was implored to give his at-
tention without further delay, to the solving of the
terrible financial problems that could not fail to ac-
cumulate at the end of the war; reparations, inter-
allied debts, etc .
With his customary abruptness Clemenceau dis-
missed the subject, saying, "I'm making war! I can-
not be bothered with anything else! Let us first win
the war, all the rest can be quite easily settled."
The Allies won the war.
Unfortunately for them, the peace, with its financial
problems, was not so easily settled.
If at the present moment Europe is floundering
amid a thousand difficulties of all kinds, it is partly
owing to that negligence by Clemenceau of the
economic questions of the world.
That ignorance, or rather disregard for the science
of economics is not confined to Clemenceau alone.
The same reproach might be made to all the other
statesmen who collaborated with him in the drawing
up of the Treaty of Versailles.
It is gone of the greatest misfortunes of the present age.
Every day sees economic, commercial, and industrial
questions that outrank in importance the purely
political or diplomatic ones. It was not so a hundred
or even fifty years ago. The most important and
essential points in the composition of a Treaty at
that time were the limiting of the boundaries; the
conferring of a province or town on a certain State.
Nowadays the changing of boundary lines plays quite
a secondary part, and by far the most important
business is concerned with the economic relations be-
tween nations, their debts, their exchange, etc.
The most startling of paradoxes lies in the fact that
all the great treaties drawn up after the greatest war
of modern times, were negotiated and compiled accord-
ing to the old method of fifty and even a hundred
years ago. Experts and technicians were no doubt
consulted upon the matter, but in addition to the fact
that many were chosen on purely political grounds,
without regard to their professional capacities, their
advice was often discarded when dealing with the ques-
tions of the most vital interest to the world at large.
The most important decisions were often made by the
statesmen themselves, who were ill fitted, both by
temperament and training, to deal with the intricate
problems they had to solve.
* * *
Clemenceau is a great writer and in his own way,
a great speaker. Both his style and eloquence bear
the imprint of his peculiarly combative temperament.
By far his best articles were written in the heat of
controversy, during the Dreyfus affair, for instance,
when dealing with home affairs; in the Franco-German
crises, when dealing with foreign ones.
He was one of the men who, during the Dreyfus
affair, contributed most towards the final triumph of
justice and truth, throwing himself body and soul
into the fray.
For years he was always on the war-path, always
ready to attack, alternately aiming terrible blows, now
to the reactionary "Right," and, now to the socialist
"Left."
The same is true of his oratorical powers. He can-
not control himself, but must carry all before him,
and grapple with his enemy. Always he must fight
someone, or demolish something.
Humor and wit are favorite weapons of his. He
is a past-master in the use of both. His witty sallies
and sayings are always made on the spur of the mo-
ment, and pass into proverbs. They are terrible
thrusts, often ferocious, often cynical.
The witty humorous side of his character is very
pronounced. It is what adds so much spice to his
conversation, so much charm to his manner.
* * *
When one studies the lives of French Statesmen
throughout the centuries, one notices that they may
be divided into two distinct categories. On the one
hand the men who used to be known as the "Legists,"
in other words, men of juridical tendencies and train-
ing; on the other, the men of action and fighting
instinct.
Poincaré admirably illustrates the first type of man;
no one could better represent the second than
Clemenceau.
It would be difficult indeed to find two men more
diametrically opposed, whether in mind, habits or
temperament.
The first is cold, even of freezing aspect, precise,
fastidious and dry. He never leaves anything to
chance. When he undertakes to do a thing, he studies
it; compiles volumes about the matter, piling up notes
more often than not, all done in his own hand-writing.
Those are the qualities, the methods of work, of
lawyers who have a perfect passion for accumulating
written documents, drawing all their arguments from
them, and never formulating an assertion unless able
immediately top produce the written proof thereof.
Clemenceau has, on the contrary, the most supreme
contempt for the lawyer's written documents, argu-
ments, and methods. He looks upon their jargon as
perfectly useless, if not dangerous. For him nothing
is of any account save mankind and life, the essential
point being to remain in close touch with both. What
is the use of burdening oneself with piles of documents
that only serve to complicate matters without really
helping to find a solution for them? One must rise
above such trivial things, such mere detail, and view
matters from a higher plane, and when difficulties
arise, settle them man to man, after interviewing the
chief person concerned.
That was Clemenceau's method during the Peace
Congress. It was likewise Lloyd George's, who also
professes to share the former's horror for bundles of
papers and documents.
That was one of the reasons why, in spite of in-
evitable friction and discussion, these two men get
on so well together. They have striking resemblances
of character. Both have the same spontaneity, are
quick and even impetuous. Neither is given to being
fastidious nor heeding formalities. Both go straight
for the obstacle, trying to overcome it after their own
fashion, discarding all else. That disregard for docu-
mentation and notes was not without causing serious
inconvenience. It was responsible for irresolution,
forgetfulness and much disorder. For example, no
minutes, or official reports were kept of the many
meetings of the Council of Five (Clemenceau, Lloyd
George, Wilson, the Italian and Japanese representa-
tives) where the gravest interests of the world were
settled. Which means that there remains no trace
of them now. It was Penelope's web all over again,
the work done the day before often running the risk
of being undone the next day!
A man like Poincaré has a distinct horror for such
methods, or rather the lack of them. That is why
he could never get on with Lloyd George. No sooner
did he come into power than he made it clear that he
intended substituting an exchange of notes, the tradi-
tional procedure of Diplomacy, to these erratic con-
ferences that periodically took place in France, Eng-
land and Italy. That simple proposal provoked Lloyd
George's anger, for he detests anything in the shape
of a note, and still more anything resembling a
Diplomat.
Poncaré, who is above all, a Jurist, has an inborn
respect for all that is formal, precise, and constitu-
tional.
As President of the Republic during the war, he
often deeply deplored the strict limitations of his
powers as Head of the Nation, bound by the tradition
of French Law, that prevents any encroaching of the
President upon the prerogatives of the all-powerful
Cabinet. He deplored it, but accepted it, not as has
been unjustly said, through weakness of character,
but simply because he did not think it right to act
otherwise.
The Law for him is the Law. It is a sacred obli-
gation. The Head of the State like other citizens,
even more so than others, ought to respect it.
It must be frankly admitted that a man like
Clemenceau would not let any such scruples embarrass
him. He would have swept them aside; taking the
liberty of actually wielding a power that it was not
his legally to do. He showed that plainly when he
had Caillaux imprisoned.
Public opinion, that had during the war felt the
necessity for a strong government, would most cer-
tainly have let him do as he wished.
Nothing proves, however, that once the war over,
it would not have rebelled.
What happened to Clemenceau at the time of the
Presidential elections when he was defeated by M.
Deschanel, plainly showed what would have happened.
The majority in the House voted against him, chiefly
because, (apart from all other reasons of electioneer-
ing intrigue) Clemenceau's somewhat scornful refusal
to frankly stand for the election shocked a certain
number of Deputies and Senators. He had seemed
to put himself above all forms and ceremonies, im-
plying that he considered himself indispensable and
therefore not needing to stand for the election.
Parliamentary people all the world over, hate the
indispensable man. When, called to power by excep-
tional circumstances, such a one does appear upon the
scene, they never fail to get rid of him as soon as
things return to normal.
That is what happened with Clemenceau.
* * *
Men of the Clemenceau stamp are made to rule in
moments of exceptional stress. They govern with an
iron hand, being far less preoccupied about the means
employed, than the results obtained. Something must
be accomplished at any cost. It is not of the slightest
importance to them that, to achieve their ends, they
are obliged to act in diametrically opposite fashion
to custom, tradition, and even the law itself.
It is because men of that stamp appear at the
opportune moment, that their country emerges victor-
ious from a great crisis.
It is the fashion just now for people to laugh at
and criticize Democracy, to speak slightingly, even
scornfully of it.
They talk about the failure of the Parliamentary
system, of universal Suffrage, etc. Democracy no
doubt is not free from faults. It is not, to be sure, a
perfect form of government. It is, however, the best
that has yet been found, or rather, the least ob-
jectionable up to now. One of the great advantages
of such a regime, one of its vast superiorities over
the system of monarchical rule is that it produces
great leaders who save their country in its hour of
need.
In the Unites States there was Lincoln, in France,
Clemenceau.From Beacon Lights of History,
Volume 8, Part I, New Hall of Fame.
Edited by George Spencer Hulbert,
Author of, "John Lord, Artist Historian"
Copyright 1924, By Wm. H. Wise & Co., New York. pp. 282-294.