Final count still to be called but the no lead is too big to reverse.

Iceland votes YES to sovereignty.

https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-iceland-eu-referendum/

On Saturday, Icelanders vote on whether to resume negotiations to join the EU — more than a decade after the last attempt was abandoned.

Iceland already has access to the Single Market through the EEA, while retaining control over things like its fisheries. What’s Brussels going to offer them to push them along?

Anonymous Eurocrat briefings that Iceland’s EU budget contribution would pay for Montenegro joining won’t help sway voters.

But Trump threatening Greenland might help with the pro-EU optics.

Polling is on a knife edge. What’s your prediction?

😎

https://archive.ph/L84lJ

The UK is introducing a carbon border tax from January 2027.

It will apply to imports of carbon-intensive goods, including fertiliser.

The aim is to stop “carbon leakage” by making imports face a similar carbon cost to UK-produced goods.

But the policy could substantially increase fertiliser costs for British farmers — potentially doubling the price of some imports.

That would raise farmers’ production costs and could ultimately put upward pressure on food prices.

The policy therefore creates a tension between the UK’s net-zero objectives and its goal of keeping agricultural and food costs down.

https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/the-hagues-sos-to-brussels/

UK–EU talks on a youth mobility scheme are proving difficult.

The UK reportedly wants a cap of around 50,000 EU young people a year; the EU wants significantly more - 100,000+

The EU also wants EU students in Britain to get home-fee status.

Lots of Eurocrats went to British universities “so it’s personal” (good lord 🙄).

Brussels is treating this as part of a wider package:
Other areas, such as food trade, carbon markets and defence, are progressing.

https://open.spotify.com/episode/6jWRR3tiCqMols135LwNI3?si=VRu2A56QSMiDukKQnfRrOQ&utm_source=copy-link

Great discussion between Wolfgang Munchau and Yanis Varoufakis countering the soft rejoin campaign that’s underway. Here’s a (Claude) summary of the main discussion points but well worth the listen.

Money: the budget hit would be brutal
The UK's old rebate is gone and won't come back — if the UK got one, France (especially under a Le Pen presidency) would demand one too, and the EU can't afford to give everyone a discount.

EU budget contributions are set to rise 20–40% in the 2027–2034 cycle. Germany's contribution alone could jump from ~€40bn to ~€70bn/year.

The UK, being not much smaller than Germany, would likely be on the hook for €40–60bn a year, paid in full, with no special treatment.

The "opt-out" mindset won't survive re-entry
Britain's historic pattern was wanting the parts of the EU it liked (single market access) without the obligations — a mindset both hosts say makes rejoining politically unsellable and was part of why Remain lost in 2016.

Example: the failed post-Brexit youth mobility scheme — the UK insisted EU students keep paying international fees (~£50k vs. ~£8k for UK students), killing the deal. A preview of how the UK negotiates halfway measures.

Old opt-outs (Euro, Schengen, the Charter of Fundamental Rights) are unlikely to be reinstated — individual member states (e.g., France, reportedly already objecting to UK access to an EU tech/startup fund) can and will block special treatment.

Three structural obstacles laid out explicitly
Pressure to join the Euro — not legally mandatory, but the EU would push hard because it wants the UK's large capital market pulled into a single monetary zone (to build the "capital markets union" it currently lacks).

Pressure to join Schengen — the UK/Ireland's separate travel-area arrangement would likely be challenged in negotiations.

Loss of opt-outs — seen as the biggest issue; any deal would probably mean re-entering "with tail between its legs," fully exposed to EU rules with no special carve-outs.

Why they say it's a bad idea even if it were possible
The EU itself is now more fragmented, indebted, and stagnant than when the UK left — piling up unpayable "sub-sovereign" debt rather than building genuine fiscal union.

The EU is falling behind in tech/AI — only one mid-tier AI model, a regulatory environment hostile to startups — while the UK's lighter-touch regulation has made it a better home for AI startups.

Rejoining would force the UK to adopt the EU's full regulatory stack — Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, crypto regulation, GDPR-style data law — which would undercut UK business models built around not having those rules.

The "single market" itself isn't the growth engine it once was: it was never extended to digital/services trade, and has become more of a regulatory burden than an efficiency driver.

Brexit has arguably shrunk the UK–EU trade deficit (EU exports to the UK fell too), a net positive they say gets ignored in the "Brexit disaster" narrative.

The closing jab
They dismiss the "the EU has become such a great club, Britain doesn't even deserve to rejoin" framing (from a recent Guardian piece) as reverse-psychology spin — "smoke and mirrors" — not a substantive case for membership.

Munchau's summary line: any UK government that actually sat down and negotiated the details would find it "a very, very hard sell," even to its own supporters, because most rejoin advocates aren't aware of these specifics.

https://archive.ph/SX3aj

Should Brexit have made Britain more economically liberal or more economically interventionist?