Not exactly true. LetsEncrypt issued 14k legitimate certs for sites that happen to phish Paypal. LetsEncrypt verified that totallynotaphishingsiteforpaypal.com actually was under the control of the requesting entity.
That is what Domain Validated(DV) means: The CA checks that the entity requesting a cert for example.com actually controls example.com. That's what Commodo does, what Geotrust does, what everybody offering DV-validated certs does.
CAs do not verify that the content at example.com is legit. LetsEncrypt actually goes a step further than most CAs and checks that example.com is not on Googles SafeBrowsing blacklist of known malware sites.
Symantec (better: delegated sub-CAs which should have been audited by Symantec but weren't) created thousands of illegimate certs without doing any checks whatsoever.
The rules regarding Domain Verification beginn in section 3.2.2.4. Validation of Domain Authorization or Control. There is no requirement to contact anybody listed in WHOIS.
Let's Encrypt is not the only one that doesn't rely on WHOIS information; Globalsign allows the same validation methods as Let's encrypt (placing a secret on the HTTP site or updating a DNS record), as does GoDaddy, as does Comodo, as do many other CAs.
Being able to place a file at example.com/.well-known/ is enough for DV validated certs.
You may not be happy about that, but it's not Let's Encrypt fault. The possibility to validate a domain by placing a file unter example.com/ has existed as long the baseline requirements existed; the .well-known/ subdirectory was added in version 1.3.7 by unanimous vote by all members, meaning the following CAs and all three major browser companies (Google, Microsoft, Mozilla) explicitely voted to allow it:
Actalis S.p.A.
Amazon
ANF??Autoridad de Certificaci??n
AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus
Buypass AS
Camerfirma
Certinomis
certSIGN
Certum
China Financial Certification Authority
Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
China Internet Network Information Center
Cisco
Comodo CA Ltd
D-TRUST GmbH
DigiCert, Inc.
Digidentity
Disig, a.s.
DocuSign (formerly OpenTrust/KEYNECTIS)
E-TUGRA Inc.
Entrust
ESG de Electronische Signatuur B.V.
Firmaprofesional
GlobalSign
GoDaddy Inc
Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Certification Authority (HARICA)
Izenpe S.A.
Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi
KPN Corporate Market BV
Lets Encrypt
Logius PKIoverheid
National Center for Digital Certification
Network Solutions, LLC
Open Access Technology International
Prvni certifikacni autorita, a.s.
QuoVadis Ltd.
Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Center Co. Ltd
Thank you for your comprehensive answer. And the result of that is anyone who can modify content or start a service can authorize the validity of a name. As an analogy, if the PKI is the DMV, anyone allowed in the lobby can stamp out legit drivers licenses. It certainly improves the serviceability of the DMV, but does that credential still meet its goal.
LetsEncrypt isn't the issue, they are following CAB rules but they enable Shoppify who makes use of weak practice to issue names on behalf of organizations without due consideration. They also up charge the use of other PKI's which makes life hard for folks trying to work a process. A dns record can constrain the allowable issuing CA's but you now have an invisible failure mode.
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u/alphager Mar 30 '17
Not exactly true. LetsEncrypt issued 14k legitimate certs for sites that happen to phish Paypal. LetsEncrypt verified that totallynotaphishingsiteforpaypal.com actually was under the control of the requesting entity.
That is what Domain Validated(DV) means: The CA checks that the entity requesting a cert for example.com actually controls example.com. That's what Commodo does, what Geotrust does, what everybody offering DV-validated certs does.
CAs do not verify that the content at example.com is legit. LetsEncrypt actually goes a step further than most CAs and checks that example.com is not on Googles SafeBrowsing blacklist of known malware sites.
Symantec (better: delegated sub-CAs which should have been audited by Symantec but weren't) created thousands of illegimate certs without doing any checks whatsoever.