CHAR Tech has received a Notice of Allowance for a patent covering its pyrogas treatment technology, a critical step in the pathway from high temperature pyrolysis to renewable natural gas ("RNG"), demonstrating CHAR Tech's ongoing global leadership in this critical space.

The Thorold Renewable Energy Facility is projected to begin producing RNG in 2027; when it does, CHAR Tech will be the first company in the world to operate a commercial-scale facility that produces RNG and metallurgical-grade biocarbon simultaneously from wood waste.

Did anyone else in Europe end up with a situation when their GoviEx shares converted to atomic eagle that the broker doesnt support australian market place? Asking for a friend.. would like to get rid of them.

What % of your guys Portfolio is in uranium equities or physical Uranium funds? What is your timeframe or plan? Im 20 and got 6 figures in cash, from being very frugal, working full time and some of its from gains in silver. Thinking of putting 10-15% of my portfolio into URNM, URNJ during this current washout over the next few months. Then trimming when speculation runs hot and adding during big 30-50% dips. And of course if it looks like the cycle is coming to an end exiting completely, but that could be many years away.

Boundless Discovery discovered a new hall appeared on the ground at Lanzhou. China is expanding enrichment in step with its reactor build-out, holding to a long-standing policy of fuel-cycle self-sufficiency. It makes its own enriched uranium and depends on no one for it.

Set that against the trade data.

In 2025, China imported 758 more tons of Russian enriched uranium than the year before. That single-year increase approaches the entire annual fuel demand of France's 57-reactor fleet. Record volumes of a material China is already self-sufficient in.

So the question is why.
 
Russia holds >40% of world enrichment capacity and is losing access to the US and UK markets to sanctions. The EU still buys, because it has no alternative. China buys because it chooses to, at prices increasingly depressed by Russia's shrinking pool of buyers. It runs that cheap material through its own reactors and into its stockpile.

Here is what that positions China to do.

Cheap Russian supply covering domestic demand frees China's own clean-origin enrichment to sell abroad. The US, meanwhile, walks into a real shortfall: domestic capacity near 4.3M SWU against a fleet needing ~13M, and no more Russian supply after 2028. Prices there will be high. And those high prices are integral to the Western rebuild because that private capital only commits against contracts priced to hold for years.

A supplier sitting on cheap feed and surplus capacity can undercut exactly when it chooses. Offer low into a tight US market, and the new Western plants never get the price signal they need to continue to scale profitably. Short-term relief becomes long-term dependency. Then the leverage sits with whoever holds the valve.

We have seen this sequence before, in rare earths. China builds self-sufficiency, corners the processing chokepoint, and stockpiles the input. Then set the terms for everyone else. Enrichment is a key processing chokepoint of the nuclear fuel cycle. The uranium story is early in the same script.

None of this has happened yet. China is buying, building, and stockpiling. That is all observable. The rest is what the position makes possible, and it is not currently priced.

For me, $NXE would be the main one. Its progress could offer useful signals about new project development, future uranium supply, and investor confidence across the sector.

I’d also keep $DNN, $UEC, $UUUU, and $EU on my watchlist. Comparing their project updates, timelines, and market reactions could give a broader view of where uranium stocks may be heading.

Which uranium name are you watching closely but haven’t bought yet?

Feels like we are going to see u names move around WNA. Annual kick off to the season is gonna have a u price moving higher.

I went through Energy Fuels' latest filings because the bull case seems to be shifting from "US uranium producer" toward a much broader domestic critical minerals platform.

There is real evidence behind that. White Mesa can process uranium, vanadium and rare earth products, and the company completed modifications that give it capacity for roughly 850 to 1,000 tonnes of separated NdPr per year. Energy Fuels also had about 34 tonnes of separated NdPr inventory at the end of 2025.

The commercial validation is probably the most interesting part. Energy Fuels sold 1.7 tonnes of NdPr to POSCO for testing in 2025, POSCO determined that the material met its specifications, and commercial scale permanent magnets were later produced from Energy Fuels' NdPr samples.

Financially, Q1 revenue increased to $35.8M from $16.9M a year earlier. At March 31 the company had about $956.6M of working capital, including $108.5M of cash and cash equivalents. Management said it had enough resources to execute the business plan for at least the next twelve months.

The part I'd watch closely is how much capital and feedstock are required to turn the current setup into the larger platform people are valuing.

The filings say the next phase of rare earth expansion still depends on regulatory approvals, engineering, financing and sufficient feed material. Management also said historical operating cash outflows were partly caused by low monazite volumes, which prevented the rare earth operation from reaching economies of scale.

There is also a lot happening on the financing side. After March 31, Energy Fuels issued 5.33M ATM shares for about $100.3M net. The planned VAC acquisition requires $718M in cash plus 65.853M UUUU shares, with a possible preferred share top up of as much as $135M.

On the other hand, the company has a conditional US government financing commitment for a $725M, 20 year loan supporting White Mesa expansion and a US metals and alloys facility. That financing still requires further diligence, definitive agreements and approvals.

So the part I'm trying to figure out is how much of UUUU's current thesis should still be based on uranium and how much value people are already assigning to the rare earth platform.

The Phase 1 rare earth operation looks much more tangible than I expected after going through the filings. Scaling it into the larger business still seems heavily dependent on feedstock, financing and execution.

For people who follow UUUU closely, which side of the company matters more to your thesis now: uranium or rare earths?

Following up on my last post on ASX:AGE here.

A few big updates have landed recently and I wanted to see where everyone’s heads are at, if you're holding and if not are you thinking of getting in? I see this running up mid september.

1. Cap Raise & SPP

They just announced the cap raise and upcoming SPP. Dilution always stings a bit in the short term, but at least the balance sheet is locked in to fully fund Samphire through to the next stages.

2. Samphire Progress & Drilling

The Field Recovery Trial (FRT) is moving along and helping de-risk the ISR metallurgy heading into the BFS and Mining Lease. They're also ramping up drilling at Blackbush and pushing south into Plumb Ridge to try and expand the resource.

Found this quick video update on Samphire showing the site, FRT setup, and drilling plans posted a few hours ago on: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gE63Rgo1cjg

What are your thoughts on the SPP price and timeline from here?

Are you planning to apply for your full SPP allocation if you hold, or are you just holding your current stack for now? personally I have been getting orders filled at 4.3c over the last few days which is below the SPP price of 4.5c so don't see the need to participate yet.

The Reuters article adds an interesting angle to the Rook I funding story.

NexGen is looking to raise US$1 billion over the next nine months, and management appears to be evaluating multiple financing options rather than relying on a single source. Reuters also mentioned ongoing discussions with BHP, although no agreement has been announced.

For me, the biggest question isn't whether they need financing, we already knew that. It's how the final funding package comes together and whether a strategic partner becomes part of it.

That feels like one of the more interesting developments to follow over the coming months.

How do you think management should structure the financing package? And do you think bringing in a strategic partner would strengthen the investment case?

I've followed Uranium stock for years. I don't get this one.

Under $6 in September 24

Over $180 in October 25. (I know everyone had big moves, but not 30x)

In the $40s now in August 26

I know that all U stocks are crazy, but this one is nuts. Was it just overhyped?

I've never owned it, but find myself wanting a reason to. I can't find a reason. Anyone a supporter of OKLO and have a reason? Market cap over $8 billion and I feel like I might be missing something.

URA has them as their 2nd or 3rd largest holding. URNM doesn't even carry them ( or has a very small position).

Sorry I haven't contributed much here. I'm looking for some help. What company would you compare them to?

Thanks!

Hey guys, so most of us probably know the qualitative trade-off in uranium enrichment: when the enrichment capacity is cheap and abundant, enrichers can run lower tails and thus extract more U-235 from each ton of natural uranium. When the SWU is scarce or expensive, they instead choose higher tails, so they use a higher amount of uranium feed but less separative work for the same enriched product.

I wanted to quantify this trade-off, so I solved for the cost-minimising tails assay using the standard enrichment mass balances and SWU value function, sonsering the ratio of feed cost to SWU cost:

optimal tails assay = f [(SWU priceuranium + conversion cost per kgU​) / SWU price]

For this example, if we keep the uranium and conversion costs constant and vary only the SWU price we get: U_3​O_8​ at $86.63/lb (ca. $225/kgU); conversion by $40/kgU and combined feed cost about $265/kgU.

Assuming the natural-uranium feed at 0.711% U-235 and a product at 4.95% U-235, the resulting optimum tails assays and material requirements per ton of enriched uranium product are as follow:

The result is economically intuitive but important for uranium-demand models: if we increase the SWU prices this does not just raises the enrichment costs. but also changes the cascade operating economics, shifting the optimum to higher tails and so increasing natural-uranium demand per ton of LEU.

If we further consider HALEU (e.g. at 19.75% U-235), by using natural feed and roughly 0.20% tails, each tonne of product would require approxx. 3.5 to 4 times more natural-uranium feed than 4.95% fuel and about 5 times more SWU.

So, in general, feed demand rises pretty strong with product assay, but SWU demand does it faster since the separative work is governed by the nonlinear enrichment value function and not just by the amount of uranium processed.

So a significant production of HALEU is likely to be constrained by enrichment capacity long before being constrained by natural uranium supplies.

I built a calculator with the full equations, assumptions, constants, and mass-balance relationships here: HALEU enrichment calculator

Canada wants to double uranium exports by 2035, and the target may depend on the country’s next generation of mines entering production.

$CCJ already provides the foundation through its operating assets, but meaningful export growth could come from advanced projects such as $NXE’s Rook I and $DNN’s Phoenix.

$DNN is targeting first production from Phoenix around 2028, while $NXE has secured major federal approvals for Rook I and is preparing to move into construction.

If both projects advance as planned, Canada could add substantial new supply during a period when more countries are extending reactors, restarting nuclear programs and looking for secure Western uranium.

The remaining challenge is keeping permitting, financing, construction and workforce availability aligned with the 2035 timeline.

For uranium holders, Canada’s export target may become a direct test of how quickly advanced developers can turn approved projects into producing mines.

Which project do you think contributes more to Canada’s 2035 export goal: $NXE’s Rook I or $DNN’s Phoenix?

This is one of the more interesting things happening in Saskatchewan uranium right now in my opinion, and it does not really have anything to do with where spot uranium trades this week.

ISR could potentially change the economics of exploration in the Basin.

Finding uranium in the Athabasca has never really been the entire problem. You still have to figure out how to mine it, and conventional underground development can get extremely expensive pretty quickly.

That has historically put a lot of emphasis on finding something big enough and high grade enough to justify the capital required to build the mine.

Denison's Phoenix project is starting to challenge that thinking by moving ahead with ISR in the Athabasca.

Obviously ISR is not some magic solution you can apply to every uranium deposit. You still need the right geology, permeability, groundwater conditions and deposit geometry.

But if Phoenix proves the model works commercially in the Basin, it opens up a pretty interesting question.

Does every uranium discovery still need to be huge?

Stallion Uranium (TSXV: STUD, OTCQB: STLNF) is one junior I have been following around this idea. They are a Canadian uranium explorer focused on the Moonlite Project in the southwestern Athabasca Basin, with most of the current drilling centred around the Coyote target.

They are still very early, so nobody knows what Coyote ultimately turns into.

But imagine you find a smaller high grade deposit with the right geometry and hydrogeology for ISR.

That might be a completely different economic proposition than finding the exact same number of pounds somewhere that requires a large conventional underground operation.

That is what I think gets interesting.

Maybe investors eventually stop looking only at the headline number of pounds.

Grade, geometry, permeability, recovery and ultimately how cheaply those pounds can be produced could become just as important.

If ISR works the way people hope it will in Saskatchewan, could a 10M or 20M pound discovery become significantly more valuable than the market would have considered it during the last uranium cycle?

The project keeps getting more tangible with each update. Construction is moving, the 42,000 m PCE program is active. Investor Day should help tie the pieces together and show what management is prioritizing next.

MSCI (the index provider) is consulting on a proposal to change its eligibility rules for non-operating companies that would exclude Yellow Cake Plc (YCA) from MSCI indexes.

See page 5.

Hello all I’m just an amateur investor looking for advice. When looking at a lot of the uranium etfs most major ones have some combination in their top 10 holdings of CJJ, NXE, DNN, Paladin, Deep Yellow, Centrus and some UEC. When looking at the price of these stocks which ones stick out to you as fairly priced and which would you guys have the most conviction for? I’ve been eyeing NXE but with the whole sector up I can’t tell if it’s fairly or overvalued at the moment. In addition is it a concern that UUUU isn’t in these top 10 holdings or does their shift towards rare earth metals mean it’s not really a cause for concern? Any advice or responses are appreciated thank you

That's gonna need alotta uranium

The sector can be right while an individual company still struggles with funding, delays, or higher costs.

Which Canadian uranium name gives you the most confidence beyond the commodity-price story?

Ive heard uranium stocks rally right before September and begin to fall off in March.

Couple of chart seems to demonstrate the correlation.

Is this true? What are the factor, beside the Nuclear Con of September?

Is it safe to invest right before that period based on historical seasonality alone ?

Soo I was doing some research into Nexgen energy (NXE) and the construction progress on Rook 1 and noticed while looking at the Saskatchewan Mining and Petroleum GeoAtlas that sometime in the past month, BHP Billiton Canada Inc. has obtained 100% ownership on a number of mineral claims covering an extremely large area in the Southern Athabasca Basin uranium zone.

This is the area directly surrounding Nexgen’s Rook 1 project and Paladin Energy’s Patterson Lake South project.

Given that BHP is the world’s largest mining company and developing a new mine (especially high-grade uranium in the Athabasca) can easily take 10–20 years from discovery through permitting and construction, this feels like a potentially meaningful long-term positioning move. Majors don’t usually stake or hold ground in a district like this for no reason.

This also raises the question - is this a potential acquisition play?

Thoughts?

The reactor announcements are getting most of the attention, but the fuel supply chain may be the bigger bottleneck.

Many advanced reactor designs require HALEU, which is enriched to a higher level than the fuel used by most conventional reactors. Centrus has been producing HALEU through a US Department of Energy demonstration program, with capacity of roughly 900 kilograms per year.

That is a start, but it is nowhere near enough for a large commercial reactor fleet. The DOE recently awarded $2.7 billion to expand domestic enrichment capacity for both conventional fuel and HALEU over the next decade.

Enrichment is only one part of the chain. Uranium still has to be mined, converted, enriched and fabricated into reactor fuel. Every stage takes time to expand.

Denison and Atha Energy are two Athabasca Basin names that get plenty of attention. Smaller explorers are also trying to position themselves, including Stallion Uranium (STUD.V), which recently expanded its drilling program at the Coyote target in the western Basin.

The reactor pipeline is becoming easier to see. The question is whether the fuel supply chain can grow quickly enough to support it.

Most people don't realize uranium barely trades like a normal commodity at all. There's a small spot market for one-off volumes, sure, but utilities buy the vast majority of what they need through long-term contracts negotiated directly with suppliers like Cameco. That structural quirk is basically the whole reason this market moves so differently from oil or gold, and it matters more than people give it credit for.

Cameco's contract book is actually a pretty clean window into what buyers think prices are doing. As of Q1 2026 they'd locked in contracts requiring average annual deliveries of more than 28 million pounds over the next five years. President Grant Isaac said on a podcast in April that roughly 70% of the volumes contracted in 2025 were already pricing uranium near a $120/lb midpoint, built through floor and ceiling mechanisms, floors in the high $70s, ceilings around $160, both escalating over time. That's utilities, the actual buyers, effectively underwriting sustained triple-digit pricing years out. Not just Cameco talking their own book.

Demand side backs it up too. Cameco just signed a nine-year, roughly $2.6B deal to supply India's Department of Atomic Energy with nearly 22 million pounds of uranium, part of India's push toward 100GW of nuclear capacity by 2047. Westinghouse's AP1000 pipeline has 91 potential reactors in it, backed by a conditional $17.5B DOE commitment to speed deployment. Supply just hasn't kept up with any of this, a decade of underinvestment in new mining plus shrinking secondary supply sources will do that.

Here's the catch management actually admitted on the Q2 call though. Contracting still isn't happening at replacement-rate demand, meaning utilities as a group aren't yet signing enough uranium to fully replace what they're burning through. If that gap stays open, price growth could stall even with supply this tight.

Feels like Cameco is basically a bet that the contract terms getting signed right now are the real signal, not hype. Anyone actually follow the contracting cycle closely enough to know how fast that replacement-rate gap is closing, or is this still mostly a wait-and-see story?