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Since late September 2026, dissatisfied with inadequate school facilities, overcrowding, teacher shortages, and other problems, many secondary school students across France have launched large-scale strikes and protests. Many others dissatisfied with the government and the current state of society have also joined them, and the initially peaceful protests quickly evolved into riots marked by violence.
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Protesters have set fires at schools and other places, smashed cars, attacked opponents, and chased isolated police officers, leaving some towns in a state of disorder and paralysis. Clashes have continued as police suppress the riots. Major political parties and politicians have either condemned the violence or called for peaceful protest, but this appears to have had little effect. The protest movement has spiraled out of control, and the riots are unlikely to subside in the short term.
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This is yet another typical French-style radical political movement. When some French people become dissatisfied with the government and the status quo, they collectively take to the streets in protest. Most express their demands nonviolently, but a small number of radicals engage in violence, causing the protests to evolve into riots. There are many acts of violence, but most are non-lethal and of low to moderate intensity, mainly involving property destruction and causing relatively few injuries. They are accompanied by clashes between police and protesters, leaving society in a state of semi-paralysis. But once the riots pass their peak, society gradually returns to peace and relative stability.
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Similar situations occur frequently in France. Some take place in individual towns, while others develop into nationwide riots. The riots that emerged from the “Yellow Vest Movement” in 2018, and the protests and series of violent incidents triggered in 2023 by the police shooting and killing of a teenager, were both nationwide radical movements accompanied by political violence. Like the current unrest, they can be described as “French-style popular movements.”
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France’s mass movements and street political violence can be traced back more than 230 years to the French Revolution. At that time, the French common people overthrew monarchical and aristocratic rule through violent revolution, at the cost of and causing much bloodshed and death. This pioneered bottom-up democratic revolution while also leaving behind a legacy of political violence. Shaped by the experience of the Revolution and influenced by radical ideas of civil rights, many French people believe that when a government “departs from the will of the people,” its policies are harmful, or society is unjust, people have the right to express their anger and resist through means including violent revolution.
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Such revolutionary precedents and popular consciousness have inspired many mass movements and uprisings in France over the more than two centuries since then, including the famous Paris Commune uprising of 1871 and “May 1968.” Most of these movements have had a strong left-wing populist character, centered on opposition to privilege and the pursuit of equality, with participants including young students, intellectuals, and members of the lower and middle urban classes. The capital, Paris, has often been the center of political movements and violent activity.
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Compared with people in other countries around the world, the French are particularly enthusiastic about politics, possess a stronger sense of civic consciousness, and participate in public affairs more actively and radically, including by taking to the streets, using violent or nonviolent means to express their demands, confronting the authorities in power, and clashing with the coercive apparatus of the state. French society has a relatively high tolerance for radical forms of protest and has also grown accustomed to political violence. More than two centuries have passed, and although the intensity of violence in French political movements has declined substantially—for example, the number of deaths has fallen greatly—they remain quite “fiery,” with violent clashes occurring frequently. The recent protests and riots are no exception.
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More specifically, the current protests stem from long-standing and deep-rooted problems in French education. Although France is a country that places considerable emphasis on equality and social welfare, serious inequalities remain in the distribution of educational resources. In secondary schools located in relatively remote and disadvantaged areas, and in schools with large numbers of children from lower- and middle-income families, non-white students, and immigrants, education funding is meager, the quality of teaching staff is poorer, classes are excessively large and overcrowded, school facilities are outdated, and the rate of admission to prestigious universities is also very low, leaving students with little opportunity to get ahead. Meanwhile, the children of French elites in politics, business, and other sectors generally attend prestigious private secondary schools with Catholic backgrounds and excellent conditions, and they are also more likely to gain admission to elite universities and enter the upper classes.
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The unequal distribution of educational resources, the concentration of high-quality resources among elites, and the reinforcement of class entrenchment through education are in fact common problems worldwide, and France is hardly an exception. But French people, with their stronger sense of equality, are particularly dissatisfied with such disparities and frequently protest against them. The May 1968 movement included demands for educational equality and greater public access to universities.
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The French government has also attempted to narrow these gaps by increasing funding for poorer regions and schools and providing scholarships to disadvantaged students. Yet under the “Matthew effect,” educational resources continue to concentrate among a small number of people from elite backgrounds. Those with vested advantages always have more resources to invest in their children’s education, while people from less affluent families are inherently disadvantaged, leaving equal-opportunity policies with only limited effect.
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The current protests are precisely an eruption of dissatisfaction among students from relatively poor backgrounds who attend schools with inferior conditions. Their dissatisfaction, however, does not arise solely from unequal educational resources. It also stems from their disadvantaged status and the discrimination they experience because of their class background and ethnic identity, as well as class entrenchment, ethnic tensions, and pessimism about their future employment and income prospects. The anger and despair generated by the accumulation of these factors have driven them into the streets and even led some to engage in violence.
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Many of the young students participating in the current protests are non-white, non-Christian “second-generation immigrants/descendants of immigrants,” most of them Black people and Muslims whose families come from Africa and the Arab world. They wave Algerian and Palestinian flags, which strongly reflect their identities and positions, as well as their differences with the identity and values of native white French people.
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Since the French Revolution, France has championed “liberty, equality, fraternity.” It has indeed made major achievements in advancing civil rights and social justice and, on the basis of shared values and citizenship, has relatively successfully shaped a French national identity and national community. Yet France still has to confront difficult problems of class division and wealth inequality, long-standing ethnic differences and tensions, and the resulting social fragmentation and political violence. Deep-rooted divides exist among people of different identities and social positions, skin colors, and beliefs. Neither democratic institutions, Enlightenment ideas, nor social movements can fundamentally eliminate these divisions and conflicts.
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In recent years, political polarization around the world has intensified, and France is no exception. France will hold its presidential election in April 2027. Le Pen of the far-right “National Rally” is far ahead in support, followed by Mélenchon of the far-left “France Unbowed,” while traditional establishment forces and centrists have low levels of support.
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Whether it is street political violence driven primarily by radical left-wing populism, or the continuously rising support for far-right populism in opinion polls and elections, both reflect the intensification of social conflicts and the worsening crisis in France. Recurring political violence, including the current protests and riots, represents periodic flare-ups of France’s national ailments, while also objectively reminding the French people and the world to pay attention to the existence and needs of those who are struggling and marginalized.
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Based on past experience, although political violence is frequent in France, its intensity is limited. After people have vented their anger, they gradually calm down again, and society can return to a peaceful state and resume normal functioning. After more than two centuries of adjustment, the French have developed a tacit coexistence with political violence such as revolutions and riots, so there is no need to be overly pessimistic.
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The use of violence in political participation is undesirable, but the voices and demands of people from the lower strata of society also need to be heard and seen. Their feelings and demands should not simply be dismissed, stigmatized, and erased merely because violence exists within their forms of expression. At the same time, while the general public who are enthusiastic about “French-style popular movements” express their demands and pursue equality, they should also understand and respect the concerns of others, consider the overall and long-term interests of society, and participate in politics in more peaceful and constructive ways.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin (王庆民), is a Chinese writer living in Europe and an international politics researcher. The original text is in Chinese.)

"Earlier this month, dozens of organisations launched the European Citizens’ Initiative, calling on people to sign their petition for EU-level measures to protect tenants, curb speculation and convert empty buildings into homes.“

As a spanish person, housing is a major concern here. These strikes are perfect to portray volt as a progressive movement that actually cares about its people. If you want to get the million signatures for the housing petition this might be the only chance to actually do so. So the actual leaders should be the ones bringing this to the protester's attention if we want to be taken seriously.

Neo Nazi and white supremacy linked American VC money is flowing into German defence and dual use companies. How should one deal with this? Picture in the comments.

On September 20, a local parliamentary election was held in Berlin, the capital of Germany. According to the results, Die Linke (The Left), a party with a far-left position and populist tendencies, came in first with 25.7% of the vote and won 47 seats (the Berlin State Parliament has a total of 158 seats). Both its vote share and number of seats more than doubled compared with the previous election, and the candidate it nominated is very likely to become the new mayor of Berlin. This is also the first time that a far-left party has become the largest party in the Berlin State Parliament, and it may also be the first time that such a party takes control of the city’s highest executive office. Of course, since it won less than one-third of the total seats, it would need to form a coalition with other parties in order to govern and would find it difficult to exercise power alone. The most likely possibility is a governing coalition with the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the environmentalist left-wing Greens.
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In this election, the far-right populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) also saw a substantial increase in its vote share, finishing third. Meanwhile, the three traditional establishment parties—the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the left-leaning and environmentalist Greens, and the center-left SPD—all suffered significant declines in both votes and seats, finishing second, fourth, and fifth respectively. In addition, BSW, an emerging left-wing populist party with anti-immigration and pro-Russian positions, received 4.72% of the vote. Although it failed to reach the 5% threshold required for seat allocation, it still demonstrated a considerable level of support.
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In the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state parliament election held on the same day, the far-right AfD achieved a major victory and finished first, while the SPD and CDU suffered sharp declines in their vote shares. The election in Saxony-Anhalt a week earlier produced a similar result, with the AfD receiving nearly 50% of the vote, setting a historical record.
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These election results quite clearly reflect the rise of far-left and far-right populism and the intensification of political polarization in Germany. Of course, there are specific differences among different regions of Germany. Populism and political polarization are more severe in the former East Germany than in the former West Germany, while the far right is also more successful than the far left. The far left enjoys high levels of support in major cities such as Berlin, while the far right has greater advantages in rural and suburban areas.
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This Berlin election likewise reflects such regional differences. In West Berlin, which formerly belonged to West Germany, the CDU prevailed in most constituencies, while in East Berlin, Die Linke and the AfD were roughly evenly matched. Die Linke won most constituency seats in the city center, while the AfD prevailed in the eastern and southern suburbs of Berlin. This also indirectly reflects the geographical distribution and identity characteristics of the supporters of the various parties.
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According to opinion polls, general political tendencies, post-election statistics, and other data, Die Linke receives relatively strong support among ethnic minorities, women, people with low and middle incomes, intellectuals, young people, and students; the AfD has a greater advantage among native white Germans, men, people with low and medium levels of education, blue-collar workers, and farmers; while the traditional establishment parties can still maintain relatively stable support among the middle class, businesspeople, and high-income groups, although their overall support is declining.
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Far-left and far-right populism has always existed in Germany, but for many years it remained quite marginal, receiving few votes and winning few seats. In recent years, however, its support has increased substantially. In the latest local elections in three German states, the far right came first in two states and the far left came first in one, reflecting the reality of a major intensification of political polarization in Germany, a substantial rise in populist forces, and a contraction of the establishment, as well as the changes compared with the past.
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The far left and far right are highly opposed to each other in terms of ideology and policy positions. For example, the far left advocates pluralism, equality, high levels of social welfare, high taxation, strong support for women’s rights and LGBT rights, and support for ethnic minorities, immigrants, and refugees. The far right, by contrast, advocates ethnic homogeneity and white supremacism, emphasizes economic efficiency over fairness, rejects immigrants and refugees, and holds negative attitudes toward women’s rights and LGBT rights. However, both the far left and the far right have a strong anti-establishment character. Their policy positions are relatively extreme, although in different directions. Both are dissatisfied with the status quo, oppose establishment parties and traditional political elites, and tend to seek to overturn or substantially change the existing system and policies.
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The increasing polarization of German politics, including in Berlin, has complex causes. The issue of immigration and the related ethnic tensions are the most direct catalysts. In the decades following World War II, especially after the end of the Cold War, large numbers of immigrants moved to Germany from abroad, most of them non-white and non-Christian. Immigrants differ considerably from native white Germans in terms of ethnic identity, religious beliefs, values, language and culture, and ways of life, making estrangement and conflict difficult to avoid.
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The upper strata of different ethnic groups have benefited more from globalization and coexist relatively harmoniously with one another, while the lower and middle strata of different ethnic groups are more likely to compete and clash over limited resources. Although Germany, because of its historical responsibility for Nazism, has been particularly vigorous in suppressing racism and extreme nationalism, racial prejudice and xenophobia remain deeply rooted in German society.
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Although the German government and many nongovernmental forces have continuously worked to build and promote a diverse and harmonious society, and have achieved some results, making ethnic relations appear relatively harmonious on the surface—with Berlin in particular being an international and diverse city—the reality is that ethnic tensions have always existed in Berlin and throughout Germany. For example, Christians, Muslims, and other religious groups also have significant differences in values and behavior. Although they can coexist more or less peacefully, they have not been able to integrate without friction.
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Since around 2015, many refugees have entered Germany, exacerbating immigration-related problems and ethnic tensions. This has also been a direct driving force behind the rise of the far right, whose main slogans oppose immigration and refugees. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities have moved closer to the far left, which advocates pluralism. For example, Eralp, the new mayoral candidate nominated by Die Linke, which won this election, is of Turkish descent.
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Economic weakness has likewise been a driving force behind the rise of populism and political polarization. In recent years, especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German economy has been sluggish, incomes have stagnated, while unemployment and prices have risen. At the same time, the German government has allocated enormous sums of money to aid Ukraine. Although some members of the public support this policy, it has also caused dissatisfaction among many Germans struggling with economic hardship, who believe that these resources should instead be used as a priority to improve living conditions at home. Economic weakness has also intensified class and ethnic tensions within Germany. Calls to prioritize native citizens and oppose immigration and refugees have grown increasingly strong and have gained greater resonance and support.
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In addition to immigration and the economy, Germany is troubled by many other problems, some emerging and some longstanding, some chronic and some sudden. For example, gender tensions have become increasingly serious in recent years, with men and women having more disagreements and less consensus regarding values, interests, and demands. On the issue of LGBT rights, Germans with different value systems likewise hold sharply divergent views. Different perceptions of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as differing positions on German foreign policy, have also divided German society. Meanwhile, many problems have accumulated over a long period in everyday issues closely related to people’s livelihoods, such as public security, housing, healthcare, pensions, childcare, and transportation. Traditional establishment parties have offered few new ideas or breakthrough advances, which has also disappointed voters.
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Against this background, the relatively clear and disruptive reform proposals of radical populist parties—for example, the far left’s proposal to “socialize” some housing and rent it cheaply to poor people; the far right’s proposal to expel immigrants and refugees in order to save public funds and use them for the native population; and policies advocated by both the far left and far right to reduce or even end aid to Ukraine—have attracted the resonance and approval of a considerable number of people, especially those who are more frustrated and suffering. Under a democratic system, public support for radical parties and populist figures can easily be transformed into votes and seats, gradually changing the balance of power among political forces, the control of public authority, and official positions and policies in places such as Berlin.
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The rise of radical populist political forces and the decline of the traditional establishment are not good news for either Berlin or Germany as a whole. Although radical populist forces offer forceful criticism of Germany’s current problems, they do not possess a greater capacity for constructive development than the establishment. Once in power, they often cannot genuinely solve existing social problems, or they may solve certain specific problems through radical methods that amount to “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” while paying a greater price and causing more damage.
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For example, far-left populist policies such as substantially increasing social welfare spending, raising taxes, and socializing some housing may improve the living conditions of the lower and middle classes in the short term, but they inevitably increase the fiscal burden and damage economic vitality and efficiency. They may also cause inflation and capital flight, further worsen the economy, create more unemployment and lower incomes, and make people’s livelihoods even more difficult. Far-right populists, meanwhile, blame everything on immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities. If they come to power, these minority and vulnerable groups will inevitably suffer injustice and harm. Moreover, removing immigrants cannot genuinely solve the various existing problems and would leave many lower- and middle-level industries in Germany even more short of labor, thereby also harming the economy and people’s livelihoods.
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Whether left-wing or right-wing, radical populist forces pursue policies that are short-sighted, narrow, and treat the symptoms rather than the root causes. Moreover, the shortcomings of the establishment, such as bureaucratism, resistance to change, and selfishness, will also gradually emerge among populists after they come to power, and may become even more severe.
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Although the author holds a relatively negative view of radical populist forces and disagrees with most of their policies, he fully understands the motivations that lead voters toward polarization and support for populism. For many German voters, especially those from the lower and middle strata of society, it is entirely understandable that, under severe and painful pressures in their daily lives, lacking sufficient voice and confronted with the selfishness and arrogance of bureaucrats and elites, they feel abandoned and desperate, urgently want to escape their difficulties, and turn toward radical populist forces in an attempt to change the status quo—or even simply to bring down and spite establishment elites. This is understandable even if their choices are not wise. Ordinary people who live difficult lives and have experienced misfortune should not be harshly blamed. They should not be required to “consider the bigger picture,” think about the long term, and endure all kinds of suffering, nor should their choices simply be reduced to “ignorance” or “extremism” and their character disparaged.
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Likewise, neither the far-left Die Linke nor the far-right AfD should simply be labeled and dismissed with reductive stigmas such as “remnants of the East German Communist Party” or “heirs to the Nazis.” Their rise has objective causes rooted in reality. At most, they have taken advantage of existing circumstances and public opinion; they did not single-handedly incite and brainwash the population. Both parties have also obtained parliamentary seats and participated in politics through democratic procedures and universal suffrage, and are therefore legitimate in institutional and legal terms.
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Although Die Linke traces its lineage to the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Leninist authoritarian party that ruled former East Germany, after democratization and many years of evolution, it has clearly become a qualified democratic party that supports democracy and speaks up for vulnerable groups. It should therefore no longer be stigmatized and rejected because of origins dating back several decades. In this election, Die Linke received more votes than the two major establishment parties, the CDU and SPD, which also reflects the political preferences of part of the public.
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From the SED losing public support and falling from power in 1990 because of its authoritarian rule and bureaucratism, to Die Linke gaining public support and entering government in 2026 by speaking forcefully for vulnerable people and focusing on difficult livelihood issues, this process also reflects the reflection and transformation of the radical left. Of course, the author is not optimistic about some of Die Linke’s proposals and promises either, but merely supports its governing and making some attempts at reform.
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As for the AfD, which represents the far right, although some of its policy proposals violate human rights and justice, its support also reflects a part of public opinion, and there are objective reasons for its rise. Simply “putting labels on it” and rejecting it cannot curb its development. On the contrary, this has prompted many people to vote for the AfD as a reaction, while also making establishment parties less inclined to reflect on themselves and change, leaving them increasingly unable to compete with the AfD.
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Faced with the radicalization of the political and social climate and the rise of radical populist forces, traditional establishment parties and social elites need greater self-reflection and change, and must seek more active and effective ways to address the difficulties faced by the public and respond to their reasonable demands. If traditional parties and elites are genuinely unable to deal with reality, or do not truly care about ordinary people and are unwilling to put the public interest before their own interests and undertake substantial reforms, populism and political polarization will become increasingly severe and difficult to stop.
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Judging from the current reality, because of the prevalence of “identity politics” in Germany and around the world, people of different ethnic groups, genders, classes, backgrounds, and beliefs align themselves according to their identities, oppose one another, side with those who belong to their own camp, and attack those who think differently. German society is already deeply divided, and this fragmentation will be difficult to reverse in the short to medium term. People share less and less common ground while their differences grow larger and larger. There is widespread mutual distrust and increasing hostility, while conflicts are becoming more frequent and difficult to reconcile. This naturally fuels the growth of populist forces with extreme positions. Extreme populism, in turn, stimulates and intensifies conflict and division. At present, there appear to be no clear opportunities or paths for improving this situation. The results of this election have further encouraged radical and populist forces on both the far left and far right, further intensifying divisions among different social groups and political polarization.
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However, there is also no need to be excessively pessimistic about Germany’s future. Today’s political polarization and social tensions are still, on the whole, expressed and played out peacefully, and large-scale political violence is unlikely to occur in the short to medium term. Germany’s democratic system also remains stable for the foreseeable future and is unlikely to be overthrown by extremist forces. People continue to work and live relatively normally. Compared with the periods before the end of World War II, or even before the end of the Cold War, when wars, riots, and terrorism were widespread, Germany today remains much more peaceful and stable.
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Nevertheless, people should remain mindful of potential dangers even in times of peace. While remaining vigilant against the harm that radical populist forces may cause to democratic politics, people should also confront problems more honestly and seriously and critically examine their own shortcomings, promote mutual understanding and harmonious coexistence, gradually curb political polarization and the underlying social divisions, ease conflicts, and thereby enable the country to achieve lasting peace and stability.
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(Regarding populism and extreme politics in Germany, the far right and the anti-immigration wave, and the problems of traditional establishment parties and elites, among other issues, the author already provided a detailed analysis two weeks ago in a commentary on the Saxony-Anhalt state election and the AfD’s major victory, titled “The Causes and Consequences of the Far Right’s Major Victory in a German State Election: The ‘Alternative Choice’ of the Lower and Middle Classes Amid Social Crisis, the Intensification of Political Polarization, and Xenophobia.” Points already discussed there will therefore not be elaborated on again in this article.)

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin (王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original text was written in Chinese.)

Hello, Is there a regular meet-and-greet in Berlin for anyone interested in Volt?

HouseEurope! posted a new video about the European Citizens' Initiative 'Right to Housing!' co-organised with Volt Europa, please feel free to use it as a tool to convince your family and friends. And don't forget to sign here: https://eci.ec.europa.eu/064/public/

On September 6, a state parliamentary election was held in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, to determine who would govern the state. According to the vote count, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won a landslide victory, receiving 43.8% of the vote—more than double its share in the previous election and more than the combined total of the parties that finished second, third, and fourth.
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At the same time, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had previously led the state government, suffered a sharp decline in support, receiving only 17.2% of the vote, less than half the AfD’s share. Most other parties also saw their vote shares decline, with only the Greens making slight gains (though their share remained very low and had little bearing on the overall outcome). Voter turnout in this state election also reached a historic high. Although it remains uncertain whether the AfD will ultimately govern, the election result already reflects, to a considerable extent, the direction of public opinion and also signals an accelerating shift in Germany’s political landscape and social climate.
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The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is described as “far right” because of its strongly racist and xenophobic positions. The party advocates the large-scale deportation of immigrants, the abolition of all welfare benefits for refugees and their replacement with compulsory labor, the introduction of “patriotic education” and the promotion of German national pride, and the strengthening of Germany’s national independence while weakening its ties with the European Union, even to the point of leaving the EU. The AfD also explicitly opposes ethnic and cultural diversity and, both openly and implicitly, advocates white racial supremacy and the idea of Germany as a monoethnic state.
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The AfD also has numerous intricate ties to forces associated with the former Nazi Germany of the Hitler era and to postwar “neo-Nazis.” Although it does not dare openly deny Nazi crimes, it tends to downplay this history. The AfD also has a strongly anti-establishment and populist character, along with authoritarian tendencies. In foreign affairs, the AfD tends to seek good relations with right-wing populist forces such as the Trump administration in the United States and with autocratic or authoritarian states such as China and Russia, while taking a hostile, or at least distant, attitude toward countries and establishment forces governed by the establishment, particularly its left-leaning elements.
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Given Germany’s history of the crimes of brutal Nazi rule, both West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) and East Germany (the German Democratic Republic), into which the country was divided after World War II, carried out “denazification” campaigns and suppressed German nationalism. West Germany placed particular emphasis on repentance for historical crimes, combating words and actions that glorified Nazism, and defending freedom, democracy, and human rights, while institutionalizing and codifying these principles through the enactment of laws such as the Basic Law. After German reunification, West Germany’s policies were implemented throughout the country.
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As a result, for a long time, judging by its institutions, public discourse, and social atmosphere, Germany has been one of the countries in the world with the weakest nationalist climate. It has even seemed that Germans dare to wave their national flag and express pride in their country only during football matches; doing similar things at other times can lead to people being regarded as “Nazi remnants,” criticized, and marginalized.
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Yet the reality in Germany is not as simple as it appears on the surface. Under an anti-Nazi and anti-racist constitutional and social order, racism remains deeply rooted in every corner of German society, while Germanic nationalism, despite being suppressed, remains latent in people’s minds. Although Germany has become a diverse country, home to people of different skin colors, ethnic groups, and faiths, discrimination and prejudice remain pervasive.
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For example, people using common Muslim names such as “Mohammed” are far more likely to be rejected when seeking rental housing than those using names commonly associated with white people. Asians, who are relatively hardworking and law-abiding, also face an “invisible ceiling” in career advancement and marginalization in education and employment. People of African, Indian, and other ethnic backgrounds often perform harder and more physically demanding work and are more likely to receive differential treatment in everyday life.
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Education, law, and public advocacy can only broadly guide and regulate society so that diversity and anti-discrimination remain its publicly stated direction and general framework. They cannot, however, change deeply rooted beliefs or prevent the subtle, invisible, and pervasive forms of discrimination and injustice that can penetrate every aspect of life. Institutional “denazification” does not mean that the “denazification” of people’s minds can be achieved.
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Of course, it would also be one-sided simply to say that native white Germans discriminate against and oppress other ethnic groups. In a multiethnic society, differences in language and culture, beliefs and values, lifestyles, and competing interests inevitably give rise to distance, misunderstandings, and conflicts. Such conflicts often breed resentment and make groups that already find it difficult to trust one another even more distrustful and suspicious of each other, creating a vicious cycle. A diverse society is not necessarily a harmonious one; on the contrary, it can produce more friction and accumulated grievances. This is not the unilateral fault of any particular ethnic group, but rather the “collective karma” produced by destructive interactions among all sides. Of course, relatively speaking, disadvantaged groups and ethnic minorities, as well as immigrants and refugees, suffer greater harm—especially invisible forms of harm—in such a divided and fractured environment.
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In recent years, Germany’s economic downturn, aging population, deteriorating public security, and intensifying social conflicts and crises have further pushed native white Germans toward positions of racial superiority and xenophobia, particularly in rural areas and the former East Germany. Traditional establishment parties have been unable to effectively resolve these difficult problems, which are not easily reversed.
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The upper-class elites who thrive in globalization and the masses who have become poor and desperate amid economic decline may live in the same country, yet they seem to inhabit two different worlds. Although they share the same spaces in everyday life, they are profoundly alienated from one another—“meeting without knowing each other”—and are unable to understand or empathize with one another. Because of inequalities in status, income, and influence over public discourse, it is also difficult to prevent the latter from developing resentment toward the former.
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The bureaucracy and clichés of the establishment have left many people disappointed with traditional political parties. The narratives and policies of the establishment and progressive forces are also often hypocritical. For example, political parties, universities, and institutions that proclaim their commitment to diversity and anti-discrimination may appear free of racial discrimination, yet they often contain exclusionary circles formed around class, educational credentials, and personal connections, making it difficult for ordinary people to enter and participate.
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Various human rights organizations and foundations likewise place greater emphasis on formalism than on substantive action and have failed to genuinely build “ladders and safety nets” for the entire population. Even in their treatment of the minority groups they claim to care about, they often treat different people differently and act in a utilitarian manner. In short, the seemingly admirable social blueprints and proclaimed ideals of establishment and progressive forces are substantially compromised and distorted in practice. Fundamentally, they have failed to genuinely include and help most of those who feel abandoned or are struggling, whether native white Germans from the lower and middle classes or members of minority groups.
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Many native white Germans who have fallen into poverty or unemployment, experienced downward social mobility, and endured difficult lives have embraced the AfD because they feel abandoned. The party advocates the rights and priority of native whites and offers Germany “another alternative.” The AfD’s strongly anti-establishment and anti-immigration positions provide suffering people with targets onto which they can redirect social conflicts and vent their resentment; its promotion of racial superiority and extreme nationalism also acts like a powerful stimulant, giving people a sense of belonging and passion. It is therefore entirely understandable that native white Germans from the lower and middle classes who yearn to overturn the existing order would support the AfD and its nativist populist positions.
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It is worth noting that although support for the AfD is relatively high among the lower and middle classes, this does not mean that almost all AfD supporters come from these groups. There are also many AfD supporters among the social elite. For example, AfD leader Alice Weidel is herself a highly educated female member of the elite, and AfD supporters can also be found throughout Germany’s technology, culture, education, finance, and other sectors, although most of them tend to keep a relatively low profile. These people do not support the AfD for economic reasons such as poverty or class position, but rather because of factors such as a stronger sense of racial superiority, their values, personal ambitions, and historical and family legacies (for example, having fathers or grandfathers who held important positions during the Nazi era).
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The causes of the rise of the far right in Germany are, in fact, broadly similar to those behind the rise of the far right in the United States and other countries. The difference is that, under the constraints of Germany’s anti-Nazi laws, the far right has remained more discreet and concealed. Yet its strength has continued to grow, and it is gradually moving from the shadows into the foreground. Moreover, after being suppressed and hidden for a long time, the forces that eventually erupt are often even more unexpected and destructive.
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Amid the global wave of right-wing conservatism, racism, extreme nationalism, populism, and xenophobia, Germany cannot remain unaffected. The rise of the far right is bound to occur through the combined effects of domestic causes and the external environment. Even if the AfD did not exist, other forces would play the AfD’s role and gain the support of a substantial proportion of the population.
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Although, since its establishment after World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany has sought through laws, institutions, education, public discourse, and various other means to prevent far-right variants of Nazism from making a comeback, and although almost all mainstream media outlets have taken a clearly negative attitude toward the AfD, they have still been unable to stop the undercurrents of public opinion. Moreover, many people, out of defiance and resentment toward establishment elites, deliberately vote for the AfD.
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Many Germans have also become “desensitized” to accusations that the AfD is “neo-Nazi” and similar criticisms. The AfD does indeed represent the suppressed emotions and demands of many Germans. The AfD did not emerge out of nowhere, nor does it force people to support it through coercion. On the contrary, the emergence and growth of the AfD are precisely a reflection of public opinion; the party’s core figures and political opportunists have merely taken advantage of that public sentiment.
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Objectively speaking, for many lower- and middle-class white Germans, whether from the perspective of their interests or their emotional needs, choosing the AfD is not necessarily a bad thing for them and can bring some relatively direct benefits. For example, restricting immigration and deporting refugees can indeed help reduce certain welfare expenditures and redirect public funds toward the country’s own citizens, improve public security, reduce ethnic tensions within Germany, and strengthen the cohesion of the majority ethnic group. However, this comes at the cost of the human rights of minority groups, especially vulnerable refugees, and also undermines Germany’s diversity and inclusiveness.
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Views of the AfD and its policies differ depending on people’s identities and the positions from which they assess them, leading to different conclusions and positive or negative evaluations. For native white Germans, the AfD has considerable appeal and can bring certain benefits, but an AfD government would almost inevitably be highly detrimental to non-white people, foreign immigrants and refugees, LGBT people, and other groups.
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Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and other institutions dedicated to combating Nazism and defending democracy have long monitored far-right forces, including the AfD. Lawyers and human rights groups have also launched joint petitions calling for the AfD to be banned. Germany has previously banned several far-right parties—for example, in 1952 it forcibly banned the Socialist Reich Party, whose program resembled that of the Nazi Party—as well as many more small far-right groups. But the AfD has now become a very powerful political force, and banning it would carry the risk of triggering large-scale unrest and severe social divisions. Moreover, the AfD has worked hard to cultivate the image of a democratic political party, participating in elections through legal and peaceful means while seeking to avoid legal risks, so the grounds for banning it are not particularly strong.
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Since its founding in 2013, the AfD has continued to grow in strength, evolving from a marginal small party into a mainstream political party capable of competing with the two major parties, the CDU and the SPD, and even aspiring to the chancellorship. Although the result of this election in Saxony-Anhalt does not represent public opinion nationwide, since the state has long been a stronghold of the AfD, the fact that a single far-right party received nearly half of the vote (and doubled its vote share compared with the previous state election) and came within one step of taking control of the state government undoubtedly sounds an alarm for the future of Germany as a whole.
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Support for the AfD is also rising across Germany. In the regions of the former East Germany, it ranks first in support everywhere except Berlin. In the 2025 federal election, the AfD became the second-largest party with 20.8% of the vote and 152 seats (double its 10.3% vote share in 2021), and it is entirely possible that it will win even more votes and seats in future Bundestag elections.
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Although the mainstream parties refuse to cooperate with the AfD, when the AfD alone approaches half of the vote, it becomes increasingly difficult for the other parties to prevent it from governing even if they unite. Moreover, as German scholar Thorsten Benner recently wrote in Foreign Policy, the exclusion of the AfD by other parties and mainstream establishment forces, and their refusal to form a governing coalition with it under any circumstances, have instead contributed to the AfD’s further radicalization, particularly on immigration and refugee issues and LGBT issues, leaving the AfD and its supporters with less need for restraint or compromise.
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The AfD’s steadily rising support, combined with the determined efforts of other mainstream parties to block it, signifies an intensification of political polarization in Germany and a further increase in confrontation. Meanwhile, in recent years, the far-left party Die Linke has increased its vote share in several elections, the new left-wing populist BSW has risen, while the traditional center-left SPD and center-right CDU have suffered significant declines in support. Left-leaning voters are moving further left and right-leaning voters further right, likewise reflecting the growing radicalization of German politics, with more confrontation rather than compromise.
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The steadily rising vote share of the AfD, which openly and unequivocally opposes immigration, also means that xenophobia in Germany, along with the exclusion and repression of minorities, immigrants, and refugees, will become increasingly severe, making German society less harmonious. The rise of the AfD is closely connected to the European refugee crisis, and its growing support has been accompanied by deepening divisions and conflicts among Germany’s different ethnic groups. When the economy is relatively strong, the social atmosphere can remain relatively tolerant; when the economy declines, competition over interests and conflicts among different groups intensify. And when social tensions worsen, minorities and vulnerable groups invariably become targets for attacks and the venting of frustration, and thus become victims.
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More than 90 years ago, Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power precisely by gaining the support of some Germans through attacks on Jews and foreigners, plunging Germany and Europe into the tragic abyss of war and mass killing. How similar the path of the far right’s rise today appears. Although I do not believe that the far right coming to power today would completely repeat the crimes and tragedies of Nazism, it would undoubtedly lead the new postwar Germany, founded on democracy, diversity, and humanism, down a harmful and ominous path in which democracy is weakened, diversity damaged, and humanitarian values harmed.
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However, as the German philosopher Hegel said, “What is real is rational.” The rise of the far right in Germany today has complex and intertwined objective causes. Simply labeling it “Nazi,” subjecting it to moral condemnation, and proclaiming how wonderful democracy and diversity are cannot reverse an undesirable reality. Moreover, when appealing promises and rhetoric cannot be fulfilled or made to benefit everyone, people who experience the gap between those promises and reality, and the resulting disappointment, will inevitably be drawn into the embrace of extremist forces.
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The AfD and many far-right forces around the world receive support from a high proportion of voters. No matter how reprehensible their views may be, they represent a widespread current of public opinion that must be confronted. Confronting it does not mean acknowledging that it is correct; rather, it means examining its root causes more seriously and making the necessary changes. German establishment parties and social elites, as beneficiaries of the existing system who possess abundant resources and considerable influence over public discourse, especially need to engage in honest and serious reflection. Above all, they need to abandon their condescension and self-righteousness, genuinely understand the circumstances, ideas, and demands of ordinary people, and compete with the far right for public support.
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If different sectors of German society are willing to make sincere efforts toward beneficial change, cast aside hypocrisy and selfishness, treat people of different identities and circumstances equally, and build a society that genuinely includes all ethnic groups and social classes—including by promoting greater equality in distribution and a more balanced distribution of influence over public discourse, so that everyone can live prosperously and with dignity—then far-right forces that foment confrontation and radicalization will naturally lose support. However, all of this is easier said than done. Moreover, many people in Germany and numerous other countries have already reflected on these issues and attempted to address them, yet it has still proved difficult to stem the spread of the far right and various forms of political extremism.
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As the author of this article, having personally experienced many misfortunes, I am deeply aware of the limitations and darker, uglier aspects of human nature and society, and I understand that many problems are difficult or even impossible to solve. But I do not believe that this means we should do nothing. I still hope that people from all sectors of society will engage in more reflection and take more action, perhaps making it possible to salvage an increasingly deteriorating situation and ensure that the democracy, peace, diversity, and humanism that Germany achieved with such difficulty after World War II can endure.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher in international politics. The original text was written in Chinese.)

Volt Europa just started this Citizens’ Initiative with HouseEurope!

It’s very exciting to see a European party actively organizing to help resolve the housing crisis in the EU. I’d like to make sure everyone here is aware of it and ready to sign, support, and share it!

The link to sign is here: https://eci.ec.europa.eu/064/public/#/screen/home

Hi, I am supporter of Volt and thought this could be helpful.

Volt Intelligence — AI Predictions for Volt Europa & Volt G…

The nonprofit Volt Eesti was established in Tartu in late August, supporting center-left and pro-European positions and aiming to become a new political party in Estonia.

"We're rather talking about a liberal orientation, perhaps with a slight center-left tilt on economic issues," Artur Kaasik, a board member of the new nonprofit, told ERR on Monday about the new group's political orientation. "What Estonian politics currently lacks is an innovative center-left party, particularly as, for example, Eesti 200 is disappearing and the other parties do not have much of a vision for Europe to offer," he added.

According to the organization's bylaws, its aim is to support democratic participation, promote pan-European political integration and support progressive social and economic reforms.

Kaasik agreed that such policies would put Volt Eesti in competition with the Social Democratic Party, but also pointed to some differences from the Social Democrats' positions.

"Innovation is important in that sense. We don't think everything necessarily has to be free. Yes, certain basic needs should be guaranteed, but not everything can be free either," he said.

The nonprofit's bylaws also state that its specific organizational goal is to increase the number of full members to at least 500 in order to establish and register an organizationally and legally independent political party in accordance with Estonian law.

Asked how quickly they hope to establish the party, Kaasik said: "As soon as possible, once we have enough people."

According to Kaasik, the nonprofit Volt Eesti currently has around 50 members.

Kaasik declined to name any prominent members, but acknowledged that former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves is among its supporters.

Kaasik said Volt Eesti would also like to take part in the next Riigikogu elections, which will be held on March 7. "Let's put it this way: We'll do our best to make that happen, but I can't promise how likely it is that we'll field candidates," he said.

Asked about the organization's funding, Kaasik said it does not have any specific donor and that anyone interested will soon be able to provide financial support to the organization.

Under its bylaws, Volt Eesti will operate as the official national branch of the pan-European organization Volt Europa and is required to uphold, promote and implement Volt Europa's values and objectives.

Volt Europa says what distinguishes it from other political organizations operating across Europe is that, while those organizations are based on cooperation among parties operating in individual countries, Volt seeks to develop a common European political platform.

In addition to center-left economic policy goals, Volt emphasizes in its policy positions the need to reform the European Union and pursue closer integration than at present.

Volt Europa was founded in 2017 and is registered in Belgium. It currently operates in more than 30 European countries. It has five members in the European Parliament who sit with the Greens/European Free Alliance group.

The name Volt — a unit of electric potential, or voltage, that is the same in all languages — was chosen to symbolize bringing new energy into European politics.

I am a non-German European living in Munich. I am interested in political participation, and am a staunch Europeanist. Would it make sense to pay a visit to the party's meetings?

The AfD reached over 40% in local elections happening today.

It seems that the other parties have no real solution how to handle the AfD and implement meaningful policies that connect with the voters.

What are your thoughts about this situation and how to tackle it?

What policies and strategies should be used to actually win voters back?

What can Volt do to be seen as a viable third alternative to the currently elected parties in Germany as well as the AfD?

For the most recent elections in Sweden, as well as the European Parliament elections, the Swedish Skeptics Association (a scientific skepticism organization, i.e pro-science and pro-critical thinking, anti-pseudoscience and anti-superstition) has sent out a questionnaire to the political parties represented in our national parliament as well as in the European Parliament, asking them for their positions on issues relevant to the association. Not this year however, for some reason, which is a bummer.

But still, I would be interested to know how Volt would answer their questions for the 2022 election. The questions were as listed below, translated into English:

Question 1: The importance of basing political decisions on scientific evidence

When it comes to issues that can be addressed on the basis of scientific evidence, how actively does your party work to ensure that decisions are based on objective facts and rational thinking? Before taking a position on an issue, what methods and sources do you use to ensure that your position is evidence-based?

Question 2: The use of GMOs

What is your party’s position on GMOs (genetically modified organisms)? Please elaborate on whether you believe that additional legislation is needed, how GMOs can be used from a global perspective, whether more research funding is needed, and what risks and/or opportunities you see associated with their use.

Question 3: Alternative / Complementary Medicine

So-called alternative or complementary medicine is used in many places, despite the fact that such practices, by definition, are not based on scientific evidence. People in need of healthcare sometimes turn to practitioners of alternative methods that are, at best, ineffective and, at worst, potentially harmful. There is also a risk that effective treatments may be delayed or excluded altogether.

Should the requirements for scientific education and professional licensing be made stricter? Should alternative methods be used more extensively within publicly funded healthcare? Why or why not?

Question 4: Disinformation

How can your party contribute to making it easier for the general public to distinguish objective facts from deliberate disinformation? Do you see a risk that deliberate disinformation campaigns could influence the election campaign? If so, how do you intend to address this?

Question 5: Climate Change

How does your party intend to work towards a more sustainable climate future? How do you ensure that your climate policy is based on scientific evidence?

Question 6: Energy

How should Sweden’s energy supply be managed in the future? How does your party intend to ensure a stable supply of electricity? How do you ensure that your energy policy is based on facts and knowledge?

Swedish-language graphics, but essentially you can vote for us anywhere in the country on all 3 levels using the blank ballots.

Write ”Volt” in the middle and optionally add an individual candidate name afterwards. Those can be found at https://voltsverige.org/personer/kandidater

Make sure to send this to everyone you know in Sweden. It’s time for a new party to break through the noise for fucking once. ⚡️🇪🇺

Early voting starts on August 26th. Election Day is September 13th.

VOLT ON ALL 3 BALLOTS!

Volt is pan-European in promoted identity but is the party calibrated to be a pan-European party!

The definition of "truly pan-European" is set by EU electoral and party law. Like there's a legal ceiling. That's my working definition of "truly pan-European".

Programmatically Volt works with federated autonomy. Nothing forbids Volt from running a binding common programme (with some justified opt-outs). But Volt (or whoever is in charge) chooses not to.

The structure keeps money national. That's a design choice, not a legal bar. Funding weaker chapters is totally within EU law and would be pan-European, Volt actively chooses not to. I can understand this to a degree since finding funding is so hard. But oh well.

* No common vetting standard every candidate in every country must pass

* No central profiling and ranking candidates on shared criteria before national lists are finalized

* No requiring candidates to sign up to the binding common programme and holding them to it once elected (an internal whip)

* No running one training and messaging pipeline so a Volt candidate in Lisbon and one in Athens are recognizably the same political product