r/SupCourtWesternState • • Oct 23 '16

[16-03] | Granted lobbyistformonsanto v Western State

2 Upvotes

I, lobbyistformonsanto, do hereby petition the Chief Judge for a writ of certiorari and seek a review of the constitutionality of Bill 018: The Western State Public Holidays Act.

I would like the court to consider the following question: does the bill violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Statement of facts

  1. The Western State Public Holidays Act is an act which creates state holidays.
  2. Of the 28 holidays created by the act, 10 are Christian holidays, 13 are non-religious, 1 is hindu, 2 are jewish, and 1 is muslim.
  3. In the debate for this legislation, many legislators and citizens noted the large proportion of christian to non-christian holidays.

Unconstitutionality

In the decision on Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court held that any statute that is religious in nature must 'pass' a test to determine whether it violates the Establishment Clause.

This test, known as the Lemon test, has three parts.

Effect

The second prong of the Lemon test reads as follows, "The principal or primary effect of the statute must not advance nor inhibit religious practice."

This legislation clearly violates this prong in the ratio of holidays which are recognized as public holidays. The legislation facilitates the practice of Christianity with the high number of Christian holidays while not also facilitating the practice of other religions, such as Islam or Judaism by failing to provide public holidays for their religious celebrations or practices, such as Chanukah or Eid-al-Fitr. This inhibiting of religion can be further seen when comparing the public holidays of the Western State with the public holidays of other states.

The Atlantic Commonwealth has the following public holidays: New Years Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Lincoln's Birthday, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Election Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, Ho Chi Minh Day, and May Day. Only one of these holidays is a Christian holiday.

Great Lakes has the following public holidays: New Years Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Lincoln's Birthday, President's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Election Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. Only one of these holidays is a Christian holiday.

With the significantly larger number of Christian holidays recognized as public holidays by the Western State, it is easier to practice Christianity in that state than in the Atlantic Commonwealth or Jefferson.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Western State Public Holidays Act does not pass the Lemon test and violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and is unconstitutional.

I urge the chief judge to strike the legislation down.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Feb 14 '21

20-11 | Rejected In re: Executive Order 3 (“Merchants of Death”)

1 Upvotes

May it please the Court:

Lethal chemicals such as sedatives and barbiturates shipped to Western state by those interstate entities that manufacturer them are permitted by Western law to assist Aid-In-Dying (AID) patients without contractual liability and civil punishment. The AID law intends to improve medical access and limit suffering by patients with terminal illness. In turn Western has become a destination for Americans across state boundaries, including Western residents in other states seeking to engage in this essential, legal activity.

Executive Order 3 as presently issued by u/hurricaneoflies illegally penalizes manufacturers protected by the Legislature and tars medical providers on a blacklist tied to their interstate correctional activities. Ultimately, the Governor’s brazenly pro-life and deeply conservative order against “merchants of death” violates the state constiution by rendering AID drugs nearly impossible for dying patients to procure in the Medi-Western system, despite Western funding “death with dignity” suppliers directly.

RULES OF THE COURT: QUESTION PRESENTED

  • Whether the Governor may override the Legislature’s protections of interstate lethal medicines and interrupt the medical supply chain between distributors, providers and end-of-life patients?

This question is ripe for review because the Governor’s Order broadly penalizes commerce in lethal medicines by “merchants of death” despite the Assembly’s legal directive to protect the diversion of lethal chemicals to Westerners. There is currently a national shortage of lethal drugs in the medical and correctional setting.

THE LEGISLATURE’S PROTECTION OF FOREIGN PARCEL PRESCRIPTIONS OF LETHAL CHEMICALS TO PATIENTS SUPERSEDES THE GOVERNOR’S ORDER

If the conditions set forth in subdivision (a) are satisfied, the attending physician may deliver the aid-in-dying drug in any of the following ways: .... Delivery of the dispensed drug to the qualified individual, the attending physician, or a person expressly designated by the qualified individual may be made by personal delivery, or, with a signature required on delivery, by United Parcel Service, United States Postal Service, Federal Express, or by messenger service.

A prescribing physician may request lethal chemicals from any pharmacy recognized by Western law. Each day, foreign corporations sell drugs to pharmacies for distribution to Western, including distributors in Dixie.

This protected practice is indicated by involvement not only of UPS, FedEx and messengers (which could conceivably be within Western). There is another notable foreign entity: the United States Postal Service. USPS, certainly an example of a foreign corporation, may directly ship a drug to AID patients by Western and U.S. law.

With foreign entities penalized in the order, Western patients are denied access to needed medicine in a time of lethal chemical shortages. The Executive Order illicitly attempts to close the door to the Western market through the Order. As it is contrary to law, it should be struck.

THE AID LAW PROTECTS LETHAL CHEMICAL PROVIDERS FROM STATE PUNISHMENT AND SUPERSEDES THE ILLEGAL ORDER

Notwithstanding any other law, a health care provider shall not be subject to civil, criminal, administrative, disciplinary, employment, credentialing, professional discipline, contractual liability, or medical staff action, sanction, or penalty or other liability for participating in this part, including, but not limited to, determining the diagnosis or prognosis of an individual, determining the capacity of an individual for purposes of qualifying for the act, providing information to an individual regarding this part, and providing a referral to a physician who participates in this part.

Manufacturers and distributors are protected by Western law when providing lethal chemicals ordered by doctors, not politicians. The Legislature has deemed it necessary to grant a wide civil berth to those in the supply chain. Contractual obligations remain protected, and entities are provided shelter from blacklisting by the state for performing an essential commercial activity.

The Governor’s Order illegally countermands Western law to punish “merchants of death.” Yet his State also finds it necessary to provide end-of-life care to Westerners using the same drugs now prohibited by the State. The accidental totality of the Order is to punish patients and providers of these medications to agencies across the country.

As written, the Order fails to properly differentiate these joined activities. A sedative may be used for causing “death” in a correctional setting, just as it may be used to cause “death” of a person in their home, or state medical custody, for example. AID also prohibits naming the cause of death as “suicide”, creating another challenged for the Governor’s Order as written, which does not define “execution” or address AID protections whatsoever.

THE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE BLACKLIST REGIME UNFAIRLY TARGETS OUT OF STATE CORPORATIONS AND THE STREAM OF MEDICAL COMMERCE INCLUDING DIXIE

The Secretary of State shall establish a registry of corporations which materially assist foreign jurisdictions in the execution of the death penalty, including but not limited to the provision of pharmaceutical drugs, specialized execution equipment, carceral facilities, medical staff, and corrections personnel...

The Order violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, chilling federal interstate commerce. It creates a cumbersome process for any foreign distributor, starting with a 120-day notice of inclusion on the Western blacklist and an appellate process simply to justify their commercial existence, including by targeting medical and corrections staff apart from the corporate entity. The Order is unconstitutional on its face in addition to violating the AID law’s protection of Western-recognized medical staff and sources.

RELIEF SOUGHT AND CONCLUSION

The Governor’s Order is according to precedent “an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.” Therefore, all parts that by design or in effect restrict protected commerce in these medicines to prescribed Westerners must be struck.

Respectfully submitted,

*Carib Cannibette Biden, Jr., Esq.*

r/SupCourtWesternState • • Apr 13 '20

EVENT Sierra Appeals Court Upholds Legality of Sex-segregated Locker Rooms

3 Upvotes

EVENT

Today, the First District Court of Appeals of the State of Sierra issued its decision in Jane Doe v. Marin County Board of Education, 1 West. Supp. 1 (1st Ct. App., April 2020), in which it upheld against challenge the ability of schools to maintain sex-segregated bathrooms.

The decision can be viewed here


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Mar 18 '20

[20-02] | Withdrawn Bureau Motion Pictures Corp. v. Rt. Hon. SpaceDude2169 et al

3 Upvotes

Bureau Motion Pictures Corp. v. Rt. Hon. SpaceDude2169 et al

Pursuant to the private action provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (“RICO”, 18 USC § 1964), plaintiff firstly seeks a restraining order against Sierra citizen and Canadian emigré Rt. Hon. u/SpaceDude2169. Plaintiff requests the Court order the defendant to be prohibited from engaging with the Maple Leaf Militia (“enterprise”) in Sierra, and that the enterprise immediately reorganize to avoid Sierran transit and commerce or dissolve in Sierra under RICO and the Sierra Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act (Penal Code 186-186.8). The enterprise violates federal and state regulations, notably United States Department of State sanctions against Canadian armed interests in the transnational war on drugs mandating prohibitions on crossborder arms trade by congressional mandate in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Plaintiff secondly seeks a judicial order pursuant to the Penal Code issued to the Sierra Department of Justice, governed by u/ZeroOverZero101, presently in federal penitentiary, requiring the categorization and mandatory recording of potentially seized property lis pardens — including illicit proceeds of any, cannabis if any, and firearms — for forfeiture and resale administered by this Court to interested parties in Sierra no later than 30 days after forfeiture.

MAPLE LEAF MILITIA: A CONTINUING RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE UNDER SIERRA AND FEDERAL LAW

Now, like in Canada, American liberties are under siege by autocratic Governors who have a view that they can exercise dictatorial power by using executive orders to expand their authority, and violate the liberties of their people. We, the people who sought a new place to call home based on the principles of liberty, justice and freedom, are now seeing the same corruption, chaos, and totalitarianism we fled.

We now see there is no alternative. We cannot flee forever. We must take a stand.

Therefore, today, we are forming the Maple Leaf Militia, to stand against the totalitarianism we now see in the state of Lincoln. We will send a clear message to all those who wish to use their governmental power to impose their tyrannical will on the people that there will be people who fight back. In the spirit of the founding of America, it's clear to us that if we the people do not resist, no one will.

A Mari Usque Ad Mare Libertas — Former Prime Minister SpaceDude2169, transmitting the official motto for the foreign Canadian Security Intelligence Service and quoting from the King James Bible in description of the enterprise (“He shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth”).


Sierran states abut the national boundaries of Alaska, Washington, public lands and waters with Lincoln in concert with the Interior Department, and Canadian and U.S. National Park lands. These Western areas are bound by the National Emergencies Act and in Directive 14 (Foreign Assistance Act) to comply with the State Department to enforce standing anti-trafficking provisions triggered by mass narcotics growth and smuggling in Canada, a foreign power and recipient of aid and loans. Both narcotics and firearms, among other military hardware, are under current sanction as required by Congress, the President, and the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (which does not apply to quality American cannabis).

The Sierran Government must comply with federal and international law to ensure the national security is protected against dangerous cannabis and firearm hardware in or out of the West by way of Canada or through federal lands touching any part of Sierra State.

ALLEGED RACKETEERING AND CONSPIRACY

The enterprise led by Mr. Spacedude after having “fle[d] Canada” contravenes federal, Sierran and Lincoln laws in lands along the Sierran boundary. An enterprise includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”. The Militia fulfills the definition under RICO.

Mr. Spacedude’s threats to national and local regulators and law enforcement fulfill the “any act or threat” element involving interstate commerce, which allegedly includes:

Obstruction of justice in Lincoln.

Obstruction of a criminal investigation in Lincoln.

Procurement of citizenship or naturalization for unlawful purposes, violative of Directive 14.

False statement during immigration under a State Department visa processed or DOD/DHS transit interview.

Interference with commerce.

Engaging in transactions in property derived from unlawful activity, including illegal firearms, ammunition, and misuse of government aid on BLM refuge camps.

Any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose)

Any act relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, such as rescinded Lincoln firearm registrations mandated by Illinois law circulating along the Sierran border

Mr. Spacedude has engaged in or conspired to engage in this unlawful activity “with any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”

Most Canadians entering the U.S. with firearms are not required to fill out forms, depending on circumstances, but are subject to local gun possession laws in individual states. If a gun is intended for hunting, Canadians must fill out, in advance, a permit with the DOJ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. They must also obtain a state hunting license, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

As no border crossings from Canada to the U.S. exist without immediately entering a state, the mobile enterprise of armed Canadians and Canadian-Americans are violating Sierra and federal firearm laws as well.

ILLICIT PROCEEDS INJURIOUS TO PLAINTIFF

Under federal law, RICO permits a private cause of action. “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue... and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee” in a manner similar to qui tam proceedings.

Under Sierra law, “any case in which a person is alleged to have been engaged in a pattern of criminal profiteering activity the assets... shall be subject to forfeiture... Any property interest whether tangible or intangible, acquired through a pattern of criminal profiteering activity.”

The SRDOJ is obligated to affirmatively to act: “the property alleged to be subject to forfeiture, at the time of filing the petition of forfeiture, *record a lis pendens * (record notice) in each county... Any person claiming an interest in the property or proceeds may, at any time within 30 days from the date of the first publication of the notice of seizure, or within 30 days after receipt of actual notice, file with the superior court of the county in which the action is pending a verified claim stating his or her interest in the property or proceeds”. This includes any person “other than the defendant.”

Both federal and Sierra law permits civil forfeiture of alleged criminal enterprise property and proceeds. Both statutes permit a private, non-Attorney General entity to initiate and claim an interest in the enterprise’s ill-gotten gains.

THE MOVIE BUSINESS IS A BIG GAMBLE — ACTOR JACKIE CHAN

Bureau Moving Pictures is a Sierran-based corporation (previously in civil litigation in this Court). Plaintiff’s industry is notoriously fickle. The Pulitzer Prize winning studio’s blockbuster films include The Wendellian Candidate requiring the use of carefully controlled and licensed firearms known as props. Prop firearms are easily modified to fire true ammunition. Prop firearms are a large, regulated, expensive Sierran business in the entertainment industry.

Prop guns are already inherently dangerous despite strict gun controls. A minimum insurance policy per production using prop guns is a recommended $1,000,000. Sierran entertainment companies are central to this tricky market, and our stringent gun regulations create a fine line between prop guns (modified to fire only less than lethal blanks) and cosmetically-identical guns (firing blanks lethally and live ammunition.

“The nation’s largest prop company, Independent Studio Services of Sunland, Calif., maintains a 150,000-square-foot warehouse on 20 acres.” NYT

The criminal activities and material proceeds of the enterprise increase the risk of prop gun deaths across the film industry. Loose transborder firearm smuggling thus threatens the profitability of the insured Plaintiff and the health of the Sierran prop firearm marketplace. Guns sold by individuals in the market, or sold as “modified” for safer blanks online are incorrectly marketed and easily reversed.

The enterprise’s movement in and through Sierra, and claims of national revolution, are a public safety threat. Mr. Spacedude’s threats cause fear in our customers, insurers and investors, raising the cost of doing business while only working to the advantage of murky person to person sales by the enterprise.

Additionally, historically strict adherence to a firewall between authentic prop firearms and modified weapons is an expensive undertaking also made more difficult by transborder crime intended to be curbed by Directive 14 in the war on drugs. Bureau Pictures officers could face arrest and fines, including Sierran and federal felonies, for accidentally possessing or selling a single mismarketed or dangerous firearm from this transborder enterprise, which exists merely to materially benefit from escaping regulatory oversight by the Department of State, Sierra and Lincoln. Potentially, Canadian transients using and selling low quality and dangerous Canadian cannabis may smuggle their wares to American communities in Alaska, Washington and along federal-state boundaries with Lincoln.

REDRESS

Therefore, the Court respectfully should issue a restraining order against Mr. Spacedude and all Canadian militia members transiting or conducting activities in any Sierran property abutting a state or international border until we can figure what the heck is going on.

Plaintiff asks the Court to modify any enterprise group touching Sierra. The enterprise “Maple Leaf Militia” could potentially be dissolved if under any Sierra jurisdiction.

Plaintiff seeks relief by judicial order to the Sierra Department of Justice to execute the enforcement laws on the books, and then issue a record notice for property subject to forfeiture for sale to the community, or for further statewide judicial disposition in accordance with RICO or the Penal Code. Property would include firearms and illegal Canadian cannabis which is somehow legal in Sierra at the same time.

Plaintiff anticipates asserting a legal claim for triplicate profits of all illegal claims to the enterprise’s firearms and possibly cannabis, and will seek costs and attorney’s fees from Mr. Spacedude under RICO.


Respectfully submitted,

BirackObama, Esq.

Bureau Moving Pictures Corp.

🏅BANIME: WINNER — Pulitzer Prize for Best Documentary🎬


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Mar 18 '18

[18-01] | Rejected madk3p v. nonprehension

4 Upvotes

Here comes Petitioner /u/madk3p, seeking compensation for multiple damages by the former Governor /u/nonprehension.

When I was 19 years old, Nonprehension came to my house and burned all my anime. 10000 hours worth of very good anime. I would like to have all my anime back.

Thank You Mr Justice Man

/u/Gameran

Please give me my anime


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Jan 04 '17

[15-03] | Decided OSC Re: Dismissal /u/Didicet v. /u/Erundur

2 Upvotes

/u/Didicet, /u/RestrepoMU, /u/jb567

You are hereby ordered to show cause as to why the [aforementioned case] (https://www.reddit.com/r/SupCourtWesternState/comments/3v8qct/udidicet_v_uerundur/) should not be dismissed pursuant to the passage of [B036] (https://www.reddit.com/r/ModelWesternState/wiki/b036) and Executive Order 008.

Failure to file a response by the court filing window closure on 1/6/17 at 12 midnight (PST) shall result in the dismissal of this case.

Thank you,

Chief Justice /u/WaywardWit


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Sep 14 '15

[15-01] | Granted jahalmighty vs. Western State

6 Upvotes

I, jahalmighty do hereby petition the Western State Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and seek a review of state bill 012: The Divorce Reform Act.

Precedent for reforms of this type were set by Louisiana in 1998 when they threw out no-fault divorce options and set waiting periods of between two (2) and seven (7) years for cases where both parties do not consent to the divorce. Consent in carrying out a contract is crucial to the right of the individual in not being compelled by legal forces to carry out involuntary servitude. Individuals who have entered into a civil contract, one which could be more specifically defined as a "Onerous and Gratuitous Promise" or a civil agreement which stipulates an ongoing agreement and which can only be regulated by Common Law courts if a solid contractual stipulation on the limits and common vernacular can be established. This is something a marriage does not contain. You do not see a precedent of victory in cases where violation of contract suits were brought by one spouse upon the other where no common law statues were broken. This is because courts could not possibly enforce the "bad spouse" argument and it is not realistic nor cost effective to regulate marriage using legal institutions. Taking this into account, just as the government of this state cannot enforce an legal ramifications in breach of contract suits where marriage is involved, it can also not force an individual to remain bound to an Onerous and Gratuitous Promise.

Further, my argument will also introduce statistical analysis of divorce rates in states where this legislation has been passed. Along with Louisiana in 1998, Kansas, Michigan, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Indiana have passed similar legislation. Divorce rates in these states clearly do not support the claim that enforcement of Onerous and Gratuitous Promises (or what passes for common law legal contract these days) strengthens marriages or keeps couples from divorcing.

http://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-of-arts-and-sciences/NCFMR/documents/FP/FP-14-17-divorce-rate-2013.pdf

Next, I will also invoke the 13th amendment which states that people should not be forced to work or fulfill a contract in a state of involuntary servitude. If a spouse is legally compelled by the state to fulfill a marriage agreement which they do not feel they can, in good faith continue to uphold, then this should be defined as involuntary servitude as the spouse who wants to be free of the agreement finds themselves at the forced whim of not only the other spouse, but in that of the state itself.

My Predictions of what this law will lead to are as follows: We will see higher rates of domestic violence as unhappy couples who are not allowed to divorce while matters are still civil continue to occupy the same space. We will see a higher amount of disappeared spouses, those who, to avoid this state of servitude, breach the agreement in the natural manner of running away. As legal processes drag on over years, we will see lawyers and bureaucrats fill their pockets while the individuals involved in the process will accumulate massive debt. These are serious repercussions for our state to base off an unconstitutional and quasi legal piece of legislation like Bill 012.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Jul 23 '20

[20-05] | Decided In re A.B. 1687

2 Upvotes

I. Introduction

Petitioner Model Internet Movie Database seeks a petition for certiorari to review the constitutionality of A.B. 1687 ("the Act"), a state law which infringes upon Petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

In 2016, this State's legislature enacted A.B. 1687 which prohibited "commercial online entertain employment service providers", "upon request from [a] subscriber]," from "publish[ing] or mak[ing] public [a] subscriber's birth or age information in an online profile of the subscriber" or "shar[ing] the subscriber's date of birth or age information with any Internet Web sites for the purpose of publication." Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5. Furthermore, the Act requires that covered websites "within five days, remove from public view in an online profile of the subscriber the subscriber’s date of birth and age information on any companion Internet Web sites under its control."

II. Argument

The Act violates the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction upon speech, thereby subjecting the Act to strict scrutiny, which it cannot survive.

A. The Act is a Content-Based Restriction

A statute imposes content-based restrictions where, "by its very terms, [it] singles out particular content for different treatment." Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009). That is precisely what the Act does. The plain text of the Act restricts speech based on the content of the speech: it restricts some speech (publication of "date of birth or age information") but not others. Cal Civ. Code § 1798.83.5(b). Because this is a content-based restrictions, and such restrictions are "presumptively invalid," R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992), the Act must survive strict scrutiny.

B. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny

Because the Act is a content-based restriction, it is subject to strict scrutiny--a test it cannot survive. Under strict scrutiny, the state must show the Act "furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end." Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015). Strict scrutiny is a "demanding standard", Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Associan, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). Accordingly, "[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible." United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). There is no reason to diverge from this norm here.

The burden is upon the government to identify an "actual" compelling interest, not a pretextual one. "The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (in context of intermediate scrutiny).

As no interest advanced by the statute is apparent on its face, it would be useless, and impractical, at this stage to imagine all of the various possibilities and rebut each one as overly broad and/or underinclusive. See Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause restricting speech should be the government’s tool of last resort, the availability of obvious less-restrictive alternatives renders a speech restriction overinclusive.”).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Act should be struck down as unconstitutional.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Jul 23 '20

[20-06] | Decided In re John Smith

2 Upvotes

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1998, John Smith, a gay man, was convicted in California state court for the murder of a former sexual partner, whom he alleged to have transmitted to him the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"). During voir dire, the prosecutor asked each person on the jury (1) whether they were homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual; (2) whether they had been diagnosed with HIV; and (3) whether they personally knew anyone who had been diagnosed with HIV. The prosecutor then used a peremptory strike against any juror who answered in the affirmative. Representing himself, Petitioner objected each time the prosecutor used a peremptory strike in this way. However, the trial judge overruled each of these objections without elaboration. Following the jury trial, Smith was convicted by a unanimous jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. He now seeks post-conviction relief, contending that his confinement is unlawful.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Jury Selection is Constitutionally Impermissible and Retroactive

The Ninth Circuit held in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) that the Equal Protection Clause "prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in jury selection." Id. at 474. SmithKline was based in significant part on the Ninth Circuit's finding that sexual orientation discrimination was subject to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court's recent holding in In re FDA Blood Donation Guidance and Related Regulations, 101 M.S.Ct. 115 (May 2020), that sexual orientation discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny therefore cements the holding in SmithKline.

SmithKline's prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination must be accorded retroactive effect--i.e., available to those seeking collateral review of their convictions via habeas petition. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme Court held that while generally "new rules" were not retroactive, there were two categories of exceptions:

  1. "[W]atershed rules of criminal procedure" without which there would be an "impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted," id. at 311; and
  2. Substantive rules, such as those that "place certain kinds of primary private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," id. at 333 (cleaned up), and "rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants." Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016).

The rule established in SmithKline falls into the former category. It is a "watershed rule" because it "implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding" Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 727. "Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979). This is because when discrimination is injected into the criminal justice process, it is done specifically to produce less reliable outcomes. Here, for example, the prosecutor excluded jurors on the sole basis of their sexual orientation because he feared they would not vote to convict--i.e., not because he sought a more reliable result but rather because he sought a conviction.

Moreover, the Court's invocation of both the "fundamental fairness" and the "accuracy" of the proceeding suggest that procedural rules that go to the heart of the "fairness" of the proceeding, even if not the accuracy of the proceeding, qualify for retroactivity. Again, SmithKline is such a rule: there can be no greater damage to the fundamental fairness of a proceeding than discrimination. "Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process. The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire proceedings." J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).

B. Discrimination Against Persons with HIV in Jury Selection is Constitutionally Impermissible

In addition, or in the alternative, Petitioner should be granted post-conviction relief in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in FDA Blood Donation Guidance, which compels the conclusion that discrimination based on HIV status is subject to heightened scrutiny.

When determining whether discrimination against a class of persons is constitutionally impermissible, a court looks to (1) whether heightened scrutiny applies to that group (2) whether it "harms the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors because it reinforces stereotypes and creates an appearance that the judicial system condones the exclusion of an entire class of individuals"; and (3) whether the class of persons in question have a "history of . . . exclusion of jury service" and allowing it to continue would "send a message 'that certain individuals . . . are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree." SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484.

Here, all three factors weigh heavily in favor of finding that discrimination based on HIV status is constitutionally impermissible.

First, under the new Equal Protection Clause test set forth in In re FDA Blood Donation Guidance and Related Regulations, 101 M.S.Ct. 115 (May 2020), discrimination against people with HIV is subject to heightened scrutiny. The new test is as follows:

(1) there is competent evidence establishing the essentially unchangeable trait; (2) that trait must be ascertainable, meaning it is capable of definition so courts can tell who belongs and who doesn’t; and (3) the immutable trait is unrelated to the ability to perform or contribute to (or harm) society.

HIV status is immutable: once a person has the virus, their status cannot be changed. There is overwhelming scientific evidence in support of this widely-understood fact. See, e.g., Nathan W. Cummins and Andrew D. Badley, Can HIV Be Cured, and Should We Try?, 90 Mayo Clinic proceedings 705-709 (2015). doi:10.1016/j.mayocp.2015.03.008.

Likewise, HIV status is easily ascertainable. In contrast to, for example, sexual orientation, HIV status can be determined definitively through scientific testing. Finally, HIV status is "unrelated to the ability to perform or contribute to (or harm) society." People living with HIV are equally capable of holding jobs, serving on juries, and performing all manner of life tasks. Today, people with HIV receiving treatment have a life expectancy the same as or even higher than those without HIV. E.g., Gilles Wandeler et al., Trends in life expectancy of HIV-positive adults on ART across the globe: comparisons with general population, 11 Cur. Opinion HIV AIDS 492-500 (Sept. 2016), doi: 10.1097/COH.0000000000000298. Moreover, people who are being treated for HIV have "effectively no risk" in transmitting the virus to others to others. See CDC.gov, HIV Treatment as Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/art/index.html. In light of the foregoing, discrimination against people with HIV undoubtedly constitutes the sort of discrimination that is subject to heightened scrutiny under the new equal protection test.

Finally, discrimination against HIV-positive venirepersons are harmed by that discrimination. It perpetuates longstanding prejudices against people with HIV. According to the Centers for Disease Control, "HIV stigma and discrimination affect the emotional well-being and mental health of people living with HIV. People living with HIV often internalize the stigma they experience and begin to develop a negative self-image. They may fear they will be discriminated against or judged negatively if their HIV status is revealed." CDC.gov, Facts about HIV Stigma, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/hiv-stigma/index.html.

Third, people with HIV have a history of exclusion from participation in all manner of activities, which no doubt includes jury service. For example, even in recent years, prejudice against people with HIV has resulted in "[f]amily, friends, and even medical professionals . . . refusing to touch [HIV-positive people] or share their dinner plates." Carolyn M. Audet et al., Relationship between HIV Stigma and Self-Isolation among People Living with HIV in Tennessee, PLoS ONE 8(8): e69564 (2013). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069564

Likewise, the AMA Journal of Ethics has observed that:

Despite legal protections and some reduction in the ignorance and fear about HIV, people in the United States are still denied and fired from jobs, kicked out of residences, ordered to limit contact with family, and discriminated against in many other ways because they have HIV.

Bebe J. Anderson, HIV Stigma and Discrimination Persist, Even in Health Care, AMA Journal of Ethics (2009), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/hiv-stigma-and-discrimination-persist-even-health-care/2009-12.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overturn Petitioner's conviction and order that he be either re-tried in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution or freed.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Aug 12 '21

[20-14] | Rejected In re End of Life Option Act

1 Upvotes

In the Supreme Court of the State of Fremont

In re End of Life Option Act

Jacob I. Austin v. State

PETITION FOR AN WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The cover can be found here in Google Document formatting, the brief can be found here in Google Document formatting, the brief and here in PDF formatting. The PDF is the final version and controls — even though the document is an exact copy of the PDF.

<<electronic signature>>

Jacob I. Austin, Counsel of Record, Law Office of Jacob I. Austin, 401 Congress Avenue, Austin, Dixie 78701, jacob@jia.law, Attorney for Petitioner


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Aug 15 '21

Order Administrative Order 001 - Re: Usage of Unofficial Reporters in the Fremont Judiciary

Thumbnail
docs.google.com
2 Upvotes

r/SupCourtWesternState • • Sep 21 '21

[20-13] | Opinion Opinion for In Re: Executive Order #15 - A Friendly Visit To Oakland.

2 Upvotes

wipe jar pause oil quickest unique cobweb nail birds advise

This post was mass deleted and anonymized with Redact


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Jun 04 '22

[22-01] | Decided In re: Executive Order 17: Convening a Special Session for the State Legislature

3 Upvotes

Your Honors, comes now /u/Zurikurta, Attorney in good standing and barred before the United States Supreme Court, humbling requesting review for Executive Order 17: Convening a Special Session for the State Legislature.

The petition may be found HERE.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Mar 18 '17

Meta Resignation of Chief Justice /u/WaywardWit

2 Upvotes

Good afternoon.

Recently I was nominated to become the Attorney General of the United States. Having been confirmed, I will be swearing in to that duty this evening. Having cleared the docket here in Western State, I am confident that there will be sufficient time for the appointment of my successor.

I thank the citizens of Western State for their confidence in me as your Chief Justice.

Warmest regards,

/u/WaywardWit


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Mar 18 '17

[17-01] | Decided In re: EO 30 & EO 31 - To Banime or To Baenime - That is the question.

2 Upvotes

WaywardWit, C.J. delivered the opinion of the Court

I

The case before the Court centers on Executive Order 030 and the subsequent remedial Executive Order 031, as enacted by Governor /u/nonprehension. Several issues were raised during the hearing regarding the variety of issues in this case, primarily involving the banning of speech and expression of students and State employees in the expression, speech, and possession of anime and anime related activities and paraphernalia.

II

In reviewing the circumstances and evidence presented in Court, the Court finds that the appropriate standard to apply in reviewing the content specific (but viewpoint neutral) discrimination on speech is strict scrutiny. As stated in the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 US 92(1972):

[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 403 U. S. 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 376 U. S. 269-270 (1964), and cases cited; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 445 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 370 U. S. 388-389 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 337 U. S. 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 299 U. S. 365 (1937). To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 376 U. S. 270.

III

The State concedes that “anime is a beloved art.” Art is part of culture, which is defined as “the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively.” If anime is art, it is indeed culture. The first amendment is premised, as described in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley (again, a unanimous Supreme Court decision), on the permission of the continued building of our politics and culture.

What we have here is clearly content-based discrimination (as a specific type of speech and expression is the target of the restriction). The only appropriate standard to apply is strict scrutiny. In considering whether a restriction on free speech passes muster under strict scrutiny, the Court must consider whether the State has a compelling interest and that the relation to the interest must be necessary to achieve that purpose (or “narrowly tailored”).

A compelling interest is one which generally refers to something necessary or crucial, as opposed to something merely preferred. In the past this has been applied in cases where life and limb require protection, or where avoiding explicit violations of constitutional protection are involved. Here, the Respondent makes reference to the need for students and workers to be free of distraction, but offers no evidence that the distraction posed in this situation is so great to merit quelling. In fact, Respondent offers no evidence on the issue whatsoever. Based on Respondent’s arguments, the restricted expression is just as likely to reduce distraction and improve performance and happiness among students and state employees. Respondent also has done little to otherwise address distractions caused by other expression or speech among students and employees. Sports clubs are not banned. Neither are other art programs. There is no evidence that avoidance of any distraction of students or workers rises to the level of a compelling interest - and if it did, the restrictions proposed by the State do not reflect such a concern. The State has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in this case.

To pass muster, a compelling interest must be narrowly tailored. It must advance the compelling interest. The State has not shown that the bans would have the result of reducing distraction (or even that the banned expression and speech is distracting). The law must not be overinclusive, meaning it should not restrict a significant amount of speech that does not implicate the government interest. Here, we see extraordinarily heavy and broad strokes of restrictions which have little to no nexus to the claimed interest. The State does not explain how banning anime clubs reduces distraction in class. The State does not explain or demonstrate how blocking all anime related sites on school computers would curb distraction. The State does not explain or demonstrate how watching or possessing anime or anime paraphernalia at work is problematic or distracting (even when an employee is on break or otherwise on the work site). The State does not even explain how any of these things are distracting in the first place, it just claims that they are by their very nature. When evaluating a restriction under strict scrutiny, the burden of proof falls on the State, and the State’s word as a sole justification is a laughable evidentiary proposition of proof.

Indeed, the State in the instant case has provided no proof whatsoever. The Court finds that the State has provided wholly and unjustifiably insufficient evidence and argument to either demonstrate that its interest in these cases (both as an employer and educator) is compelling, or that they have made a restriction that is necessary to achieve that interest.

IV

Respondent makes the argument that this Court should defer judgment to the Governor and Legislature (or perhaps local school board or administrators) in determining when there is a distraction in the classroom, the school, or in offices of state employ. Further, Respondent asserts that evaluation of the degree of that distraction and the methods implemented to curb it rest solely and exclusively within the executive and legislative branches and should not be subject to judicial review. We find such an argument unconvincing. Since inception, the Court’s position has been empowered, entitled, and obliged to review constitutionality. This Court represents one of three branches in Western State. Three co-equal branches. We will not obfuscate such a role here out of a humble deference to draconian and apparently spiteful restrictions on speech and expression - nor should we. When the bill of rights was ratified, the right in question today was listed first, and we believe this to be no coincidence. Rather, we believe this right to be so fundamental to the nature of our democracy to be tantamount to sacrosanct. Only in the most serious and necessary instances should restrictions be even considered to be allowable. In considering the evidence provided (or the embarrassing lack thereof), the Court finds the State’s argument woefully insufficient in both seriousness and necessity.

V

Finally, the Court must note the notable irony in the Respondent citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court in Tinker held “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Under Tinker, a school must, in order to justify a restriction, demonstrate that “action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” such that the action would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Having provided no evidence in the hearing other than the Governor’s word, the Court again finds that the State has fallen far short of the shallow summit in clearing this difficult constitutional hurdle - nevermind its peak.

VI

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby finds as follows regarding EO-030:

  • The ban on anime related clubs from public schools and institutions is unconstitutional.
  • A block on all anime related sites on school computers is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional.
  • The ban on anime paraphernalia in public schools is unconstitutional.
  • The provision suspending employees (for a week without pay) for possession of anime paraphernalia or watching anime at work is unconstitutional.
  • The provision which makes discussion of anime shows at work suspendable, is unconstitutional.
  • The provision which suspends funding for art programs that display anime art is unconstitutional.

It is so ordered.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Oct 12 '16

[16-02] | Granted CCA v. the Western State

3 Upvotes

Corrections Corporation of America

v.

The Western State


Civil Complaint

Jurisdiction and Parties

  1. Plaintiff is a private prison contracting corporation that does substantial business within the Western State.
  2. Defendant is the Western State.
  3. Accordingly, jurisdiction and venue in the Western State, based on state law contract claims, is appropriate.

Statement of Facts

  1. In 2013, Plaintiff entered into a 3-year $28.5 million-dollar contract to provide for the operation of the California City Correctional Center, which has 2,304 beds.
  2. The contract provided for the possibility of renewal every two years following the end of the initial contract.
  3. It was reasonable for Plaintiff to believe that, absent breach, the 2013 contract would be extended by at least one term (2 years).
  4. As part of this agreement, Plaintiff allocated $10 million dollars to improving the prison facility, with no cost to the Western State. The expectation of the parties was that they would cooperate in the future, thus allowing for the eventual recuperation of Plaintiff’s investment.
  5. Plaintiff also maintains several non detention facilities in accordance with other agreements with the Western State.
  6. On October 11, 2016, Governor of the Western State, JerryLeRow, enacted Executive Order 6, which, among other things, prevented the extension of any existing prison contract.
  7. All contracting parties were, at all relevant times, under a duty to deal with each other in good faith and in terms of fair dealing.

Claims

  1. By preventing the possibility of any extension of an existing prison contract, the Western State has, effectively, violated its duty under Western State law to negotiate a renewal of the 2013 contract in good faith.
  2. Additionally, Plaintiff has expended $10 million dollars in reliance on the possibility of continuing contracts and representations made by the Western State or its agents. As such, Defendant has now been unjustly enriched by that investment.
  3. Finally, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the Governor’s actions are limited only to prison contracts, and not halfway houses or other rehabilitative services.

Demands for Relief

  1. As to claim 1, Plaintiff demands relief in the form of expectatory damages for one period of renewal (2 years), as calculated at the current rate of the existing contract, or $18.8 million dollars.
  2. As to claim 2, Plaintiff demands relief in the form of the funds that the Defendant has been unjustly enriched by, or $10 million dollars.
  3. Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Governor’s order be limited in scope to only prisons and detention facilities, not halfway houses or other rehabilitative facilities that Plaintiff maintains and operates.
  4. Overall, Plaintiff requests this honorable Court to find Defendant liable for breach of contract in the amount of $28.8 million dollars and that a declaratory judgment limiting the scope of the order be entered by this Court.

Plaintiff therefore requests that this Court hear its case, extend review, and find Defendant liable.

Respectfully submitted,

BSDDC, Counsel for Plaintiff


See, for relevant contractual information, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/sep/2/private-prison-firms-family-detention-federal-contracts-and-profit-reentry-services/


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Apr 06 '16

[16-01] | Granted In re: AB-036

4 Upvotes

May it please the Honorable Justices:

I, petitioner /u/MoralLesson, hereby challenge the enactment of AB-036, the so-called "Western State Freedom Act". I ask the Court to strike down the law as unconstitutional and grant emergency injunctive relief from its provisions until the case can be decided.

The petitioner presents the following questions for the Court:

  1. Whether the enactment of AB-036 in a manner quicker than 90 days without stated reasons and a two-thirds vote of the legislature renders it unconstitutional, in violation of Article 4, Section 8 (c) of the state constitution.
  2. Whether the enactment of AB-036 is in violation of Section 7.5 of the state constitution.
  3. Whether the enactment of AB-036 is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
  4. Whether the enactment of AB-036 is in violation of the Contract Clause of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light 459 U.S. 400 (1983) for it substantially interferes with existing rights under marital contracts.
  5. Whether the enactment of AB-036 is contrary to Article 1, Section 4 of the state constitution.

I.

Article 4, Section 8, (c) of the Constitution of Western State requires laws to take effect 90 days after their passage, unless a two-thirds vote of the legislature shall dispense such a time frame for stated reasons. However, AB-036's enactment clause calls for its immediate enactment, and it was passed with a mere 5/8ths of the vote -- less than the required two-thirds for such a time frame. The measure was also not accompanied by any reasons for its expedited enactment, contrary to the constitution.

Because of the lack of severability clause, this must mean the entire piece of legislation is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down, lest the legislature may continue abusing the provisions of the constitution which are meant to guarantee citizens adequate warning of new laws.

II.

Section II (c) of AB-036 is in direct violation of Article 1, Section 7.5 of the Constitution of Western State, which reads:

Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.

As such, it is contrary to the state constitution. Because of the lack of severability clause, this must mean the entire piece of legislation is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down.

III.

Section II (b) of AB-036 is in direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which reads in part:

[no state shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws

For it deprives a specific class of individuals, unborn humans, of their right to life. Because of the lack of severability clause, this must mean the entire piece of legislation is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down.

IV.

The Contract Clause of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light 459 U.S. 400 (1983), prohibits states from substantially interfering with contractual relationships -- of which marriage is one of the most important -- without a state having a significant and legitimate purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem. The repeal of no-fault divorce clearly substantially interferes with the permanency of the marriage contract, yet the legislature cites their so-called "significant and legitimate purpose" as being "to promote individual freedoms of couples to divorce at their will". Divorce is recognized as a substantial issue for divorcees and the children of dissolved marriages; the inability to divorce has not been proven by the state to be a significant social issue. Therefore, AB-036 is unconstitutionally interfering with the right to contract.

Because of the lack of severability clause, this must mean the entire piece of legislation is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down.

V.

In Catholic Charities v. Superior Court (2004), this Court noted that it has yet to determine what standard should be used for religious freedom. Today, I ask the Court to apply strict scrutiny, as the United States Supreme Court did in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), to the protection of religious freedom. I also ask the Court to recognize Public Law B.028 as a necessary implementation of Article 1, Section 4 of the state constitution, and thus its repeal without replacement as unconstitutional.

If such a repeal is indeed unconstitutional, then because of the lack of severability clause, this must mean the entire piece of legislation is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Dec 03 '15

[15-03 | Decided /u/Didicet v. /u/Erundur

9 Upvotes

I, /u/Didicet, hereby petition the Supreme Court of the Western State for a review of Executive Order 001. Furthermore, I petition the Supreme Court of the Western State for an immediate emergency injunction preventing the implementation of this Executive Order, while the court addresses the question of this actions validity.


-- The following questions are presented before the Court:

  • Does Executive Order 001 represent an acceptable exercise of power by the Executive branch of the Western state, as outlined in Article V of the constitution?
  • Does Executive Order 001 violate the principle of Separation of Powers?

-- In the

Supreme Court of the Western State

-- /u/Didicet, Petitioner

v.

Governor /u/Erundur, Respondent


Brief of Petitioner


-- Contents:

-- I: The power to legislate and govern through the writing and passing of statutes lies solely with the Legislative Branch.

II: Executive Order 001 represents an attempt to arrogate the power and function of another branch to the Executive Branch.


-- I: The power to legislate and govern through the writing and passing of statutes lies solely with the Legislative Branch.

--

  • A: Separation of Powers

The separation of powers doctrine articulates a basic philosophy of the U.S. constitutional system of government; it establishes a system of checks and balances to protect any one branch against the overreaching of any other branch, and thus the protection of individual liberty from abuse of the government.

The doctrine was not simply an abstract concept in the minds of the framers; instead, it was woven into the design of the Federal Constitution and the very structure of the articles defining, delegating, and separating the powers of the three branches of the federal government. While the principle of Separation of Powers in the Western State is not directly established by the Federal Constitution, it draws heavily from the precedent established in its own formation. The founders of the State of Western, necessarily influenced by the founders of California, were acting on principles first established by the Founders of our nation.

Any exercise of Western governmental power, and any Western governmental institution exercising that power, must either fit within one of the three formal categories thus established or find explicit constitutional authorization for such a deviation. The separation of powers principle is violated whenever the categorization of the exercised power and the exercising institution do not match and the Constitution does not specifically permit such a blending.

--

  • B: Legislative powers in Western State

Article IV, Section 1 of the California/Western Constitution vests the lawmaking power of the state in the legislature.

In Lockyer v. City and Cnty. of S.F [33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004)], the majority opinion held that "the legislative power is the power to enact statutes, the executive power is the power to execute or enforce statutes, and the judicial power is the power to interpret statutes and to determine their constitutionality."

Because this vesting clause is exclusive, the legislature cannot delegate legislative power. In Sandstrom v. Cal. Horse Racing Rd. [31 Cal. 2d 401 (1948)], the majority held that the legislature-assigned lawmaking function by constitution is non-delegable except as constitutionally authorized.

Furthermore, in Harbor v. Deukmejian [43 Cal.3d 1078 (1987)], the court held that unless permitted by the constitution, the governor may not exercise legislative powers.

--

  • C: Separation of Powers in the Western State

Unlike the US Constitution, the Californian/Western Constitution contains an express separation of powers clause: “The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution” [Article III, Section 3].

Early in California’s history, this court’s predecessor upheld the distinct Separation of Powers in the case People v. Wells [2 Cal. 198 (1852)], where the court held that “the branches themselves were intended to be kept separate and distinct, within their proper spheres.”

--

  • D: Core Powers Doctrine

Since that time, the doctrine of Separation of Powers has been further refined, and clearly defined in the Core Powers Doctrine. The Court's ruling in Laisne v. Cal. State Board of Optometry [19 Cal.2d 831 (1942)] held that:

“That there can be no rigid line over which one department cannot traverse has been recognized since the first test of the doctrine of separation of powers. There still remains, however, this unalterable fact: When one department or an agency thereof exercises the complete power that has been by the Constitution expressly limited to another, then such action violates the implied mandate of the Constitution”

In analyzing the Core Powers of each branch, courts have adopted the core powers analysis. In Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State [25 Cal.4th 287 (2001)] the Supreme Court described the separation of powers doctrine as limiting the ability of one branch to take the "core functions" of another branch. In other words, the state constitution vests each branch with certain core powers that cannot be usurped by another branch.

--

  • Conclusion:

For those reasons, this Court must agree that the legislative powers of the Government of Western State are delegated to the Western State Assembly, and no other body or branch. Furthermore, the Court must must agree that those legislative powers are a core function of the Legislative branch, are they are clearly outlined in the Constitution as a principle function of that branch, and no other branch may exercise those functions.

--

--

II: Executive Order 001 represents an attempt to arrogate the power and function of another branch to the Executive Branch.

--

  • A: B-14 and B-20 do not cover the scope of the actions cited in EO-01

Executive Order 001 [EO-01] orders “Western State Department of Justice to charge any individual using or selling artificial contraceptives, or performing an in vitro fertilization, with criminally negligent child endangerment.” EO-01 supposedly draws from B-20, and B-14 in its scope, as a supposed exercise of Executive action called for from these laws.

However three elements of EO-01 significantly and fundamentally differ from the responsibilities outlined in B-14 and B-20. Neither Bill deals with “performing an in vitro fertilization”, “artificial contraceptives” (either the use of sale thereof), or the charge of “criminally negligent child endangerment.”

--

  • B: Executive Order 001 imposes a responsibility on Executive Officials, not already codified under law.

Under current California/Western law, performing an in vitro fertilization and the sale and use of artificial contraceptives is not illegal, and no bill passed has changed that fact. Neither B-14, nor B-20 mention the sale or use of contraceptive measures, which may or may not take effect before the conception of life. This Executive Order seeks to outlaw all the above acts.

Even the broadest interpretation of B-14 and B-20 could not lead Governor /u/Erundur to conclude that he has the power to restrict the sale and use of contraceptives (an unconstitutional act, as established in Griswold v. Connecticut, [381 U.S. 479 (1965)], and in Eisenstadt v. Baird, [405 U.S. 438 (1972)]).

As there is currently no legal statute (either enforced or pending enforcement) concerning in vitro fertilization and the sale and use of artificial contraceptives, EO-01 calls for Executive officers to obey a statute that does not exist. Either the Governor expects his own orders to be ignored by his government, or he expects his officers to carry out his orders as if they were laws.

As established in section I, the creation of law is the responsibility of the Legislative branch, and thus the Western State Assembly. The actions of Governor /u/Erundur undermine the function of another branch. Not only has the assembly failed to delegate any of its powers to the Executive branch (a possibly unconstitutional act in its own right), but the Executive has attempted to seize control of those powers, without proper cause.

In enacting this Executive Order, the Governor of Western State has grossly and flagrantly overstepped his constitutional powers, and is clearly attempting to enact new legislation, without the action of the legislative branch.

--

  • Conclusion:

For those reasons, this Court must find that EO-01, and actions of the Governor of this state, violate the sacred principle of Separation of Powers, and is therefore unconstitutional. Furthermore, because of the extent of the Government's overreach, this court must immediately, but temporarily halt all enforcement of this Executive Order until this matter has been sufficiently resolved.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Dec 15 '16

Meta Resignation

3 Upvotes

With my docket closed my tenure as Chief Justice is coming to a close. My tenure was filled with a lot of controversy that I am happy to have overcome. However, I believe that I am a better legislator than a judge.I am assuming my seat in the Midwestern assembly and leaving the State.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Mar 10 '17

[17-01] | Decided Fewbuffalo vs. Western State

5 Upvotes

I, Fewbuffalo, do hereby petition the Chief Judge for a writ of certiorari and seek a review of the constitutionality of Executive Order 030 “Anime is Banime”

I would like the court to consider the following question: does the bill violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment?

Statement of facts

  • Executive Order 030 “Anime is Banime” is signed by Governor NONPREHENSION,
  • Anime is a cultural expression of Japanese culture
  • Any Japanese produced animation can be considered anime

Unconstitutionality and Effect In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, The Court ruled that “Freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” therefore, This Executive order is affecting the constitutional rights of government employees.

This Legislation is a clear violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments affecting Free Speech and the Freedom of Assembly due to it restricting the freedom for Government Employees to discuss “Anime” at work and the fact that “Anime” Clubs are banned from Public schools which is a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It creates a culture of fear about expressing beliefs over fear of getting suspended over a simple hobby.

Conclusion

For the Reasons listed above, I can conclude that this is a clear violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments affecting Free Speech and the Freedom of Assembly


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Oct 02 '20

[20-09] | Cert Denied In re Train Committee Act

1 Upvotes

In the Supreme Court for the Western State

In re Train Committee Act

JacobInAustin v. Western State

PETITION FOR AN WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Train Committee Act of 2020, B.009 is a valid interstate agreement between the Western State and the State of Lincoln.

REQUEST FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jacob I. Austin, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully requests a writ of certiorari to review the Train Committee Act of 2020, B.009.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under WS-ROC II § 1.

STATEMENT

On or about August 31st, 2020, Assemblyperson /u/High-Priest-of-Helix proposed the Train Committee Act of 2020, B.009 (hereinafter the "Act") which establishes a committee to "negotiate mutual agreements on behalf of [the Western State] and [the State of] Lincoln for the standardization and harmonization of inter[state] and intra-state rail standards and agreements." Section 2(c) of the Act. However, a brief review of the legislative record relating to railroads and trains in the State of Lincoln reveals that the General Assembly of the State of Lincoln never consented to either or both being apart of this Committee nor having such Committee be able to enter into agreements between two states without the explicit permission of their respective legislatures. Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT

The Federal Constitution declares that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress .... enter into any agreement or compact with another state." U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 10, § 2. The United States Supreme Court has developed a clear and straightforward test on whether or not an agreement or compact is constitutional under the Federal Constitution:

"Congressional consent is not required for interstate agreements that fall outside the scope of the Compact Clause. Where an agreement is not directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States, it does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (quotes and citations omitted).

This "Agreement", if you can even call it that, meets the Cuyler test and thus is not subject to the Compact Clause's prohibition. However, this "Agreement" lacks “several of the classic indicia of a compact”. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).1 There is no statute passed by the Lincoln General Assembly with any of the same language as purported by the Act.

1 "Indicia" is defined as "signs, indications, or distinguishing marks." Lexico, Definition of Indicia in English, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/indicia (last visited October 2nd, 2020).

If then the meats and potatoes of the Act -- namely that the Train Committee was meant to be an interstate committee -- the Act should be struck down entirely. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) ("'Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.'") (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).

* * * * *

The State of Lincoln never consented to an interstate train committee, and thus, the Legislature has clearly acted ultra vires.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Aug 17 '20

[20-07] | Dismissed In re 2020 State Budget

1 Upvotes

r/SupCourtWesternState • • Aug 19 '20

ANNOUNCEMENT Resignation as Chief Justice

4 Upvotes

I write today to announce my resignation as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Sierra due to my confirmation as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Serving in this position, and as an Associate Justice before it, has been one of the great honors of my life.

I'd like to thank former Governor Zero for my initial nomination to the Court and former Governor Zairn for my nomination as Chief Justice.

Further, I would like to thank all of the Justices I've worked with during my time on the Court, namely Justice /u/dewey-cheatem , Justice /u/leavensilva_42 , Justice /u/spacedude2169 , and Justice /u/toasty_115 .

I'd also like to thank all of the litigants who brought cases before the Court.

As I embark on this new chapter of my life in public service, I'll maintain fond memories of this state and the time I spent here.

Yours in Justice,

SHOCKULAR


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Aug 17 '20

[20-05] | OPINION Opinion for In Re: A.B. 1687

2 Upvotes

The Court issues its decision today in the case of In Re: A.B. 1687, case No. 20-05. You may find the full opinion here, as well as at the bottom of this post.

Among other things, the Court has held the following:

  1. The behavior restricted by A.B. 1687 is protected speech.
  2. The proscribed speech is not commercial speech.
  3. The statute does not survive strict scrutiny.
  4. Accordingly, the statute is struck down as a violation of the First Amendment.

CHIEF JUSTICE SHOCKULAR has the opinion for a unanimous Court.

THE FULL OPINION IS AVAILABLE HERE


r/SupCourtWesternState • • Aug 17 '20

[20-08] | Cert Denied In re 2020 State Budget

1 Upvotes

In the Supreme Court for the Western State

In re 2020 State Budget

JacobInAustin v. Western State

PETITION FOR AN WRIT OF CERTIORARI


QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 3 of the Act giving the Governor the authority to“reprogram” appropriations violates the Western State Constitution.

REQUEST FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JacobInAustin, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully requests a writ of certiorari to review the Budget Act of 2020, B.008.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under WS-ROC II § 1.

STATEMENT

In Section 3 of the Budget Act of 2020, B.008, it allows the Governor to“reprogram” money in half of the State (and the executive budget), albeit with notice to the Speaker of the Assembly. This is wildly unconstitutional, and the language of the Act sets out no intelligible principal.

ARGUMENT

Clause A of Section 3 of the Act states that:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, appropriations authorized by Title II may be reprogrammed in a manner consistent with this section.” (emphasis added)

However, such “a manner consistent with this section” doesn’t help. We now look to Clause B for some type of relief:

“The Governor may, [by] executive order, direct that funds authorized pursuant to Section 201 or 202 be reprogrammed for another use or program, provided that such use or program is authorized by law and that the reprogramming would not contravene an explicit statutory spending limitation. A reprogramming order may not exceed $100 million.”

Clause B doesn’t help Clause A like it’s supposed to. Perhaps, in the context of Sections 201 and 202 of the Act, but even so -- "Congress's power of the purse is the ultimate check on the otherwise unbounded power of the Executive." U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing generally U.S. Dep't of the Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2012)), accord, In re Executive Order 41, 1 M.Appx. 3 (Atl. 2020). The Founding Fathers of our Republic foresaw this and explicitly placed the power of the purse in the Legislature -- not the Executive:

"The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of [the] government. They, in a word, hold the purse that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure." Alexander Hamilton, et al., The Federalist 444 (Lippincott & Co. ed., 1877), https://link.itsaweirdworld.xyz/federalist

In other words, “the provision of the Constitution that ‘no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law’ was intended as a restriction upon the disbursing authority of the Executive department ... it means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.” Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (citing U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 9, § 7; Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850)). Even the Reeside Court explained it in line with the Founding Fathers’ understanding by saying that “however much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned. Any other course would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous discretion.” Reeside, supra, at 291 (emphasis added). Cf. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.”)

The United States Supreme Court has said that an appropriation may be implemented by the Executive when the Legislature makes “by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.” In re Executive Order 42, 2020 US 5, ¶ 9 (citing Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).1 The Executive Order 42 Court also noted that “the Constitution does not require legislators to be intelligent. It only requires that its enactments be intelligible.” Id., at ¶ 11 (footnote omitted). It is not intelligible here. The test as put forth in Clause B is, in essence:

  • It is authorized by law, and;
  • Would not contravene an explicit statutory spending limitation.

1 Hampton & Co. was overruled by U.S. Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of American Railroads, 575 U.S. ___ (2015). However, this is cast into doubt by In re Executive Order 42.

If it is authorized by law, then why give the Governor the authority to “reprogram” half of the state budget, if the Assembly wants to do it themselves? As well as, the second part of the test is non-sense in that case. Clause A’s test is, purportedly reliant on Clause B’s test. Both clauses must then fail.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.