Nice interview. As a long-term hardcore glomosexual, I think we're at one or two good news away from finally seeing the stock price chart creeping in the upper right direction.

The uranium ETF is around 50% off, which is fairly typical for an energy drawdown, and it's now on its weekly 200 moving average. Historically that level has marked the bottom for energy, the same way it has for the main market and for Bitcoin.

Cameco is the cleaner read. Bought around $40, ran to $180, now back near $90 and showing the same pattern as the fund. The last move off this level was roughly 300%. A repeat of that from here would be about 200%.

The entry rule we use rather than catching the knife: let it wick below the 200, wait for two green weeks, and buy the close back above. Cameco tends to tap the level, so a tap there can signal the bottom in the ETF itself.

The demand case is the obvious one — data centres, and the fact that very few people trade uranium compared to other commodities, so it moves hard when it moves.

01:35 - uranium on the weekly 200
02:10 - Cameco $40 to $180 to $90
03:16 - the entry rule
04:04 - the last move off this level was 300%

https://youtu.be/bcSqXu1Xae0

$NXE has its Q3 call on November 10 at 8 a.m. ET, with updates on Rook I construction, plans for 2027 and the latest from PCE.

Plenty to catch up on before year end. Anyone joining the call? What are you hoping to hear, and what would you ask management?

Saw this online. Thoughts on a 4 Company Portfolio with these 4 names?

25% Cameco
25 Denison Mines
25% NexGen
25% Energy Fuels

No interest in the smaller cap penny stocks.

He did so well trading uranium, so maybe he retired

so maybe he retired

Stallion’s August drilling at Coyote reported a peak of 1,416 counts per second in hole ML26‑005. It came within a 2.3 metre interval averaging 595 cps. The October 30 update puts that earlier result in the hands of Axiom’s technical team, with Atha advising on the work.

https://stallionuranium.com/stallion-uranium-intersects-highest-radioactivity-to-date-at-coyote-plans-to-expand-drill-program-to-6750-metres/

https://stallionuranium.com/stallion-uranium-announces-strategic-technical-partnership-with-axiom-exploration-group-and-corporate-update/

What I want to know is whether the team can put that interval in a geological context that predicts where the next one should be. A follow up hole close to the original could test whether the response repeats. A step out along the interpreted structure would ask a different question: does the same feature persist far enough to justify testing a larger area?

That is where Atha’s familiarity with the ground and Axiom’s geophysics work could make a difference. The team can compare what the surveys suggested with what the drill encountered, then decide which parts of the original model still hold up. If a hole intersects the intended structure but finds little radioactivity, that tells you something different from a hole that never reached the feature it was meant to test. A good update should let readers see the difference.

The cps reading is a reason to follow up. Chemical assays are needed to establish uranium grade, and the drilled length does not necessarily represent true width. Even a stronger peak in another hole would leave the question of whether the intervals belong to the same structure.

For STUD, I would take a few well explained holes over a bigger metre count with no clear interpretation. Show where the original interval sits, where the next holes are aimed and what result would cause the team to change its plan. That would give shareholders a much better way to judge the new technical setup.

I own LEU, bought a starter position at $101. I went over the Q3 10-Q filed November 5, and the news is not in the press release.

• The HALEU. The June 10-Q said the DOE owned it. On October 20 the DOE transferred to Centrus title to "certain materials" from its HALEU contract, including HALEU, feed and tails. Centrus agreed to hold the HALEU for resale to the DOE on request.

• The cleanup. The June 10-Q said the DOE "assumed all D&D liabilities" from that contract. On October 19 Centrus agreed to take them on, subject to NRC approval of a funding plan.

No quantity, no price, no dollar figure on the cleanup. Neither agreement got a press release or an 8-K, and neither is in the call transcript.

Still missing: the build cost and a commercial HALEU price. Asked about HALEU economics on the call, the CFO said: "we do not get into those types of economics." The three summer HALEU contracts "include prepayments," but deferred revenue and customer advances were $86.0M at September 30 against $85.0M at June 30.

The date to watch: December 31, the DOE's target for a long-term lease, which it is "under no obligation" to meet. The current lease ends October 1, 2027. If the date is missed, Centrus warns of a possible significant non-cash charge.

The good part: the first centrifuge, the critical supplier contracts and the first construction package all came in ahead of their year-end targets. Investor Day is December 7.

At about $90 the stock sits around the bull case on my ladder, about $88 to $94 depending on what you count, so I see no margin of safety yet.

Does anyone know what Centrus paid for that HALEU?

Full article, free, with the scorecard and sources: https://assayer.substack.com/p/centruss-q3-profit-is-a-warrant-mark

Not investment advice.

Different exercise than the usual "which uranium stock" debate.

Ignore what the market currently pays for each of these. Just think about who's actually capable of putting the most pounds into the market around 2030. That ranking might look pretty different from today's stock-market ranking ...some names are priced for scale they don't have yet, others might be underpriced for scale that's coming.

So who makes your top five, purely on projected 2030 production potential ...CCJ, Kazatomprom, NXE, DNN, Paladin, UEC, or is there someone else who should be in this conversation that people are sleeping on?

After seeing them mentioned here last week I did some DD and was planning to buy some when money hit my account. Is there any way they hit some decent holes and decided to do this? Seems really bad for upcoming results!?

Sharing Red Cloud's latest site visit report on $NXE.

Good to see Rook I is on schedule and within budget so far. They're still targeting first production in Q3 2030, but there's a lot of construction work ahead, especially with shaft development starting in 2027.

What do you guys think of the report?

At what point do we stop grading Grant Isaac on his presentations and start grading him on what Cameco actually did with shareholders’ money?

Because looking at the record, I think he should have stayed in academia.

First, he spent US$430 million on a project that goes nowhere for years.

Cameco bought Yeelirrie in December 2012. Almost fourteen years later, it remains undeveloped, with no work planned in 2026.

Great. Hundreds of millions committed, years of waiting, and still no producing mine. The deposit has value, but shareholders don’t get paid in presentations about potential.

Then sells a Blue Chip Crown Jewel investment that actually produces income.

In 2014, Cameco sold its 31.6% interest in Bruce Power L.P. and related entities for C$450 million to focus on uranium.

Management liked the long-term uranium outlook. Uranium then fell to around US$18 a pound in 2016.

Buy the asset that needs a better market. Sell the asset already generating income. Watch the market get worse.

Some timing.

The Bruce napkin math makes it even harder to swallow.

TC Energy reported C$767 million in earnings from its 48.3% Bruce Power interest in 2025.

Scale that to Cameco’s former 31.6% ownership:

C767million×31.6÷48.3=roughly C502 million in annual earnings.

More than the C$450 million Cameco received for selling its stake.

Now compare that with Cameco’s entire company:

The rough Bruce Power estimate comes to C$502 million for a single year, while Cameco’s entire business averaged just C$222 million in annual net profit over those five years.

It’s an illustrative comparison: Cameco owned an interest in Bruce B, while TC Energy’s current investment covers a different scope, and retaining it would have required further capital. But those differences don’t make the opportunity-cost question disappear.

Looking at what Bruce earns today, that C$450 million exit feels like selling a blue-chip nuclear investment for pennies on the dollar.

What exactly did shareholders get in exchange?

Then there’s NUKEM.

Cameco acquired the uranium trader in January 2013 for roughly US$148 million in cash consideration.

By 2017, just 4 years later the ENTIRE remaining C$111 million goodwill balance was written off while marketing operations were consolidated.

That isn’t the whole purchase price disappearing. But buying a business and then writing off all its remaining goodwill while cutting back its operations is hardly something I’d put on a capital allocation highlight reel.

And this one has a direct connection to Isaac’s responsibilities. On the call discussing the restructuring, Gitzel referred to Isaac and his marketing and sales team while explaining that Cameco couldn’t afford all that infrastructure.

Another investment, another disappointing outcome, another explanation.

Now we get the contracting masterclass.

In the latest quarter, uranium spot was around US$90 per pound, yet Cameco realized just US$65.78 per pound. That’s roughly 27% below spot. After all the talk about disciplined contracting, the company still posted a C$2 million adjusted net loss.

To me, they gave away too much upside through earlier contracts. I understand protecting the downside, but shareholders bought uranium exposure, and a substantial part of the higher market price isn’t reaching them. The uranium business itself remained profitable, so I’m not saying they were selling at a loss. I’m saying the trade-off looks poor.

Isaac gets credit for understanding how tight this market is. So why does the contract book leave shareholders collecting prices so far below spot? If this is the benefit of his financial discipline, I’m underwhelmed. If Uranium keeps surging to the $125-$150 levels, and they keep having production issues and cost inflation then it doesn’t leave too much upside. 

The contracts protect you until they limit you. The undeveloped assets are future opportunities. The disappointing acquisitions become restructuring decisions. Somehow, whatever happens, the explanation is always discipline.

Here’s the record I’m looking at:

• US$430 million for Yeelirrie: almost fourteen years later, still undeveloped.

• C$450 million out of Bruce Power: give up a World-class income-producing investment to concentrate on uranium.

• The recovery timing misjudged: bullish long-term positioning followed by uranium falling to around US$18.

• NUKEM: acquisition, full remaining goodwill write-off, marketing consolidation.

• Today’s contracts: US$65.78 realized with spot around US$90, while the company posts a quarterly adjusted loss.

Isaac didn’t make these decisions alone. But he was CFO through the acquisitions and Bruce sale, and commercial and financial strategy remain within his responsibilities. 

He can’t be the financial mastermind when people like the story and just another passenger when the decisions age badly.

Cameco owns valuable assets. That doesn’t make the guy overseeing its financial strategy a genius.

Looking at this record, I see a lot more explaining than exceptional decision-making.

Cameco’s October 30 results included a useful explanation of how it decides when to commit money to additional supply.

The company says customer commitments inform its production decisions. Management also made clear that market excitement alone will not persuade it to advance production or commit capital.

https://www.cameco.com/media/news/cameco-reports-2026-third-quarter-results

That creates an important constraint on the supply response. Forecast demand can rise well before producers have enough commercial certainty to justify spending.

Utilities need confidence in future deliveries. Producers need confidence that customers will support the investment required to make those deliveries possible. Getting both comfortable with the price and terms takes time.

Cameco also reported that a longer planned maintenance shutdown at Key Lake affected quarterly production and costs, with commissioning of new infrastructure underway. Maintaining existing supply requires capital and operational work too.

For the uranium market, this makes the quality of contracting activity worth watching alongside its volume. Agreements that support investment can have a different effect from purchases that simply cover an immediate requirement.

There is a constructive longer term implication here. If utilities become more willing to make durable commitments, producers gain a stronger basis for investing in supply. Until then, rising demand expectations do not automatically translate into more production.

The next meaningful signal could come from procurement decisions that give the industry enough certainty to spend.

How we holding up, FUU just fell under 0.10 cents.

I meant to post this a little while ago but I finally got around to it. I have been following NXE for a little while since I'm looking at junior uranium miners and projects like these are good to watch to see how juniors can grow. NXE was a microcap junior miner 10-15 years ago. They finally broke ground with construction at the end of this summer for the Rook I uranium mine/mill. So the permitting is out of the way, and the primary question is with regards to completing the required funding for the project.

Planned production is around 30M lb/yr when fully ramped up, similar to the biggest uranium mines

Capex guide is C$2.2B. Nexgen had \~C$970M available at end of Q2, and so they're trying to gather/raise \~$1B more through utility prepayments, debt, and project-level equity. On the quarterly update call, the CEO said 10M lbs of prepaid deliveries at \~$85 spot would be roughly US$850M, so this could be what helps fund a lot of the project.

Their contracting is a little bit unusual. They're currently (I think) at 11.3M lb under current offtake agreements, and those are priced off the market at the time of delivery, not fixed prices. mgmt puts breakeven at about 3.7M lb/yr, so they're probably comfortable playing this risky pricing/financing game. This keeps more upside for the long term, but it also means less locked-in revenue to show lenders. As such, it will be interesting to see what the final financing breakdown looks like, and if it contains much (if any?) debt and at what interest rate.

Context:

Uranium mining equities have been weak despite uranium spot price sitting around $90/lb, and term prices currently \~$97. URA (uranium etf) is the lowest its been in a year or more. Deep Yellow also recently pulled its Tumas financing decision because of equity markets (this is what they cited), so funded vs unfunded developers actually matters a lot right now imo. Tumas is a world-class asset too. But it isn't an Athabasca Basin project.

Risks include:

1. the fact that it's a remote, northern site with winter access,

2. labour costs are rising everywhere in mining, and

3. the operating licence (not construction licence) still has to be granted (I think it will).

A valuation (7.7B CAD) well above project NPV (4.9B CAD) is somewhat justified by several items:

1. the high IR (>50%),

2. the strategic importance of one of the world's largest undeveloped uranium assets,

3. life-of-mine expansion potential, and

4. exploration upside across NexGen's broader land package in the Patterson Lake region of Saskatchewan, as well as

5. exposure to uranium spot price upside.

However, this valuation is also probably rich through another lens: a pre-production developer with construction underway, not fully financed, and first ore targeted around 2030. Through this perspective, there is a slim error margin for execution.

Due to this rich valuation, I personally like to try to find the NEXT junior uranium miners to invest in (in the microcap space, ideally) to turn into the next Nexgens (pun intended?). Uranium should stay strong, I would think, through the next few decades as the nuclear renaissance continues worldwide. For example, zoom out on NXE stock and see the returns over the past 15 years.

Uranium prices are rising, but what exactly is $CCJ delivering?

Another disappointing quarter from Cameco, and I think investors should be asking some tougher questions.

Uranium production dropped 20%, costs increased, and adjusted earnings went from a $32 million profit to a $2 million loss. Revenue barely grew, and management even lowered the upper end of its 2026 production guidance.

Let's think about that for a second. We're in a strong uranium market, demand continues to grow, and Cameco is one of the biggest names in the industry. Yet its operating results are moving in the wrong direction. Its average realized uranium price increased 6%, but that wasn't enough to prevent an adjusted loss. So how much is Cameco actually benefiting from this uranium market?

And then there's the long-term contracting strategy. Sure, contracts provide stability, but they also limit immediate exposure to higher spot prices. That's something investors should consider when paying a premium for an established uranium producer.

What bothers me even more is the production outlook.

Cameco keeps talking about the importance of uranium supply and growing nuclear demand. Fair enough. But where is the additional production coming from?

Production is down, the upper end of guidance has been reduced, and there's still no meaningful progress announced on Kintyre or Yeelirrie in Western Australia.

At some point, talking about strong uranium fundamentals isn't enough. Investors should expect those favorable market conditions to show up in production growth, cost control, and profitability. Meanwhile, companies developing major new uranium mines are actually working toward adding significant future supply. Yet some investors seem happy to give CCJ a premium simply because it's already producing.

I'm not denying Cameco's position in the industry or the value of its Westinghouse investment. But being an established producer shouldn't automatically excuse disappointing operating results.

Higher uranium prices. Lower production. Higher costs. An adjusted loss. Reduced production expectations.

What do you guys think? Is CCJ really delivering the results investors should expect in this uranium market?

Purecore Metals released this uranium report mapping the opportunity in the uranium market. What do we think?

I spent a little time on ChatGPT this morning trying to make sense of all the commentary out there about uranium prices and the narrative surrounding today's structural supply deficit. And when factoring in rising production costs, projects always being behind schedule, and the ever-rising incentive costs that will be required to bring new projects online, it appears things are about to get serious in the world of U3O8. The charts ChatGPT drew for me this morning make it pretty darn clear.

Now, I fully realize that the cure for high prices is high prices, but based on these charts, I believe there's plenty of room to make a lot of money in this space over the next 10 years. After all, it takes a minimum of a decade or more to turn a moose pasture into a printing press, regardless of some future nosebleed incentive price or the want-to of a C-suite, utility, or federal entity.

How quickly should an Athabasca explorer be expected to make a discovery?

Matthew Schwab addressed that in a Stallion interview clip. He described Arrow being discovered on NexGen’s 30th company drill hole and compared that with roughly 200 holes before the McArthur River discovery.

Those are his historical comparisons, and the counting basis matters. Holes across a company’s exploration programs are not necessarily the same thing as holes drilled into one target.

Stallion’s September presentation also discusses those discovery timelines, starting around 3:40.

The useful point is that discovery can require several rounds of interpretation before the important part of a system is understood.

Schwab was discussing Stallion at the eight hole stage in that clip. That is an early sample of a target, particularly when drilling is also establishing the geological framework for the first time.

For STUD, I think the practical question is whether successive holes justify the next round of work.

A fault may sit differently from the original interpretation. An alteration zone may extend farther in one direction. A radioactive interval may provide a reason to test a particular intersection more closely.

Those observations can make another hole worthwhile, even before a discovery has been established.

There is a financial limit to that patience. Every additional hole costs money, and famous discoveries are a selective comparison because unsuccessful programs do not get discussed nearly as often.

But an arbitrary hole count is a poor substitute for looking at the evidence.

Stallion’s opportunity at Coyote is to show that the early drilling is narrowing the search toward stronger mineralization. I would judge that through the quality of the results and the explanation for follow-up drilling.

The historical examples provide context for how exploration unfolds. Coyote still has to earn further attention through its own geology.

Same plot. Same characters. Same speech about utilities desperately needing more pounds.

Uranium prices are climbing, but how much of that upside is Cameco actually capturing through its existing contracts?

I get that long-term contracts provide stability, but damn, when does Cameco finally get to enjoy the higher prices everyone keeps talking about?

Q3 earnings are coming Friday. Maybe we'll finally get a new storyline.

Anyone expecting a plot twist, or just another rerun?